In response to a question about foreign reports that he is ordering U.S. troops out of Syria, Trump said Thursday that he did not know where that came from, however, he added, "we're not involved in Syria. Syria is in its own mess. They've got enough messes over there. They don't need us involved."
Earlier this week, Israeli official broadcasting channel Kan reported that “senior White House officials conveyed a message to their Israeli counterparts indicating that President Trump intends to pull thousands of US troops from Syria.” The news was picked up by a number of foreign news outlets, but was ignored here in the U.S.
During a Q&A with reporters after an Executive Order signing session (about 13:19 in the video) at the Oval Office Thursday, Trump was asked about the report. He did not seem surprised, but was curt in his answer nonetheless. “I don’t know who said that, but we’ll make a determination on that."
The United States reportedly has some 2,000 troops in Syria, which is reeling from the December fall of Bashar al-Assad's government and the takeover of former Al-Qaeda linked militants HTS. The U.S. has been manning outposts in the northeastern part of the country throughout the Syria civil war, ostensibly to fight ISIS and provide assistance to the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces, which are in charge of detention camps housing ISIS fighters. The U.S. has been conducting numerous airstrikes and raids against ISIS targets there, including the reported killing of "Muhammad Salah al-Za'bir, a senior operative in the terrorist organization Hurras al-Din (HaD), an Al-Qaeda affiliate" in a "precision airstrike in Northwest Syria" as reported by Central Command on Thursday.
But critics are hoping that Trump will "determine" that the troops on the ground are if anything in harm's way and need to come home, as he did in 2018 when he was last president and was thwarted by his own Pentagon. Since then the landscape has become more murky and volatile and critics are concerned that Washington will see the turnover in power in Syria as justification to stay longer.
“Arguing for an indefinite U.S. troop presence in Syria both overstates U.S. influence and ties troops to uncontrollable conditions,” said Quincy Institute Middle East Fellow Adam Weinstein, who is also a Marine Corps veteran of the Afghanistan War.
“Syrians have taken back their country and Washington should respond with diplomacy and sanctions relief rather than indefinite troop deployments," he added. “ISIS is largely degraded, Assad’s regime is gone, diplomatic outreach to the new leadership in Damascus is underway, and Iran’s proxy forces have taken a severe beating. There’s little reason why U.S. troops should remain in Syria.”
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Top photo credit: President Donald Trump signs two executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on Thursday, January 30, 2025. The first order formally commissioned Christopher Rocheleau as deputy administrator of the FAA. The second ordered an immediate assessment of aviation safety. Photo by Bonnie Cash/Pool/Sipa USA
Transatlanticism’s sternest critics all too often fail to reckon with the paradox that this ideology has commanded fervent devotion since the mid-20th century not because it correctly reflects the substance of U.S.-European relations or U.S. grand strategy but precisely because it exists in a permanent state of unreality.
We were told that America’s alliances have “never been stronger” even as the Ukraine war stretched them to a breaking point. Meanwhile, Europeans gladly, if not jubilantly, accepted the fact that Europe has been rendered poorer and less safe than at any time since the end of WWII as the price of “stopping Putin,” telling themselves and their American counterparts that Russia’s military or economic collapse is just around the corner if only we keep the war going for one more year, month, week, or day.
Perhaps the biggest and cruelest lie of all, one stemming back to the tragic conceit of Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to remake post-1918 Europe on the basis of his Fourteen Point program, is the naively millenarian sentiment that the balance of power and hard power realities are relics of a less enlightened age, replaced by the universal dictates of liberal democracy.
So it is that top Western leaders and thinkers convinced themselves that a war-torn country which is entirely dependent on Western military, financial, and humanitarian aid — which could sustain its own war effort for barely several months, if even that, if the aid was to stop — should actually be treated as a wholly independent actor capable of making its own foreign policy decisions completely untethered from the aspirations, priorities, and convictions of its Western backers.
The Trump administration’s snap decision to freeze U.S. aid to Ukraine has drawn no shortage of incredulous reactions, but there is a sense in which it was always bound to end this way. After years of willful, destructive dereliction by the previous administration, the dog is finally reasserting control of its tail in a way that cannot but shock and dismay those, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who’ve come to believe that the Zelensky government can forever adhere to its unrealistic victory plans and peace formulas, forever exercise a veto on any form of diplomatic engagement between Russia and the West, and forever sustain Western support even as Russia’s growing battlefield advantages approach critical mass.
President Volodymyr Zelensky sought to prosecute the war as long as it takes to secure what he sees as credible security guarantees, centering on soliciting NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine or securing Ukraine’s outright NATO membership. The Trump administration, by stark distinction, made clear early on its goal of facilitating a negotiated end to the Ukraine war in a way that does not entail the extension of any concrete U.S.-backed security guarantees.
Zelensky hurriedly responded to the freeze by appearing to walk back his maximalist position on security guarantees and willingness to negotiate with Russia, but it remains to be seen whether this change in tone will translate into a meaningful change in Ukraine’s diplomatic strategy.
This is not, nor has it ever been, a contest between evenly leveraged partners. Ukraine relies overwhelmingly on U.S. military assistance, including the provision of Starlink internet services, and intelligence sharing to sustain its military effort. Any speculation that the Europeans can inherit America’s share of that burden and indefinitely fund Ukraine in Washington’s absence will quickly run up against the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies that required Washington to take a leading role as Ukraine’s supplier in the first place.
On that score, it is no accident that, in spite of surging political will among European leaders to do something, all the European plans presented thus far hinge on the U.S. acting as a security backstop in a way that, to one degree or another, secures America’s explicit, binding commitment to go to war against Russia over Ukraine, something that the Obama and Biden administrations themselves repeatedly rejected, and is opposed by large majorities in every NATO country.
The situation has escalated to this point because Ukraine, flanked by the UK, France, and other European players, has refused to heed the Trump administration’s repeated statements and signals on these issues. The administration has therefore unsurprisingly turned up the pressure on Zelensky, sending its strongest signal yet that continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine amid Russia’s invasion is conditional on Kyiv engaging as a good faith participant in a negotiated track with Moscow.
The decision to freeze, rather than terminate, aid appears to be consistent with a strategy not to wash its hands of Ukraine, which would be counterproductive to ending this war and detract from Washington’s larger goal of securing some kind of detente with Moscow, but to exercise U.S. leverage in a way that facilitates meaningful progress in negotiations. It also ensures that the U.S. does not simply relinquish one of its main sources of leverage over Russia, a point that will become increasingly important when the negotiations progress to discussion of contentious topics, particularly on the territorial question, where Moscow maintains its own set of maximalist demands which will likely need to be watered down to achieve a viable, durable peace.
To be sure, it is regrettable that the dissonance between Washington and Kyiv has reached a point where this kind of move is seen as necessary, and there is an inherent risk that this kind of direct compellence against Ukraine can inadvertently strengthen Russia’s hand both on and off the battlefield. This risk will have to be mitigated by vigorous behind-the-scenes diplomacy to reassure Kyiv that Washington’s goal to end the war is intended to benefit Ukraine, not throw it under the bus, and that the U.S. is in it for the long haul when it comes achieving a durable peace that all the parties can live with.
The idea of supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes” with no explicit strategic goal whilst Russia slowly grinds down the country was neither sustainable nor ethical. Over the past three years, the West continually abdicated its outsized share of ownership over diplomacy to end the war by dressing up its strategic paralysis in hollow moralistic slogans. This administration recognizes Washington’s role as a central driver of events and seeks to wind down this war in a way that doesn’t just serve U.S. interests but puts postwar Ukraine in a position to recover and eventually flourish while promoting a broader stability in Europe.
This will require careful, sustained diplomacy with all three stakeholders — Ukraine, Russia, and Europe — and the surgical juxtaposition of sticks and carrots in service of a larger incentive structure that gives everyone a long-term peace.
The administration is now moving with full recognition that the status quo on Ukraine is and has always been unviable, but this realization should be coupled with a deliberate, nuanced, and patient approach, one that extends beyond a ceasefire, to work toward a reinvigorated architecture of European security with the goal of ensuring that nothing like the catastrophe that has played out since 2022 can reoccur.
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Top Image Credit: A Nigerien soldier walks out of a house that residents say a Boko Haram militant had forcefully seized and occupied in Damasak March 24, 2015 (Reuters/Joe Penny)
Insinuations by a U.S. member of Congress that American taxpayers’ money may have been used to fund terrorist groups around the world, including Boko Haram, have prompted Nigeria’s federal lawmakers to order a probe into the activities of USAID in the country’s North East.
Despite assurances by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Richard Mills, who said in a statement that “there was no evidence that the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, was funding Boko Haram or any terrorist group in Nigeria,” Nigeria’s lawmakers appear intent on investigating.
No doubt, a probe into Nigeria’s long drawn counter-terrorism operation is long overdue. Since 2009 with the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, billions of dollars have poured into the North East, an area the size of New England, ostensibly to assist aid groups providing vital humanitarian relief for civilians caught in the rapidly degenerating security landscape.
This vital aid has now stopped due to Washington’s decision to freeze foreign assistance for 90 days. According to the U.N., a total of $910 million is required this year alone to respond to the humanitarian needs of 3.6 million people in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in northeast Nigeria.
It would not be the first time we have heard accusations of this nature. What is different, however, this time around is that the current furor risks distracting from the real problem: Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram. Over the years, Nigeria’s military have been increasingly unable to contend with the insurgency’s extraordinary resilience.
As recently as January, General Christopher Musa, Nigeria’s Chief of Defense Staff, told Al Jazeera, “as we speak, over 120,000 Boko Haram members have surrendered, and most of them came with hard currency. How did they get it? How are they funded? How did they get the training? How did they get the equipment?… How are they able to sustain themselves for 15 years? That is one question I think everybody should ask themselves.”
These are tough questions that Nigeria’s military and intelligence services claim to have no means of answering. Hence aid groups, flush with foreign currencies, have become easy scapegoats. In October 2019, the Nigerian army banned two NGOs — Action Against Hunger and Mercy Corps — from providing humanitarian services in the North East, accusing them of working with Boko Haram. The groups rejected the accusations, with Action Against Hunger stressing they only deliver “neutral, impartial and independent” aid to the most vulnerable, especially women and children in the North East.
Since fighting began in 2009, approximately 35,000 people have been killed, while 2.5 million people have been displaced from their homes and a further 230,000 people have fled to neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Often, aid workers themselves have been caught in the crossfire, with 37 killed since 2009. In 2018, Médecins Sans Frontières was forced to briefly halt its operations when a deadly strike by Boko Haram fighters on a military base in Borno state killed at least three aid workers. The military base was near a camp hosting about 55,000 internally displaced persons.
Meanwhile, contrary to Nigeria’s chief of defense staff, there appears to be plenty of evidence, dating back to 2014, of where Boko Haram gets its funding. “During this period, Boko Haram relied on local sources of funding, including robberies, kidnappings for ransom, and extortion of communities under their control,” Zagazola Makama, a counterterrorism and security expert in the Lake Chad region, told Responsible Statecraft.
At this point in 2014, Boko Haram controlled 22 out of the 27 local government areas in Borno state in its self-described Islamic caliphate. Several reports have explained that the terrorist group funded its operations from extortion, charitable donations, smuggling, remittances and kidnapping, while also leveraging its control of the ancient Trans-Sahara trading routes to exert tolls on the rural population. Here the terrorist group has established a quasi-economic ecosystem through which it is able to generate significant income from taxing agricultural activities, including fishing and cattle rearing. The group is also able to use old smuggling and trading routes across the Sahel to import arms and mercenaries to sustain its activities.
Indeed, a Dubai-based Boko Haram financing ring consisting of six Nigerians was discovered as recently as 2020. The sophisticated money laundering group was found to have facilitated the transfer of $782,000 from Dubai to Nigeria between 2015 and 2016 to bolster Boko Haram’s operations.
Shortly after, Nigeria’s Financial Intelligence Unit revealed another alleged group of 96 Boko Haram financiers and 424 associates in March 2022. Until now, the Nigerian government has failed to reveal their identities. It’s hard not to believe that the government’s furor over USAID isn’t an attempt to divert attention away from their failures here — as well as their failure in the war against the Islamist insurgency. Despite repeated claims of technically defeating the group, Boko Haram and its splinters, although severely weakened, have retained the ability to deliver deadly strikes on civilian and military targets.
One might also ask why U.S. military aidhasn’t been more effective. Since the U.S. designated Boko Haram and a local splinter group, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2013, U.S. support to Nigeria’s military has increased considerably. Between 2016 and 2020, Washington spent no less than $1.8 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to support Nigeria’s maritime security, military professionalization, and counterterrorism efforts.
Between 2018 and 2022, the United States also authorized the permanent export of over $53 million in defense articles to Nigeria via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process.
That the Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgency continues notwithstanding speaks to a larger crisis, which also includes the blighting socio-economic condition of the North East and Sahel regions, which provide a ready army for recruitment by the group and has left vast spaces ungoverned for dissident groups to thrive.
Operationally, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a combined multinational army comprising military units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria and established in 2014, has suffered frequent operational lapses. Since 2015, the MNJTF has conducted six significant operations. However, many have been short and not always sustained long enough to root out the terrorists or disperse them completely.
Also, the absence of policing capability has become a recurrent problem for the mission. This means that areas initially liberated by fighting units are soon reoccupied by the terrorist groups.
To ignore these vital operational questions to pursue an inquest against relief agencies might seem gratifying for the moment, and possibly even rewarding politically, due to the interest the controversy has generated. But in the long run, it would probably do nothing to strengthen the country’s capacity to rid itself of an insurgency that has lasted for far too long.
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Top image credit: Hezbollah Member of Parliament Ali Fayyad stands in Burj al-Muluk, near the southern Lebanese village of Kfar Kila, where Israeli forces remained on the ground after a deadline for their withdrawal passed as residents sought to return to homes in the border area, Lebanon January 26, 2025. REUTERS/Karamallah Daher
The Lebanese Hezbollah movement is facing unprecedentedly challenging times, having lost much of its senior leadership in its latest war with Israel.
Events in neighboring Syria have further compounded the organizations losses. Not only did Hezbollah lose its main transit route for weapons deliveries with the fall of the Assad dynasty, but it now has to live with the reality of a new leadership in Damascus affiliated with the very same Sunni-extremist groups Hezbollah had fought against in support of the former leadership.
However, the recent funeral procession for the movement’s former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was a stark reminder that it continues to enjoy broad public support. The procession was one of the largest events in Lebanon’s history, with hundreds of thousands of mourners taking to the streets.
Responsible Statecraft sat down with Hezbollah parliamentarian Ali Fayyad to discuss the party’s future following the latest developments. Fayyad has been an active member of Hezbollah since its founding and previously headed its think tank: the Consultative Center for Documentation and Studies.
Fayyad emphasized that under the current circumstances, the organization’s approach is for the Lebanese state to handle the situation with Israel, which continues to occupy parts of Lebanese territory. He is quick to highlight, however, that Lebanon reserves the right to use force, if necessary, in order to end the Israeli occupation. Any talk of integrating Hezbollah militarily into Lebanon’s state institutions is premature, says Fayyad, and hinges on factors like the state building its defensive capabilities.
Regarding the Trump administration’s policies towards Lebanon, the Hezbollah legislator argues that attempts to marginalize Hezbollah will not stabilize Lebanon. He also raises the possibility that Washington may be attempting to stir up a confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Shiite movement, warning of the dire repercussions resulting from such a scenario. Fayyad explained however that the issues Hezbollah has with the United States are not bilateral in nature, but rather stem from U.S. support for Israel and what he terms “unjust hegemony” over world affairs.
On the situation in Syria, he does not shy away from admitting that the fall of former president Bashar Al-Assad was a major setback for the movement, questioning the stance of the new Syrian leadership towards Israel.
Below is the full text of the interview:
RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT: What is the future of Hezbollah after Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah?
ALI FAYYAD: Hezbollah is committed the path of Sayyed Hassan and to the principals and to its resistance role and vision towards the situation in Lebanon and the region. But there were also big shifts that took place in Lebanon and the region that must be taken into consideration, and Hezbollah is heavily focused on understanding these shifts and on contemplating how to deal with them. The charismatic leadership of Sayyed Hassan played a very fundamental role in leading the party and in managing the organization, politically and militarily. Now, under the leadership of the new secretary Sheikh Naim Qassem, it is expected that we will move more towards an institutional type of party rather than the party of a leader. This is consistent with the convictions of the new secretary general.
RS: When we speak about an institution-like party, will this be reflected in more focus on the domestic arena and somewhat lesser focus on the region?
FAYYAD: The issue of the party led by a leader and a party that focuses more on the institutional dimension in decision making has nothing to do with the shifts that took place in the region and in Lebanon. When we talk about shifts, we have that which relates to Lebanon after the document on implementing U.N. resolution 1701 was issued (the latest Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement), and the rampant U.S. attempts to reshape the region. Regarding Lebanon, we underscored our commitment to 1701 and to the implementation measures document. We committed completely to the obligations related to the South of the Litani River, and because the implementation document is concerned with explaining and implementing resolution 1701, its reference and geographical scope is subject to international resolution 1701.
RS: What can we expect from Hezbollah when it has more of an institutional nature?
FAYYAD: The presence of Sayyed Hassan was overwhelming. When he decided anything, this decision would be embraced by everyone given his historic leadership role. Now, the new secretary general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, is more in favor of the institutions playing their role in decision making; now, we have moved more towards a collective institutional leadership that makes decisions based on the internal bureaucracy, the internal institutions.
RS: Is Hezbollah in the process of becoming solely a political party?
FAYYAD: No, Hezbollah, despite the shifts that took place, remains a resistance party on the one hand and a political party on the other. However, every stage requires a different approach when it comes to resistance. Hezbollah remains committed to resistance and considers that it is Lebanon’s right to confront any Israeli aggression. But this current stage, given its unique nature and the shifts that happened, perhaps requires a different approach.
For example, one of the major developments of the current stage was that the Lebanese state stepped forward to manage the situation against the Israeli enemy, and Hezbollah accepted this role and is giving the state the opportunity to take charge of the situation with the Israeli enemy. This doesn’t mean that Hezbollah is no longer committed to its role as a resistance.
RS: The clearer question, which people want to know the answer to is that of arms, because there is this understanding that the ceasefire agreement tacitly includes ultimately getting rid of Hezbollah’s arms.
FAYYAD: I was saying that 1701 geographically refers to the South of the Litani River. Now, regarding the North of the Litani River, the implementation document said that no weapons can be imported and developed. We call on the Lebanese state to exercise its role completely regarding controlling the situation on the borders. We have no problem in this regard, however, everything that is related to the resistance in the North of the Litani River, we consider to be a sovereign issue that concerns the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah calls on the government to reach an understanding regarding the situation in the North of the Litani.
RS: So you view President Joseph Aoun’s call for addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons via dialogue positively?
FAYYAD: This is consistent with what Hezbollah wants.
RS: Should an understanding be reached regarding the weapons, is Hezbollah ready to be integrated into the state militarily?
FAYYAD: It is too early to speak about these issues. There are a number of issues that are intertwined. This issue can’t be dealt with on its own, but rather has to be approached holistically. When I say that, it means it is closely linked to making sure the state is able to exercise its role of defending the land and the people in Lebanon.
RS: There are five positions which Israel still occupies in Lebanon. How will Hezbollah deal with this should the state fail in addressing this issue?
FAYYAD: We consider that this stage — the stage of implementing the measures of 1701— we consider it to be the responsibility of the state and we are closely following the situation. When the state reaches a dead end, we call on it to assess the situation and identify the opportunities and to look into the options that will liberate the territory. But in any case, the Israelis being in five points is something which we consider to be occupation and this gives Lebanon the right to use all possible means to liberate these occupied territories. This is the exact same official Lebanese stance because the meeting of the three leaders (the president, prime minister and parliament speaker) in Baabda (the Lebanese presidential palace). … When the Israelis announced that they will stay in Lebanese territories, the three leaders met and issued a very important statement announcing that the Israeli presence in this area is occupation and Lebanon has the right to use all possible means to liberate these territories.
RS: All possible means, does this include armed resistance?
FAYYAD: The term “all possible means,” which was included in the Taif Agreement and in the Cabinet manifestos for many years, and was reintroduced in the presidential statement, means diplomatic and non-diplomatic means.
RS: I am getting a sense that there is a kind of optimism towards this government bearing in mind that we know what happened with the Iranian planes (Lebanon’s top officials have decided to halt direct flights between Tehran and Beirut indefinitely after Israeli threats). Are you optimistic in light of what happened?
FAYYAD: We think that this Lebanese government deserves to be given an opportunity to prove itself and to show that it is able to fulfill the promise made in the Cabinet manifesto. It said the priority is to liberate the land and defend the people. It also said this is the state’s main role,and it is true there is no meaning of state sovereignty without being able to protect the people and land. Number two, this government promised to rescue, reform and rebuild the state, and we are completely ready to cooperate in both issues
RS: How does the party view the American role, specifically the Trump administration? The American envoy (U.S. Deputy Middle East envoy Morgan Ortagus) said Hezbollah has been defeated and must be excluded from the government. What is your stance regarding these statements and the Trump administration more broadly?
FAYYAD: These stances are irresponsible, and they are an intervention in Lebanese internal affairs, in addition to the fact that they don’t take into consideration the sensitivities and the delicate foundations on which Lebanese political stability is based. They put pressure on the Lebanese state more than it can take and therefore don’t help in achieving stability and recovery.
Hezbollah is the most popular political movement in Lebanon and a prominent political player, and it enjoys widespread public support as a resistance. The American stances ignore the will of a large segment of the Lebanese people and a parliamentary block representing Hezbollah elected democratically. Furthermore, these stances look more like media propaganda than actually being a responsible political approach towards the situation in Lebanon, because Ortagus set a condition that Hezbollah not be represented in the government, but while the American envoy was issuing this statement in Baabda, the government was being formed and Hezbollah was part of it. So, Hezbollah is represented with two ministers in the government.
The stances issued by the American administration and the way in which the Americans are approaching Lebanon contradicts the declared American goal that expresses a firm commitment to stability and rebuilding of a strong state in Lebanon. Hezbollah calls on the government and the other factions to discuss the outstanding issues domestically via dialogue. The American stances don’t go in that same direction, but rather their end result would be Lebanese infighting. And we fear that the American goal is for there to be confrontation between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah and its supporters. This is something very dangerous for Lebanon and we don’t want it, and want to avoid it. Rather, we want the best possible ties with the Lebanese army and we support the army.
RS: Since you mentioned this point, how do you view the American support for the Lebanese military?
FAYYAD: Never did we announce a stance rejecting grants, especially in light of the difficult economic and social circumstances. But we always stressed that we place emphasis on the independence of the military institution and it not being hostage to any foreign power, and that foreign aid must not be linked to political conditions.
RS: Wafik Safa (the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit) recently said that the Americans always try to contact the party and meet Hezbollah directly and that this continues to be the case. What is the stance of the party regarding any attempts to establish direct contact with the United States?
FAYYAD: Internationally, we have very good ties with a large number of countries in the world including countries in the EU. But when it comes to the United States, because of its complete alignment with Israel which occupies our territories and committed genocide against the Palestinian people, we have a political stance that rejects establishing any form of contact with the American administration. But we also differentiate between the American administration and American society, whether it be media organizations or academic institutions or activists or intellectuals. There is no problem whatsoever with having such nonofficial meetings between Hezbollah and these parties.
RS: Many say that Hezbollah is a common danger to Israel and the U.S. and go back to the (1983) marine barracks attacks, accusing Hezbollah of being involved in terrorism activity and targeting Americans. But based on what I’m understanding from you, the only problem between the party and the U.S. is the American support for Israel. Is that the case?
FAYYAD: We don’t have bilateral problems with the Americans. The stance towards the Americans is linked first of all to the Palestinian cause and this alignment (with Israel) which ignores human rights and the U.N. laws and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. And as a follow up to this point, this American armed support to Israel which used its weapons to destroy 200,000 (Lebanese) homes in the recent war, and killed the Secretary General (Hassan Nasrallah) with weapons that only America possesses — the bombs weighing 2,000 pounds, and the Israelis admitted this. The Israelis were rearmed recently with 9,000-pound bombs. These kinds of bombs are the heaviest non-nuclear bombs in history. So, the problem with the American administration is this issue first of all and second this intervention in the affairs of other societies and countries, and exercising unjust hegemony over international relations. So, we have two problems, one related to the Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict and the intervention in our internal affairs, and the other related to the American approach towards the global system. This contradicts completely with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points. It also contradicts with all of the constitutional and humanitarian ideals that were established by the founding fathers in the United States.
RS: How do you respond to Hezbollah being accused of pursuing terrorist activities and plans in places like Cyprus and Thailand and other faraway places?
FAYYAD: Hezbollah doesn’t pursue any terrorist activity be it in Lebanon or abroad. Hezbollah openly operates in Lebanon to liberate territories occupied by the Israeli enemy. This right is enshrined in the laws of the United Nations and is one of the basic principles concerning the rights of nations and human societies. And second, we have the right to defend ourselves against the Israeli aggressions. These societies pay a heavy price and are killed in the thousands, and their institutions and homes are destroyed. They are also victims of internationally-banned weapons, like the use of white phosphorus in south Lebanon. If you compare Israel’s losses with those inflicted on us, these losses are almost negligible.
RS: How heavy of a blow were the events in Syria for Hezbollah, and how do you assess the repercussions on Lebanon domestically and on Hezbollah’s supporters, because we saw confrontations on the border (between Lebanon and Syria).
FAYYAD: There’s no doubt that the political transformation which took place in Syria was a major strategic loss, we can’t deny that. We did not support the approach which was taken in regards to the complicated ties between the former Syrian regime and the Syrian people. We don’t support any kind of oppression and corruption or sectarian practices.
RS: Then why did you support the regime?
FAYYAD: Our previous ties with the regime are linked to one specific issue related to the necessity of establishing a balance against Israel in a complicated regional struggle, whereby Israel receives all forms of international support and for the sake of having regional depth. Our ties with the regime were strictly tied to these considerations.
RS: And regarding the confrontations on the boarder?
FAYYAD: Regarding the new leadership in Syria, we are not looking for trouble and we adopt the stance of the Lebanese state that called for balanced ties between the two countries. But we underscore the importance of protecting minorities, respecting freedoms and not having a new oppressive leadership in Syria. We are also keeping an eye on the stance of the new leadership in Syria towards Israel. This stance is confusing and poses a lot of questions, as Israel infiltrated and occupied Syrian territory without any stance taken from the new leadership. This is something strange from every legal and political standpoint which you wouldn’t find in any other country.
The confrontations (on the Lebanese Syrian border) have been linked to smuggling and smuggling gangs, but we believe it is more than that. It aims to put political pressure on Lebanon, and what we want is for the eastern northern borders to be stable.
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