In response to a question about foreign reports that he is ordering U.S. troops out of Syria, Trump said Thursday that he did not know where that came from, however, he added, "we're not involved in Syria. Syria is in its own mess. They've got enough messes over there. They don't need us involved."
Earlier this week, Israeli official broadcasting channel Kan reported that “senior White House officials conveyed a message to their Israeli counterparts indicating that President Trump intends to pull thousands of US troops from Syria.” The news was picked up by a number of foreign news outlets, but was ignored here in the U.S.
During a Q&A with reporters after an Executive Order signing session (about 13:19 in the video) at the Oval Office Thursday, Trump was asked about the report. He did not seem surprised, but was curt in his answer nonetheless. “I don’t know who said that, but we’ll make a determination on that."
The United States reportedly has some 2,000 troops in Syria, which is reeling from the December fall of Bashar al-Assad's government and the takeover of former Al-Qaeda linked militants HTS. The U.S. has been manning outposts in the northeastern part of the country throughout the Syria civil war, ostensibly to fight ISIS and provide assistance to the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces, which are in charge of detention camps housing ISIS fighters. The U.S. has been conducting numerous airstrikes and raids against ISIS targets there, including the reported killing of "Muhammad Salah al-Za'bir, a senior operative in the terrorist organization Hurras al-Din (HaD), an Al-Qaeda affiliate" in a "precision airstrike in Northwest Syria" as reported by Central Command on Thursday.
But critics are hoping that Trump will "determine" that the troops on the ground are if anything in harm's way and need to come home, as he did in 2018 when he was last president and was thwarted by his own Pentagon. Since then the landscape has become more murky and volatile and critics are concerned that Washington will see the turnover in power in Syria as justification to stay longer.
“Arguing for an indefinite U.S. troop presence in Syria both overstates U.S. influence and ties troops to uncontrollable conditions,” said Quincy Institute Middle East Fellow Adam Weinstein, who is also a Marine Corps veteran of the Afghanistan War.
“Syrians have taken back their country and Washington should respond with diplomacy and sanctions relief rather than indefinite troop deployments," he added. “ISIS is largely degraded, Assad’s regime is gone, diplomatic outreach to the new leadership in Damascus is underway, and Iran’s proxy forces have taken a severe beating. There’s little reason why U.S. troops should remain in Syria.”
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Top photo credit: President Donald Trump signs two executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on Thursday, January 30, 2025. The first order formally commissioned Christopher Rocheleau as deputy administrator of the FAA. The second ordered an immediate assessment of aviation safety. Photo by Bonnie Cash/Pool/Sipa USA
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
Cutting the Pentagon’s testing office is nuts
Pentagon weapons are pretty much perfect, which is why Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is slashing the Defense Department’s independent testing office in half.
Just kidding!
Sure, the Pentagon chief issued a memo(PDF) May 27 gutting the place. But unfortunately, with a kennelful of dogs like the multi-service F-35 fighter, the Navy’s Constellation-class frigate, the Marines’ V-22 tilt-rotor, and the Army’s hypersonic Dark Eagle drone, the Pentagon needs more oversight and rigorous testing, not less.
DOT&E is charged with overseeing the testing done by the military services, which tends to be performed with kid gloves. The Project On Government Oversight has been pushing for more thorough weapons testing even before DOT&E’s creation in 1983.
Hegseth has declared war on DEI, but it’s not like these uber-testers are pushing the diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts denounced by the administration (unless you’re talking about diversity of expertise when it comes to testing multi-billion-dollar weapons, taxpayer equity in what they’re buying, and including professionally skeptical outsiders to ensure the biggest bang for the buck).
DOT&E’s annual report is one of the few independent sources of information available on the arcane — but vital — topic. “Hegseth’s memo highlights a key misunderstanding — or rejection — of why Congress created an independent testing office in the first place,” Greg Williams, The Bunker’s boss here at the Project On Government Oversight, said. “The law tries to make sure weapons are evaluated outside the chain of command that develops and promotes them.”
Let’s face it: The Trump administration doesn’t like oversight, whether it’s from universities, law firms, or the press. Last week it challenged the century-old Government Accountability Office, whose solid reports have been a bracing tonic to Pentagon privilege for years.
What’s now unfolding before taxpayers’ green eyeshades is nothing less than internal accountability self-destruction.
Army prematurely pushes platform into production
The U.S. military is always racing to get ahead of … well, something that the fog of future war hides. But the Army is willing to cut corners to get the replacement for its UH-60 Black Hawk to the troops sooner rather than later, even if it means accepting greater risk that it won’t perform as promised.
Basically, the service wants to begin building its new aircraft before prototype flight tests are completed on its recently named MV-75 tiltrotor (previously known as the V-280, and the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft). Improved modeling, MV-75 backers say, will lead to prototypes that will closely match the final design. That means they won’t have to wait, cooling their rotors, for pesky test-pilot reports on what needs fixing before production begins. The Army incredibly predicts this will cut the MV-75’s testing schedule from the typical four to 10 years, to two.
We’ve seen this movie before. It doesn’t end well. Tilt-rotors — well, the Pentagon’s own V-22(PDF) is the only model in production — are notoriously unreliable and, therefore, costly to maintain. Like the V-22, the Pentagon’s F-35(PDF) is flown by three services — the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines. It too has been plagued by cost overruns and delayed deliveries, due in no small part because the Pentagon rushed it into production.
The MV-75 program could end up costing $70 billion. Its accelerated fielding is already making the Army rethink its speed and range “requirements,” which are roughly double those of the Black Hawk. “Rather than pursue perfect, we are pursuing an aircraft that is close to being what we asked for,” Colonel Jeffrey Poquette, the MV-75 program manager says. The Army brass, he adds, would rather get the MV-75 sooner rather than “design yourself to death.”
Missile defense’s red flag on Guam
René Kladzyk here at the Project On Government Oversight had a grim story May 29 about lousy U.S. military barracks on the Pacific island of Guam. In fact, Navy Secretary John Phelan told POGO he was “appalled” and “very upset” after touring them on a recent visit. Alas, it’s only the tip of the iceberg for conditions on the U.S. territory. That’s also where the Pentagon is building an $8 billion missile shield to defend it and Guam’s extensive U.S. military assets against attacks from China and/or North Korea.
President Trump recently declared how good, fast, and cheap “The Golden (née Iron) Dome for America” continental aerial (i.e., more than mere missiles) shield will be. Two days later, the Government Accountability Office told a much different story about the much smaller Guam Defense System (GDS) — including its lack of decent housing. “Guam already faces a housing shortage for military personnel,” the GAO said. The U.S. military population there is projected to grow from 10,000 now to 20,000 in 2033. “GDS planners have expressed doubts about their ability to build housing on time.”
Beyond housing, the watchdog agency tallied a list of what’s missing from Guam to support the personnel who will be needed to tend to its expanded missile-defense system. They range from schools, to medical facilities, to commissaries, to drinking water. In fact, the U.S. is having trouble maintaining the simple missile defense shield currently in place. The Army had to scramble to secure its launchers and radars from a 2023 typhoon, and is leaving “spare parts unprotected outside” leading to “corrosion of spare parts.”
The GAO interviewed Pentagon officials about Guam’s missile defense before Trump unveiled his Golden Dome initiative. They said Guam’s modest missile defense system “will be the department’s largest and most complicated, presenting communication and planning challenges among the various DOD stakeholders.”
The price of maintaining military aircraft is likely to spike as the world’s air forces buy ever more complicated warplanes, Defense News’ Stephen Losey reported May 23.
Small-to-medium companies remain leery of doing business with the Defense Department despite years of effort and legislation designed to expand its industrial base, John A. Tirpak reported May 26 in Air & Space Forces Magazine.
Jamie McIntyre, CNN’s Pentagon correspondent from 1992 to 2008, wrote May 30 of the war now underway between the Pentagon and the reporters who cover it for the Washington Examiner, where he is now a columnist.
Once again, The Bunker is taking next week off. We’ll be back June 18. Kindly consider forwarding this on to colleagues so they can subscribe here.
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Top photo credit: An Abrams M1A2 Main Battle Tank is loaded onto a trailer headed to Vaziani TrainingArea May 5, 2016, in preparation for Noble Partner 16. (Photo by Spc. Ryan Tatum, 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division)
With the stroke of a pen, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has gutted the Pentagon’s weapon testing office.
His order is intended to “eliminate any non-statutory or redundant functions” by reducing the office to 30 civilian employees and 15 assigned military personnel. The order also terminates contractor support for the testing office.
The ostensible reason for the change is to save $300 million at a time when billions are being added to the defense budget.
But any potential savings in the short term will eventually be drastically eclipsed by the money wasted fielding faulty weapons. In fact, this move will end up endangering troops by sending them into combat with gear that has not been properly vetted.
The real problem with this move is simple: reducing the size of the testing office reduces its oversight capacity. The office of Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) maintains an oversight list of all the programs it monitors. The testing office currently has 272 programs in its portfolio including the latest model of the M1A1 Abrams, the B-21 bomber, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier. It will soon also include programs like the F-47, the Navy’s anticipated F/A-xx, plus whatever new systems Silicon Valley creates.
To put this into perspective consider this: to adequately monitor a program like the F-35, the testing office has a civilian action officer covering a slate of related programs. That individual can’t attend all the meetings or review the reams of data generated during the testing events. For support and analysis, DOT&E contracts other civilians with specific expertise. DOT&E works with federally funded research and development centers like the Institute for Defense Analysis, MITRE, Applied Research Associates, and Virginia Tech to provide the manpower to monitor testing events, attend planning meetings, analyze data, and write reports.
With reduced capacity, the testing office will, by necessity, have to rely more on the analysis provided by the military services and the defense industry. Neither are the intended neutral arbiters Congress needs to properly oversee the performance of the Pentagon’s new weapons.
Congress created the testing office in 1983 over the furious objections from both the defense industry and Pentagon leadership. At the time, a bipartisan core of lawmakers believed they were not being told the full truth about the performance of new weapons. They also had plenty of evidence that tests were being compromised. A constant flow of news articles detailing failed weapon tests appeared on the pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times about programs like the Sergeant York air defense gun and the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle.
The saga of the latter has been immortalized in the book and film The Pentagon Wars.
The individual military services each have their own operational test agencies. The Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center, the Navy’s Operational Test & Evaluation Force, Marine Corps Test and Evaluation Activity office, and the Army Test and Evaluation Command conduct the operational test events. The role of DOT&E with its supporting personnel is to help design the tests, ensure they are conducted properly, and then independently analyze and report the results of them.
The entire purpose of operational testing is to determine whether a new weapon is both combat effective and suitable for use with the troops. It’s not good enough for a weapon to work in a controlled laboratory environment. It has to work in the hands of the troops who will operate it and in the conditions in which they fight.
An expert marksman testing a new rifle might be able to hit the bullseye every time on an indoor range. Such a result might lead some people to believe the rifle is effective. But if a soldier takes the same rifle into the field and it immediately jams due to the humidity swells the ammunition by a few microns, the weapon is neither effective or suitable.
It’s better to discover problems like that before the weapon goes into full production and certainly better than when the soldier is in a firefight.
The question of whose interests are really being served must be asked. The best interest of the men and women serving in the ranks is to make sure their weapons and equipment have been thoroughly evaluated before being placed in their hands. The American taxpayers have an interest to see that their hard-earned money isn’t buying weapons that don’t work.
Service leaders have a professional interest to see their pet projects move rapidly through the process. Many of them also have a financial interest because upon their retirement from the military, they take lucrative positions in the defense industry. The industry executives have an interest in making sure the government buys their wares. A testing report showing that a new weapon isn’t performing well threatens the future of a marquee product, hence the animosity towards the testing office.
But ultimately, the military won’t benefit from hollowing out the testing office. While the move may save a few dollars in the short term, the troops will end up paying the price when they end up fighting not only the enemy, but their own faulty gear.
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Top image credit: President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi attends the 34th Arab League summit, in Baghdad, Iraq, May 17, 2025. Hadi Mizban/Pool via REUTERS
As the scorching summer season approaches, Egypt finds itself once again in the throes of an uncomfortable ritual: the annual scramble for natural gas.
Recent reports paint a concerning picture of what's to come, industrial gas supplies to vital sectors like petrochemicals and fertilizers have been drastically cut, some by as much as 50 percent. The proximate cause? Routine maintenance at Israel’s Leviathan mega-field, leading to a significant drop in imports.
But this is merely the latest symptom of a deeper, more chronic ailment. Egypt, once lauded as a rising energy hub, has fallen into a perilous trap of dependence, its national security and foreign policy options increasingly constrained by an awkward reliance on Israeli gas.
For years, the Egyptian government assured its populace and the world of an impending energy bonanza. The discovery of the gargantuan Zohr gas field in 2015, hailed as the largest in the Mediterranean, was presented as the dawn of a new era. By 2018, when Zohr began production, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declared that Egypt had "scored a goal," promising self-sufficiency and even the transformation into a regional gas exporter. The vision was that Egypt, once an importer, would leverage its strategic location and liquefaction plants to become a vital conduit for Eastern Mediterranean gas flowing to Europe.
Billions were poured into new power stations, further solidifying the nation's reliance on gas for electricity generation, which today accounts for a staggering 60 percent of its total consumption.
However, the dream of abundant domestic gas has, like so many ambitious projects in the region, begun to wither. Just three years after its peak, Zohr’s output alarmingly declined. Experts now suggest Zohr’s recoverable reserves may be far less than initially estimated. Furthermore, as Egyptian energy expert Khaled Fouad notes, the political leadership's "impatience" to accelerate production for quick economic returns — especially to capitalize on European demand amid the Russia-Ukraine war — led to technical problems and damage to the wells.
Compounding this internal mismanagement is Egypt’s chronic foreign currency crunch, and the multi-billion dollars in arrears it owes to international oil and gas companies.
These financial troubles have, in turn, curtailed crucial investments in new exploration and the maintenance of existing fields, effectively strangling domestic production. Consequently, by 2023, Egypt had dramatically reverted to being a net natural gas importer, a precipitous swing of over $10 billion from its brief surplus just a year prior. And in 2024, Israeli gas accounted for a dominant 72 percent of Egypt's total gas imports. This growing dependence has, perhaps inevitably, transformed a commercial transaction into a formidable tool of leverage.
The true vulnerability of this arrangement was laid bare following the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023. Israel, citing "security concerns," abruptly forced Chevron, the field’s operator, to shut down production at its Tamar field, causing imports to Egypt to plummet. This marked the first of several disruptions, with another significant cut occurring in May of this year. While officially attributed to maintenance, Egyptian analysts widely interpret these interruptions, coinciding with heightened political tensions due to the Gaza war, as a form of political "blackmail."
This energy dependence has profoundly constrained Egypt's national security and foreign policy calculus, particularly concerning the Gaza conflict. For Cairo, the war next door poses an existential threat due to persistent calls from figures like U.S. President Donald Trump and far-right elements in the Israeli government, for the displacement of Gaza’s population into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.
This prospect, a "red line" for Egypt, is fiercely resisted by Cairo, which views Israel's active push of Gaza's inhabitants towards the Egyptian border as a calculated attempt to extinguish the possibility of a future Palestinian state. In addition to the political fallout for Cairo if realized, such a move would displace upwards of a million Gazans, including Hamas militants, onto Egyptian soil, which would in turn transform Sinai back into a volatile conflict zone.
The region was only recently stabilized after a costly, over decade-long campaign against extremist militants, a campaign in which Hamas, for a period, even provided clandestine aid to some of these groups. The potential for renewed instability could far exceed its previous peak.
In addition to exacerbating security challenges, a mass displacement will also dramatically spike Egypt's domestic energy demands, already strained by the sudden influx of over 1.2 million Sudanese refugees into Egypt since the outbreak of war in Sudan in April 2023, according to Egyptian government estimates.
Furthermore, Egypt's economic and energy vulnerability limits its room for maneuver. The absence of a new Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv, a symbolic gesture of protest against Israel's Gaza offensive, masks the deeper, uncomfortable truth that Cairo’s ability to exert meaningful influence in the ongoing tragedy is severely hampered by its reliance on Israeli energy.
Confronted by these immense pressures, Egypt cannot afford to provoke a direct confrontation that could jeopardize its national security, energy supplies, or critical foreign aid, which has historically been disbursed by the U.S. in direct support of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Instead, Cairo is relying on a combination of military posturing, diplomatic initiatives, and regional alliances to push back against Israeli actions — while being careful not to cross a line that would trigger severe retaliation or broader destabilization.
Faced with this awkward and increasingly untenable predicament, Egypt is now scrambling for alternatives, embarking on a multi-pronged outreach strategy that underscores the desperation of its energy crunch. Capitalizing on its thawing of relations with Turkey, President el-Sisi’s visit to Ankara in September 2024, followed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's reciprocal trip to Cairo in December of the same year, cemented the rapprochement with agreements on energy cooperation, among other areas of shared interest.
Crucially, Egypt has inked a deal for the long-term lease of a Turkish Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) from Höegh Evi Ltd., signaling a sustained reliance on LNG imports for at least a decade. In parallel, Cairo is in advanced talks with Qatar, a global gas giant, for long-term supply contracts.
While these external maneuvers are underway, Egypt is simultaneously intensifying domestic exploration efforts. Minister of Petroleum Karim Badawi recently announced the drilling of 75 wells and 40 new discoveries in the past year, estimated to hold significant, albeit relatively modest, reserves.
However, substantial discoveries take years — typically three to five, especially for offshore fields — to develop and connect to the grid. Renewable energy, championed by Egypt with ambitious targets to meet 42 percent of its electricity demands from green sources by 2035, offers a crucial long-term pathway. But, the upfront investment is immense, and the immediate impact on bridging the current energy deficit is negligible. All these efforts, while necessary, are long-term fixes, offering little respite for the immediate summers to come.
The reliance on Israeli gas, initially framed as an economic boon, has proven to be a strategic liability, eroding Egypt's foreign policy autonomy and tethering its domestic stability to external forces. Achieving true energy self-sufficiency or, at the very least, a diversified and resilient energy mix, will require years of sustained investment, prudent resource management, and a strategic vision that prioritizes national security over short-term economic expediency.
Until then, Egypt remains caught in the current, its fate disproportionately swayed by the flow, or interruption, of gas from its neighbor across the Sinai.
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