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Top photo credit: Palestinian Mohammed Abu Halima, 43, sits in front of his tent with his children in a camp for displaced Palestinians in Gaza City, Gaza, on December 11, 2025. Matrix Images / Mohammed Qita
Four major dynamics in Gaza War that will impact 2026
December 29, 2025
Just ahead of the New Year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is set to visit President Donald Trump in Florida today, no doubt with a wish list for 2026. Already there have been reports that he will ask Trump to help attack Iran’s nuclear program, again.
Meanwhile, despite the media narrative, the war in Gaza is not over, and more specifically, it has not ended in a clear victory for Netanyahu’s IDF forces. Nor has the New Year brought solace to the Palestinians — at least 71,000 have been killed since October 2023. But there have been a number of important dynamics and developments in 2025 that will affect not only Netanyahu’s “asks” but the future of security in Israel and the region.
Here are four major takeaways from 2025 which will no doubt impact all sides of the conflict, including the U.S., in 2026.
Israel’s war on Gaza is continuing in all but name
Following the announcement of Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza in October, which included a ceasefire and hostage/prisoner release, the world breathed a collective sigh of relief. Israel’s apocalyptic assault on Gaza has killed at least 71,000 Palestinians, including some 20,000 children, displaced nearly all of Gaza’s 2.3 million inhabitants, and wiped out most of its infrastructure, including more than 90 percent of its housing stock—a war that a UN Commission of Inquiry, along with a growing chorus of human rights groups and scholars, describe as a genocide.
Since the ceasefire officially went into effect on October 10, however, Israel has continued to carry out deadly airstrikes and other military operations killing more than 400 Palestinians in that time. Despite the ceasefire agreement, Israel continues to restrict humanitarian aid, including shelter materials and other essential items, so children are freezing to death. Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip has been effectively partitioned between an Israeli-controlled eastern zone and a narrow — and ever-shrinking — coastal strip where Hamas still operates and where the vast majority of Gaza’s 2 million residents are concentrated in what is now less than 40% of its territory.
Israel’s systematic destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure has also continued, including the demolition of 1,500 buildings since the start of the ceasefire. In addition to prolonging the suffering of people in Gaza, Israel’s continued attacks and ceasefire violations in Gaza threaten a wider explosion and the eventual collapse of the ceasefire itself. Netanyahu, who only reluctantly signed onto the ceasefire deal, may be trying to bait Hamas into a military response as a pretext for relaunching full-scale war on Gaza. Israel’s assassination of senior Hamas commander Raad Saad on December 13 has further shaken the already precarious truce and raised alarm bells within the administration, with Trump privately worrying that Netanyahu was derailing his peace plan.
The Trump plan risks turning the U.S. into a co-occupier of Gaza
The plan calls for the creation of an international Board of Peace (BoP) to run Gaza’s internal affairs, including future governance and reconstruction, and to be chaired by President Trump, as well as an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to oversee security in the Gaza Strip.
Palestinians, who were not consulted in the plan’s development, are afforded a more limited role in governing Gaza via a technocratic committee that reports directly to the BoP. Meanwhile, the United States and Israel have established a joint civil military coordination center (CMCC), located in southern Israel near the Gaza border, to oversee aid distribution and implementation of the ceasefire in the interim.
In addition, Trump has announced plans to appoint a two-star general to lead the ISF in Gaza. Despite Trump’s pledge not to put boots on the ground, with Americans in control of both the administrative and security arrangements in Gaza, there is a real risk of the U.S. becoming a co-occupier of Gaza alongside Israel. Such a scenario would further erode America’s international standing and could potentially subject U.S. personnel and assets to direct attacks in the region and beyond.The price for supporting Palestine went up in 2025
To be clear, Americans that publicly expressed support for Palestinians’ human rights often paid a price under Biden, from losing jobs to facing physical violence. Yet under Trump, that price rose significantly.
Mahmoud Khalil was one of several activists targeted for deportation solely due to their advocacy for Palestine. Although some have been released, Leqaa Kordia, Ya’akub Vijandre, and others remain in detention. Similar to Biden, the Trump administration has sought to conflate criticism of Israel with antisemitism, but has intensified the resulting legal repercussions: the administration launched an Antisemitism Task Force, froze funding to universities, and carried out politically motivated “civil rights” investigations based on flimsy evidence.
A report produced by the American Association of University Professors and the Middle East Studies Association on the weaponization of civil rights law to repress campus speech stated that “Palestine is less an exception to academic freedom than it is a pretext for erasing the norm altogether.” Yet free speech is more than a norm, it is a Constitutional right enshrined in the First Amendment.
Unfortunately, the administration may soon undermine other fundamental freedoms: following the decisions by Texas and Florida governors to designate the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) a terrorist group — it is a domestic U.S. Muslim civil rights organization — many fear the administration may follow suit, fundamentally attacking the freedom of association. While such efforts have begun by targeting advocates for the rights of Palestinians and Muslims, they are unlikely to end there, with implications for Americans’ most basic liberties.
And yet support for Israel continues to fall
Despite the intensified repression of pro-Palestine speech, combined with concerted efforts by Israel’s supporters to suppress information about the daily horrors inflicted on Gaza, Israel continued to hemorrhage popular support in the U.S. A majority of Americans (53%) held a negative view of Israel as of April.
A poll in August found that 60% of voters disapproved of sending additional military aid to Israel. This shift is especially dramatic on the left, where 7 in 10 Democrats said that Israel has “gone too far” in its military operations in Gaza, yet even a majority of Republicans under age 45 say they would prefer a 2028 presidential candidate who would reduce U.S. security assistance to Israel.
Notably, 39% of American Jews describe Israel’s actions as “genocide.”
Meanwhile, candidates for the 2026 midterms running for both parties have refused to take money from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). This reflects a split in Trump’s coalition, where many are increasingly questioning how his administration can claim the mantle of “America First” when Israel’s preferences clearly dictate U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Despite their best efforts, Israel and its supporters have lost control of the narrative: soon after October 7, American billionaires coordinated with the Netanyahu government to spread pro-Israel messaging. As the carnage in Gaza continued unabated, Israel targeted journalists in an effort to staunch the flow of information. Yet even liberal darlings like Obama speechwriter Sarah Hurwitz acknowledged that when she tries to advocate on behalf of Israel, she is “talking through a wall of dead babies.”
Efforts by billionaires like Larry Ellison to purchase TikTok and by Meta to censor information about Palestine have been unsuccessful, so far, in turning the tide of public opinion.
It seems unlikely that the shattered myth of American and Israeli interests as indistinguishable will re-emerge, at least in full, in 2026.
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Top photo credit: Map of Nigeria (Shutterstock/Juan Alejandro Bernal)
Trump's Christmas Day strikes on Nigeria beg question: Why Sokoto?
December 28, 2025
For the first time since President Trump publicly excoriated Nigeria’s government for allegedly condoning a Christian genocide, Washington made good on its threat of military action on Christmas Day when U.S. forces conducted airstrikes against two alleged major positions of the Islamic State (IS-Sahel) in northwestern Sokoto state.
According to several sources familiar with the operation, the airstrike involved at least 16 GPS-guided munitions launched from the Navy destroyer, USS Paul Ignatius, stationed in the Gulf of Guinea. Debris from unexpended munition consistent with Tomahawk cruise missile components have been recovered in the village of Jabo, Sokoto state, as well nearly 600 miles away in Offa in Kwara state.
No civilian casualties were reported in both areas, although there were damages to buildings in Offa.
It is the first direct U.S. airstrike on Nigeria’s soil — a West African oil-producing giant that Washington has often considered a crucial ally in the turbulent Sahel region. It is also the sixth country, following closely behind Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, where Trump has authorized airstrikes this year alone.
The U.S airstrike came a day after a bomb ripped through a mosque in Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria, leaving at least five people dead and dozens injured. In a post on social media shortly after the airstrike, Trump identified the target as “ISIS Terrorist scum, who have been targeting and viciously killing, primarily, innocent Christians, at levels not seen for many years, and even Centuries!” He concluded by wishing everyone Merry Christmas “including the dead Terrorists.” The U.S. Africa Command (Africom) also said that “multiple Isis terrorists were killed” in strikes on camps in Sokoto.
But days after, there is still no official confirmation by the Nigerian government that any terrorists were killed. Many Nigerians are also asking: Why Sokoto? “The airstrike raises more questions than it resolves”, says Stephen Adewale, a Professor of History at the Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) in Nigeria.
A predominantly Muslim state, Sokoto is far removed from the Middle Belt where Christian communities have suffered the most sustained and large-scale violence in recent years in complex conflicts involving armed groups, criminal gangs, and communal tensions. The state is also far removed from the epicenter of the jihadist insurgency in Borno State in the northeast and the Lake Chad Basin area where the more prominent terrorist groups, Boko Haram (JAS) and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) have built a base. Except for a network of notorious bandit groups that abduct civilians for ransom, Sokoto, whose population in any case is overwhelmingly Muslim, has not experienced the same scale of jihadist violence as other states in the region.
According to Nigeria’s government, foreign ISIS elements have been infiltrating Sokoto State from the Sahel region and, in collaboration with local affiliates, are using locations in the state as assembly and staging grounds to plan and execute large-scale terrorist attacks within Nigerian territory. But the only jihadist group in the state is the little-known Lakurawa, a shadowy Sunni group that came to prominence early this year when Nigeria government designated it a terrorist organization. The group started as a vigilante outfit invited from neighboring Sahel countries by local communities in northwestern Nigeria to protect them from bandits before evolving into a jihadist movement preaching and enforcing strict Islamist rules across villages along the borders of Sokoto and Kebbi States.
Despite U.S and Nigeria’s official statement saying the airstrikes targeted “Islamic state enclaves” in Sokoto State, Lakuruwa’s international affiliation is still an unresolved controversy with some jihadist experts claiming they are Al-Qaeda affiliates and others linking them with IS.
According to a new study by two researchers, James Barnett and Umar Musa, given the fluidity and fractious nature of jihadi alliances in the Sahel, some of the original members of the group may have been affiliated with JNIM in 2017-2018, but “present evidence points to the majority of so-called Lakurawa activity, particularly in Sokoto and northern Kebbi states, as being the work of ISSP militants.”
This has added a fresh layer to the controversy that has dogged U.S. policy in Nigeria since Trump declared last month Nigeria a “Country of Particular Concern” for failing to protect Christians,” and threatened to order U.S. troops into the country “guns-a-blazing.” Trump’s outburst caused a diplomatic row with Nigeria’s government and increased tensions within the country’s 230 million population. Since then, Abuja and Washington had been engaged in frenetic diplomatic talks which has seen delegations from both countries exchange visits and at least two congressional hearings in Washington.
The Christmas day bombing is the first public confirmation that both countries are now working together. According to a statement by Nigeria’s Minister of Information on Friday, December 26, the airstrike was conducted following “explicit approval by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” The statement added that the operation was carried out “with the full involvement of the Armed Forces of Nigeria and under the supervision of the Honorable Ministers of defense, as well as the Chief of defense Staff.”
The operation was also its first test of what is at the moment still a patchy relationship. The key issues of disagreement remain what they have been all along: the religious framing of the country’s conflict and Nigeria’s sensitivity towards its sovereignty even as it welcomes foreign military assistance. Several established groups that monitor the violence argue that Nigeria’s conflict is complex and that they have seen no evidence that Christians are being killed at a greater rate than Muslims.
Yet, the Trump administration’s characterization of the conflict has not changed. This remains a sore point for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who came to power two years ago on a Muslim-Muslim ticket and is struggling to administer a country whose vast population is roughly evenly divided between adherent of both religions.
The simmering dissension has surfaced quickly in the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes. While Trump continued to frame them as part of his mission to protect Nigerian Christians from radical Islamists while promising more, Nigeria has struck a more even tone, insisting that the action is targeted at “terrorist violence in any form whether directed at Christians, Muslims or other communities.”
The day after the airstrike, Nigeria’s foreign minister, Yusuff Tuggar, was asked during an interview what he thought about Trump’s social media post framing the military strike as a defense of Christians, he replied “We’re focusing more on what has been done.” He added that Nigeria’s government is not going to “pore over the forensic details of what was said.”
Notwithstanding the gray areas, the emerging security cooperation between Trump and Tinubu testifies to both countries’ desire to work together to end a security crisis that has implications for the entire region. But what the last 48 hours has demonstrated is that there are underlying challenges that both countries need to work on for cooperation to prosper.
This is more the case now as there are indications that more strikes are likely in the coming days or weeks. Brant Phillip, a security analyst who has been tracking flight patterns of U.S airplanes and UAVs over Nigeria’s sky in the past weeks, reported on X that following a one-day pause, the U.S has resumed Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) flight missions, this time on ISWAP enclaves in the Sambisa forest of Borno state in the northeast of Nigeria.
“Even when undertaken with consent or cooperation, foreign military action that appears misaligned with local realities risks strategic blowback,” Professor Adewale said. “It can undermine state sovereignty, fuel suspicion among local populations, and reinforce perceptions that external actors do not fully understand the societies they intervene in.”
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Top image credit: Voodison328 via shutterstock.com
What use is a mine ban treaty if signers at war change their minds?
December 26, 2025
Earlier this month in Geneva, delegates to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty’s 22nd Meeting of States Parties confronted the most severe crisis in the convention’s nearly three-decade history. That crisis was driven by an unprecedented convergence of coordinated withdrawals by five European states and Ukraine’s attempt to “suspend” its treaty obligations amid an ongoing armed conflict.
What unfolded was not only a test of the resilience of one of the world’s most successful humanitarian disarmament treaties, but also a critical moment for the broader system of international norms designed to protect civilians during and after war. Against a background of heightened tensions resulting from the war in Ukraine and unusual divisions among the traditional convention champions, the countries involved made decisions that will have long-term implications.
A short history of norm erosion
Since its adoption in 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty has symbolized what determined multilateral action can achieve. The treaty’s comprehensive prohibition on antipersonnel (AP) mines and its other comprehensive provisions established a new gold standard for humanitarian disarmament. Its impact is indisputable: millions of mines destroyed, vast areas of land returned to safe use, and countless lives and limbs saved. But the treaty now faces threats on a scale few imagined possible. And because the convention has served as a model for other humanitarian disarmament instruments and is an integral part of international humanitarian law (IHL), these developments carry risks that go far beyond the convention itself.
The crisis began in mid-2024 when Lithuania, fearing Russian aggression, decided to leave the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Walking away from a treaty governing warfare just when conflict appeared on the horizon was an unprecedented and short-sighted move. Yet the response from its allies was muted, teaching other countries exactly the wrong lesson. With the precedent set and the political price low, it was perhaps inevitable that others would follow suit. Indeed, several months later, five European countries — Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland — announced simultaneous withdrawals from the Mine Ban Treaty, again blaming Russian aggression against Ukraine.
It is clear that the security situation has evolved in Europe. But AP mines are known to cause massive human suffering due to their indiscriminate and inhumane nature, and nothing about the current security situation changes this fact. Abandoning the treaty and returning to antipersonnel mines will not deter an attack, especially by a cruel and determined enemy like Russia. Instead, laying mines in their soil will put at risk the very lives they were intended to protect. Research from the 2025 Landmine Monitor shows the 90% of recorded casualties are civilians, and almost 50% are children.
Moreover, by walking away from the legal commitments that protect civilians just when they would need to be applied, they are undermining not just the conventions in question, but the entire body of laws protecting civilians in conflict, precisely when the rules-based order is already under immense strain. The move also, paradoxically, diminishes the global values that these countries say they adhere to and claim sets them apart from Russia, particularly after Moscow’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.
But by far the most serious threat facing the Mine Ban Treaty today is Ukraine’s July 2025 announcement that it was suspending its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. Its notification to the United Nations referred to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, which includes rules for suspension and withdrawals. While withdrawals are damaging and disloyal to the humanitarian norm, states have the legal right to withdraw under Article 20. But the Mine Ban Treaty clearly does not permit suspension. The very idea is illogical, absurd, and extraordinarily dangerous for the convention and the broader fabric of IHL.
Suspending the ban on mines during armed conflict goes directly against the object and purpose of the treaty. The treaty was designed to apply to armed conflict, as Article 1 explicitly bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of AP mines “under any circumstances.” It was also intended to prevent states from leaving during war. Some argue that a declaration of suspension would amount to a state reserving the right to use these weapons in exceptional circumstances. But such reservations are also barred by the treaty as it prohibitions apply “under any circumstances”. Finally, during the negotiations in 1997, a proposal to allow suspension during conflicts with non-party states was soundly rejected.
Ukraine’s action is not merely legally flawed, it represents an existential threat to the integrity of all humanitarian law conventions. If a state can suspend its IHL obligations during wartime, then every convention establishing rules of war is fundamentally undermined. The Geneva Conventions, the conventions on chemical and biological weapons would all be vulnerable to the same logic. When times get tough, global norms need no longer apply.Salvaging the norms
Recognizing this danger, since October many countries — including Austria, Australia, Belgium, Colombia, France, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom — sent the United Nations Secretary General a variety of formal objections or other communications signaling their opposition to Ukraine’s suspension. Under Article 65 of the Vienna Convention, these notifications should halt the suspension’s validity.
Yet more action was needed to stop the suspension precedent from being set. In a letter to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties dated July 29, 2025, the U.N. under secretary general for disarmament affairs noted that “any dispute or objection regarding the decision of Ukraine to suspend the operation of the Convention is to be settled among the Parties to the [Mine Ban] Convention.” Instead of clarifying the legal situation itself, the U.N. placed the burden on the members of the Mine Ban Treaty,
Attention thus shifted to the convention in Geneva earlier this month, where treaty defenders pushed for language in the meeting’s final report affirming that suspension was not permitted. The goal was not to condemn Ukraine or its actions, but to ensure that any other state looking to this first-ever IHL suspension would see that suspension was not an option.
Fortunately, reason prevailed, and decisive language was adopted. The MSP Final Report stated, “The Mine Ban Treaty does not allow suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations” and referred to Ukraine as a State Party. In other words, Ukraine’s attempted suspension was invalidated, and it remains bound by the convention. The decision was backed by statements opposing suspension from dozens of countries from around the world.
While Ukraine must continue to fully respect its obligations under the Convention, compliance has already posed a challenge for Ukraine. Thus, other States Parties will need to be vigilant in both discouraging Ukraine from using and/or producing antipersonnel mines and in ensuring any reports of non-compliance are closely examined. While Russia, a non–State Party to the Convention, remains the primary perpetrator of antipersonnel mine use in Ukraine — causing unspeakable suffering and devastation — Ukrainian forces are believed to have used antipersonnel mines in the fall of 2022, and there are now growing indications of continued use as well as reports of production by Ukrainian companies and individuals.
This picture is further complicated by the United States’ announcement in late 2024 of the transfer of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines to Ukraine, the current status of which remains unclear.
Any use and/or production of such mines by Ukraine would constitute a clear violation of the Convention and would need to be addressed by States Parties.
Looking ahead
A united response protected the treaty and signaled that the erosion of humanitarian norms will not be tolerated. Thanks to vigorous diplomacy and engagement by committed states and civil society, the Geneva meeting ultimately upheld the treaty’s core principles with unambiguous language in a decisive win for the protection of civilians.
The crises facing the Mine Ban Treaty this year went far beyond any one weapon, one country, or one conflict. They represented the choices states need to make now about the kind of international system they want to uphold, one based on rules, mutual restraint, and the protection of civilians or one where norms apply only in times of peace and can be discarded when they are most needed.
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