With phase one of the Gaza ceasefire’s lapse on Saturday, Israel has cut off goods and supplies from entering Gaza in a move an Israeli source said was “coordinated with the Trump administration."
Israel’s Sunday supplies halt is intended to pressure Hamas into accepting a last-minute proposal it says was engineered by Trump envoy Steve Witkoff. The Trump administration has yet to confirm it’s behind such a proposal, though it’s said it will back whatever actions Israel takes.
In a video announcing the move, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked President Trump for supporting Israel, including its new goods and supplies halt. He also suggested “further steps” could be taken if Hamas doesn’t release the hostages.
“Israel has decided to stop letting goods and supplies into Gaza, something we've done for the past 42 days. We've done that because Hamas steals the supplies and prevents the people of Gaza from getting them,” Netanyahu alleged. “We will take further steps if Hamas continues to hold our hostages. And throughout this, Israel knows that America and President Trump have our back.”
“Thank you again, President Trump!”
Netanyahu said Hamas rejected the new, allegedly U.S. engineered, proposal. But while the original plan called for both sides to negotiate an exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, the new proposal does not mention a release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel. Further, a Hamas official told Drop Site News that Israel’s aid halt announcement came before the group could be briefed about the alleged Witkoff proposal.
Hamas called the move “cheap blackmail, a war crime and a blatant coup against the agreement” in a Sunday statement. Oxfam also called the supplies cut a “a reckless act of collective punishment.”
Hamas says Israel must abide by the original ceasefire terms and start phase two negotiations, which would facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a final end to the war if successful.
In contrast, Israel has chosen to maintain IDF presence in a Egypt-Gaza border region it calls the Philadelphi corridor, in violation of the original ceasefire agreement which dictated that a corridor pull-out would have begun Saturday. According to Hamas, Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire with various attacks in Gaza, reportedly killing 116 Palestinians during what should be a truce.
Meanwhile, with the ceasefire and related negotiations on thin ice, the Trump administration expedited $4 billion in military aid to Israel over the weekend.
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top image credit: Steve Witkoff, the special envoy to the Middle East, makes an appearance moments before President Donald J. Trump holds a joint news conference at the White House with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, 2025. (Photo by Joshua Sukoff/MNS/Sipa USA)
Having spent the past decade telling the British public that Russia poses the biggest ‘immediate threat’ to the United Kingdom, the idea that Britain should get ready to fight China is idiotic and irresponsible.
During a visit to Australia to join HMS Prince of Wales, which is currently leading Carrier Strike Group 25 to Asia,UK Defense Secretary John Healey implied that the UK might be willing to fight China in the Pacific over Taiwan. “If we have to fight, as we have done in the past, Australia and the UK are nations that will fight together. We exercise together and by exercising together and being more ready to fight, we deter better together.”
Rather than staying silent on military engagement over Taiwan, as UK governments have tended to do, Healey is trying to position Britain’s military forces as a deterrent to a resurgent China. This is deluded, and not just because the UK has shown itself unwilling to fight Russia directly over Ukraine.
Russia, as it were, is considered much more of a “threat” to European security than China. But even with Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s pledge of increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 – and it is questionable whether this is affordable given the UK’s fiscal constraints – Britain most certainly isn’t big enough to fight both China and Russia, even if it wanted to.
Indeed, one of the arguments in favor of the U.S. pressuring Europe to foot the bill for ongoing war with Russia in Ukraine, is to allow America to refocus its energies in the Indo-Pacific region. An often and, in my view, distasteful mantra advanced by even the most hawkish US politicians on Russia, is that Ukrainian troops are fighting so U.S. troops don’t have to.
Healey’s comments display a worrying lack of strategic focus. The recent UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) committed British naval forces heavily to the creation of an Atlantic Bastion designed to secure the North Atlantic from the growing threat of Russia’s rapidly expanding sub-surface fleet. Since 2011 alone, the Russian navy has taken delivery of 27 new submarines with more under construction.
At best, the SDR sets a target for the building of up to 12 new attack submarines to replace the five Astute class submarines currently in service, two of which are in refit. Any new vessels wouldn’t arrive at the earliest until the late 2030s. It also envisions a complex system of ocean sensors and uncrewed sub-surface assets to counter Russian submarines. Simply securing the Atlantic from a rapidly rising Russian threat will require extensive cooperation with European navies, in particular with France, Germany and Norway.
Even with a replenished fleet, UK naval power still won’t be sufficient to have global impact. The Carrier Strike Group 25, currently in the Pacific, has deployed a significant chunk of available naval assets: one carrier, one destroyer, one frigate, and one attack submarine; that’s right, all of four vessels.
As I have said before, the Chinese won’t be worried by this. China currently boasts at least 234 vessels, which is larger than the U.S. fleet, having outstripped American warship production by a significant margin since 2010. While the Chinese fleet is thought to be deficient in some key capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, larger fleets have won “25 out of 28 historical wars.”
Admittedly, one of three victories in which an outnumbered fleet prevailed was the Battle of Trafalgar where the Royal Navy pitted itself against France and Spain off the coast of Cadiz. Admiral Horatio Nelson had at his disposal 27 ships of the line and 4 frigates. This compares with the modern Royal Navy which, not including submarines, which didn’t exist in 1805, has 24 blue-water fighting vessels, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and mine counter-measures vessels.
The idea that, even in its entirety, this can deter China is a fantasy. Of course, any British and Australian military engagement in Taiwan would be under the command of a U.S. admiral as part of a fleet possibly supplemented by those Asian countries that might be willing to join the fight, possibly including Japan and South Korea.
A doomsday scenario of a World War III in the Pacific would draw much of the Royal Navy away from British shores, leaving our country even more exposed to Russia. So, while Healey’s hawkish comments might play well with breathless Western journalists at a presser on the deck of a British aircraft carrier docked in Darwin, they make no sense in the real world.
And, in any case, they make the defense secretary appear tone deaf and out of touch given the diplomatic pivot towards China that has taken place under Starmer’s government.
To his credit, the prime minister has sought to position Sino-British relations somewhere between the naivete of former Prime Minister David Cameron’s unpopular “golden era” and the aggressively Sinophobic policies adopted by Prime Minister Theresa May and her successors. That has led to unprecedented political engagement by UK ministers since the end of 2024, including visits by the foreign secretary and chancellor of the exchequer, chief of the defense staff and, most recently, the national security adviser.
In the face of intense media scrutiny of any moves that signal a softening of the UK’s stance towards China, the Labour government is trying to pull off the impossible. Attract much- needed Chinese investment into Britain while keeping Chinese hands off of sensitive industries and critical national infrastructure. Disagree in private about issues around democracy in Hong Kong and Uighur rights in Xinjiang, while reopening dormant areas of economic and financial cooperation.
Of course, the biggest challenge Starmer faces on China is in trying to boost economic and trade relations at the same time he attempts to do the same with the U.S. and the European Union, without making any trade-offs along the way.
And therein lies the true vacuity of Healey’s comments. They may play well with AUKUS allies but will be understood as provocative in Beijing. This episode offers a healthy reminder that Britain will struggle to be friends with everyone, while looking to pick fights around the globe.
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Top photo credit: Palestinian children suffering from malnutrition receive medical care at Al-Rantisi Children's Hospital, July 24, 2025, Gaza. Photo by Omar Ashtawy apaimages Gaza city Gaza Strip Palestinian Territory 240725_Gaza_OSH_0014 Copyright: xapaimagesxOmarxAshtawyxxapaimagesx
The prospects for negotiating a ceasefire and an end to the humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip appear as dim as ever. Israeli and U.S. representatives walked out of talks with Hamas in Qatar that had been mediated by the Qataris and Egyptians. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is talking about “alternative” means of achieving Israel’s goals in the territory.
President Donald Trump, echoing Netanyahu’s levying of blame on Hamas, asserted that “Hamas didn’t really want to make a deal. I think they want to die.” Trump went on to mention a need to “finish the job,” evidently referring to Israel’s continued devastating assault on the Strip and its residents.
I have been thinking for a long time about the negotiation of ceasefires. Nearly 50 years ago, I wrote a book, “Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process,” which explored the diplomatic and military dynamics of how two belligerents negotiate a peace while simultaneously fighting a war.
What is taking place in Gaza now is mostly not a war, even though that term commonly is applied to the violence there. It is instead a largely unilateral assault on a population and its means of living. It is a situation in which one side, Israel, has — as Trump might put it — nearly all the cards.
The news stories emerging almost daily from Gaza are not about pitched battles between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas fighters. They are mostly not about battles at all. Instead, they are about the latest large-scale killing by Israel of Gazans, mostly civilians, at a rate that has averaged about 150 deaths per day since the current round of carnage began in late 2023. Civilians are killed largely with airstrikes but also more recently through getting shot while seeking ever-scarcer food.
Mass starvation has become perhaps the most gut-wrenching part of the Gaza catastrophe, and one where Israel has again tried to shift blame onto Hamas. A longtime Israeli accusation in endeavoring to shut down the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)—the principal international organization with the mission of aiding Palestinian refugees, including in Gaza—is that Hamas supposedly was stealing UNRWA-supplied food. Trump has echoed that accusation.
A study by the U.S. Agency for International Development (before the Trump administration dismantled the agency) of reported incidents of loss or theft of U.S.-supplied humanitarian assistance in Gaza found no evidence that Hamas has engaged in widespread diversion of aid. More recent press reporting shows that the IDF itself has found no evidence of Hamas seizing or diverting aid.
Israel’s opposition to UNRWA has nothing to do with Hamas or with theft of humanitarian aid. It instead concerns how UNRWA — because it is a United Nations agency explicitly focused on Palestinians — constitutes an international recognition that the Palestinians are a nation and that many of them are refugees from their homeland.
The humanitarian situation in Gaza got worse once Israel succeeded in pushing UNRWA aside. The U.S.-backed and Israeli-controlled alternative aid scheme is not only woefully inadequate in meeting immediate needs but also designed as an adjunct to Israel’s ethnic cleansing objectives. The limitation of aid to a few distribution points facilitates the forced relocation of surviving Gazans into what amounts to a concentration camp, as a possible prelude to removal from the Gaza Strip altogether.
Some aid has recently been dropped into Gaza by air. Airdrops are an ineffective and inefficient way of trying to relieve the starvation. The amounts delivered are a tiny fraction of what is needed. The cost of delivery is far higher than by land. As demonstrated by an earlier U.S. effort to deliver aid this way, some of the supplies are lost because they fall into the sea or, even worse, kill people crushed by falling pallets. But for some donors, an airdrop serves as a visually dramatic conscience-calming gesture.
For Israel, it serves as a distraction from the fact that the biggest impediment to getting humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip is Israel’s continued land blockade of the territory. Valuing that distraction, Israel itself has joined in the airdrop gesture. At the same time, however, Israel continues to allow only a trickle of aid to cross the land border, with many hundreds of truckloads left to spoil and be destroyed by the IDF.
In my decades-old book, I identified a type of war ending that is an alternative to a negotiated settlement as “extermination/expulsion,” meaning that the militarily dominant side physically obliterates its opponent or pushes it out of contested territory. Extermination/expulsion of the opponent is an appropriate label for Israel’s objective in Gaza.
The prevailing Israeli conception of the opponent, or enemy, in Gaza is the entire Palestinian population, an attitude that was already well rooted on the Israeli Right before the Hamas attack in October 2023 and has grown even stronger and wider since then. The deaths already inflicted, directly or indirectly, by the IDF have significantly advanced the extermination objective. The expulsion part has mostly been the stuff of internal Israeli deliberations, although it came more into the open when Trump gave Netanyahu’s government the gift of endorsing the ethnic cleansing with his Riviera-in-Gaza proposal.
Insofar as Hamas is defined as the enemy, the Israeli objective of extermination has been more explicit. The Trump administration has declared its support for Israel’s repeatedly stated objective of “eradicating” Hamas. Netanyahu, speaking to an internal IDF audience last year, said that “we will kill the Hamas leadership” and that this killing as well as acting “in all areas in the Gaza Strip” was part of “total victory” that would be needed before military operations would end.
The objective of extermination/expulsion is an obvious deal-killer. It makes no sense to expect the other party to a conflict to negotiate its own eradication.
Netanyahu also has other personal and political reasons to keep Israeli military operations going indefinitely. These include delaying his full reckoning with corruption charges and keeping intact his coalition with right-wing extremists who are especially vehement about eliminating or expelling Palestinians from Gaza and who strongly oppose a ceasefire.
For Netanyahu’s government, any talk of a ceasefire has little to do with getting closer to peace in Gaza. Instead, it is only a temporary pause in operations that this government finds expedient for whatever reason, be it logistical resupply, relief from diplomatic pressure, or something else. As with the ceasefire earlier this year, the Israelis will feel free to break it whenever they no longer find it expedient.
Hamas has wanted a ceasefire for some time, and why shouldn’t it? Much of its leadership has indeed been killed, and its ability to resist further Israeli attacks is badly battered though not eliminated. The longer the suffering of the Gazan population continues, the more that Hamas may lose support among those who blame it for triggering the devastation with its 2023 attack. The group has nothing to gain, and only more to lose, as the violence continues.
Throughout off-and-on ceasefire talks since last year, the main sticking point has been that Hamas wants a clear route to a permanent end to hostilities while Israel wants to retain the ability to resume its attacks. Hamas also has tried to use what few cards it has to gain relief for the civilian population of Gaza, by calling for unimpeded humanitarian aid and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas so that residents can return to their homes. In addition, it has sought freedom for some of the Palestinians in Israeli prisons.
Press reporting based on internal documents from the recent round of talks in Qatar shows that the Hamas negotiators worked closely and carefully with the Qatari and Egyptian mediators to try to craft a viable ceasefire agreement. Hamas had already agreed to the great majority of the content in a framework document that the mediators said Israel had accepted.
The amendments Hamas sought were mostly focused on relief for Palestinian civilians and aimed at getting greater precision and clarity in the framework agreement. For example, regarding withdrawals of Israeli troops, instead of the draft’s vague language about withdrawal to lines “close” to what was in the January 2025 ceasefire agreement, Hamas insisted that the negotiators talk in detail about specific lines on maps. The Hamas negotiators offered their own proposals that made some refinements of only 100 or 200 meters from the maps they finally were given.
Regarding release of Palestinian prisoners, in response to the vague framework language, the Hamas representatives wanted to negotiate specific numbers, to match the specific numbers of Israeli hostages to be released in the framework. On humanitarian aid, Hamas wanted a return to United Nations administration of aid distribution and a reopening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt.
Having negotiated seriously on these and other points, the Hamas representatives were taken aback by the subsequent U.S. and Israeli walkout and by Trump’s accusations about Hamas’s alleged responsibility for the breakdown.
Trump’s assertion that Hamas “didn’t really want to make a deal” and instead wanted “to die” is nonsense. The talks in Qatar ended because Netanyahu’s government decided it did not want to make a deal at this time. As with most things involving Israel, the Trump administration fell in line behind Netanyahu.
Blaming Hamas for continuation of the Gaza catastrophe is another instance of treating a Palestinian resistance group—whether it is Hamas or any other, and there have been many of them—as the cause of violence associated with the subjugation of Palestinians and occupation of their homelands, rather than as an effect of the subjugation and occupation.
Netanyahu in the past has found it expedient to treat Hamas as something other than the evil incarnate that Israel portrays it as today. Netanyahu earlier facilitated Qatari payments to Hamas as a way of building up the group as a counterweight to the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority.
This tactic was part of a continuing Israeli strategy to keep Palestinians divided, so that Israel can say that it “does not have a negotiating partner”—a line echoed by Israel’s powerful lobby in the United States. That approach is yet another indication of unwillingness to reach a negotiated peace with the Palestinians.
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Top photo credit: Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty meets with Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi in Cairo, Egypt, June 2, 2025. REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El Ghany
In the heart of old Cairo last month, one of the Middle East’s longest-running rifts was being publicly laid to rest.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, flanked by Egyptian officials, walked through Cairo’s historic Khan el-Khalili bazaar, prayed at the Al-Hussein Mosque, and dined with former Egyptian foreign ministers at the storied Naguib Mahfouz restaurant. Araghchi was unequivocal when he posted during his trip that Egyptian-Iranian relations had “entered a new phase.”
This visit was more than routine diplomacy, but a signal of a potentially seismic shift between two Middle Eastern powers, drawn together by the pull of shared crises.
The rupture began in 1979, when Iran’s revolutionary leaders severed diplomatic relations after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords with Israel — a betrayal in Tehran’s eyes. The schism deepened when Cairo granted asylum to the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was just overthrown by a popular revolution which birthed a new Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. He died and was buried in Egypt in 1980.
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Egypt’s material support for Saddam Hussein’s regime cemented Tehran’s view of Cairo as an antagonist. For decades thereafter, diplomatic relations remained frozen, with only intermittent and largely fruitless attempts at dialogue.
Against this backdrop of accumulated grievances, Tehran’s recent renaming of "Khalid al-Islambouli Street," is a particularly significant gesture. The street had honored the chief suspect in Sadat’s 1981 assassination, whom Iranhailed as a "martyr" after his court-mandated execution by firing squad. The new name, “Hassan Nasrallah Street” instead pays tribute to Hezbollah’s slain leader, killed by Israeli airstrikes in 2024, rectifying a decades-old insult to Egypt.
This renaming represents a strategic concession, resolving what Araghchi called the “final hurdle” to normalization weeks earlier. Cairo’s swift public embrace of the move, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ambassador Tamim Khallaf calling it a "positive step" that "helps put matters back on the right track," demonstrated Egypt’s willingness to turn the page.
During marathon meetings with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty in June, Araghchi asserted that "trust between Cairo and Tehran has never been this high." The tangible outcome of the meetings was an agreement to establish regular political consultations at the sub-ministerial level — a structured channel absent since 1979.
Crucially, Abdelatty carefully framed the visit as a pragmatic necessity, not as unconditional alignment. "There is a mutual desire to develop our relations, taking into account the concerns and perspectives of each side," Egypt’s chief diplomat said.
This nascent détente is less about newfound affection than cold-eyed calculation amid emerging and converging crises. First, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, launched in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza but enabled by Iranian arms and training, struck Egypt’s economic jugular. Billions of dollars in Suez Canal revenues evaporated as shipping rerouted around Africa.
While Araghchi publicly downplayed direct control over the Houthis, insisting that Yemen "makes its own decisions," Cairo desperately needs Tehran’s leverage to restore maritime security. Abdelatty’s blunt emphasis on "protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea" during a March phone call with Araghchi underscores this vital priority.
While Yemen’s Houthis maintain operational independence from Tehran, Iranian support for the group is well-documented, and statements from Egyptian leadership calculate that Iran could exert significant influence on the Houthis.
For Iran, reeling from last month’s Israeli and U.S. strikes on its nuclear and military infrastructure, normalization with Egypt — the Arab world’s cultural heart and an important U.S. ally — helps establish its regional legitimacy and expands its diplomatic options. This outreach is all the more urgent now that its traditional "Axis of Resistance" is faltering, with Hezbollah battered in Lebanon, Hamas under siege in Gaza, and Bashar Al-Assad ousted in Syria.
Larger regional dynamics are increasingly conducive to Iranian-Egyptian normalization. China’s 2023 brokering of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement removed a critical veto. With Riyadh restoring ties with Tehran, Cairo gained freedom to engage Iran without fear of alienating its vital Gulf financiers.
This new diplomatic freedom is being accelerated by the brutal reality of Sudan’s civil war. The conflict has pushed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to revive a dormant alliance with Iran in a desperate search for military support. Since Egypt is also a key backer of the SAF, Cairo and Tehran now share a mutual ally in a war raging on Egypt's southern doorstep, creating an unexpected arena of common interest.
These regional realignments, coupled with shared economic pain — Egypt’s debt crisis and Iran’s crippling sanctions — make tangible cooperation on trade, and religious tourism (primarily for Iranians to visit Shiite sites in Egypt) suddenly viable.
Additionally, Israel's 12-day assault on Iran further intensified cooperation between Cairo and Tehran.
The offensive created parallel crises for both: for Iran, Israeli strikes — conducted with U.S. assistance — against its defense and nuclear infrastructure deepened its isolation, violated its territory, and derailed nuclear diplomacy. Concurrently, Egypt suffered collateral damage to its energy security when Israeli-operated gas fields, supplying 15-20% of its needs, were shuttered. This forced emergency measures and sparked blackout fears, revealing a shared vulnerability exploited by the conflict.
The attacks also amplified Egypt’s mediating role while drawing Iran and Egypt closer. Sisi’s late-night call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, just hours before U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites — in which Sisi condemned Israeli "escalation" — highlighted Cairo’s unique positioning. Egypt’s foreign minister has since embarked on a diplomatic blitz, coordinating with Oman, which has mediated U.S.-Iran talks, U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Steve Witkoff, and Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in hopes of reviving nuclear negotiations.
Despite the momentum, full diplomatic trust remains constrained by structural divides. Egypt's pro-Western orientation — anchored in U.S. military aid and its 46-year-old treaty with Israel — clashes with Tehran’s revolutionary ethos. Hostility toward the U.S. (“the Great Satan” as the Islamic’s Republic’s founders called it) has remained a core, albeit flexible pillar of Iranian foreign policy.
For Cairo, its relationship with Israel is non-negotiable, for reasons both strategic and existential. Israel is not only a critical energy supplier, but also an indispensable counterpart in Gaza ceasefire talks aimed at ending the brutal war raging on Egypt’s Sinai border. Iran's anti-Western posture, meanwhile, has been hardened by a series of Israeli escalations: direct strikes killing senior military and scientific figures, and explicit threats to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Significantly, Iran's support for Hamas — the militant group Israel has been fighting in Gaza for nearly two years — isn't merely a complication; it's a structural barrier.
Egypt, in addition to being a key mediator in the Gaza conflict, is also a significant stakeholder with sensitive national security interests on the line. Its primary objectives are to secure a ceasefire, establish a governing authority in a post-war Gaza, and, crucially, prevent a mass influx of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula.
However, Cairo’s goals clash head-on with Iran's public declarations in support of the militant group.For Egypt, Hamas is not a partner but a dangerous security threat. Cairo views the group as a hostile offshoot of its primary domestic arch-nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and has long accused it of fueling the brutal Islamist insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. This deep-seated animosity is irreconcilable with Tehran's position.
After Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi hailed the attacks as a "victorious operation" that "made the Islamic Ummah happy." In a recent interview with Fox News, Iran’s Foreign Minister called Hamas “freedom fighters...fighting for a just cause.”
This praise is not just political, it was backed by operational links managed by figures like the recently assassinated Revolutionary Guard commander Saeed Izadi, who reportedly oversaw military coordination with Hamas. While reports indicate Iran did not participate in the October 7th attack, its praise for Hamas is backed by decades of material support that built the group's military strength.
Iran’s support for Hamas, and its fundamental hostility towards Israel, which itself is a necessary albeit frustrating partner for Egypt, will continue to complicate the burgeoning relationship.
The Cairo-Tehran rapprochement therefore is not a grand strategic embrace but rather a marriage of convenience. Its trajectory leans toward deeper engagement because mutual necessity — securing waterways, averting an all-out regional war, surviving economically — now outweighs the costs of avoidance.
It looks probable that the two nations will soon upgrade their current low-level missions to full embassies, that economic ties will continue to grow, and that diplomatic channels will remain active on flashpoints like the Red Sea crisis and U.S.-Iran nuclear talks. However this relationship will remain inherently transactional, constrained by their competing national interests.
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