The Philippines-China maritime tussle just edged up a notch this past week, with Chinese television reporting a Chinese flag-planting operation in a tiny cluster of sand banks in the South China Sea known as Sandy Cay.
Chinese personnel left after their operation, which apparently took place earlier in the month. The Philippines responded in kind soon after the announcement, with a combined team of its navy, coast guard, and police mirroring the Chinese action. The incidents took place in the backdrop of the major U.S.-Philippine annual exercise Balikatan, which began on April 21.
The situation in the South China Sea has been deteriorating since late 2023, when clashes between Manila and Beijing escalated dramatically. A limited agreement in July 2024 on the most dangerous flashpoint, the Second Thomas Shoal, has held up until now. Manila has been running resupply missions without incident to the tiny contingent of Philippine troops perched there since then. But as we predicted in August 2024, clashes have indeed spread to new geographies, keeping the overall tensions high.
Manila, which has named the West Philippine Sea its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) as, might worry that Beijing’s show-of-sovereignty operation is designed to eventually occupy it and build military structures, similar to what China did at nearby Subi Reef about a decade ago.
But the operation was likely not just about possession of the reef — but about pushing the question of maritime rights and jurisdiction over the surrounding waters. In 2016, an international tribunal ruled these waters as being indisputably a part of the Philippine EEZ. But Sandy Cay, referenced as a high-tide feature in the ruling, is likely entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, overlapping with Chinese-militarized Subi Reef. (The tribunal explicitly refused to rule over the sovereignty of Sandy Cay and determined Subi Reef to be a low-tide elevation generating neither a sovereignty claim nor its own territorial sea or EEZ.)
Sandy Cay is also very close to Thitu island where Manila maintains a military base. Thitu is also the only Philippine-controlled island with a permanent civilian population.
Chinese maritime coercion and illegal intrusions are increasingly of concern, not just to the Philippines, but also towider Southeast Asia. The United States has been getting more involved in the imbroglio, deepening its commitment to its treaty ally, the Philippines, including with new U.S. military sites on the Philippine mainland.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
Russian historian Stephen F. Cohen, who passed away five years ago this September, occupied a position in American intellectual life that has become increasingly rare: a tenured Ivy League professor with deep establishment credentials who used his considerable influence to challenge rather than echo establishment narratives.
As Ukrainian-American journalist Lev Golinkin observed, Cohen was “someone who didn’t just write about history but had dinner with it,” having briefed U.S. presidents and maintained friendships with figures like former Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev.
Yet the ideas he championed — warning of the perils of ignoring Russia’s security interests and the dangers posed by an unchecked security state — were unpopular, even outright dismissed as “Putin apology,” particularly at a time when allegations of extensive Russian interference in the 2016 election made Vladimir Putin public enemy number one for many Americans and rendered talk of rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia increasingly difficult in establishment circles.
Cohen’s critique of U.S. foreign policy was not rooted in sympathy for Putin, but in a sober reading of post-Cold War history. “He fully understood the foolishness of U.S. policy toward Russia since the early 1990s,” University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer told RS. “There would be no war in Ukraine today if Western policymakers had taken his advice on the perils of NATO expansion, especially into Ukraine.”
Now, as we approach five years since Cohen’s passing, the U.S. and NATO find themselves engulfed in the very crisis he spent decades warning against.
To his credit, President Trump will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday to discuss a resolution to the three-year-old Russia-Ukraine war, something President Joe Biden had not done during his own term. Still, bipartisan factions in Washington push for more weapons for Kyiv, thinking this war can still be won on the battlefield, despite $175 billion in aid since 2022 and Ukraine's dwindling military prospects. A Senate Appropriations Committee vote just approved another $1 billion for Ukraine with overwhelming bipartisan support (26-3) in July.
Though he did not live to see the 2022 Russian invasion, Cohen anticipated it. For decades, he argued that dismissing Russia’s legitimate security concerns — primarily Moscow’s strong opposition to NATO expansion — was not only reckless but a predictable provocation.
When a bipartisan coalition in Congress led by Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and the late Sen.John McCain (R-Ariz.) openly celebrated their role in ousting Ukraine’s democratically elected President Yanukovych in 2014, Cohen broke with virtually everyotherestablishment opinion, criticizing the Obama administration for its “shameful” intervention, which he presciently predicted, could “provoke Russia into a war with the United States and NATO in Ukraine.”
In the more immediate term, as Cohen pointed out, U.S. support for the new Ukrainian government “created a reign of terror,” in cities like Odessa where officially sanctioned “anti-terror” squads, some with openly Neo-Nazi allegiances, violently suppressed opposition to the newly installed government.
Remembering the late Cohen, Golinkin recalls how “Steve was the only major figure in America who insisted on remembering the Russian-speaking Ukrainians,” like Golinkin’s family members who “distrusted and hated the new Kiev government. He spoke of neo-Nazi paramilitaries who fought for the U.S.-backed government committing war crimes against civilians in eastern Ukraine. He spoke the truth, regardless of how unwieldy it was.”
Beyond Cohen’s scrutiny of American meddling in Eastern Europe, he also directed his criticism toward domestic political currents that were reorienting Washington’s posture toward Moscow.
When many in Washington and beyond were claiming that Russia had worked with the Trump campaign and tipped the scales against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, Cohen was instantly skeptical of their charges, recognizing holes in the narratives that establishment journalists would take years to acknowledge.
While debates over the extent of Russia’s meddling in the 2016 presidential election consumed the nation’s attention, with some analysts even declaring Russia’s alleged interference an “attack on the United States” on par with Pearl Harbor, Cohen understood that the hysteria would neuter the left’s antiwar instincts. A consequence, he warned, would be a newly empowered political alliance between the liberal establishment and neoconservatives united in their drive for confrontation with Russia — a realignment that made diplomacy all but impossible and even “treasonous.”
Illustrative of that realignment, was the nascent class of what Politico termed “The Spies Who Came in to the TV Studio” — intelligence officials like James Clapper elevated to trusted cable news contributors at CNN and NBC who, “explain[ed] the methods by which the Russians recruit spies” and “entertain[ed] us with their disdain for President [Trump].”
“There was a time when liberals and progressives were deeply suspicious of the American intelligence community,” said Cohen. “How did it happen that liberals and progressives today are embracing the FBI and CIA in their war against Trump?”
In 2018, when establishment media joined together to condemn President Trump’s Helsinki Summit with Vladimir Putin, a meeting former CIA Director John Brennan labeled “treasonous,” Cohen instead praised the meeting and applauded Trump’s acknowledgement — rare for any U.S. President — that “both sides are to blame,” for poor relations between the United States and Russia.
Now, with an upcoming summit between the U.S. and Russia scheduled for August 15, an American president has finally signaled a willingness to embrace Cohen’s core lesson; that recognizing Russian security interests as legitimate isn’t “appeasement,” but the only path toward avoiding mutually assured destruction.
Predictably, a chorus of neocons and liberals have emerged to pre-emptively sabotage any attempt to reach a negotiated settlement, urging Trump to follow through on his ultimatum and levy even more sanctions against Russia. The Alaska Summit “is a great victory for Putin,” John Bolton declared on CNN. Similarly, The Financial Times cautioned that Trump’s eagerness to cut a deal —one a majority of Ukrainians now support — evokes “the ghosts of Munich and Yalta.”
But the Alaska summit offers a rare opportunity to step back from the brink. Whether U.S. leaders choose to seize it — or ignore Cohen’s lessons once again — will determine not only the future of the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine, but perhaps the survival of all nations in the nuclear age.
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Top image credit: Jeremy Corbyn, ex-Leader of the Labour Party seen protesting the starving of Gaza outside Downing Street. July 2025 (Lab Mo / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect)
The rise of public support for the populist right, and in some cases also the populist left, has remodeled political competition in France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.
British politics is increasingly following this trend, although a general election is not due until 2029. The right populist Reform UK party, led by veteran Brexiteer Nigel Farage, has been leading in opinion polls since April, clearly sapping the remaining strength of Britain’s venerable Conservative (Tory) Party. The unpopular Labour administration of Prime Minister Keir Starmer now faces a left populist challenge from a new party led by the former Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn.
Farage’s Reform party has surged to first place in opinion polls with 31%, well ahead of the governing Labour Party at 21%. The Conservative Party, which ruled continuously from 2010 to 2024, trails at a miserable 17% voter support. Both establishment parties have been on a downward trajectory since the 2024 elections. Corbyn’s party is in its early phase of organization, with a founding conference planned for later this year.
As in the other cases in Europe where populist parties are on the rise, defense policy and coolness toward unconditional support for Ukraine are not the main drivers of Reform’s success nor of Corbyn’s aspirations. Reform UK wins support by decrying irregular migration, while the Corbyn left emphasizes inequality, inadequate social services, and a weak economy. Polls show “immigration and asylum” as leading public concerns, while defense and security hardly register by comparison.
The populists’ dissent from the mainstream on the war in Ukraine and on foreign policy more generally would presumably matter if and when these parties win a share of power.
Why the populist challenge matters for war and peace
Both populist right and populist left across Europe tend to prioritize domestic social and economic issues, but they differ radically on irregular immigration and on the impacts of ethnic and linguistic diversity. Both tend to be Euro-skeptic.
The avowedly nationalist Reform UK depicts the EU as encroaching on the prerogatives of democratically elected national leadership, while the left wing of the Labour Party has also been wary of the EU, which is seen as too wedded to neo-liberal economics. These attitudes helped produce the victory for the “leave” option in the 2016 Brexit referendum. One of the leading advocates of Brexit, Nigel Farage, poses a formidable challenge to the Conservative Party from the right.
The party program of Reform UK does not address foreign policy at all. However, Farage is close to the Trump administration and has said that NATO expansion contributed importantly to Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. Returning from a visit to Mar-a-Lago after Trump’s election last November, Farage called for “concessions on both sides” to end the war in Ukraine.
On July 24, Corbyn and disaffected Labour MP Zarah Sultana announced plans to launch a new left-wing party, with the tentative name YourParty. This excited a surprising level of interest, garnering 600,000 registrations on social media. Initial polls indicate its support could range from 10% to 15% of the electorate.
Corbyn has mobilized protests against Israel’s war in Gaza and advocates a diplomatic solution in Ukraine. He has been closely associated with antiwar causes throughout his career and is a co-founder and leader of the activist network Stop the War, first formed in September 2001 to oppose the looming invasion of Afghanistan, and now very much absorbed in public protests against British support for Israel’s operations in Gaza. Banished by Starmer from Labour, Corbyn is an independent MP.
Corbyn’s party project draws on and courts support from younger voters, as well as from communities of color in Britain. This has close parallels with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), as Mélenchon himself has acknowledged.
Can populists affect foreign and defense policy?
Neither Farage nor Corbyn nor their supporters share the dislike and dread of Russia promoted by Britain’s mainstream parties and much of the media. This could be significant if Reform UK and/or Corbyn’s party attract substantial support from the Conservatives and Labour, respectively. A steadily decreasing majority of the population (now only about 53%) supports continuing to arm and finance Ukraine.
Because any success of Corbyn’s party harms Labour, it could inadvertently help Reform UK win the next election, because of the “first past the post” electoral rule. Corbyn insists his party would present stronger opposition to Farage’s party than is being offered by Starmer’s government.
In general, trends point to polarization and the “Europeanization” of Britain’s politics — a splintering of the party system as the center ceases to hold — and more zero-sum contestation in the country’s politics.
The ideal of a united Europe — including the UK — providing support to Ukraine for the indefinite future is very unlikely to be achieved in a more fractured political system in which the anti-establishment right and left exert greater influence.
In 2016, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) published what the organization called their “working definition” of antisemitism.
According to its lead writer, “It was created primarily so that European data collectors (of antisemitic incidents) could know what to include and exclude. That way antisemitism could be monitored better over time and across borders.”
She added, “It was never intended to be a campus hate speech code, but that’s what Donald Trump’s executive order accomplished this week.”
These words were written by the American Jewish Committee’s antisemitism expert Kate Aronoff, in 2019. She, as the author, was condemning the application of the definition by the Trump administration, which signed an executive order in December of that year that made Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act apply to antisemitic acts defined under the IHRA.
Many worried that this order, which was signed nearly four years before the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas — and the mass killing, devastation and starvation of civilians in Gaza that has followed — would serve to stifle critics of the Israeli government. In many ways, as international students in the U.S. have been arrested and threatened with deportation for expressing pro-Palestinian political views, and schools have cracked down on student protesters for fear of getting federal funding yanked, it has.
Today, the IHRA claims its definition has been adopted by nearly 1,300 entities, including 45 countries, the United States Executive Branch among them, as well as 37 U.S. state governments and 96 U.S. city and county governments.
So what is the definition?
“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may (emphasis) be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It might not be limited to that. Is anti-Zionism, antisemitism? IHRA’s website attempts to explain: “Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” That language seems ambiguous too.
The text goes on to cite examples of antisemitism including, “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.” Does criticizing Israel’s government qualify as this? Or this other IHRA antisemitism bullet point: “Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.”
The definition’s language does not read like law, because, according to Aronoff, it was never intended to be law. However, critics say IHRA and supporters of Israel are using it to chill and quash criticism of Israel’s government policies, and most recently, military operations in Gaza and the West Bank here in the U.S.
Aviva Chomsky spelled out what’s happening in an essay at The Nation last week: “Creating legal avenues to suppress what would otherwise be protected political speech about Israel is a major reason that the IHRA and its allies have felt the need to turn their definition into law. And advocates for the legal adoption of that definition claim that it’s necessary because antisemitism is on the rise in this country.”
The proliferation of these laws came within months, if not weeks after the Oct. 7 attacks, when over 10,000 Gazans had already been killed, mostly civilians, in IDF operations in the Strip. Protests were ramping up in American streets and especially college campuses as Americans began questioning U.S. military aid to Israel. Government officials, including the FBI, were warning that incidents of antisemitism were already climbing to "historic levels" across the country.
On his November 2023 bill to require the Department of Education “to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of antisemitism for use in enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws,” Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY) said outright, “we have seen a rapid rise in antisemitism on these college campuses, and we need to crack down on it.”
The U.S. House eventually passed a pro-IHRA definition bill, 320-91, in May 2024. The Senate, so far, has failed to do the same.
In the meantime, the crackdown on speech has been in full force, often justified by some variation of IHRA-defined prohibitions on antisemitism.
Palestinian activist and Columbia University graduate student Mahmoud Khalil was arrested in March “in support of President Trump’s executive orders prohibiting antisemitism.”
After last year's protests over the war in Gaza, the Trump administration said it expanded on its 2019 order and would take “forceful and unprecedented steps to marshal all Federal resources to combat the explosion of anti-Semitism on our campuses and in our streets since October 7, 2023.”
In late July, The Times of Israel reported that at Columbia University alone “nearly 80 students were suspended or expelled” as the school came under pressure to crack down on alleged antisemitism or lose federal funding. Columbia is by no means an outlier.
When Republican Ohio State Senator Terry Johnson proposed a bill in November — that passed — to define antisemitism under state law to determine whether an individual has committed “ethnic intimidation,” he said that “demonstrations related to pro-Gaza protests on college campuses have been marked by disturbing displayed aggression and intolerance.”
“Many of these protests cross the line into antisemitism by targeting Jewish students and expressing hateful rhetoric,” Johnson added, not issuing any specific examples for the record.
His efforts had critics. “By tying the IHRA definition to legal and administrative decisions, this bill risks confusing legitimate criticism of Israel’s policies or the political ideology of Zionism with antisemitism,” said Ann Ghazy, who joined others at the state capitol ahead of the December 2024 vote that nonetheless overwhelmingly passed Johnson’s bill. “Such conflation undermines valid discussions about human rights and self-determination and threatens to stifle debates necessary for a healthy democracy.”
Kenneth Stern is the director of the Center for the Study of Hate at Bard College who authored the IHRA’s original definition of antisemitism in 2006. Stern said that weaponizing the definition through law, or executive order, "puts pro-Israel Jewish students in a situation where they may be seen as trying to suppress speech rather than answer it.”
Stern, who says there is real antisemitism in America, including on college campuses, nonetheless charges that the definition he helped to craft is being distorted and misused to silence anti-Israel critics, and that could make the situation worse.
Critics contend that merely using this definition to enforce new laws or de facto speech codes could lead to other abuses. This is already happening. As independent journalist Glenn Greenwald noted on X on Sunday: “A Jewish professor of Holocaust Studies may leave Columbia because the texts she always used include the Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt, who compared Zionists to Nazis and said Zionism is racist: now banned ideas under the IHRA hate speech code Trump forced on universities.”
Greenwald was referring to the Trump administration’s funding cuts to schools that the White House feels are not properly investigating for antisemitism offenses as defined by the IHRA.
As Columbia professor Marianne Hirsch, a prominent genocide scholar, told the Associated Press, “A university that treats criticism of Israel as antisemitic and threatens sanctions for those who disobey is no longer a place of open inquiry. I just don’t see how I can teach about genocide in that environment.”
Hirsch has been using the same curriculum for years but suddenly it’s an offense. It shouldn’t be, nor should speaking against Israel’s government, or any other government, and especially one’s own.
As Aronoff put it, “If you think this isn’t about suppressing political speech, contemplate a parallel. There’s no definition of anti-black racism that has the force of law when evaluating a Title VI case.” She added, “If you were to craft one, would you include opposition to affirmative action? Opposing removal of Confederate statues?”
Good questions, messy and unanswered, and likely unanswerable, because few would even think to go there legally, due to the First Amendment.
Whether or not something is considered “hateful rhetoric" — does waving a Palestinian flag, or calling what is happening in Gaza a genocide qualify? — this display of speech is something most Americans for the last half century understood was protected under the First Amendment, a precedent set by the Supreme Court in 1978 in a case brought by the ACLU in defense of neo-Nazi speech.
The Ohio state senator mentioned above insists that his “legislation should not be construed to diminish or infringe on any right protected by the First Amendment.” This addendum is what most government leaders have said to brush off Constitutional concerns over their antisemitism speech bills. And they are wrong — just because they say it passes Constitutional muster doesn’t make it so.
Courts are already considering whether using the IHRA definition of antisemitism to forge policies and law is unconstitutional.
In October 2024, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found in Students for Justice in Palestine v. Abbott that an executive order directing all Texas higher education institutions to use the IHRA definition of antisemitism to create and enforce speech codes likely violates the First Amendment and that affected student groups can proceed with lawsuits against the governor.
There has been much racial and religious upheaval throughout the history of the United States and an often bruised and battered First Amendment has, thankfully, survived it all.
Is this now but a memory? And for what cause — another country’s government?
As Glenn Greenwald posits, “There's no Israel exception to the First Amendment of the US Constitution.”
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