Top photo credit: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi 首相官邸 (Cabinet Public Affairs Office)
Takaichi 101: How to torpedo relations with China in a month
November 26, 2025
On November 7, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could undoubtedly be “a situation that threatens Japan’s survival,” thereby implying that Tokyo could respond by dispatching Self-Defense Forces.
This statement triggered the worst crisis in Sino-Japanese relations in over a decade because it reflected a transformation in Japan’s security policy discourse, defense posture, and U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in recent years. Understanding this transformation requires dissecting the context as well as content of Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks.
The controversy centers around applying Japan’s “survival-threatening situation” law to Taiwan.
Approved by Japan’s Diet in September 2015, this legislation enabled Japan to exercise to a very limited degree its right of collective self-defense even if Japan itself were not attacked directly.
The law imposed three stringent conditions: (1) an attack against a foreign country with which Japan has close relations threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, (2) there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and (3) the use of force must be limited to the minimum extent necessary.
During the Diet deliberations in September 14, 2015, the government explained that contrary to the general notion of collective self-defense under international law, the Self-Defense Forces according to article 88 of the Self-Defense Force Law would be limited to the defense of Japan and would not be involved in the use of force overseas to fight in another country including the victim of the attack.
The Abe government at the time avoided any mention of a Taiwan contingency. In fact, the conventional view was that because Japan did not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country consistent with the 1972 Japan-China normalization communique, an armed Chinese attack against Taiwan in itself would not constitute a “survival-threatening situation.” Most Japanese security experts thought that a Chinese attack on an allied country like the United States in the context of a Taiwan scenario would be necessary.
While prime minister, Shinzō Abe was careful not to provoke China by mentioning Japan’s military involvement in a Taiwan contingency. But after his retirement, he became more openly supportive of Taiwan. In December 2021, during an on-line appearance at a Taiwan think tank event, Abe stated, “A Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan. In other words, it is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance.”
Then during a Japanese television program in February 2022, Abe called on the United States to drop its strategic ambiguity regarding the defense of Taiwan. While reiterating that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,” Abe declared that the establishment of Chinese air and sea superiority around Taiwan would “affect Japan’s territorial waters, or at least our exclusive economic zone.”
During a gathering of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in July 2021, then Deputy Prime Minister Tarō Asō declared that Japan with the United States “would have to defend Taiwan” if invaded by China and that Taiwan experiencing a “big problem” could “relate to a survival-threatening situation for Japan.”
While visiting Taiwan in August 2023, Asō, who was then LDP vice president stated, “I believe that now is the time for Japan, Taiwan, the United States and other like-minded countries to be prepared to put into action very strong deterrence. It’s the resolve to fight.”
And in September 2025, Asō in a Tokyo meeting with Taiwan legislators stated that “Taiwan is a country that shares fundamental values with Japan.” China protested Asō’s remark by insisting that “Taiwan is a province of China, never a country.”
Before becoming prime minister, Takaichi echoed Abe and Asō. In her first run for the LDP presidency in September 2021, she argued that a Taiwan crisis would be a threat to Japan and the possibility of deploying Self-Defense Forces would be high. During her second run for the LDP’s top post in September 2024, Takaichi suggested that a Chinese maritime blockade on Taiwan could qualify as a “crisis that threatens the nation’s existence.”
Moreover, Abe and Asō played a major role in Takaichi’s path to the prime ministership. Abe endorsed Takaichi during the September 2021 LDP presidential race. The Asō faction’s support was critical to Takaichi’s victory in October 2025.
This political context motivated former Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party to grill Takaichi about what constitutes a “survival-threatening situation.” Okada was concerned that Takaichi as prime minister might adopt an expansive interpretation of the “survival-threatening situation” law that exceeded the understandings reached during the September 2015 Diet deliberations.
After having the director-general of the Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau confirm the September 2015 government’s restrictions regarding the “survival-threatening situation” legislation, Okada got Takaichi herself to confirm this understanding. He then noted how some politicians have been making careless remarks about what would qualify as a “survival-threatening situation” despite these officially acknowledged restrictions.
Okada gave as an example Takaichi’s own comments that a Chinese maritime blockade of Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation.” He questioned how that could be since Japanese ships could bypass the blockaded area and Japan would still be supplied with energy and food. Takaichi responded that the U.S. military intervening to break the blockade that then led to an armed clash or a blockade imposed in the context of war could be considered a “survival-threatening situation.”
Okada criticized her answer as being an overly expansive view of the concept since a blockade on Taiwan would not necessarily threaten Japan’s survival.
Emphasizing the importance of considering worst-case scenarios, Takaichi then referred to different ways that China could seek to bring Taiwan completely under its control such as “closing off its sea lanes, the use of force, misinformation, or cyber propaganda.” She then declared, “If [China’s control of Taiwan] involves the use of warships and the exercise of military force, I believe this could undoubtedly constitute a case of a survival-threatening situation.” Especially problematic in this statement was the absence of any reference to a Chinese attack on U.S. forces. This implied that a Chinese attack on Taiwan in itself could threaten Japan’s survival and thereby permitting the use of force.
In addition to being the first time a sitting Japanese prime minister has explicitly mentioned a Taiwan contingency as a “survival-threatening situation,” Takaichi’s remarks angered China because they reflected a sea change in Japan’s security discourse, defense posture, and U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
Mainstream Japanese defense experts now openly argue that China’s control over Taiwan could be an existential threat to Japan. Japan has been deploying new defense capabilities in its southwestern region (including the recently announced missile deployment on Yonaguni Island near Taiwan), and the U.S. and Japan are enhancing military planning, coordination, and joint exercises to more effectively respond to a Taiwan crisis. Moreover, in March 2025, the former chief of the Joint Staff of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces was appointed to be an adviser to Taiwan’s Cabinet, suggesting that Taiwan seeks to advance security cooperation with Japan.
From the U.S. and Japanese perspective, these developments aim to deter China’s use of force against Taiwan at a time when Beijing is increasing its economic and military pressure on Taipei. But from China’s perspective, Japan with the United States is interfering in a Chinese domestic issue, encouraging Taiwan’s pro-independence forces, and impeding the possibility of peaceful unification of Taiwan with China. A possible Japanese military role in a Taiwan scenario is especially infuriating to Chinese because of Japan’s colonial rule over Taiwan after 1895.
Under current circumstances, Chinese diplomatic and economic coercion against Japan could accelerate the militarization of the Taiwan issue and increase the risk of a dangerous military incident.
So what should Japan do to help defuse this crisis?
Ideally, as former Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka has recommended, Prime Minister Takaichi could retract her Diet remarks and apologize for going beyond the Japanese policy and practice of not commenting on specific hypothetical scenarios related to survival-threatening situations. But that appears to be politically difficult if not impossible, especially after Xue Jian, the Chinese Consul-General in Osaka, posted on social media a threat of beheading Takaichi. Since this malicious and inflammatory post was quickly removed, a helpful Chinese next step would be to reprimand the Chinese diplomat for his unprofessional conduct after recalling him to Beijing.
In response, Japan should reassure China with a more robust articulation of its one-China policy. Rather than simply reiterating that Japan continues to abide by the 1972 normalization communique, Tokyo should explicitly say that it does not support Taiwan’s independence, as Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi orally conveyed to Chinese President Jiang Zemin in November 1998. In addition, Japan should declare that it opposes unilateral changes in the status quo, including the independence of Taiwan.
Regarding the “survival-threatening situation” law, Japan should explicitly state that it does not consider Taiwan to be a sovereign country and should confirm that its actions will be consistent with its long-held strictly defensive defense doctrine (senshu bō’ei). In other words, Tokyo should publicly reaffirm that even under a “survival-threatening situation,” Japan’s Self-Defense Force would be limited to the defense of Japan and would not be using force overseas to fight in another country or territory such as Taiwan.
These statements, if made by Prime Minister Takaichi herself, would give more credibility to Japan’s claim that her November 7 remarks did not entail a substantive policy change regarding Taiwan and may clear the way for stabilizing Sino-Japanese relations.
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Top photo credit: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and António Costa, President of the European Council at the G7 world leaders summit in Kananaskis, June 15, 2025. Picture by Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street
The Europeans pushing the NATO poison pill
November 25, 2025
The recent flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding Ukraine has revealed a stark transatlantic divide. While high level American and Ukrainian officials have been negotiating the U.S. peace plan in Geneva, European powers have been scrambling to influence a process from which they risk being sidelined.
While Europe has to be eventually involved in a settlement of the biggest war on its territory after World War II, so far it’s been acting more like a spoiler than a constructive player.
The core of the current negotiation effort is the American plan, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Ukrainian officials in Geneva reportedly agreed to reduce from an initial 28 points to19. Critically, the most sensitive issues — namely territorial compromises and the final status of Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO — have been reportedly deferred for direct talks between Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky.
Into this fragile process, European capitals have thrown a wrench. Having circulated various "counter plans," they have now settled on a different tactic: offering unsolicited amendments to the American proposal.
The effort is reportedly being led by the E3 – Britain, France and Germany. Rubio, however, poured cold water on those efforts by stating in Geneva that he was "unaware of any European drafts." Tellingly, he refused to meet with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, a former Prime-Minister of Estonia. This is a stunning diplomatic snub that highlights her profound incompetence as the embodiment of the maximalist position consisting, in her own words, only in “weakening Russia and supporting Ukraine”.
A Rubio snub ought to render her position utterly untenable. A foreign policy chief who cannot secure a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State to end the war in Europe is not a diplomat; she is an obstacle to peace.
It remains to be seen what specific amendments Europeans are introducing to the American plan but based on the principles they have expressed so far, including in the previously leaked counterplans, some of their amendments would almost certainly amount to poison pills designed to ensure the deal's collapse.
That could then be blamed on Moscow and used to justify a return to a default setting of a protracted war. Nowhere is this more evident than on the issue of NATO.
The original American draft contained clauses directly addressing the alliance, which is Russia's primary security grievance. It stated, “It is expected that Russia will not invade neighboring countries and NATO will not expand further,” and that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO.” This was the absolute core of the proposal — an acknowledgment that ending the war requires confronting the question of European security architecture, namely, the place of NATO and Russia in it.
The European initial counter-proposal, by contrast, excised these clauses entirely. It removed the principle of no further NATO expansion and, regarding Ukraine, merely noted that a consensus for membership does not currently exist, while deliberately leaving the door open for a theoretical future accession.
For Moscow, which launched a war largely to prevent this exact scenario, agreeing to a ceasefire that leaves that door ajar is an unequivocal surrender of its stated war aims. By insisting on keeping the 2008 Bucharest Summit promise to keep the door open to NATO membership for Ukraine alive, Europe is ensuring the Kremlin will dismiss the entire proposal outright.
This is the fatal flaw of the European approach. It appears a strategically cynical move, allowing European leaders to posture as defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty while ensuring the war continues. They can then blame Moscow for the talks' collapse, claiming, “We offered Putin a path back, and he chose war.”
The strategic calculus here is brutally simple. The American plan, for all its flaws, represents a politically viable path to ending the slaughter. By embedding these poison pills, Europe is scripting a scenario where Moscow refuses, the West demands more sanctions on Russia, more and better weapons for Ukraine, and the war escalates into a bloody next chapter, leading, down the road, to a potential nuclear standoff.
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Top image credit: A Sudanese army soldier stands next to a destroyed combat vehicle as Sudan's army retakes ground and some displaced residents return to ravaged capital in the state of Khartoum Sudan March 26, 2025. REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig
Will Sudan attack the UAE?
Saudi leans in hard to get UAE out of Sudan civil war
November 25, 2025
As Saudi Arabia’s powerful crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), swept through Washington last week, the agenda was predictably packed with deals: a trillion-dollar investment pledge, access to advanced F-35 fighter jets, and coveted American AI technology dominated the headlines. Yet tucked within these transactions was a significant development for the civil war in Sudan.
Speaking at the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum President Donald Trump said that Sudan “was not on my charts,” viewing the conflict as “just something that was crazy and out of control” until the Saudi leader pressed the issue. “His majesty would like me to do something very powerful having to do with Sudan,” Trump recounted, adding that MBS framed it as an opportunity for greatness.
The crown prince’s intervention highlights a crucial new reality that the path to peace, or continued war, in Sudan now runs even more directly through the escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The fate of Sudan is being forged in the Gulf, and its future will be decided by which side has more sway in Trump’s White House.
The official peace process is, for all practical purposes, at a dead end. Trump's senior adviser for African affairs Massad Boulos’s proposal for a three-month humanitarian truce, designed as a first step in a roadmap laid out by the "Quad" (America, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt), has collided with the irreconcilable positions of the belligerents. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), having just secured a major victory in capturing the last army-controlled city in Darfur, nominally accepted the truce while continuing its offensive push.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), however, have dug in their heels. Their commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has been unequivocal, declaring there will be "no truce, no talks, or peace" until the RSF lays down its arms and that the current ceasefire proposal is “the worst yet” — alleging it was a plan to “nullify the existence of the armed forces” while leaving the RSF intact. The gap between the two sides is not one that can easily be bridged.
The grim turning point was the fall of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, to the RSF late last month after a brutal 18-month siege. The city’s capture was accompanied by horrifying reports of mass killings, systematic rape, and ethnically targeted atrocities that the UN’s human rights chief called a "the epicenter of human suffering in the world."
The RSF's battlefield successes are underwritten by significant foreign support, chiefly from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UN experts and American lawmakers have accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, including advanced drones that have given it a decisive edge. Abu Dhabi officially denies this, but the reputational damage following the atrocities committed by the RSF in El Fasher has become undeniable. Estimates of the death toll in the city range from between 2,000 up to tens of thousands, while roughly 90,000 civilians have fled El Fasher since its takeover by the RSF according to U.N. Figures.
In an interesting admission, Anwar Gargash, a senior Emirati diplomatic envoy, recently conceded that the Gulf powers made a "critical mistake" by not opposing the 2021 coup that empowered both warring generals, and crushed the prospect of a “civilian government” which the UAE now calls for. While framed as a moment of sober reflection, the statement also serves as an attempt to distance Abu Dhabi from RSF’s gruesome actions and bolster its claim to neutrality in the conflict.
This diplomatic signaling is backed by an aggressive media campaign. Sky News Arabia, a joint venture partly controlled by the UAE’s vice president, dispatched a reporter into the besieged city of El Fasher, and the resulting coverage predictably downplayed humanitarian suffering while attempting to legitimize the paramilitary force. This on-the-ground narrative warfare complements a wider effort by Emirati influencers to shift blame onto the SAF and its Islamist allies for the atrocities committed in El Fasher, despite the army’s total withdrawal from the city when attacks on civilians took place. The calculation in Abu Dhabi appears to be that the fallout will be manageable, banking on its media machine and iron-clad ties with Trump to ride out the storm.
Yet this attempt at public repositioning is running up against hardening views in Washington. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently signaled this growing impatience, stating recently that "something needs to be done to cut off the weapons and the support that the RSF is getting." At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing months earlier, he was even more explicit, naming the UAE directly and “other countries” of waging a “proxy war that is destabilizing the region."
Moreover, in a significant move last week, Senate Democrats, led by Chris Van Hollen (D-Maryland) , attempted to pass the 'Stand Up for Sudan Act,' which would have suspended all U.S. arms sales to the UAE until the White House could certify it was no longer arming the RSF. While the bill was blocked, it signals increasing, bipartisan congressional unease with Abu Dhabi's role in Sudan’s brutal war.
Indeed, the prolonged conflict has raised the specter of complete state collapse in Sudan, a risk accelerated by the fall of El Fasher. This victory has freed up RSF manpower and resources to press eastwards, threatening to reclaim central Sudan and Khartoum, from which the army expelled the group last year. This places the SAF (and the remnant state it represents) in existential peril, a worry now shared by a growing regional bloc, with Egypt and Turkey reportedly coordinating to bolster the SAF’s capacities.
Just after El Fasher’s fall, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty traveled to Port Sudan for urgent talks with army chief al-Burhan. In an interview conducted aboard his plane en route to Sudan’s wartime capital, Abdelatty framed Egypt’s intervention in clear national security terms, warning that the war risked a "division" that would be "extremely dangerous" not just for Sudan, but for Egypt itself. Abdelatty added that Sudan’s military “cannot be replaced by parallel entities,” a clear and forceful rejection of the RSF’s legitimacy.
For these regional powers, backing the army is a pragmatic calculation. The army-led government holds the country's U.N. seat and controls the last vestiges of state machinery necessary for providing public services and enabling the return of millions of displaced Sudanese, a process already underway, with the U.N. reporting that over a million people have returned to army-controlled Khartoum.
This prospect of a failed state on its doorstep deeply alarms Saudi Arabia, and is directly responsible for its recent and forceful diplomatic intervention. With less than 200 miles of the Red Sea separating them, Riyadh fears a failed Sudan would become a nexus for migrants, terrorism, and trafficking in arms and drugs like Captagon (for which production boomed after Sudan's civil war erupted), directly threatening its own security and the crown prince’s Vision 2030 goals. Against this backdrop, Saudi support for a central authority is a strategic imperative, and it has openly signaled its support for preserving Sudan's "legitimate institutions," a clear diplomatic endorsement of the national army over its paramilitary rival.
For now, the formal peace process, embodied by the Quad and led by a single American envoy with an impossibly vast portfolio, remains a sideshow. The real determinant of Sudan’s future will be shaped by the intensifying competition for influence with the White House between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Mohammed bin Salman has made his move in Washington, the question now is how Mohammed bin Zayed will respond.
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