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Mike Johnson

Mike Johnson can't stop the GOP's internal split on Israel

The speaker pledged to root out 'isolationists,' but these divisions started long ago and they're only getting wider

Analysis | Washington Politics

House Speaker Mike Johnson took part in a private meeting with pro-Israel leaders from a variety of organizations on Capitol Hill last Wednesday during which he reportedly expressed concern about growing “isolationism” in the GOP.

Speaking to several individuals who attended the meeting, Jewish Insider reported, “Johnson, who described himself to the group as a ‘Reagan Republican’ focused on ‘peace through strength,’ acknowledged that isolationism is rising in the Republican Party, and that the party is likely bound for a major debate on the issue after President Donald Trump leaves office.”

The report added, “And Johnson told the group that, in his candidate recruiting efforts, he’s working to filter out isolationists to prevent that wing of the party from growing larger in the House, four people who attended the meeting said.”

While it’s unclear what Johnson meant by “isolationists,” it’s likely, given his audience, that he’s referring to those who don’t support the far-right pro-Israel view, oppose Israel’s war in Gaza and/or advocate for Palestinian rights. The term is also often used by neoconservatives and other proponents of American militarism more generally to smear advocates of restraint.

In any case, the “major debate” on GOP foreign policy — particularly about Israel — that is supposed to take place after Trump leaves office has been well underway for some time. And Johnson’s crusade to root out the so-called “isolationists” — meaning those anti-war Republicans who are increasingly critical of Israel — is not new.

Almost three decades ago, when Pat Buchanan defeated the GOP establishment candidate, Sen. Robert Dole, in the 1996 Republican New Hampshire presidential primary, party heads worked feverishly to make sure that’s as far as he got.

When my former boss, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), ran for the U.S. Senate in 2010, the GOP brass didn’t want the son of Ron Paul anywhere near Capitol Hill. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) handpicked his own primary candidate who received the endorsements of American war machine boosters like former Vice President Dick Cheney and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani.

Cheney didn’t endorse in any other GOP primary that year but insisted that Paul’s more hawkish opponent was the “real conservative” in that race.

After Paul won the general election in a landslide, former George W. Bush speechwriter and prominent neoconservative David Frum lamented, "How is it that the GOP has lost its antibodies against a candidate like Rand Paul?"

The senator’s father — himself a former member of Congress — never got anywhere near the White House in his two Republican presidential runs in 2008 and 2012, but he did help inspire a sizable anti-war populist movement, the popularity of which has worried the old guard for decades.

Ever since Donald Trump declared that the George W. Bush administration lied about the Iraq war on a Republican presidential debate stage in 2016, and went on to win the election, GOP foreign policy debates almost immediately expanded beyond the parameters of a military first approach.

It became okay to be “America First,” meaning prioritizing the interests of one’s own nation above those of others, whether it be foreign funding or foreign wars, which was kryptonite to those intent on making the world safe for democracy, as neocons often claimed they were doing.

So if Speaker Johnson is worried about internal debates on the direction the GOP is going on Israel and wants to nip that in the bud, he’s too late.

Indeed, polling has shown that Republicans are increasingly moving away from their traditional reflexive support for Israel. On the Gaza war, a new Associated Press-NORC poll revealed “a bipartisan uptick in Americans finding Israel’s military response has ‘gone too far.’”

“About 7 in 10 Democrats say this now, up from 58% in November 2023,” the report noted. “And roughly half of independents say the same, compared with about 4 in 10 in the earlier measure.”

“Republicans have also moved slightly, from 18% to 24%,” the AP noted.

A late August poll showed that 14% of Republicans had become comfortable calling Israel’s actions in Gaza a “genocide.” As RS observed three weeks ago, “The view that Washington’s support has enabled Israeli actions in Gaza was transpartisan. Nearly three out of four Democrats (72%) agreed with that proposition, as did 57% of Republicans, and 63% of self-identified independents.”

Another poll in June found that 53% of Trump voters didn’t think at the time that the U.S. military should get involved in the conflict between Iran and Israel. The poll also found that 63 percent of Trump voters said the U.S. should “engage in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program” while just 18% said the U.S. should not.

And before Israel launched its 12-day war on Iran this summer — that Trump later joined — a whopping 64% of Republicans said in another poll that they supported negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

This is why AIPAC — the powerful pro-Israel lobby group that works to keep Washington in line — is ponying up hundreds of thousands of dollars to oppose restrainers like Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.). Johnson appears worried that they and a handful of other GOP restrainers might grow in number in the mid-terms, and pro-Israel leaders are being promised that this increasing “isolationism” will be stopped. Massie and others have acknowledged exactly what is happening to them.

Making Mike Johnson simply the latest establishment champion for war in his party’s neverending battle against any Republican who might prevent it.


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Analysis | Washington Politics
Keir Starmer
Top image credit: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com

Britain's half-baked national security strategy

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The new British “National Security Strategy” is not really a strategy at all, but a mess of conflicting (and often fantastical) goals and unexamined assumptions.

For this, two things above all are responsible. The first is the unexamined tension between, on the one hand, the strategy’s promise of a “systematic approach to pursuing national interests,” and, on the other, the repeated assertion that these interests are totally and inextricably bound up with Britain’s alliances. For it should be clear by now that “allies” cannot necessarily be relied on, and that in certain circumstances the agendas of allies are not a security asset but rather a source of greatly increased danger to Britain.

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Top image credit: Prime Minister of Spain Pedro Sanchez during the summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union at the European Council in Brussels in Belgium the 26th of July 2025, Martin Bertrand / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect

Spain's break from Europe on Gaza is more reaction than vision

Europe

The final stage of the Vuelta a España, Spain’s premier cycling race, was abandoned in chaos on Sunday. Pro-Palestinian protesters, chanting “they will not pass,” overturned barriers and occupied the route in Madrid, forcing organizers to cancel the finale and its podium ceremony. The demonstrators’ target was the participation of an Israeli team. In a statement that captured the moment, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez expressed his “deep admiration for the Spanish people mobilizing for just causes like Palestine.”

The event was a vivid public manifestation of a potent political sentiment in Spain — one that the Sánchez government has both responded to and, through its foreign policy, legitimized. This dynamic has propelled Spain into becoming the European Union’s most vocal dissenting voice on the war in Gaza, marking a significant break from the transatlantic foreign policy orthodoxy.

Sanchez’s support for the protesters was not merely rhetorical. On Monday, he escalated his stance, explicitly calling for Israel to be barred from international sports competitions, drawing a direct parallel to the exclusion of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. “Our position is clear and categorical: as long as the barbarity continues, neither Russia nor Israel should participate in any international competition,” he said. This position, which angered Israel and Spanish conservatives alike, was further amplified by his culture minister, who suggested Spain should boycott next year’s Eurovision Song Contest if Israel participates.

More significantly, it emerged that his government had backed its strong words with concrete action, cancelling a €700 million ($825 million) contract for Israeli-designed rocket launchers. This move, following an earlier announcement of measures aimed at stopping what it called “the genocide in Gaza,” demonstrates a willingness to leverage economic and diplomatic tools that other EU capitals have avoided.

Sánchez, a master political survivalist, has not undergone a grand ideological conversion to anti-interventionism. Instead, he has proven highly adept at reading and navigating domestic political currents. His government’s stance on Israel and Palestine is a pragmatic reflection of his coalition that depends on the support of the left for which this is a non-negotiable priority.

This instinct for pragmatic divergence extends beyond Gaza. Sánchez has flatly refused to commit to NATO’s target of spending 5% of GDP on defense demanded by the U.S. President Donald Trump and embraced by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, citing budgetary constraints and social priorities.

Furthermore, Spain has courted a role as a facilitator between great powers. This ambition was realized when Madrid hosted a critical high level meeting between U.S. and Chinese trade officials on September 15 — a meeting Trump lauded as successful while reaffirming “a very strong relationship” between the U.S. and China. This outreach is part of a consistent policy; Sánchez’s own visit to Beijing, at a time when other EU leaders like the high representative for foreign policy Kaja Kallas were ratcheting up anti-Chinese rhetoric, signals a deliberate pursuit of pragmatic economic ties over ideological confrontation.

Yet, for all these breaks with the mainstream, Sánchez’s foreign policy is riddled with a fundamental contradiction. On Ukraine, his government remains in alignment with the hardline Brussels consensus. This alignment is most clearly embodied by his proxy in Brussels, Iratxe García Pérez, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament. In a stark display of this hawkishness, García Pérez used the platform of the State of the Union debate with the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to champion the demand to outright seize frozen Russian sovereign assets.

This reckless stance, which reflects the EU’s broader hawkish drift on Ukraine, is thankfully tempered only by a lack of power to implement it, rendering it largely a symbolic act of virtue signaling. The move is not just of dubious legality; it is a significant error in statecraft. It would destroy international trust in the Eurozone as a safe repository for assets. Most critically, it would vaporize a key bargaining chip that could be essential in securing a future negotiated settlement with Russia. It is a case of ideological posturing overriding strategic calculation.

This contradiction reveals the core of Sánchez’s doctrine: it is circumstantial, not convictional. His breaks with orthodoxy on Israel, defense spending and China are significant, but driven, to a large degree, by the necessity of domestic coalition management. His alignment on Ukraine is the path of least resistance within the EU mainstream, requiring no difficult choices that would upset his centrist instincts or his international standing.

Therefore, Sánchez is no Spanish De Gaulle articulating a grand sovereigntist strategic vision. He is a fascinating case study in the fragmentation of European foreign policy. He demonstrates that even within the heart of the Western mainstream which he represents, dissent on specific issues like Gaza and rearmament is not only possible but increasingly politically necessary.

However, his failure to apply the same pragmatic, national interest lens to Ukraine — opting instead for the bloc’s thoughtless escalation — proves that his policy is more a product of domestic political arithmetic than coherent strategic vision. He is a weathervane, not a compass — but even a weathervane can indicate a shift in the wind, and the wind in Spain is blowing away from unconditional Atlanticism.

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Top image credit: Metamorworks via shutterstock.com

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Washington Politics

According to a new survey, North American think tanks are tied as the least transparent of any region. The poll, conducted by On Think Tanks, surveyed 335 think tanks from over 100 countries. The accompanying report, released today, found that only 35% of North American think tanks (mostly from the U.S.) that responded to the survey disclose funding sources. By comparison, 67% of Asian think tanks and 58% of African think tanks disclose their funding sources.

And there are signs that think tank funding transparency is trending towards more opacity. Just last month, the Center for American Progress — a major center-left think tank with $46 million in annual revenue — announced that it would no longer disclose its donors. The think tank said it was taking this “temporary protective step” out of concern that the Trump administration could target them.

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