According to reports today, satellite images are showing that the massive U.S. project to build a pier and causeway to help surge humanitarian aid into Gaza has finally begun.
President Joe Biden first announced the plan during his State of the Union speech, on March 4.
The problem is it was supposed to be complete in "early May" but Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, system is no where near being in place. In fact, according to this Associated Press report, an American military engineering unit is currently "training" to build the 1800-foot causeway, which is supposed to be anchored right off the Gazan beach, with another Israeli military unit, up the coast. The article doesn't say how the American unit is accomplishing this without boots on the ground, which was promised up and down and sideways by the Biden administration.
The U.S. Naval vessels are in place about 7 miles away in the waters between Gaza and Crete. They will first build a floating pier onto which humanitarian aid will brought from inspection centers in Crete. Then the aid will be shipped by vessels to the causeway and then onto a staging area on the beach. This is where this gets tricky. Supposedly the Israelis will be providing security on the beach and the U.N. will be delivering it into Gaza, but the project came under mortar fire on the beach last week and Hamas has pledged to "resist" Israel or any other foreign force brought in to guard the area. In short, the entire gambit has become a head scratcher.
Furthermore, according to Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, the whole thing is going to cost the U.S. taxpayers $320 million (in addition to the $26 billion approved last week) up front. This is quite a bit to swallow given that there are check points and ports in Israel that could be surging aid into the starving Palestinian population but are not. Nevertheless, officials say they still expect this to be up and running in "early May."
None of this has escaped the attention of even the biggest pro-Israel hawks on Capitol Hill. "This dangerous effort with marginal benefit will now cost the American taxpayers at least $320 million to operate the pier for only 90 days,” charged Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Mississippi), in an interview with Reuters, which broke the story about the cost.
“How much will taxpayers be on the hook once – or if – the pier is finally constructed?” Wicker asked further.
“For every day this mission continues, the price tag goes up and so does the level of risk for the 1,000 deployed troops within range of Hamas’s rockets.”
Interestingly the pier is no longer considered a temporary fix. According to CNN this morning, "the ultimate goal is to turn it into a full-time commercial operation that can be used by other countries and non-governmental organizations."
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Army mariners assigned to the 368th Seaport Operations Company and 331st Transportation Company construct a causeway adjacent to the Merchant Vessel Maj. Bernard F. Fisher off the coast of Bowen, Australia, July 29, 2023. (Photo Credit: Sgt. Ashunteia' Smith)
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has consistently demonstrated a reductive and simplistic approach to geopolitics that betrays a serious lack of strategic depth and historical knowledge for such a critical role. Her failure is symptomatic of a broader decline of European statecraft.
Reacting to the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the military parade in Beijing dedicated to the victory over fascism in World War II, attended by dozens of leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kallas expressed that it was "news" to her that China and Russia were among the victors who defeated Nazism and fascism
This is not a minor gaffe; it is a shocking lack of historical literacy. The Soviet Union (whose primary successor state is Russia) suffered over 20 million casualties in the Great Patriotic War, a sacrifice that, in alliance with the United States and Britain, fundamentally broke the back of the Nazi war machine. China, for its part, endured immense suffering in a brutal conflict with Japan that was a crucial, though often overlooked in the West, theater of World War II. China puts its death toll at 20 million. To be unaware of this is to be ignorant of the foundational architecture of the entire post-war order.
To compound this, in a bizarre caricature, she characterized the Chinese as “very good at technology but not that good in social sciences, while the Russians are super good in social sciences but bad at technology." It surely must be alarming that the EU's top diplomat would present this juvenile dichotomy as a legitimate lens through which to view two of the most complex and serious strategic challenges facing the continent.
Kallas’ statements were so egregious that they prompted an uncharacteristically direct and harsh rebuke from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, a move that signals a worrisome degradation of the EU’s diplomatic standing.
This primitive understanding is now being operationalized into a dangerously rigid foreign policy. Under the leadership of Kallas's European External Action Service (EEAS) and Ursula von der Leyen's European Commission, the EU has systematically severed every channel of communication with Russia. In Brussels, there are no behind-the-scenes diplomatic dialogues, no backchannel explorations, and not even engagement at the think-tank level behind closed doors. The official position is an absolutist moral stance: we do not talk to Putin, a war criminal.
This policy is not just strategically naive; it is laughably inconsistent. The same institutions maintain deep, continuous engagement with Israel, whose prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes. The EU's floundering response to the war in Gaza laid bare this incoherence: aside from principled stands taken by Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia, the bloc has failed to impose any meaningful costs on Israel.
The selective application of the moral principles by the EU masks a strategy of total disengagement with Russia. By refusing all contact, the EU voluntarily blinds and deafens itself, ceding all initiative and forfeiting any ability to probe for weaknesses, explore off-ramps, or even accurately gauge the adversary’s disposition. This is not statecraft; it is self-imposed paralysis.
The EU’s strategic abdication stands in stark contrast to the complex reality of modern global diplomacy. What we witnessed in Beijing was not a formation of some sort of a Chinese-led anti-Western bloc, but a convergence of interests among non-Western powers on two key fronts: minimizing the impact of U.S. secondary sanctions and building independence from the dollar-dominated financial system. For countries like China, India, and Russia, this is not primarily about opposing the West, but rather asserting sovereignty and creating strategic autonomy. They are resisting Washington's ability to unilaterally dictate global economic terms, a concern that resonates far beyond any single alliance.
This is a strategy of multi-vectorism, not monolithic opposition. Nations like Turkey (a member of NATO but cooperating with Russia) and India (balancing ties with the West, China, and Russia) are skillfully playing this game. Even China itself practices it, supporting Russia economically while simultaneously attempting to strengthen ties with Europe.
Russia, largely isolated from the West due to its war in Ukraine, is forced to lean into its Eastern vector, as evidenced by new energy agreements with China. However, this is a pragmatic adaptation, not an ideological marriage. The Kremlin would likely reactivate the Western pivot if offered sufficient economic incentives and political concessions, such as acquiescing to Moscow’s core war aims in Ukraine (namely, recognizing de facto its territorial gains and securing Ukraine’s neutrality, i.e. non-membership in NATO) and lifting all sanctions.
It is currently politically untenable for the West to extend such concessions. Even so, Putin went to meet with Donald Trump in Alaska, which shows his willingness to at least partially restore the Western vector through working bilaterally with Washington. Hence, his visit to Beijing was not any more “anti-American” than his visit to Alaska was “anti-Chinese.”
This pragmatic, multi-vector strategy is not confined to non-Western powers. In fact, it presents a profound internal contradiction for the EU itself, where member states Hungary and Slovakia stand as rare examples of attempting this approach within the bloc. Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico have consistently advocated for — and practiced — a foreign policy that seeks to maintain open channels with Moscow and Beijing, arguing for diplomacy over perpetual confrontation and emphasizing the severe economic costs of decoupling for European economies.
Yet, rather than engaging with this strategic perspective, the dominant EU narrative simply dismisses them as Putin sympathizers. This refusal leaves the bloc with a foreign policy that is neither coherently values-driven nor pragmatically effective. It is stuck in a moralizing limbo, exemplified by the likes of Kallas and von der Leyen.
Alarmingly, as the rest of the world hedges, the EU is not only refusing to do so but is rather actively increasing its strategic dependence on a single, increasingly disinterested, partner: the United States. Examples abound: the one-sided trade deal; the humiliating supplication to Trump on Ukraine; the detached-from-reality discussions on the “coalition of the willing” providing "security guarantees" to Ukraine that the EU and UK are utterly incapable of fulfilling without American military might; the U.S.-backed snapback of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, an act that directly contravenes European economic and security interests by increasing the likelihood of a new war between Israel and Iran and pushing Tehran further into the arms of the Russia and China.
This lack of strategic autonomy is all the more damning as even the United States, despite its rhetoric, is undergoing a pragmatic reassessment of its global positioning.
If Europe is to navigate the treacherous waters of the 21st century, its leaders must show they possess some basic understanding of the great powers with which they must contend rather than the kind of cartoonish mindset propagated by Kallas and her ilk. The unbearable lightness of the current approach will leave Europe not as a protagonist in the shaping an emergent global order, but rather as its helpless, disoriented, and increasingly irrelevant spectator.
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Top image credit: F-35A Lightning II's from the 34th Fighter Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, land at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, April 15, 2017. The aircraft arrival marks the first F-35A fighter training deployment to the U.S. European Command area of responsibility or any overseas location as a flying training deployment. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Matthew Plew)
A new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report has found that Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, the primary contractors working on the F-35, made product deliveries 238 days late on average in 2024 — despite the program paying them hundreds of millions in performance incentive fees, which encourage completing tasks on-time.
By comparison, the same deliveries were 61 days late on average in 2023. But even then, the contractors’ lateness was chronic, if not absolute. Lockheed Martin delivered 110 aircraft in 2024 to the program — all late.
The report also found that Pratt & Whitney, which makes engines for the F-35, delivered 80 of 82 engines late for F-35 production during 2021 through 2022. All 89 engines were late in the 2022-2023 production period, as were all 66 delivered for 2023-2024.
Stunningly, Pratt & Whitney still earned 56%, 78% and 37% of the program’s performance incentive fees, which were offered to encourage on-time engine deliveries, for those production lots respectively. The DoD even financially penalized Pratt & Whitney for being late; the incentive fees it accrued offset that penalty.
The GAO also reported that the program's ongoing modernization effort, which would improve the fighter jets’ targeting, navigation, communications, and electronic warfare systems, is $6 billion over budget, and will be completed in 2031 — 5 years past its initial due date.
Ultimately, the GAO’s latest warnings of F-35 bloat are on par for the program’s course. The most expensive DoD project to date, the F-35’s repeated cost increasespreviously triggered a critical DoD review back in 2012, forcing the Pentagon to confirm the F-35 project was essential to national security, viable, and cost-effective for it to continue.
The program survived that review, but the new report shows that problems persist. The new GAO report recommends that DoD consider whether its production schedules for F-35, and its incentive fees given to contractors for it, are practical. And it asks the DoD to evaluate whether Lockheed Martin, in particular, can realistically deliver F-35 products in a timely manner.
Will the gravy train finally wreck?
Having monitored the F-35 program for over two decades, the GAO maintains the F-35 has specific capabilities, including its stealth technologies and sensor networking systems, that make it critical for the DoD’s tactical air portfolio, and thus for U.S. national security.
Contractor antics aside, however, other experts believe the gargantuan program has little to offer, essentially because the F-35 will never truly be mission-capable — despite being in service for a decade.
“The latest GAO report underscores once again that the F-35 is not now, and will never be, fully ready for combat,” William Hartung, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told RS. “The program, which was touted at the outset as representing a ‘revolution in military procurement,’ was doomed from day one because its variants were meant to carry out a huge range of potential missions. It has done none of them well.”
To Hartung’s point, the GAO found in 2023 that the F-35 was only mission capable slightly over half the time.
“It’s time for the Pentagon to cut its losses and phase out the program now, before we waste billions of additional taxpayer dollars on a flawed plane that spends almost half its time in the hangar getting repaired,” Hartung told RS.
Ultimately, compounding concerns about the F-35 program’s chronic financial waste and overall viability have yet to blunt Washington’s interest in it. As matters stand, the Pentagon will continue to increase F-35 production until 2032. And while the president’s budget requested 47 F-35s for FY2026, significantly fewer than the FY2025 request for 68 F-35s, the Senate Armed Services Committee markup of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2026 still authorized 10 more.
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Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian visits Iran's nuclear achievements exhibition in Tehran, Iran April 9, 2025. Iran's Presidency/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
On August 28, the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) set the clock ticking, triggering the snapback mechanism and warning Iran that it must show meaningful progress on nuclear diplomacy within 30 days or face the return of pre-2015 U.N. sanctions.
Coming after Israel and the United States attacked Iran, hitting nuclear facilities and infrastructure and assassinating senior Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) officers and nuclear scientists, the EU’s decision has raised the stakes immeasurably.
It also comes as President Trump declared Iran should not engage in uranium enrichment. But the issue is not simply one of centrifuges and international inspection protocols to monitor Iran’s compliance. It is whether the Islamic Republic can reconcile its ideological posture with the need to survive.
The debate inside Tehran is now sharper than at any point since the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 when U.S. President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions. At one end stands President Masoud Pezeshkian urging pragmatic engagement. At the other, the hardline bloc associated with Keyhan newspaper in demanding escalation. Above them, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sets the limits, allowing neither surrender nor uncontrolled confrontation.
Pezeshkian is keenly aware that confrontation with the United States will not serve Iran. He is also aware that he would be signing the end of his political career if he capitulated to U.S. pressure to abandon Tehran’s nuclear program. This is a tough balancing act. After U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in June, Pezeshkian’s government suspended cooperation with the IAEA by banning international inspections at nuclear facilities. This was a defiant act, meant to show Iran would not be bullied. Yet Pezeshkian’s tone in other moments has been pointedly different, revealing a realistic assessment of his options. “If we rebuild the nuclear facilities, they are going to attack them again,” he said last month before asking the obvious question directed at hardliners who reject diplomacy: “What can we do if we do not enter negotiations?”
Pezeshkian’s reformist base has gone even further. In a controversial statement, the Reform Front urged Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment voluntarily to prevent snapback and the economic collapse that would likely follow. Iranian outlets carried the call, which was immediately condemned as treachery by hardliners
In a rare public statement, former President Hasan Rouhani, expressed hope that Iran could still convince European signatories to JCPOA to remove snapback from the U.N. Security Council agenda, although he did not say how. Rouhani made it clear that snapback will be very costly for Iran, and pleaded with JCPOA critics to stop censoring the deal.
Keyhan, the hardliners’ mouthpiece, has been adamant that Iran must not retreat, but instead rely on threats that force others to step back. They have called for Iran’s exit from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Such moves, of course, would escalate the crisis deliberately and increase incentives for building a nuclear bomb. For this faction, which includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, compromise is a slippery slope. Better to endure sanctions, and possibly another round of confrontation with Israel and the United States, than surrender sovereignty.
Khamenei hovers uneasily over the two camps, which might explain his often contradictory statements. He has described the nuclear issue with the U.S. as “unsolvable” and dismissed direct dialogue as superficial. Yet, in the same week he defended Pezeshkian from criticism, urging Iranians to support “those who serve the nation, especially the president, who is hardworking and persistent.” The balance is revealing, he will not permit surrender and sees the pragmatists as useful in breaking out of this quandary.
Outside powers complicate the equation. Russia and Chinaopposed the E3 decision but they cannot block snapback; instead, they may simply refuse to enforce sanctions, dulling the economic impact on Iran. Tehran may be encouraged by that. But this would offer only partial relief; while significant, they can’t substitute for access to global markets.
Russian officials have openly called the E3 move “illegitimate,” with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warning it will inflict additional damage to confidence in international mechanisms. For its part, China’s foreign ministry described the decision as “irresponsible” and signaled that Beijing would not cooperate with enforcement. Official Iranian outlets, such as Tasnim and Fars, have amplified these statements, presenting Moscow and Beijing as bulwarks against Western pressure. Yet Iranian economists caution that Russian and Chinese non-compliance cannot compensate for the loss of European markets or access to global banking. The IMF projects Iran’s economy to grow only 0.6% in 2025, the lowest in the Middle East except for war-ravaged Syria and Lebanon.
Israel, meanwhile, has wasted no time. It is lobbying Washington to act again, urging the U.S. not to relent on its “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Defense Minister Israel Katz warned bluntly that Israel would strike if threatened. With the 30-day deadline looming, delay in Tehran’s response to the E3 to restore trust will be read in Tel Aviv as a green light for renewed bombing. The lesson of June, that Iran’s nuclear program can be struck and set back overnight, likely informs Israeli calculations.
All hope seems to rest on Pezeshkian’s ability to navigate this maze and somehow secure the approval of the Supreme Leader to find a compromise. His mission would be to match national pride with pragmatism: preserve the right to enrich, but cap levels and accept inspections that reassure Europe and lower the risk of further strikes. Khamenei has done this before, dressing compromise in revolutionary terms as “heroic flexibility.” He may do so again to prevent the greater danger of collapse. It may be that Rouhani’s comments were aimed for the ear of the Supreme Leader so that he reins in the hardliners.
Ordinary Iranians, meanwhile, are showing signs of war weariness. Sporadic local protests over basic needs have become commonplace. Surveys published last month by the Iranian Students Polling Agency suggest that over 70 percent of Iranians prioritize economic stability over nuclear advancement, further evidence that the public mood is shifting. This underlines Pezeshkian’s dilemma: his push for negotiations is not only a diplomatic calculation, but also a response to the mounting fatigue of a society unwilling to carry the costs of perpetual confrontation.
Without a compromise within the coming weeks, the consequences could be devastating. The return of sanctions will likely crush what remains of Iran’s economic resilience. The IRGC may be willing to fight on, but ordinary Iranians have demonstrated they do not wish to be sacrificed at the altar of ideology. Without a quick response to stop the clock, Israel will view Tehran’s inaction as a license to strike again. The regime will face what it has feared most: a challenge not to its centrifuges, but to its very survival.
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