According to reports today, satellite images are showing that the massive U.S. project to build a pier and causeway to help surge humanitarian aid into Gaza has finally begun.
President Joe Biden first announced the plan during his State of the Union speech, on March 4.
The problem is it was supposed to be complete in "early May" but Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, system is no where near being in place. In fact, according to this Associated Press report, an American military engineering unit is currently "training" to build the 1800-foot causeway, which is supposed to be anchored right off the Gazan beach, with another Israeli military unit, up the coast. The article doesn't say how the American unit is accomplishing this without boots on the ground, which was promised up and down and sideways by the Biden administration.
The U.S. Naval vessels are in place about 7 miles away in the waters between Gaza and Crete. They will first build a floating pier onto which humanitarian aid will brought from inspection centers in Crete. Then the aid will be shipped by vessels to the causeway and then onto a staging area on the beach. This is where this gets tricky. Supposedly the Israelis will be providing security on the beach and the U.N. will be delivering it into Gaza, but the project came under mortar fire on the beach last week and Hamas has pledged to "resist" Israel or any other foreign force brought in to guard the area. In short, the entire gambit has become a head scratcher.
Furthermore, according to Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, the whole thing is going to cost the U.S. taxpayers $320 million (in addition to the $26 billion approved last week) up front. This is quite a bit to swallow given that there are check points and ports in Israel that could be surging aid into the starving Palestinian population but are not. Nevertheless, officials say they still expect this to be up and running in "early May."
None of this has escaped the attention of even the biggest pro-Israel hawks on Capitol Hill. "This dangerous effort with marginal benefit will now cost the American taxpayers at least $320 million to operate the pier for only 90 days,” charged Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Mississippi), in an interview with Reuters, which broke the story about the cost.
“How much will taxpayers be on the hook once – or if – the pier is finally constructed?” Wicker asked further.
“For every day this mission continues, the price tag goes up and so does the level of risk for the 1,000 deployed troops within range of Hamas’s rockets.”
Interestingly the pier is no longer considered a temporary fix. According to CNN this morning, "the ultimate goal is to turn it into a full-time commercial operation that can be used by other countries and non-governmental organizations."
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Army mariners assigned to the 368th Seaport Operations Company and 331st Transportation Company construct a causeway adjacent to the Merchant Vessel Maj. Bernard F. Fisher off the coast of Bowen, Australia, July 29, 2023. (Photo Credit: Sgt. Ashunteia' Smith)
Early this week, popular Twitch streamer and YouTube podcaster Hasan Piker was
detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents for two hours at Chicago O’ Hare International Airport. There, he said he was questioned about his work and on his political views, especially those related to Israel’s war in Gaza and foreign policy.
Piker, who is an American citizen and was returning home from a family trip to France, spoke with RS about his experience being detained, First Amendment rights, and U.S. foreign policy in the Trump era. He said he was not arrested, but was clearly singled out for his interviews and online commentary. He told RS that he thinks the feds are likely worried about blowback and “bad branding” now that this case has gotten widespread attention and is generally seen as an attempt to put a chill on Constitutionally protected speech challenging the administration’s policies.
In a X post this week, the Department of Homeland Security suggested Piker was "lying for likes."
The following interview has been edited for length and clarity
Stavroula Pabst: Now that you've had some time to reflect on the experience [of being detained], and maybe you've been able to speak with other journalists and lawyers about it…do you have anything more to say about the situation than what your initial reaction to it was. Has maybe your analysis of the episode changed at all over the last few days?
Hasan Piker: Not necessarily. I guess the only thing that was really interesting was the Department of Homeland Security's spokesperson's response to it all, which was to claim that this was like ‘lying for likes,’ and that it was a routine part of the process, a routine investigation that was, was not conducted on the basis, or was not started on the basis, of like political dissidents. And that they released me after, you know, asking these questions. I find that interesting, because, on the one hand, I think that they're still lying. I don't think that they're being truthful when they say it's not targeting due to political opinions.
But I think it's also interesting that they are worried about that being branded with the, that being associated with the administration. Like they're worried that could be an angle of attack, or an angle of criticism that could galvanize a lot of people against the administration.
So it's interesting — what they chose to defend and what they chose to omit. And what they chose to omit, of course, is the line of questioning, because I think that's what most people are understandably disturbed by: you know, my political affiliations, my opinions on American foreign policy, my opinions on Israel and numerous non-state actors that are in the region. All of that is constitutionally protected speech for an American citizen such as myself. And yet this was, these were questions that were asked almost to feed a line of inquiry that could potentially create some kind of actionable situation, you know, in an effort to, like, trip you up in that conversation. To try to see if you could say something that could justify further investigation into whether or not you are doing something illegal, like material support for any number of these different groups.
And so that, in and of itself, was a frustrating, frustrating thing to contend with, that the administration is trying to do this. But I guess, like I said, the silver lining is that they are still worried about the bad branding, the bad attention that this brings upon the Department of Homeland Security. So those are my thoughts since the detention.
SP: I understand in that same [DHS] comment, I believe it's Tricia McLaughlin, she had said that what had happened to you was legal. What do you make of that?
HP: I think it's definitely very strange, if this is now considered legal and routine. Because not only did she say it's legal, but she also said it was a routine investigation. And I don't know if it's actually routine, or if it should be routine, to ask American travelers entering the country what their opinion on the President is. Would it have been fine if, I don't know, Rush Limbaugh was apprehended during the Bill Clinton administration at the border? I mean, I don't even know if Tucker Carlson was questioned or investigated by the Department of Homeland Security, or any other agency under the Biden administration, when he went and talked to Vladimir Putin, the leader of a foreign adversary.
So, I don't think this is routine at all. I mean, it's routine if you are Muslim, living in the post 9-11 War on Terror era where you're traveling and all. And I have seen some of that impact as well, like you know, getting the quadruple “S” stamp on my boarding pass, like, I've experienced that before, right, for additional security clearances and things of that nature.
But this was unique in the sense that I've never been taken to a detention center, and like, been investigated this thoroughly with questions that revolve around things that they're not even supposed to technically ask you when you're entering the country. Your opinion on the president is not pertinent to entering the country as an American citizen. It is unconstitutional for them to bar me entry into my own country on the basis of my first amendment-protected speech.
SP: In light of this event, it's my understanding that you've accused the U.S. government of "causing a chilling effect" and an "environment of fear" through these detainments, not just yours, but as well as others in an effort to silence critics. Why do you think the U.S. government might view your speech or your political activity as dangerous to its prerogatives, and perhaps especially in regards to its foreign policy goals and objectives?
HP: Because it's deeply unpopular. It's that simple. Our agenda in the Middle East, our grand design for the region, revolves around Israel dominating every other country in its immediate vicinity with American munitions. And the atrocities are so severe that it has actually changed the political calculation in the way that people view Israel no longer as the most reliable and most valuable ally in the Middle East... This has created a major fissure between what the American public's demands are, which I believe are very reasonable and just, which is to put an end to this bloodshed and to also bring about war criminals that are responsible for this genocide to justice, right?
And the American politicians on the other hand, the American government, on the other hand, has a very different attitude on this, a very different attitude that revolves around letting Israel continue doing what it wants to do. And for this reason, I think, and this happened, this accelerated under Biden administration, as well, something I was very critical about even then, the government's response to this has been to basically try and punish people for not liking what Israel is doing, rather than address the elephant in the room: the idea that this can continue forever is ridiculous, and that's where we're at now. That's why we are seeing [this] first from an immigration enforcement side, which is, I think, also delivery, because that was Trump's most popular policy. In his mind, at least.
So we're seeing the immigrant enforcement mechanism target student protesters and even green card holders for no crimes whatsoever, but simply for their First Amendment protective speech in an effort to, I think, open the door to a complete erosion of the First Amendment and maybe even possibly another unconstitutional precedent to set on, on a distinction being made in terms of constitutional protections between citizens and non-citizens. Because right now, there is no distinction.
The constitution protects citizens and non citizens alike as long as they're on U.S. soil, which means that they're still also protected by the First Amendment. I think that that's what they're trying to tackle right now. And I fear that they're using Israel, which has a tremendously sophisticated and and very expansive, and also expensive, lobbying and and influence peddling operation in the United States of America and the the cynical shield that this influence peddling operation uses is antisemitism, that that this administration is using antisemitism as a way to open up the flood gates of eroding civil liberties, and they're doing this in a very cynical and very transparent manner.
SP: If our ability to speak out as civilians in this capacity is being jeopardized, what should we try to be doing right now to prevent that? What is our action in terms of where we go from here, now that [U.S. citizens' right to free speech is] to possibly be the target?
HP: I mean, I think we just keep pushing. There's nothing else to do in this situation. You can change targets as the government changes its priorities or engages in ridiculous enforcement and further encroachments on civil liberties.
But before that happens, as long as there are legal avenues that you can exhaust, I think we should exhaust all avenues, and all options, and engage in civil disobedience and continue to speak truth to power and exercise our first amendment rights, especially as American citizens.
I have immense privilege as an American citizen, an American citizen that is relatively wealthy and as an American citizen with a public persona. And I try to use that privilege every single day to speak out for those who can't speak out for themselves, to give voice to the voiceless. And I'm going to continue doing that, regardless of whether or not the government doesn't like it, or whether or not the government wants to prosecute me over these sorts of things, when previously, it would have been seen as unimaginable to prosecute an American citizen over their constitutionally protected speech.
SP: I have a more specific question regarding the detainment. Have you heard of the Zionist organization called Betar?
HP: Potentially. But it's not — we don't have to look that far.
I mean, I've been almost declared the number one antisemite of the year by stopantisemitism.org. I've been targeted by the ADL [Anti-Defamation League] on numerous occasions. So there are much more prominent advocacy institutions, not even Stop Antisemitism, but ADL being like, probably the most, the largest and the most influential one with institutional muscle, coming after me with regular frequency and with vicious smears of antisemitism when I have been a massive combatant of antisemitism in perpetuity. It's just that I am also an anti-Zionist, and that is very frustrating for a lot of these organizations that simply care about Israel and not necessarily about antisemitism at all.
So there's a number of different groups that could have put me in the crosshairs of this administration. There's also obviously alongside this, like sophisticated influence peddling operation. There are papers that will routinely write hit pieces at times when I'm getting any sort of media coverage that's somewhat positive. You got the ‘Free Presses’ of the world that very obviously, are just doing propaganda for Israel with regular frequency. You have the ‘New York Posts’ of the world, like these right wing newspapers. Sometimes Fox News will even entertain writing counter-messaging.
This happened after my New York Times article came out. There was, in the Sunday Style section, they wrote about the appeal that I have, I guess, for young men. And this was viral among right-wing circles. And very quickly, as it happens over and over again, all of these are institutions that I was talking about, all these, like right wing papers that I was talking about, started immediately writing counter articles being like, ‘This guy's a terrorist supporter. He loves terrorism.’ And you know, broadly, in the eyes of the broader public, that kind of stuff doesn't work anymore. Like, no one really cares about it that much. Everyone's like, ‘oh, here we go. Another person who is pro-Palestine is being branded as an antisemite again.’ And I feel like that has kind of softened the impact. But it's obvious to me that the government certainly takes note of these things, right? That's something to consider.
SP: You had said that you told the CBP agent that you were upset that Trump hasn't ended the wars, and obviously that's definitely true in relation to Israel-Gaza.
Now, Trump has made certain efforts to try to move to end the war in Ukraine. And he's also made certain efforts to negotiate with Iran, as well as Yemen's Houthis. What do you think about Trump's efforts in these other realms? Do you support some of his other foreign policy efforts?
HP: Yeah, I actually mentioned the Houthis specifically in my interrogation as well, where I said, look, there are certain things that Trump does that I think are considered unorthodox from a, you know, foreign policy perspective, in comparison with the previous administrations, that I actually appreciate.
And the one that immediately came to mind was the talks that took place in Oman over a cessation of hostilities between the Ansar Allah movement and the Trump administration. And I think that that was productive. Stopping the bombing of [unclear], other numerous points in Yemen, and killing a bunch of civilians was not only costly. I believe what the total number is like, $15 billion of munitions that have been used so far in Yemen? It's more so than the War on Terror. As a matter of fact, it's, like, totally ridiculous. I guess you could say it's irresponsible statecraft. And I said that I actually appreciated that he did that. So there are certain things that he does that I agree with.
But the problem is, that didn't come about exclusively because Trump is a peaceful dove. That came about because the Houthis were punishing the American Navy tremendously with the very little that they have, right? It's the poorest nation on the planet, and yet, they were able to take down 22 Reaper drones, that are, what? $20 million a pop almost, or even more expensive than that, if I'm not mistaken. Four F-18 fighter jets were destroyed in the process, one under the Biden administration in the month of December, and then three, including the last one, being destroyed the day of the ceasefire. I mean, those are $70 million a pop. That's a crazy amount of cost and, if you believe the New York Times reporting on this, they were claiming, or at least, like, sources were claiming, that they even, the Houthis were almost able to take down an F-16 and an F-35 seriously putting pilot lives at risk and really changing the calculation for the Trump administration.
So it's not necessarily that Trump was a peaceful dove, but at least he was reasonable enough to recognize that these guys are not going to stop, and at the very least it's better to continue engaging in a defensive posture for Israel. But, you know, let them do whatever they're doing to Israel, but also create this situation where there's no longer any sort of back-and-forth between the American Navy and the region and the Houthis.
SP: What [do] you see amongst your own streamers, or the people that follow your work. Do they feel their foreign policy views are being represented? What are their frustrations and how do we move forward with that?
HP: No, I don't think the broader American foreign policy perspective is being represented. But I think that is also by design, kind of, where Americans have the capacity to feel as though they want peace all the time. But that's only because a lot of our imperialist efforts are sheltered from the public, whether it be the damaging impact to the local populations, or even migration patterns that end up out of all of the displacement, the migration patterns that end up causing destabilization in certain places, like Europe. Those issues never come all the way back to the United States of America and create political trouble in the United States of America. We are sheltered from the impact of our actions.
And I think that the media, broadly, also keeps people desensitized, and either desensitized or utterly oblivious to American foreign policy, which is precisely the reason why both parties can engage in like full blown war hawk behavior all around the world, and even Trump can present himself as a peaceful dove, as an ender of wars. Even though he also, when in charge, will greatly accelerate America's most damaging and most violent policies on the global stage.
So I guess the point I'm trying to make is that like, Americans fancy themselves to be peaceful, or want to feel peaceful, and want to vote for a guy who says he's going to end the wars. But both parties are not really invested in that at all.
At least Trump is lying about it when he's running for office, which I think is also still instructive to understand, like what the public position is on this. But neither, neither party actually represents it, and it's really damaging. We're completely servile to the interests of the military industrial complex in this country, our politicians are.
WARSAW, POLAND — Although there are surprisingly few candidate banners in the streets of Warsaw these days, Poland finds itself in the throes of a presidential election, which will take place on Sunday.
If, as expected, no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a second round between the two leading candidates will take place in two weeks time.
In the Polish political system, the president is not the head of government but carries influence over foreign and defense policy and can veto parliamentary legislation unless the veto is overcome by three-fifths of the parliamentarians. No matter who wins the election contest, either the conservative-liberal Rafał Trzaskowski of the ruling Civic Coalition of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, or the right-wing Karol Nawrocki, supported by the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland is likely to continue with its plans to devote 5% of its GDP to defense spending.
Of note, Poland was long on its way to 5% before Trump asserted that this should be the target for NATO countries. The presidential election will actually be more consequential for the internal balance of power in the country. A Trzaskowski win would greatly facilitate the work of the Tusk-led government, which does not enjoy a three-fifths majority and has often clashed with President Andrzej Duda, supported by PiS.
A consensus on defense spending
Bartosz Rydliński, a lecturer at the Political Science Institute of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw (UKSW), explains that after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, "Poland began to mirror the fate of Ukraine and Ukrainians. For this reason, there was almost complete political consensus on record-high military spending."
Despite the recent increase in anti-Ukrainian sentiments against the one million Ukrainian refugees living in Poland, there is also a broad political consensus, including both Trzaskowski and Nawrocki, behind supporting Ukraine's military effort against Russia even if the U.S. reduces its share of aid for the embattled country.
This contrasts with a poll in late 2024, which registered for the first time that a majority of Poles believe the war in Ukraine should end even if this implies Kyiv giving up part of its territory or sovereignty. Correspondingly, only 31% believe it is better to keep fighting without making concessions to Russia. Even so, and despite security and military factors becoming increasingly important in these elections, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki are expected to move comfortably to the second round.
As of now, Poland is already spending 4.12% of its GDP on defense, leading the next NATO countries Estonia (3.43%) and the United States (3.38%) by a considerable distance. It is countries like Poland that have led to what the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently decried as an "unprecedented rise” in global military expenditures.
Others look at these same figures as a net positive. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in Warsaw on February 2025 on his first trip abroad, noted that, "we see Poland as the model ally on the continent, willing to invest not just in their defense, but in our shared defense, and the defense of the continent."
To understand Poland's high level of military expenditure, the importance of the country's geographical location, bordering on the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus, cannot be over-emphasized. The Suwałki Gap, a 100-kilometer (62-mile) stretch of land connecting Poland to Lithuania and the rest of the Baltics, is considered by many to be one of the weakest points for NATO in the event of a confrontation with Russia.
It is also an area where Poland and Lithuania have been recently expanding their military infrastructure.
Still, Poland's military spending spree has historical roots that go deeper than the country's geographical reality after the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Ukraine War. Here, it might be useful to resort to the concept of "nervous sovereignty" used by Jarosław Kuisz, the editor-in-chief of the Polish political weekly Kultura Liberalna.
According to Kuisz, due to historical reasons, Poland is a perfect example of a country always alert to a potential loss of sovereignty. After the three partitions of Poland in the late 18th century, Poland disappeared from the map of Europe until the end of the First World War, only to be occupied by Nazi Germany and then become a Communist state connected to the Soviet Union.
Kuisz's thesis about "nervous sovereignty" appears to be supported by a recent poll, which shows that 63% of Poles believe Poland is threatened by other countries. The percentage, seven points higher than last year, contrasts with only 26% of citizens saying no.
Rydliński notes that "to this day, wedding rings are worn on the right hand in Poland as a mournful reminder of the lost national uprising of 1863. This is perhaps the most striking example of how the trauma of enslavement is present in Polish identity and social consciousness."
But can Poland afford it?
Although Poland's increase in military spending might be understood from the perspective of a country that feels insecure and does want to put a price tag on security, it is doubtful that increased funding will contribute to strengthening the national economy. For all the renewed popularity of "military Keynesianism" in Europe (and the well-founded corresponding doubts on whether military expenditure can lead to inclusive growth), Poland's weapons industry cannot even absorb the new spending levels.
Polish armament companies have proved uncompetitive, being ignored by EU-sponsored efforts to re-arm the European continent. In March 2024, for instance, the EU allocated money to 31 companies to increase European ammunition production, with the only Polish contractor on the list receiving less than 0.5% of the total funds.
The Polish weapons industry is dominated by the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ), a state-controlled conglomerate made up of 50 different companies. The company struggles even with basic orders such as producing boots and helmets. PGZ has had ten different bosses since 2013, when it was created during Tusk's previous period as prime minister.
PGZ's goal of producing 150,000 shells every year has been delayed by three years to 2028. One of the few successful Polish weapons exports is the Piorun man-portable air defense systems, which have proven successful in the Ukraine War.
Poland's economic growth was close to 3% of its GDP in 2024, significantly outperforming the EU's average, set below 1%. And yet, the Polish government cannot do away with political tradeoffs on its way to record-high military spending.
Rydliński believes the effect of high defense expenditure can already be seen, as the new volumes of expenditure, in combination with a fairly neoliberal tax and contribution system, are "affecting the condition of public services. This includes the crisis in healthcare, low wage increases in the public sector, and low spending on research and development. Poles are already paying the price for high defense spending at the expense of selective and non-complementary social policies."
The troubles faced by Poland to meet its increased defense expenditure through domestic production, together with the painful policy choices that would come with it, offer some food for thought to countries such as Germany, which are now flouting the possibility of raising defense expenditure to 5% of the GDP.
In Poland, despite the swing in public opinion in favor of ending the Ukraine War, the voters are expected to elect a status quo president that will keep on the path of increased military expenditure and support for Ukraine.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Ukranian President Voloydmyr Zelensky, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk walk in the grounds of the Mariynsky Palace, in Kyiv, Ukraine, May 10, 2025. Ludovic Marin/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo
As the Istanbul peace talks get underway, Europe’s response to the Russia-Ukraine war exposes its profound weakness and reliance on U.S. support, with leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron, Britain’s Keir Starmer, and Germany’s Friedrich Merz resorting to bluffs that lack substance.
The European trio, after visiting Kyiv and meeting with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 10, issued Russiaa 30-day ceasefire ultimatum to begin on May 12, threatening severe sanctions in case of Moscow’s non-compliance. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed it, offering talks in Istanbul without a truce instead, in line with Russia’s insistence that the “root causes” of the conflict be addressed, including Ukraine’s potential NATO membership.
Kyiv and its European alliesinsisted that a ceasefire should precede talks. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for immediate negotiations, sidestepping the ceasefire, upended their strategy and forced Zelenskyy’s attendance. Europe has exposed itself as being increasingly irrelevant, its strategies crumbling without American backing.
Zelenskyy plans to attend the talks in Istanbul aiming to appear peace-seeking and avoid being blamed by Trump for the failure to use the chance to end the war. Putin, for his part, scoffed at the threat of new sanctions, declaring, in reference to the Europeans: “They harm themselves with these moves, but they do it anyway, the fools.”
However, Moscow is also reluctant to alienate Trump and provoke an end of its nascent dialogue with Washington. So, while Putin will not attend the talks, he will send his aide Vladimir Medinsky who already was the head of the Russian delegation at the Istanbul talks in Spring 2022, where both sides reached a draft agreement. This signals Moscow’s determination to resume talks based on the same parameters as in 2022: Ukraine’s neutral status, security guarantees from all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China) and reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces.
The question now is whether Zelensky will accept to negotiate with Medinsky, or will send his own aides, such as his foreign minister or the head of the presidential administration. Either way, it would only further expose Europe’s inability to steer the process.
Regardless of Kyiv’s decision, the EU’s 17th sanctions package, approved on May, exemplifies this lack of leverage. Including a ban on chemical exports for weapons, visa bans and asset freezes for Russian officials, trade restrictions on companies evading sanctions, and measures against nearly 200 oil tankers in Russia’s “shadow fleet,” the package was deemed so weak that Hungary and Slovakia — who long advocated for negotiations with Moscow to end the war — didn’t bother blocking it. Sweden and Finland noted parliamentary approval is needed, but no delays are expected.
EU diplomats admit that “massive” sanctions of the sort threatened by Macron or escalatory steps like sending German Taurus missiles to Ukraine lack credibility without U.S. support and would take too long to implement, allowing Moscow to dismiss them as a bluff. With gas phase-outs delayed until 2027 and internal divisions — Hungary’s and Slovakia’s resistance chief among them — Europe’s economic leverage seems even less convincing.
Macron’s posturing further underscores this weakness. He admitted France has exhausted its aid to Ukraine and cannot escalate support. He noted that frozen Russian assets cannot be confiscated due to legal barriers, warning that Moscow could reclaim them if sanctions falter — a damning admission of Europe’s fragility.
His proposal to deploy European troops in Ukraine, framed as an alternative to NATO membership, is another empty gesture. “We cannot leave Ukraine alone. Since it will not join NATO, we offer alternative guarantees,” Macron claimed, suggesting troops be placed in “strategically important points” away from the front for joint operations to create a “deterrence effect.”
Yet, he confirmed no combat role, and Russia’s repeated opposition to Western troops renders the idea toothless. Macron and Starmer concede the plan hinges on Kyiv-Moscow agreements, admitting its speculative nature. Starmer, echoing Macron’s rhetoric, offers no concrete commitments, while Merz, Germany’s new chancellor, pushes for sanctions and aid but lacks the fiscal or political clout to act unilaterally. Their collective strategy — threatening Russia with sanctions or troops — collapses without U.S. muscle. It also diverts the focus from what should be a serious conversation on realistic, achievable security guarantees for Ukraine.
As the EU threatens sanctions if Russia rejects a ceasefire, Europe’s diluted measures and lack of coordination with Washington expose the bluff. Trump’s proximity to Istanbul during a Middle East visit could see him intervene if talks show promise, reinforcing his role as the decisive player. Without U.S.-driven terms or a U.S.-Russia deal, Europe’s calls for peace along current lines are futile, as neither Moscow nor Kyiv sees their respective positions as too weak to agree to unfavorable terms.
If the Istanbul talks lead to some sort of an agreement, it is Trump who’ll be in a position to claim credit as he insisted on the talks to take place in the first place. If the talks fail, Trump’s reaction — escalating arms deliveries to Ukraine, pressuring Kyiv, maintaining limited support, or disengaging — will impact the war’s trajectory.
Europe, shackled by weak sanctions, exhausted resources, hollow proposals, and stubborn refusal to talk to Moscow has no independent path.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.