A National Security Council official said Tuesday that sanctions on Russia have created an “opportunity” for U.S. arms makers to find new buyers.
“Just as a practical matter, countries that have heretofore relied on Russian equipment are going to find it very difficult to get even basic supplies coming through because of this weakened defense industrial base,” Cara Abercrombie, the NSC’s coordinator for defense policy and arms control, said at a defense industry conference.
Abercrombie added that U.S. weapons manufacturers need to be “ready to go” in order to seize the opportunity, noting that the government is “looking at opportunities to provide countries what they need.”
The comments seem to show that President Joe Biden is interested in expanding Washington’s dominance in the global arms trade. U.S. arms makers accounted for 39 percent of that market last year, while Russian companies made up about 19 percent of global exports.
While the official did not specify which countries the defense industry should aim for, the biggest potential target is India, which received more than 23 percent of Russian weapons exports between 2016 and 2020. The U.S. has reportedly begun pressuring India to wean off of Russian arms, and American officials claim that New Delhi has been receptive to their arguments about finding new weapons dealers.
Other leading buyers of Russian weapons include China, Algeria, Egypt, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Iraq, some of which are already recipients of U.S. arms.
Connor Echols is the managing editor of the Nonzero Newsletter and a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
Top photo credit: Donald Trump (Anna Moneymaker/Shutterstock) Volodymyr Zelensky (miss.cabul/Shutterstock) and Vladimir Putin (paparazzza/Shuttterstock)
The Trump administration has reportedly taken an essential step towards a peace settlement in Ukraine. It has stopped calling for an unconditional early ceasefire — which the Russians have always rejected — and instead offered concrete and detailed terms to Moscow.
If as reported these terms include recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Donbas, this makes excellent sense. It has been obvious since the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023 that Ukraine cannot recover these territories either by force or through negotiation.
Far better to draw a line under this issue rather than allow it to fester — especially since it is clear that most of the population of Crimea and much of that of the Donbas do not want to return to Ukraine.
Swapping the remainder of Ukrainian-held Donbas for Russian-held territory elsewhere, as Trump has apparently proposed, would be deeply painful for Kyiv, and has already been rejected by President Zelensky. He is also encouraging European leaders to reject it. However, Russia has already captured most of the region and is now very close to taking the key town of Pokrovsk.
If the war continues, it is reasonable to assume that Russia will take the rest of the Donbas in the year to come. If Ukraine rejects this deal, and Trump ends U.S. aid to Ukraine, Russia will likely take very much more. However painful, accepting this part of the deal is therefore the wise and patriotic choice for Ukraine — though only if Russia moderates other demands.
Crucial issues still remain unanswered. Russia has always categorically demanded Ukrainian neutrality. Will Moscow be satisfied with a mere statement by Trump that NATO membership for Ukraine is permanently excluded? Or will it demand that the Ukrainian parliament re-install the commitment to neutrality that formed part of the Ukrainian constitution before 2014?
Will Russia demand that NATO formally rescind the proposal for long-term Ukrainian NATO membership announced by NATO in 2008? If so, to push this through would take huge pressure on Ukraine and Europe by the Trump administration.
Meanwhile, Russia will need drastically to scale back its demands for Ukrainian "denazification" and demilitarization", which in their extreme form would mean Ukrainian regime change and disarmament — which no government in Kyiv could or should accept.
If compromise can be reached on these issues, then the Russian, Ukrainian, and European governments would all be extremely foolish to reject a deal.
If Russia chooses to snub Trump, it would commit itself to the search for complete victory, which may be unattainable. It would also lose a unique opportunity to restore decent relations with the United States moving forward.
If Ukraine rejects the terms, it would most probably forfeit future U.S. military and financial aid, and be forced to rely on far more limited help from Europe. Even if Ukraine could continue to retreat slowly rather than collapsing, no future peace deal would bring better terms. In both Russia and Ukraine, opinion polls show majorities of the population anxious for an early peace.
As to the European governments, if they block a peace settlement they will commit themselves to support Ukraine indefinitely without the U.S. — something that their own populations are increasingly opposed to.
There is no perfect settlement to end this war. The one now apparently taking shape does, however, look about right in terms of what could realistically be achieved. For the sake of the tens or hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians who will die if the war continues, all parties have a duty to abandon maximalist dreams.
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Top image credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com
President Donald Trump has announced he will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska next week to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. As of this writing there are early reports that a framework deal is shaping up that would begin with Ukraine ceding territory in the Donbas to Russia, even land it now partially controls.
Trump deserves great credit for acting to advance the end of the war. If reports today are true he has abandoned the sanctions he threatened and is still determined to seek a compromise “deal” required to end the war in Ukraine -- which has been stalemated for nearly three years and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
The problem is, so far, his administration has been proceeding in an ad hoc, improvised fashion, seemingly ignoring the modern history of successful U.S.-supported mediation of violent conflicts.
Beginning in February, the president and his aides proposed a month-long cease-fire. Yet enduring suspensions of hostilities are generally a result of, rather than a precondition for, peace negotiations. Recent examples include Bosnia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, and Sudan.
Trump later appeared to back off when Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose forces are on the move, posed stiff political conditions. U.S. officials have met separately with the Ukrainian and Russian leaders, spurning potentially useful collaboration with affected countries in Europe and the Global South.
Confronting the adversaries’ diametrically opposed peace plans, the administration prematurely offered its own one-page proposal and pushed three unaccompanied, unproductive meetings between Russian and Ukrainian officials — all to little or no avail.
Venting his frustration, Trump has swung from threatening to abandon his peace initiative, to pausing military and intelligence aid to Ukraine, to restoring that assistance, promising new, largely defensive weapons, and threatening 100% tariffs on countries doing business with Russia unless Putin agrees to an undefined “deal” within an unrealistic 10-12 days. As that deadline came and went, Trump is heralding his upcoming one-on-one with Putin. But Secretary of State Marco Rubio cautions that the president’s most important role will be to “come in at the end [of a negotiation] and close on it.” Yet, as of today, no negotiation process has been established.
The overall impression is one of an ill-thought out, pell-mell initiative that has a good chance of failing.
It doesn’t have to be this way. Whether because of Trump’s inexperience with peacemaking and impatience or State Department amnesia, the administration is failing to apply lessons in peacemaking bequeathed by four past presidents. As numerous scholars have detailed, under Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush the U.S. successfully promoted a dozen, enduring mediated settlements of complex, bitter internal and interstate conflicts in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Namibia-Angola, Northern Ireland, and Sudan. Three of these wars — in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Sudan — killed more people than the up to 350,000 estimated to have died so far in Ukraine.
In every one of these cases, there was initial uncertainty — as there has been in Ukraine — that one or more parties were really ready to negotiate an end to the conflict. Yet that did not deter the peacemakers. In each instance, success was eventually achieved following the formal establishment of a unique peace-making structure (or series of structures) led by a relatively neutral third-party mediator deploying professional skills. The latter could be a regional organization, a United Nations body, one or more governments, even a non-governmental organization.
A rich literature, including many first person accounts, describes how the mediators nurtured peace agreements in conflicts that were either “ripe for resolution” — meaning the parties appeared to perceive they could not win, and the costs of continuing the war were higher than those of a potential settlement — or needed further ripening as circumstances on the ground became clearer.
What did these mediators actually do? They regularly summoned the combatants to participate in direct negotiations or “proximity talks,” listened carefully to their concerns, explicated their differences to the parties, and worked to find an even-handed middle ground. They determined how to incorporate the combatants’ sponsors and other important countries and regional groups into the discussions as “friends” of the undertaking. They arranged technical assistance to implement agreed peace plans. By gradually developing a degree of political and personal trust among the participants, they reduced their fears and gave them a sense of joint ownership of a political dialogue.
They also built an architecture for achieving consensus: ordering meeting agendas, setting target dates for decisions, determining at what point to bring up a cease-fire and when to insist that the parties accept their recommended compromise or be blamed for the collapse of the entire effort.
As the process moved forward, the mediators and their “friends” utilized various forms of leverage on the adversaries. Most often, these carrots and sticks involved economic and military resources (including the provision of neutral international peacekeepers). These incentives and threats were particularly effective because they were wielded in the context of ongoing political negotiations where the participants and their state sponsors were beginning to at least grasp the possibility of a satisfactory political alternative to continued fighting. In the absence of such talks, “tough” unilateral measures — such as the additional sanctions proposed by President Trump against Russia and its trading partners — are likely to be less impactful.
Notwithstanding this impressive diplomatic record of replacing violent conflict in sensitive regions with sustainable political arrangements, there is no guarantee that mediation will work in Ukraine. For example, it ultimately failed to achieve peace in Rwanda, Angola, and Syria. But this was largely due to flaws in the settlements or weaknesses in international cooperation or enforcement. A further caution: the negotiation process takes time, usually as at least two years, although cease-fires may be achieved well before then. Yet, this is the best model we have for treating such conflicts.
The Trump administration should move beyond its current ad hoc approach to securing a “deal” on Ukraine. Its priority should be to bring the conflict under a structured mediation led by the U.S., accompanied by key European actors and the Global South (including interested countries like Brazil, India, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates). Convening the combatants should not be difficult as they have met with each other several times during the course of the war.
If he could only draw some lessons from recent American history, Donald Trump might earn himself a shot at winning his coveted Nobel Peace Prize.
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Eduardo Bolsonaro (right) in front of the White House (You Tube /screenshot)
On August 1, the Trump administrationimposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian imports, sending high-volume sectors like coffee, beef, and textile companies scrambling to adjust to their new reality. The tariffs came on the back of a lobbying campaign from an unlikely source — Brazil itself. Whereas other foreign entities are lobbying the U.S. government to reduce their tariffs, allies of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro asked for more.
Eduardo Bolsonaro, financed by ex-president father Jair Bolsonaro, is the main catalyst behind the lobbying efforts. And by not registering his activities, Eduardo Bolsonaro may be running afoul of the U.S. foreign lobbying laws.
For several months, the younger Bolsonaro has been lobbying the White House and the U.S. Congress to carry out a maximum pressure campaign of tariffs and sanctions against his own country over the Brazilian authorities’ prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro. The primary target of Eduardo Bolsonaro’s campaign is Alexandre de Moraes, the Brazilian Supreme Court Justice leading the investigations into the ex-president.
The elder Bolsonaro is accused of attempting a coup in 2022 to remain in office, which allegedly included a plot to poison President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva and assassinate Moraes. Citing a flight risk, Moraes ordered Bolsonaro to wear an ankle monitor, a move the ex-president called a “supreme humiliation." On Monday, the Brazilian Justice went a step further, placing Jair Bolsonaro under house arrest after he violated a court order prohibiting the use of social media.
Nicknamed “Number Three” by his father as if assigning ranks in a battalion, Eduardo Bolsonaro moved to the U.S. in March and quickly became the family’s chief emissary and lobbyist abroad. Alongside Paulo Figueiredo, the grandson of Brazil’s last military dictator, Eduardo Bolsonaro has metwith U.S. lawmakers, including chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Brian Mast (R-Fla.), co-president of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Chris Smith (R-N.J.), and Republican Assistant Whip Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-Fla.). Eduardo Bolsonaro has also bragged about his close relationship with the White House itself.
A week after a meeting on May 14 between Eduardo Bolsonaro’s entourage and Rep. Cory Mills (R-F who asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a hearing if he would consider sanctions against Moraes. “That is under review, and there’s a strong possibility that it could happen,” replied Rubio.
Trump seemingly took the call to action seriously, escalating the stakes far beyond targeted sanctions. On July 9, he sent a letter to President Lula announcing the tariffs. “Due in part to Brazil’s insidious attacks on Free Elections, and the fundamental Free Speech Rights of Americans, starting on August 1, 2025, we will charge Brazil a Tariff of 50% on any and all Brazilian products sent into the United States,” Trump declared.
Eduardo Bolsonaro immediately celebrated the 50% tariffs — referring to them as the “Moraes Tariff” — and responded with a video on his YouTube channel taking credit. “Over the past few months, we have maintained intense dialogue with officials from President Trump's administration, always aiming to accurately and document the reality Brazil is experiencing today,” he said. “The letter from the president of the United States only confirms our success in conveying what we have been presenting to Brazil with seriousness and responsibility.”
Days before the tariffs set in, Trump also imposedMagnitsky sanctions on Moraes, freezing any assets the Brazilian Justice has under U.S. jurisdiction and preventing him from using credit cards backed by U.S. financial companies. Once again, Eduardo Bolsonaro celebrated the decision and took credit. “When I exiled myself to the U.S., I made my intention very clear: to sanction Alexandre de Moraes,” he said. “Today, I have the feeling of a mission accomplished.”
Moraes alleges that Eduardo Bolsonaro’s campaign in the U.S. is being bankrolled by his father with the objective of “shaking the country's economy.” Jair Bolsonaro has reportedly sent around $350,000 to his son. “I put money in [Eduardo’s] hands, quite a lot,” Bolsonaro acknowledged in May, around the same time Eduardo Bolsonaro’s lobbying campaign ramped up.
To date, Eduardo Bolsonaro has not registered as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), the U.S. foreign lobbying law. As an elected official to Brazil’s National Congress, Eduardo Bolsonaro could qualify for an exemption from registering as a foreign agent. However, Josh Rosenstein, a FARA expert and partner at Sandler Reiff, explained to RS that to do so, the State Department needs to recognize his role as an elected official and interpret his actions as within the scope of his duties.
A State Department spokesperson told RS in an email that the agency had not received a notification from Eduardo Bolsonaro or the Brazilian government that his lobbying actions fall under official government activity.
“Absent the form or some similar official notification to the State Department, FARA's regulations are clear that the exemption is unavailable,” explained Rosenstein. The Department of Justice, which, under the Trump administration, has reserved FARA charges only for instances of “traditional espionage,” is unlikely to ask Eduardo Bolsonaro to register as a foreign agent.
Eduardo Bolsonaro's lobbying campaign for sanctions and tariffs succeeded — perhaps too much. His political gambit could backfire, as some would-be allies are already blaming the Bolsonaros for the new tariffs, leaving the family increasingly politically isolated. A new AtlasIntel and Bloomberg poll shows Lula’s approval rating is now at over 50% for the first time since October 2024, having steadily climbed since Trump’s initial tariff threats.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has given the cold shoulder to the actual Brazilian government.
In a recent interview with the New York Times, Lula said that it has been impossible to contact Trump about the tariffs. “I designated my vice president, my agriculture minister, my economy minister, so that each can talk to their counterpart to understand what the possibility for conversation was. So far, it hasn’t been possible…So I hope that civility returns to the Brazil-U.S. relationship.”
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