Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping react as they hold a bilateral meeting at Gimhae International Airport, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, in Busan, South Korea, October 30, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein TPX
Can Trump finally break with Biden's failed China policy?
October 29, 2025
UPDATE 10/30: President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping emerged from much anticipated meeting in South Korea Thursday with a broad framework for a deal moving forward. Trump said the U.S. would lower tariffs on China, while Beijing would delay new export restrictions on rare earth minerals for one year and crack down on the trade in fentanyl components.
As Donald Trump prepares for his long-awaited in-person meeting with Xi Jinping on Thursday, he faces a fateful choice.
Will he embrace the machinery of geopolitical confrontation established by his first-term Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then systematized by the Biden administration, pushing the United States and China to a permanent rupture? Or will he chart a new kind of great power peace, defined not by utopian expectations of harmony but instead by wary mutual exploitation?
The Biden administration’s China policy emerged from a broad sense of crisis among mainstream Democratic leaders. As they entered office in 2021, their dream of a multicultural meritocracy at home and liberal American hegemony abroad was crumbling around them in the face of populist politics and surging authoritarianism around the world.
If Trump was the face of this crisis in the domestic arena, China was its face in international politics — seemingly the opposite of democracy, free markets, and U.S. global primacy (never mind that China was little involved in the disastrous Middle East wars, the financial deregulation that delivered the 2008 financial meltdown, or America’s increasingly corrupt and unresponsive politics). In then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s words, “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”
Since the Biden project was a restoration of the status quo, such a challenge was unacceptable.
Ironically, Biden was building on what he inherited from Trump’s first term. China hawks under Trump had taken advantage of the president’s trade grievances and Covid-era recriminations to pursue an agenda of geopolitical dominance focused on military brinkmanship and a campaign to destroy China’s technologically advanced companies.
The Biden administration accepted these measures and built on them. Top Biden officials believed that containing China — organizing U.S. allies against it, cutting off its development in high-value sectors, discrediting it in the eyes of rising powers in the Global South, casting it as the antagonist in a worldwide struggle between democracy and authoritarianism — was not just a desirable agenda in its own right. It also offered a narrow path to reviving American economic dynamism and domesticating the populist passions threatening establishment political leaders.
Why? Because hostility to China seemed to be the common ground that most of the warring groups in American life shared. Center-left and center-right pundits like David Ignatius or David Brooks portrayed China as the foreign enemy that would allow America to overcome its internal divisions and turn back the threat of populism. As Matthew Yglesias put it, “anti-China politics could be the unifying national project we need.”
Antagonism to China was so appealing to so many in Washington — and the prospect of looking weak on China was so terrifying — that the bipartisan decision for confrontation received almost no critical discussion. In the space of a few years, the debate over China swung 180 degrees from compulsory support for free trade to compulsory support for undermining and excluding China. But official Washington was out of touch with the American people. By a 2-to-1 margin or more, Democrats, Republicans, and independents all preferred working to avoid military conflict with China over preparing for it.
In hindsight, we can now see the wisdom of popular thinking. The Biden gamble that the United States could suppress China’s power without significant cost to American interests has failed, leaving the United States weaker and the world a more dangerous place.
Far from rallying the rest of the world to join the containment of China, even allies dragged their feet while developing countries overwhelmingly rejected a coerced choice between Beijing and Washington. Building up three- or four-country military formations to surround China was more successful, but also exacerbated Beijing’s own fears and set off a menacing arms race in the region.
Biden’s homilies about democracy rang hollow in the rest of the world, as the United States backed illiberal regimes when convenient and poured weapons into war crimes. His pretensions to world leadership foundered on instability in the United States and foreign resentment against his economic nationalism.
The Biden failure was most spectacular in the realm of technology. The administration claimed its decision to stymie Chinese advance in the most strategically important sectors was motivated solely by national security considerations. But because the blockaded technologies, like advanced semiconductors or quantum computing, are not primarily military in nature but the basis for high-value development across the whole economy, the administration committed itself to sabotaging China's entire growth strategy. If the attempt had succeeded, the two superpowers would have entered open conflict.
It did not succeed. Chinese companies found gaps in the regulations or smuggled in supplies. Beijing poured resources into building out domestic capacity in the targeted technologies. What was originally meant to be a precisely targeted “small yard, high fence” approach to halting China’s development predictably became an inexorably expanding roster of blocked goods, blacklisted firms, and new restrictions. Yet China continued to record stunning technological breakthroughs.
American companies lost billions of dollars and China was convinced that the U.S. would never tolerate Chinese economic competition. We now face a stronger, more independent, and more aggrieved China.
China went beyond skirting the American restrictions. It carefully studied American export controls, sanctions, and tariffs. Beijing slowly but systematically erected its own mirror-image system — often using word-for-word phrasing in the regulations — capable of doing serious damage to the U.S. economy. When Trump started a new trade war this year, China throttled the supply of rare earth elements, forcing some companies to idle production before the U.S. agreed to step back from the brink.
Today former Biden administration China officials and their neoconservative brethren in the Republican Party are demanding that we double down on this failed policy, driving it all the way to a permanent split in the global system. Parts of the Trump administration are pushing Trump in this direction, while Democrats on the outside are trying to goad Trump into conflict by calling him “chicken.”
Whatever his other faults, Trump is immune to this sort of manipulation. In fact, he savors casting aside the kind of sanctimonious moralizing that blinded the foreign policy establishment to the steep costs and terrible risks of the Biden China policy.
But can Trump build a different basis for the relationship? Secretary of State Rubio has suggested a framework, arguing that the era of unchallenged American dominance is past and we need to accept “a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet” in which “avoiding war and armed conflict” among powers is a crucial priority.
What that might look like in practice is more difficult. The immediate agreements teed up for Trump and Xi’s approval at their meeting are a good start, but will not rebuild the shattered foundation of the relationship.
Trump’s emphasis on trade and investment, coupled with China’s newly established power to hold him in check, shows real promise. Trump wants investment in the American economy to drive reindustrialization. Chinese companies — among them world leaders in manufacturing — want to restore access to the world’s largest economy, and Chinese leaders want a stable international environment. Indeed, China has already offered major investments. What remains is establishing prudent but flexible safeguards and a mechanism to channel Chinese investment into American priorities.
These are thorny problems that would be difficult under the best of circumstances. But if Trump can accept China as a peer power rather than constantly seeking new sources of leverage and can impose his vision of great power peace on his fractious administration, he could finally swing the world off a trajectory toward conflict.
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Top photo credit: Supporters attend a ceremony announcing the Reconstruction and Development Coalition election platform ahead of Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections in Karbala, Iraq, October 10, 2025. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iraq faces first quiet election in decades. Don't let that fool you.
October 28, 2025
Iraqis head to the polls on November 11 for parliamentary elections, however surveys predict record-low turnout, which may complicate creation of a government.
This election differs from those before: Muqtada al-Sadr has withdrawn from politics; Hadi al-Ameri’s Badr Organization is contesting the vote independently; and Hezbollah — Iran’s ally in Lebanon — is weakened. Though regional unrest persists, Iraq itself is comparatively stable.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani’s tenure was quieter than his predecessors’ (see here, here, here, and here), ending without scandal or disappointment, but electricity shortages have harried his administration which has announced ambitious infrastructure projects. (Iraq currently produces between 24,000 and 28,000 megawatts of electricity, and Iraq recently inked a contract with U.S.-based General Electric to add another 24,000 megawatts by 2028.)
Recently, U.S. energy giants Chevron and ExxonMobil signed exploration and development deals. Simon Watkins of OilPrice.com, called ExxonMobil’s comeback in Iraq “a major geopolitical shift, signaling renewed Western engagement.” These developments likely please U.S. President Donald Trump, who has yet to meet Sudani formally in Baghdad or Washington, D.C.
Whoever becomes Iraq’s next prime minister faces three major challenges: the water crisis, U.S. relations, and regional entanglement with Iran.
Managing the water crisis
Iraq’s most immediate problem is water scarcity. It depends on Turkey and Iran for nearly 75% of its freshwater through the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate upstream. Torhan al-Mufti, Sudani’s adviser on water affairs, warns that Iraq’s vulnerability stems from these transboundary flows.
There is some good news: according to Mufti, water inflows from Turkey to the Tigris have doubled in two years. In October 2025, Baghdad and Ankara reached a draft water-sharing agreement that includes infrastructure rehabilitation, implemented by Turkish companies, and a permanent consultation group to coordinate future water-sharing decisions.
Nevertheless, 2025 has been Iraq’s driest year since 1933. Rainfall shortages, and Turkish and Iranian dam projects, reduced Tigris, and Euphrates water levels by up to 27%. Reservoirs now hold less than 8 billion cubic meters, their lowest volume in over eight decades.
In September, the government suspended wheat planting due to insufficient water. Southern Iraq, particularly Basra, home to 3.5 million people, faces a growing humanitarian crisis as residents rely on trucked-in water. The once-vast Mesopotamian marshes, a UNESCO World Heritage site, are retreating, threatening biodiversity, and displacing communities.
Increasing water salinity is hurting farmers and livestock. The International Organization for Migration reports saltwater intrusion is destroying farmland, palm groves, and citrus orchards. This ecological decline risks economic instability and social unrest, especially in rural regions.
One solution may be to lease farmland abroad, following the example of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which cultivate crops in Africa to preserve domestic water. However, this could deepen Iraq’s internal dislocation, displacing struggling agricultural communities.
Balancing US relations
U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, but returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. Washington pledged to achieve the “enduring defeat” of ISIS — a mission to justify a long-term presence.
Under a recent agreement, U.S. combat forces began withdrawing in September 2025, with a full exit expected by September 2026. However, small contingents will remain in Iraqi Kurdistan and at Ain al-Asad Air Base to assist in counterterrorism operations.
In October, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged Sudani to “disarm” the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — a 240,000-strong force formed to fight ISIS with an annual budget of roughly $3.5 billion. The U.S. pressured Iraqi lawmakers to withdraw legislation that would place the PMF fully under government control, though internal disagreements also helped doom the bill. Sudani recently declared the armed groups have two options: join the official security institutions or transition to [unarmed] political work.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq cost the Americans over 4,400 dead and over $3 trillion. The U.S. now faces “the Meddler’s Trap” — a self-inflicted cycle in which intervention creates new problems that policymakers feel compelled to manage indefinitely. Iraq remains caught in this dynamic: Washington wants to leave but cannot bear the risks of doing so.
Keeping Iraq out of the US–Iran conflict
A third challenge for Iraq’s next government is avoiding entanglement in the long-running U.S.–Iran rivalry. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Washington has sought to reverse what it sees as a national humiliation: the overthrow of its ally, the Shah of Iran, and the 444-day hostage crisis that followed, that may have swayed the 1980 presidential election.
Over the decades, both sides have waged a shadow war — from sanctions and cyberattacks to assassinations and economic sanctions. Iran’s ballistic missile, drone, and nuclear programs are now American justifications for continued containment.
In June 2025, U.S. airstrikes targeted three Iranian nuclear facilities. President Trump claimed the operation “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, though American military intelligence wasn’t so sure. Meanwhile, Israel, America’s closest ally in the region, has reportedly continued assassinations and covert operations against Iranian scientists and facilities.
Iraq risks becoming a battleground by proxy. In May 2025, U.S. Reps. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and Greg Steube (R-Fla.) advocated sanctioning Iraq as part of the “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. They advocated sweeping penalties on the PMF, much of Iraq’s banking and oil sectors, the minister of finance, “Iran’s facilitators in Iraq,” the chief justice of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, and former prime ministers — a decapitation attack on Iraq’s economy and sovereignty.
The slogan of Sudani’s political project is "Iraq First," but to Washington, Iraq is a tool for pressuring Iran, all the money and dead soldiers provide the justification for America’s droit du seigneur; but this dynamic threatens Iraq’s national stability. The next prime minister must navigate between the U.S. and neighboring Iran to preserve Iraq’s fragile independence. The PMF’s status will be the most contentious issue between America and Iraq, as the Americans have forgotten what happens when you suddenly demobilize a large group of well-armed men.
Despite relative quiet and significant new foreign investment under Sudani’s tenure, Iraq still faces water shortages, unfinished security reforms, and the constant danger of being drawn into foreign conflicts, mostly the legacy of Saddam Hussein’s repression, and Western sanctions and military attacks.
Balancing domestic needs with foreign pressures — especially from the United States and Iran — will define Iraq’s future far more than the election’s immediate outcome.
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Top image credit: Joey Sussman and Photo Agency via shutterstock.com
Trump-Xi reset could collapse under the weight of its ambition
October 27, 2025
On Thursday, President Donald Trump is expected to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Seoul, where they will aim to calm escalating trade tensions and even explore striking a “Big Deal” between the world’s two superpowers.
The stakes could not be higher. The package reportedly under discussion could span fentanyl controls, trade, export restrictions, Chinese students, and even China’s civil-military fusion strategy. It would be the most ambitious effort in years to reset relations between Washington and Beijing. And it could succeed — or collapse — under the weight of its own ambition.
Start with fentanyl. Synthetic opioids now kill more Americans each year than car crashes or gun violence. Much of the supply chain apparently begins in China, where chemical precursors flow into global markets with little oversight.
If Beijing were to meaningfully crack down, the human impact would be enormous. Thousands of American families could be spared the devastation of overdose. But here lies the dilemma: unfortunately China has treated drug enforcement as a bargaining chip. Any cooperation is likely to come at a price — tariff relief, technology access, or concessions elsewhere. In other words, Beijing may save American lives, but only on terms that also advance its own strategic goals.
Trade is another pillar. The U.S. deficit with China remains stubbornly high, fueled by state subsidies and market barriers. And China’s move to place export controls on its rare earths — effectively mimicking America’s foreign direct product rule on valuable minerals — has infuriated the president, spurring new threats of a 100% tariff on Chinese goods. But there’s a relatively straightforward way to ensure these tensions do not explode into overly-harmful restrictionism: some good dealmaking. Trump has always thrived on the language of deals, and this negotiation would give him a chance to frame himself as the one leader willing to go toe-to-toe with Beijing.
The outline is familiar: more access for American exporters, more purchases of U.S. goods by China. But the memory of the 2020 “Phase One” agreement hangs over the talks. Then, China promised sweeping purchases it never delivered. Without credible enforcement, a new trade deal risks being little more than a press release. The rumor mill is filled with all sorts of strange concoctions such as China buying 500 new Boeing airplanes and in return the U.S. accepts 600,000 PRC students.
The hardest piece of this puzzle may be technology. Washington has tightened export controls on semiconductors and advanced AI tools, citing fears that China’s civil-military fusion blurs the line between private innovation and state power. Beijing calls it containment; Washington calls it self-defense.
It is difficult to imagine a neat compromise here. One side sees survival; the other sees supremacy. At best, diplomats might carve out limited areas of cooperation — say, on medical AI or clean energy — while drawing firmer red lines elsewhere. Activation of the renewed STA by launching 2-3 modest initiatives for the research collaboration under a policy of “smart openness” could be a worthwhile trust-building approach. It must be realized, however, that the tech issue alone could sink any broader bargain.
Trump, for his part, relishes spectacle. A head-to-head negotiation framed as the art of the deal on a global stage, would play to his instincts. But style cannot substitute for substance. If the summit produces vague promises, the political bounce will fade fast, and the structural tensions in all likelihood will return.
Why would Xi even entertain such a deal? The answer lies in China’s own headwinds. Post-Covid, China’s economy largely has remained in the doldrums. The property sector remains in crisis. Global investors are wary. A meaningful truce with Washington, even a partial one, could stabilize markets, stimulate new foreign investment, and buy time for new domestic reforms contained in China’s new 15th Five Year Plan.
But Xi cannot appear weak. As with President Trump, every concession must look like reciprocity, not capitulation. China will frame fentanyl controls as a contribution to global security, trade adjustments as a growth engine, and any export talks as sovereignty preserved. The choreography will matter almost as much as the substance.
Bundling so many issues together is bold — but risky. A breakthrough on fentanyl could be derailed by gridlock on tech or rare earths. A trade concession could be overshadowed by continued military mistrust. Negotiations of this scale often collapse because success in one area is held hostage to failure in another.
Diplomatic history offers a lesson: steady incrementalism works better. The Cold War was managed through step-by-step arms agreements, not sweeping resets. The original Iran nuclear deal focused narrowly on enrichment, not regional behavior. Grand bargains may make headlines, but they rarely hold.
Still, the urgency is real. Fentanyl is killing Americans. Trade frictions are undermining the global economy, broadly defined. Technological rivalry is fueling fears of conflict. If Washington and Beijing cannot find even partial common ground, the alternative is a spiral of mistrust that further drags the world toward confrontation and even an economic crash.
For ordinary Americans, the stakes are tangible. A mother in Ohio who loses her son to an overdose does not care about tariffs. A farmer in Iowa who can’t sell soybeans to China doesn’t care about semiconductor rules. A deal that alleviates these pressures would resonate far beyond the Beltway.
For the world, the stakes are even larger. If the U.S. and China can manage rivalry without sliding into war, it sets a precedent for great-power competition in the 21st century. If not, the rest of the globe will be forced to navigate an increasingly unstable order.
The Seoul talks will test whether both governments still see value in diplomacy, not just confrontation. Success will not mean overall friendship. It will mean coexistence: guardrails, enforcement, and partial agreements that prevent the relationship from careening into crisis.
As things now stand, the temptation for Trump and Xi seemingly will be to aim for headlines. But what matters more is durability. Better a modest deal that sticks than a sweeping one that collapses. The world doesn’t need theatrics. It needs a foundation for managing the most consequential relationship of our time.
The world’s leaders are watching with bated breath.
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