The Senate on Thursday smacked down two measures sponsored by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) that were intended to block the sale of some offensive weapons to Israel.
The first, a resolution to end the sale of certain bomb components and warheads, S.J. Res. 33, had 15 votes in favor and 82 against. The second, a resolution to end the sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions and some guidance kits, S.J. Res. 26, failed 15 - 83. All votes in favor were from Democrats.
His previous attempt at passing joint resolutions of disapproval for the sale of weapons to Israel in November 2024 also failed. Last time, he brought three JRDs forward, and they garnered slightly more support. A resolution to block the sale of some tank rounds received 21 votes in favor, and resolutions to block mortar rounds and guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions received 22 and 20 aye votes, respectively.
Israel’s war on Gaza has killed more than 50,000 Palestinians, with over 112,000 wounded, or 7% of the total population. Israel officially broke the January ceasefire and resumed military activity last week, killing at least 700 since.
Sen. Sanders noted during his remarks that all humanitarian aid had been blocked from entering Israel for over 30 days. He called what Israel is doing a violation of the Geneva Convention and the United States’ Foreign Assistance Act.
“It is no secret how these weapons have been used,” Sanders said. Strikes against civilian targets “have been painstakingly documented by human rights groups.”
Sanders pointed to a recent Economist-YouGov poll that showed only 15% of Americans support increasing military aid to Israel, while 35% supported ending or decreasing military support. Additionally, a J Street poll found that 62% of Jewish Americans supported the withholding of offensive weapons to Israel until Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to an immediate ceasefire.
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Top Photo: Committee Chairman U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) speaks during a Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee hearing on Julie Su's nomination to be Labor Secretary, on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., April 20, 2023. REUTERS/Amanda Andrade-Rhoades
Committee Chairman U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) speaks during a Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee hearing on Julie Su's nomination to be Labor Secretary, on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., April 20, 2023. REUTERS/Amanda Andrade-Rhoades
Top image credit: Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan gestures to soldiers inside the presidential palace after the Sudanese army said it had taken control of the building, in the capital Khartoum, Sudan March 26, 2025. Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council/Handout via REUTERS
In the final days of Ramadan, before Mecca's Grand Mosque, Sudan's de facto president and army chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan knelt in prayer beside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. Al-Burhan had arrived in the kingdom just two days after his troops dealt a significant blow to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), recapturing the capital Khartoum after two years of civil war. Missing from the frame was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Gulf power that has backed al-Burhan’s rivals in Sudan’s civil war with arms, mercenaries, and political cover.
The scene captured the essence of a deepening rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE — once allies in reshaping the Arab world, now architects of competing visions for Sudan and the region.
For two years, Sudan has been enveloped in chaos. The conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed forces (SAF) and the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," has inflicted immense suffering: an estimated 150,000 killed, allegations of mass atrocities staining both sides but particularly the RSF in Darfur, 12 million displaced, and over half the population facing acute food insecurity.
Khartoum, once a symbol of confluence, bears deep scars — widespread destruction, looted homes, and streets haunted by the unburied dead. It was against this backdrop of devastation and military gains that al-Burhan made his trip across the Red Sea.
Early in the conflict, Saudi Arabia played a prominent role by facilitating the evacuation of thousands of foreigners via Port Sudan, an effort that garnered significant goodwill. Building on this, and alongside the United States, the kingdom stepped into the role of mediator hosting the Jeddah ceasefire talks in May 2023.
This mediation aligned with Riyadh’s broader strategic pivot toward de-escalation, evident in its rapprochement with Iran and its transformation from aggressor to peacemaker in Yemen. Instability across the Red Sea poses a direct threat to the kingdom’s ambitious Vision 2030 economic overhaul — particularly its crown-jewel projects like NEOM and the Red Sea tourism megaprojects along its western coastline, as well as the Yanbu Terminal expansion, which aims to diversify oil export routes away from the Strait of Hormuz. Such turmoil also risks undermining Saudi Arabia’s critical food security investments in Sudan, where vast agricultural ventures had become a linchpin of bilateral ties.
However, the Jeddah process withered and the commitments signed on paper dissolved under the reality of continued fighting. A subsequent U.S.-led effort in Geneva, pivoting to humanitarian access after the Jeddah talks collapsed, faltered when the SAF boycotted the talks entirely. By 2025, the return of President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine gutted what remained of American diplomatic capital. USAID’s funding slashes — which shuttered 77% of Sudan’s emergency food kitchens — not only deepened famine but stripped Washington of a key lever it could use to compel concessions. With the U.S. retreating inward, the vacuum proved irresistible to Saudi Arabia.
The tipping point arrived in February 2025. As the RSF and its allies formalized their charter for a parallel administration in Nairobi, Saudi Arabia, alongside Qatar and Kuwait, issued a firm public rejection. The Saudi Foreign Ministry unequivocally stated its opposition to "any illegitimate steps taken outside Sudan’s official institutions that threaten its unity.”
Al-Burhan’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and its timing solidified this alignment. The agreement announced by both nations during the visit to establish a “coordination council to strengthen relations” signaled long-term engagement, moving beyond the neutral arbiter role. Crucially, this meeting directly followed a high-level Saudi delegation's visit to Port Sudan days earlier, focused squarely on reconstruction.
While Riyadh actively cultivates the role of regional stabilizer, Abu Dhabi faces mounting scrutiny regarding its alleged role in fueling the RSF’s war effort.
In March 2025, Sudan filed a case at the International Court of Justice, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention through its alleged military, financial, and political support for the RSF, thereby facilitating atrocities, particularly the ethnic cleansing of the Masalit in West Darfur. While the UAE’s foreign minister dismissed the case as "feeble media maneuvers," the charges echo findings from a U.N. Panel of Experts report, which deemed evidence of UAE arms supplies (including drones and air defenses) to the RSF as "credible."
This alleged support has triggered significant political fallout in Washington. U.S. lawmakers Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) publicly confirmed in January, citing administration briefings, that the UAE was indeed arming the RSF, directly contradicting prior assurances it gave the Biden administration. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also placed holds on arms sales to the UAE over its role in Sudan.
The UAE's actions in Sudan appear consistent with a wider regional modus operandi. Abu Dhabi’s playbook involves empowering non-state actors, often with secessionist leanings, to secure access to resources and strategic geography. We see this pattern in Libya with its backing of Khalifa Haftar, and in Yemen through its enduring support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose push for independence directly counters Saudi efforts to maintain Yemeni unity under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
Somalia offers another vivid example, where the UAE circumvented Mogadishu to directly arm and fund regional entities like Puntland (reportedly using its Bosaso base for RSF resupply), Somaliland, and Jubaland, thereby fragmenting the country while securing coastal footholds. The announcement of the RSF's parallel government in Nairobi last month seemed a direct application of these tactics. The UAE finalized a $1.5 billion loan to Kenya the same week, prompting speculation that its influence played a role in Nairobi hosting the event.
The widening gulf over Sudan, therefore, is not an isolated disagreement but symptomatic of a deeper strategic divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Where they once coordinated closely, particularly in countering the perceived threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and attempting to reshape the GCC during the Qatar blockade, their paths now diverge sharply.
Economically, they compete fiercely, with Saudi Arabia challenging Dubai's business hub status through policies requiring regional HQs in Riyadh and launching rival mega-projects. Within OPEC+, tensions have simmered between the two over production quotas, reflecting differing priorities and misaligned projections on the proximity of the decarbonized future. Even maritime borders near the Yasat Islands has become a point of contention, with Riyadh lodging complaints at the U.N. against Abu Dhabi's unilateral demarcation of the potentially oil-rich area.
This rivalry now spills into the public domain via social media. Recent online clashes saw well-known and widely followed Saudi commentators brand Emirati counterparts as "outcasts," describing them as being "hated by Arabs and Muslims." In tightly controlled media environments, such sharp exchanges often reflect official displeasure.
Ultimately, Sudan is paying the price for this fractured Gulf relationship. Saudi Arabia, driven by its Vision 2030 imperatives and a desire to reassert regional leadership through stability and state institutions, has placed its bet on the SAF. The UAE, focused on resource access and countering perceived ideological threats, continues its alleged support for the RSF despite the mounting condemnation.
As long as the rivalry persists, Sudan will remain tragically caught in the crossfire, its future held hostage by a geopolitical struggle reshaping the contours of power across the region.
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Top image credit: Steve Witkoff, the special envoy to the Middle East, makes an appearance moments before President Donald J. Trump holds a joint news conference at the White House with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, 2025. This is Trump’s first joint news conference with a foreign leader in his second term. (Photo by Joshua Sukoff/MNS/Sipa USA) VIA REUTERS
While Donald Trump has repeatedly bragged that he can end international conflicts in days, he is clearly frustrated that global leaders are not bending to his will. Only last week, he said that he is “angry” that Moscow has not offered a Ukraine deal and that he might impose secondary “tariffs” on Russian oil sales. He also warned that if Iran doesn’t “make a deal, there will be bombing.”
This lashing out is not part of some grand “madman” strategy. Rather, it is a product of Trump’s apparent need to project power. The trick is to know how to reward that projection: Putin’s commissioning of a portrait of Trump — which his personal Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, claims the Russian leader asked him to deliver to the president — paints a vivid example of the nature and perhaps limits of such strategic flattery.
Iran’s Supreme Leader would never stoop to such antics. Still, it is possible that Ayatollah Khamenei understands that his negotiators might use Trump’s abiding need to display his global acumen to get American concessions on a nuclear deal. Because Trump’s volatility can open doors or blow them up just as quickly, international leaders — and his own advisers — are constantly struggling to manage (or exploit) an approach to the world that lacks any coherent strategy or even tactics.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that while Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian insisted after Trump’s latest threat that “th[e] path for indirect negotiations remains open,” an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader warned that American troops deployed “at least ten bases -around Iran” are “sitting inside a glass room.” Grappling with his impulse-driven foreign policy, Trump’s rivals find it difficult to get any sense of his bottom line.
Hope and confusion in Tehran
U.S.-Iran relations are a case in point. It is worth recalling that in November Elon Musk met with Iran’s U.N. ambassador, Saied Iravani. Commenting on the surprise encounter, a conservative Iranian website declared that, “It appears that Trump has genuinely decided to adopt a different approach…perhaps, as (Foreign Minister) Abbas Araghchi put it, moving from 'maximum pressure' to 'maximum rationality.’” This observation echoed Araghchi’s previous statement that “maximum rationality” would “probably get a different result” and seemed calculated to test Trump.
Trump’s decision in mid-January to remove security details for former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook — both men key architects of Trump’s first-term “maximum pressure” policy against Iran — encouraged Tehran’s cautious optimism. When Hook was summarily dismissed from a top position on Trump’s transition team after complaining about the Biden administration’s “appeasement” of Iran, the hardline Tehran Times quoted Trump’s announcement on Truth Social (“Brian Hook from the Wilson Center for Scholars... YOU'RE FIRED!") while the Islamic Republic News Agency speculated that Trump’s actions “could be sending signals to Iran that he may be willing to engage with Tehran diplomatically,” even if it is “unclear whether the moves signal a shift in tactics, strategy, or attitude.”
Trump’s mysterious letter to Khamenei
The drama revolving around the letter that Trump sent Khamenei on March 5 shows that striking this balance won’t be easy. While not revealing the letter’s contents, Trump alluded to it during his March 6 Oval Office remarks.
“I’d rather negotiate a peace deal…but we can make a deal…just as good as if you won militarily,” he said. Two days later on Fox News, he acknowledged that “I’ve written them a letter saying I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.” His assertion that the U.S. seeks a deal that would be “just as good as if you won militarily” suggests that Trump is telling Khamenei that, by dint of either talks or brute force, the administration will compel Iran to totally dismantle its vast enrichment facilities.
This is a demand that no Iranian leader, including Khamenei, can possibly accept. As he and Araghchi made clear, they will not accept U.S. ultimatums. As Khamenei put it, the “negotiations” that “some bully governments” seek “are not aimed at solving issues, but to…impose their own expectations.” If his depiction of the letter’s take-it-or-leave-it tone is accurate, the U.S., Israel and Iran may well be on a path to military confrontation.
A Trump-Netanyahu partnership without limits?
While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would welcome a U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran, it is striking that only six weeks ago the Israeli press was full of reports speculating that, as one Haaretz writer put it, Netanyahu might “go head to head with Trump on striking Iran.” But everything changed with Trump’s February 4 remark that two million displaced Palestinians must leave Gaza. While world leaders strained to make sense of this statement, Netanyahu praised Trump’s “revolutionary, creative approach,” arguing that it created “many possibilities,” one of which, it now appears, was Israel’s renewed assault in Gaza. It is also very likely that Netanyahu construed Trump’s words as telegraphing U.S. support for an eventual attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
But such an attack will not be easy given the domestic upheaval that Israel’s renewed assault on Gaza has sparked. Wading into the political waters, President Isaac Herzog declared that “thousands of citizens…are…crying out to prevent the widening of rifts and divisions….It is unthinkable to ignore these voices and not seek consensus.”
Coming amid the controversy over Netanyahu’s March 20 firing of the head of Israel’s Shin Bet security service, Herzog’s statement points to a constitutional crisis that could send Israel into a kind of civil war. Undeterred, Netanyahu’s Likud Party asserted that “Herzog has joined the ‘deep state.’” Clearly, Netanyahu and his allies believe that he has much to gain by emulating Trump’s paranoia and thus intimating that he and the U.S. president are on the same page politically and strategically.
Netanyahu cannot trust his mercurial twin
Still, Netanyahu must tread carefully because the divisions tearing Israel apart will grow as it expands the war in Gaza and ramps up military actions in Lebanon and Syria. If these actions lead to the killing of the Israeli hostages and/or spark a military confrontation on three fronts, the specter of regional mayhem reflect poorly on Trump. The last thing he can tolerate is looking like a “loser.”
In fact, Witkoff seemed to use his March 21 interview with Tucker Carlson to help his boss out. The resumption of war in Gaza, he argued, runs counter to Israeli public opinion. Moreover, he stated that Hamas is not ideological, that it must have a political role in a post-Gaza deal, and that real compromises with Hamas and Iran are vital to the stability that, according to Witkoff, is Trump’s number one goal when it comes to global affairs. And he seemed to walk back Trump’s own words when he argued that his letter to Khamenei was not an ultimatum, that he wants a nuclear deal that includes “verification,” and that the military option is not “a very good alternative.”
Spinners beware!
Witkoff’s interview provoked a storm in the Israeli press, and rightly so: a trusted envoy, he is struggling to transform Trump’s utterings into something resembling a coherent policy. Yet if the Middle East blows up, or seems to be moving that way, Trump might launch another verbal blast that will have leaders, policy analysts and pundits in Tehran, Jerusalem and Washington scurrying to fathom what it means. But if Witkoff and can temper his boss’s outbursts without embarrassing or antagonizing him, he could help Trump pull back from the brink. Such an effort will partly hinge on whether Trump can muster the emotional energy to articulate and sustain support for a real compromise. Perhaps pushing back against such a possibility, national security adviser Mike Waltz recently declared that nothing less than “full dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program is acceptable, thus perhaps putting him at odds with Witkoff.
The battle to spin Trump’s verbal bouts continues not only in Washington, but also in Tehran. Days before Trump threatened to bomb Iran, government sources in Tehran claimed that the president’s letter “is not exactly clear, (but) is not an ultimatum.” Indeed, Araghchi’s assertion that “indirect negotiations can continue,” was a message reiterated by another close adviser to Khamenei.
While, as noted above, Iran’s president has also repeated this message despite Trump’s recent threats, in the wake of the Signal Group Chat fiasco, senior administration officials are unlikely to risk their necks competing to influence Trump’s stance on Russia, Iran or indeed any other country. Like their counterparts in Tehran, Jerusalem, Moscow and other capitals, his security advisers must tread carefully in their attempts to manage Trump’s fiery temperament and careening impulses.
A longer version of this article originally appeared at Arab Center Washington DC.
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Top image credit: NEWPORT NEWS, Va. (July 10, 2019) The upper bow unit of the future aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) is fitted to the primary structure of the ship, July 10, 2019, at Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Huntington Ingalls Industries by Matt Hildreth/Released)
“We are also going to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry, including commercial shipbuilding and military shipbuilding,” President Trump said during his March 6 joint address to Congress.
The president did not break new ground with the announcement. Virtually every year, Navy and industry leaders complain that the United States does not invest enough in the nation’s shipbuilding facilities. Yet according to the Congressional Budget Office, lawmakers have appropriated more shipbuilding funds than the president requested for at least 17 of the past 20 years. Even with the extra funds, the Navy’s major shipbuilding programs have consistently fallen behind schedule and over budget.
Over the next three years, the Navy plans on retiring 13 more ships than it will commission, shrinking the fleet to 283 ships by 2027. According to the Navy’s current plan, the fleet will grow to 515 crewed and uncrewed vessels by 2054. To reach that goal, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the Navy will spend more than $1 trillion, nearly $36 billion each year for the next three decades on shipbuilding alone.
It remains unclear if the Navy can realize its plan, even if Congress provides the funds. Ramping up naval construction is not simply a matter of resources. The Navy spent $2.3 billion between 2018 and 2023 to increase the capacity of the submarine shipyards. Despite this investment, the production rate for Virginia-class attack submarines decreased from around two boats per year to 1.2.
In just 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the number of skilled shipyard workers shrank from 62,000 to 21,000. The number of workers has increased since 2001, but shortages remain. During a 2024 symposium, the director of the Navy’s Submarine Industrial Base Program said the United States needs to hire 140,000 workers just to meet the needs of the current submarine building program.
One of the best ways for the Navy to ease the current shipbuilding struggles is to pursue better ship designs. The constant pursuit of exquisite technology and excessively complex ship designs results in longer construction times. The insidious practice of concurrency — beginning construction of a ship before the design is complete — causes further delays. As design flaws are discovered during construction, workers must go back and re-do already completed work. These often require extensive retrofitting, consuming substantial time and money. With limited shipbuilding facilities, longer construction times create a backlog that only exacerbates industry’s ability to meet demand.
Navy leaders could provide some relief to the haggard shipyards by simplifying ship designs. Simplicity should always be a key design parameter in any weapon program. Designs based on proven technology can be developed and built faster. An acquisition strategy that prioritizes simplicity will keep the Navy and other services one step ahead of obsolescence.
Navy leaders should have learned this lesson from the Littoral Combat Ship debacle. That program was intended to be the small surface combatant of the future with a complicated modular design to swap out specialized equipment for different missions. Engineers could not get that gimmick to work properly, and the scheme was eventually abandoned. The program has been beset by a string of embarrassing maintenance failures and questions about its combat survivability. The Navy is now in the process of retiring these troublesome ships. The Littoral Combat Ship program’s only milestone achievement is joining the mothball fleet early.
Before throwing more money at the shipbuilding problem, the nation’s civilian and uniformed military leaders should first change their acquisition strategy to lessen the burden on the overworked shipyards already devoted to naval warships. The Congressional Budget Office recommended the Navy develop a missile corvette that can be built by the nation’s other shipyards. The Navy has used a similar approach of licensing designs to commercial shipbuilders in the past to meet its shipbuilding goals to great effect. The idea has merit today because doing so would expand both the size of the fleet and the industrial base.
The Navy’s challenges didn’t crop up overnight, and they won’t be solved overnight. Another infusion of taxpayer money is unlikely to resolve the shipbuilding industry’s capacity limits.
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