Trump doesn't need to buy Saudi loyalty with a security pact

What’s in it for the United States?

Proponents of a Saudi security guarantee offer several supposed benefits. First, they have long claimed the United States must double down on support for Saudi Arabia to quell concerns about U.S. reliability. Saudi doubts, while not new, were hardened by Washington’s lack of response to the 2019 attack on its Abqaiq-Khurais oil facilities and, more recently, Israel's strike on Qatar, which Washington initially seemed unwilling or unable to prevent.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials are increasingly anxious about Gulf states’ growing ties with China. Trump has complained that the Saudis are “with China" now due to insufficient U.S. support, promising to "win them back" and "always protect them." A formal defense arrangement, the logic goes, is necessary to pull Riyadh back into Washington’s orbit.

Lastly, the Trump administration, like the Biden team before it, seems to believe that promises of protection can coax Saudi Arabia into normalization with Israel and advance a broader grand bargain to transform the region. Given how the Qatar pledge emerged, the administration may believe a similar deal with Riyadh can secure buy-in for other U.S. priorities, such as involvement in Gaza’s post-war stabilization.

The case for a formal pledge to Saudi Arabia doesn’t add up. Defense commitments can be valuable when they serve a specific purpose and deter a defined threat, as NATO did vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the early Cold War. However, the threat that any Saudi agreement is expected to deter is indeterminate, at best, and problematic, at worst.

For instance, a Qatar-like pact might create expectations that the United States would retaliate against a country, perhaps even a U.S. ally, if it were to carry out an airstrike on suspected terrorists in Saudi Arabia. But who would attempt such a thing? The Saudis and the Iranians reached a reconciliation agreement in 2023, further calling into question the need for a US security guarantee. And what of internal security threats to the regime? In the midst of the Arab Spring uprisings in March 2011, Riyadh sent troops into neighboring Bahrain to snuff out anti-government demonstrations.

Wider concerns about the supposedly existential importance of Saudi oil to the U.S. economy have long been disproved — largely because oil markets have become much more resilient to supply shocks — even before the United States became a net oil exporter in 2018. If supply shocks occur, Americans will feel the effects at the gas pump, but those effects are short-lived, and certainly not worth fighting a war to prevent. We’ve come a long way since President Jimmy Carter declared the entire Persian Gulf to be a vital U.S. interest. In short, there is no direct threat to the United States that warrants a security pledge to Saudi Arabia. The supposed benefits are neither material to core U.S. interests nor likely to be achieved by such a commitment.

Longstanding doubts about U.S. commitment to the region cannot be papered over; they reflect a stark reality: precisely because the security of the kingdom is not a vital U.S. national interest, pledges to defend it lack credibility. An agreement between Trump and MBS can’t change that.

Fortunately, the United States doesn't need to “reassure” Saudi Arabia to win its cooperation, as core U.S. and Saudi interests are broadly aligned. In the near term, both desire a lasting end to the Gaza war and a dialing down of regional tensions. Likewise, Saudi Arabia shares the United States’ goals of energy security, counterterrorism, and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s recent deal with Pakistan is cause for optimism, if Washington plays its cards right, as our Stimson colleague Asfandyar Mir notes.

China’s inroads in the Persian Gulf pose little threat to the United States. Beijing's engagement in the Middle East is driven primarily by economic interests, not a desire to dominate the region, which it has neither the intent nor the capability to do. At the same time, promises of U.S. protection will not pull Riyadh away from Beijing, which is seen as a critical partner in Saudi efforts to diversify its economy, deepen partnerships, and bolster its international standing. Trying to out-bid China through security concessions would be both costly and futile. Indeed, The Wall Street Journal reports that MBS has admitted to "playing major powers against each other" to secure U.S. concessions, which should give Washington pause rather than encourage more generosity.

And while Israeli-Saudi normalization would be welcome, it would be a mostly symbolic achievement; the countries already discreetly cooperate on the issues that matter. Normalization certainly isn't worth the cost of a U.S. pledge to defend Riyadh, which amounts to rewarding both parties for doing what is already in their mutual interest, especially when Saudi officials have ruled out normalization absent significant steps toward a Palestinian state, which are unlikely in the near term.

Risks of a Saudi Pact

A security pact with Saudi Arabia might not bring many benefits, but it would come with significant downsides. It would create moral hazard, risking U.S. entrapment through what MIT’s Barry Posen calls “reckless driving.” Consider Riyadh’s actions in Yemen. Extensive U.S. support emboldened Saudi Arabia to wage a disastrous, failed intervention there that dragged on for seven years, fueling a war that claimed close to 400,000 lives, including nearly 20,000 civilians killed by airstrikes. But when the United States’ failure to respond forcefully to the Abqaiq-Khurais attack showed Riyadh it could not count on unconditional U.S. backing, it had no choice but to seek an exit from Yemen. Even if Saudi Arabia does not behave recklessly, a pledge to defend the kingdom would limit U.S. flexibility and increase pressure to intervene if Saudi Arabia comes under attack again.

Even a watered-down or largely symbolic commitment would carry risks. Regardless of the specifics of the security agreement, if Saudi Arabia were attacked, a written commitment would provide ammunition to those pressing for U.S. intervention, even though U.S. core interests do not justify it. The language of the Qatar security guarantee has been widely accepted as “akin to NATO’s Article 5,” setting unrealistic expectations. Any formal arrangement would also send the message to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors that they can still rely on the United States, rather than encouraging them to take their security into their own hands. American protection, it seems — and potentially the lives of American servicepeople — is up for negotiation. It shouldn’t be.

Above all, additional commitments would delay a long-overdue U.S. recalibration away from the Middle East. The United States can secure its modest interests in the region without maintaining a major military presence, and certainly without pledging to fight on behalf of Riyadh. It would be foolish for an overstretched America to take on further burdens in a region of declining strategic importance.