How Trump's Board of Peace is set up for a multibillion dollar fail

On February 19, the Board of Peace will host its inaugural meeting in Washington, DC. President Trump said it will be “the greatest and most prestigious… ever assembled.”

Yet, due to its excessive ambitions and questionable legitimacy, the Board of Peace could entangle the U.S. in intractable crises and erode Washington’s influence.

Although the Board was initially conceived to address the Gaza crisis, its newly released Charter criticizes “institutions that have too often failed” and “seeks to promote stability, restore lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict."

Thus, as President Trump suggested, the Board of Peace targets the U.N., which Washington regards as a bloated bureaucracy rife with ideological bias.

Yet those wide-ranging ambitions could prove a foreign policy distraction for Washington, honing in on issues that have no real bearing on vital U.S. interests. For example, Trump has already expressed his desire to resolve the Egypt-Ethiopia conflict over the Grand Renaissance Dam, implied that the Board might assume some of the responsibilities of the 66 international organizations that Washington left in early 2026, and claimed that it could “do pretty much whatever [its members] want to do.”

The risk of overstretch is compounded by the Board’s questionable ability to deliver. The informal and exclusive nature of minilateral organizations has consistently led to suboptimal efficiency and insufficient legitimacy.

But the Board of Peace’s characteristics may exacerbate this problem. Although its charter promised “more nimble and effective” approaches, it lacks enforcement, dispute-resolution, and accountability mechanisms, as well as a structure that enables good governance.

Excessive personalization is equally problematic. President Trump determines who receives membership invitations, controls the Board’s finances, sets the agenda, can veto decisions, and can expel executive board members. He could be replaced only if he resigns or is unanimously declared incapacitated, and he alone can appoint a new chair.

Moreover, Trump has offered executive positions to controversial figures, including former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a co-architect of the Iraq War, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is under investigation by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.

This centralization of power could undermine the Board’s status as an impartial arbiter.

The Board of Peace could also suffer from its reluctance to even display “the illusion of fairness” in international relations.

Admittedly, the U.S. often used international law and the so-called “rules-based order” to protect its hegemony. When rules conflicted with its interests, it often bypassed them, including by abusing its U.N. Security Council veto or pursuing election interference, coups, and assassinations against sovereign states.

The Board of Peace seems set to further this trend. It largely omits post-World War II international principles, including national sovereignty, self-determination, and equal rights.

Additionally, many of the world’s most unstable and underdeveloped countries have not received invitations. However, most would struggle to pay the $1 billion fee required of states that wish to remain members after three years.

Those features have curtailed the Board’s appeal. Although important countries including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Israel have accepted Trump’s invitation, about 40 of the 60 states that Washington has courted have not yet joined.

China, Russia, and India are noncommittal. Even if they changed their minds, they may still prioritize the U.N., where they have greater influence. Likewise, most European democracies have kept their distance, largely due to concerns about the U.N. and Moscow’s potential membership.

Moreover, the Board’s Sunni Arab members accepted Trump’s invitation solely to resolve the Gaza crisis.

Those limitations may undermine the Board’s legitimacy, especially in disputes involving non-members or global issues.

The Board of Peace could even erode America’s interests. For instance, its hostility toward the U.N. could further strain the organization’s finances and prompt other countries to neglect it. Yet despite these challenges, U.N. missions have helped stabilize entire regions at relatively low cost, a fact the Trump administration occasionally acknowledged.

As such, the U.N.’s decline could destabilize multiple regions, exposing American lives and assets while pressuring Washington to consider more costly forms of involvement.

The Board’s questionable stance on principles could inflame tensions and violence. For instance, the Palestinians’ underrepresentation relative to Israel could undermine the next phase of the Gaza peace process, which will unfold in a volatile context, entail complex disarmament and reconstruction, and include an International Stabilization Force under American supervision.

More broadly, as it further erodes the legitimacy that underpinned Washington's international influence, the Board of Peace could incentivize other countries to pursue alternative partnerships that exclude the U.S. and to oppose Washington more vigorously.

Instead of a self-defeating global vision, Washington should refocus the Board of Peace on implementing its embattled Gaza peace agenda in a legitimate and sustainable manner.