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Osce-scaled

Austria should buck the West and welcome Russia to key security meeting

Leaders who condemn Moscow's presence at the OSCE are acting like 'insulted liver sausages,' not diplomats.

Analysis | Europe

In recent years, many Western diplomats — let alone politicians — appear to have forgotten the very meaning of diplomacy. It does not mean agreeing on everything with your friends. It means negotiating with rivals and sometimes even enemies. That in turn means learning about them, so as to try to understand their goals, their view of their own countries’ vital interests, and therefore the issues on which compromise will or will not be possible.

Sometimes this will lead to the conclusion that no compromise is possible; but the only legitimate path to this conclusion is through talking. Increasingly, however, the West has adopted the stance that just meeting with adversaries at all involves some sort of surrender or moral compromise.

Hence the widespread condemnation by Western politicians and commentators of the Austrian decision to permit sanctioned Russian lawmakers to attend a meeting in Vienna of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) something that, as the Austrian government has pointed out, it is formally bound to do as the host country of the OSCE headquarters.

The condemnation of course stems from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has rightly been the subject of economic sanctions and condemnation by Western states, including Austria. It should be remembered however that the OSCE was created during the Cold War, explicitly as a means of engaging Moscow in discussions of European security. Soviet participation was not broken off by the West during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, nor did Russia, Germany or France demand the barring of American and British participation as a result of the invasion of Iraq.

Austria is a member of the European Union, but under the terms of the treaty of 1954 by which Western and Soviet occupation forces withdrew from the country, it has not joined NATO or any other military alliance. It has sent economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but no military aid.

This neutrality was the reason why the OSCE headquarters was established in Austria. Long before that however, it had allowed Vienna to become a very useful place for contacts and talks between the Soviet Union and the West – and this was recognized as advantageous by Western governments. During the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was a closed system, cultivating Soviet contacts in order to try to learn more about the place was something that Western governments and experts greatly desired. Vienna therefore was also a paradise for spies from both sides.

Sanctions by Western governments against individuals visiting their countries are of course at the discretion of the countries concerned, but they have no wider grounding in international law. As this case demonstrates, they are not only a barrier to diplomacy and the acquisition of knowledge, but also (especially as imposed by Washington), they have a tendency to extend themselves to third countries who did not impose the sanctions, and thereby to damage relations with them.

These sanctions are extremely irritating to many countries around the world (including partners like India), who see it as yet another sign of a Western assumption of moral arrogance, and a legacy of Western imperialism, the memory of which in fact cancels out Western moral superiority. As former Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon has written:

"Alienated and resentful, many developing countries see the war in Ukraine and the West’s rivalry with China as distracting from urgent issues such as debt, climate change, and the effects of the pandemic.”

It would be different if NATO were actually at war with Russia; though even then meetings on neutral ground could be beneficial. But the Biden administration has made clear that it does not want Washington's assistance to Ukraine to become a direct war with Russia. President Biden and other U.S. and European officials have also stated their belief that in the end, some form of negotiated agreement with Russia will be necessary — albeit on terms advantageous to Ukraine.

This being so, there can be no argument in legality, morality or practicality for preventing Russian politicians from going to Vienna, and listening to what they have to say and have them listen to Western concerns. We pay our diplomats to practice diplomacy, not — to borrow an Austrian phrase — to behave like insulted liver sausages.


he closing session of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Belgrade, 4 December 2015. (OSCE/Jonathan Perfect)
Analysis | Europe
Pedro Sanchez
Top image credit: Prime Minister of Spain Pedro Sanchez during the summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union at the European Council in Brussels in Belgium the 26th of July 2025, Martin Bertrand / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect

Spain's break from Europe on Gaza is more reaction than vision

Europe

The final stage of the Vuelta a España, Spain’s premier cycling race, was abandoned in chaos on Sunday. Pro-Palestinian protesters, chanting “they will not pass,” overturned barriers and occupied the route in Madrid, forcing organizers to cancel the finale and its podium ceremony. The demonstrators’ target was the participation of an Israeli team. In a statement that captured the moment, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez expressed his “deep admiration for the Spanish people mobilizing for just causes like Palestine.”

The event was a vivid public manifestation of a potent political sentiment in Spain — one that the Sánchez government has both responded to and, through its foreign policy, legitimized. This dynamic has propelled Spain into becoming the European Union’s most vocal dissenting voice on the war in Gaza, marking a significant break from the transatlantic foreign policy orthodoxy.

Sanchez’s support for the protesters was not merely rhetorical. On Monday, he escalated his stance, explicitly calling for Israel to be barred from international sports competitions, drawing a direct parallel to the exclusion of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. “Our position is clear and categorical: as long as the barbarity continues, neither Russia nor Israel should participate in any international competition,” he said. This position, which angered Israel and Spanish conservatives alike, was further amplified by his culture minister, who suggested Spain should boycott next year’s Eurovision Song Contest if Israel participates.

More significantly, it emerged that his government had backed its strong words with concrete action, cancelling a €700 million ($825 million) contract for Israeli-designed rocket launchers. This move, following an earlier announcement of measures aimed at stopping what it called “the genocide in Gaza,” demonstrates a willingness to leverage economic and diplomatic tools that other EU capitals have avoided.

Sánchez, a master political survivalist, has not undergone a grand ideological conversion to anti-interventionism. Instead, he has proven highly adept at reading and navigating domestic political currents. His government’s stance on Israel and Palestine is a pragmatic reflection of his coalition that depends on the support of the left for which this is a non-negotiable priority.

This instinct for pragmatic divergence extends beyond Gaza. Sánchez has flatly refused to commit to NATO’s target of spending 5% of GDP on defense demanded by the U.S. President Donald Trump and embraced by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, citing budgetary constraints and social priorities.

Furthermore, Spain has courted a role as a facilitator between great powers. This ambition was realized when Madrid hosted a critical high level meeting between U.S. and Chinese trade officials on September 15 — a meeting Trump lauded as successful while reaffirming “a very strong relationship” between the U.S. and China. This outreach is part of a consistent policy; Sánchez’s own visit to Beijing, at a time when other EU leaders like the high representative for foreign policy Kaja Kallas were ratcheting up anti-Chinese rhetoric, signals a deliberate pursuit of pragmatic economic ties over ideological confrontation.

Yet, for all these breaks with the mainstream, Sánchez’s foreign policy is riddled with a fundamental contradiction. On Ukraine, his government remains in alignment with the hardline Brussels consensus. This alignment is most clearly embodied by his proxy in Brussels, Iratxe García Pérez, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament. In a stark display of this hawkishness, García Pérez used the platform of the State of the Union debate with the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to champion the demand to outright seize frozen Russian sovereign assets.

This reckless stance, which reflects the EU’s broader hawkish drift on Ukraine, is thankfully tempered only by a lack of power to implement it, rendering it largely a symbolic act of virtue signaling. The move is not just of dubious legality; it is a significant error in statecraft. It would destroy international trust in the Eurozone as a safe repository for assets. Most critically, it would vaporize a key bargaining chip that could be essential in securing a future negotiated settlement with Russia. It is a case of ideological posturing overriding strategic calculation.

This contradiction reveals the core of Sánchez’s doctrine: it is circumstantial, not convictional. His breaks with orthodoxy on Israel, defense spending and China are significant, but driven, to a large degree, by the necessity of domestic coalition management. His alignment on Ukraine is the path of least resistance within the EU mainstream, requiring no difficult choices that would upset his centrist instincts or his international standing.

Therefore, Sánchez is no Spanish De Gaulle articulating a grand sovereigntist strategic vision. He is a fascinating case study in the fragmentation of European foreign policy. He demonstrates that even within the heart of the Western mainstream which he represents, dissent on specific issues like Gaza and rearmament is not only possible but increasingly politically necessary.

However, his failure to apply the same pragmatic, national interest lens to Ukraine — opting instead for the bloc’s thoughtless escalation — proves that his policy is more a product of domestic political arithmetic than coherent strategic vision. He is a weathervane, not a compass — but even a weathervane can indicate a shift in the wind, and the wind in Spain is blowing away from unconditional Atlanticism.

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