Anti-establishment parties of populist right, and occasionally of the populist left, made inroads across Europe in elections of 2024, reflecting in part the waning confidence across societies that NATO’s aims for the war in Ukraine can be realized.
While continuing in general to support Ukraine, a growing share of the public has come to accept the case for a negotiated settlement. The idea of a united Europe independently taking on the full responsibility for funding and arming Ukraine seems highly improbable.
We have seen the inexorable decline in support for established parties of Europe’s center-right and, even more acutely, of its center-left. Nevertheless, these mainstream parties have tended to be able to hold onto power by forming coalitions embracing center-right and center-left, and sometimes accommodating some of the insurgent populists’ arguments, for example on immigration. However, by jointly taking responsibility for governing, mainstream parties demonstrate their fundamental convergence on most areas of policy and risk further defections of voters frustrated with the unsatisfactory status quo.
Effect of the realignment on support for Ukraine
The elections of 2024 that seem most evidently to challenge the consensus on Ukraine’s war aims and its eventual NATO membership are France’s parliamentary elections of June 2024, the German elections in three eastern states in September, and the June 2024 European Parliament elections. All three of these contests marked breakthroughs for anti-establishment parties of the right and left. In each case, the mainstream parties have held onto power but have not contained the populists’ growing influence.
Contested elections: Georgia and Romania
In Central and Eastern European countries, candidates and parties expressing reservations about support for Ukraine are accused of benefiting from covert Russian influence operations. This applies to the two cases in Europe where election results favoring antiwar candidates or parties have been challenged — Georgia and Romania.
According to the official count, Georgia’s governing party, Georgian Dream, won 53% of the vote on elections held October 26. International observers reported numerous violations, but it is difficult to establish that these invalidate the result. The incumbent Georgian Dream’s appeal to voters featured the familiar mix of nativism, religious traditionalism, and sensitivity to the plight of provincial and rural voters (have-nots) that characterizes programs of the populist right across Europe. They also relied on a good record of economic performance. Their stance on foreign policy — avoiding open conflict with Russia — has generated mass protests by the liberal, pro-EU opposition, with political stability hanging in the balance.
A nationalist right-wing candidate, Calin Georgescu, finished first with 23% in the first round of Romania’s presidential election on November 24, but the Constitutional Court invalidated this election in early December, citing alleged Russian funding of his campaign, including wildly popular TikTok posts. The election is to be re-run early next year, and Georgescu is likely to be disqualified.
Georgescu’s “breakthrough” can also be related to the indigenous historical roots of the nationalist right in Romania, which has occasionally had relatively strong showings in elections since 1989. Georgescu’s outsider status and insurgent campaign also drew upon popular frustration with the weak economy and official corruption, particularly among religious traditionalist voters in small towns and rural areas. It is unlikely that disqualifying Georgescu will affect the root causes of support by some voters for populist-nationalism.
Anti-populist alliances of the shrinking center
Austria’s mainstream parties across the left-right spectrum are working to form a governing coalition to exclude from power the populist-nationalist Freedom Party (FPO) which finished first in September elections. Freedom Party leader Herbert Kickl campaigned on opposition to supporting Ukraine. The other major parties favor continued humanitarian and diplomatic support.
France and Germany are the principal exemplars of the “firewall” strategy of quarantining populist challengers. This has so far not curbed the growth of support for these parties. The populist right and left blocs in the French parliament are unwilling to fall in line behind a government of the weakened center in France. Germany’s elections on February 23 are likely to produce a coalition of center-right and center-left, which risks building more popular support for the populist right and left, both of which oppose continued arming of Ukraine.
Populist right in government
In several cases, the populist right has been admitted to broad governing coalitions and has not evidently destabilized the status quo. This applies to the Netherlands, where the Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders surged to win the most seats of any party in the elections of November 2023, but has not significantly affected policy within the coalition government it has joined. Bulgaria, which has had repeated inconclusive elections, has allowed the populist right into coalitions, which have proved unstable and short-lived. Sweden and Finland have also been governed by coalitions where the populist right has been included. These cases brought greater resistance to immigration but have not had any effect on steadfast support for Ukraine.
Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, whose populist right Brothers of Italy party leads Italy’s government, has won favor in Brussels and in Washington by fully supporting NATO aims in Ukraine. This is so far the sole example of a full conversion of a populist party to the geopolitical mainstream. The other two right populists who hold power in Europe — Hungary’s Orban and Slovakia’s Fico — openly oppose the mainstream consensus on Ukraine.
What lies ahead?
The principal tests in the coming year for the mainstream parties’ effort to curb, co-opt or accommodate the populist challenge will be the German elections of February, the September presidential election in Poland, and possible new parliamentary elections in France by next fall.
Slow economic growth and tight fiscal constraints obviously make for a restive and disgruntled electorate. Moreover, Europe’s turbulent external environment is not conducive to curbing the momentum of anti-establishment parties. Europe is in the crosshairs of new U.S. tariffs, which would deepen the economic slump and could challenge some EU member countries’ commitment to the union itself. Fracturing of the EU would harm Europe’s ability to mount a credible conventional deterrent to counter any renewed Russian challenge to follow the war in Ukraine.
The significance of the crises in France and Germany is hard to exaggerate. Together, these two countries account for almost 40% of the GDP of the EU as a whole, and they are the two largest net contributors to the EU budget. This hard reality limits the scope of attempts by Poland, the Nordics, and Baltics to form an alternative bloc for European leadership. However, as Poland prepares to take on the rotating presidency of the EU in January, it stands to play a prominent role in a crucial period for diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine.- France and Germany on the rocks as Ukraine crisis deepens ›
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- Rightward, populist drift in EU elections signals big Ukraine shift ›
