President Trump announced today that he would impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico starting tomorrow. The tariffs were originally set to take effect on February 4, but he then announced a last-minute reprieve of one month.
The announcement comes despite very different responses from Canada and Mexico to Trump’s tariff threats. President Sheinbaum of Mexico has gone to some lengths in recent days to accommodate U.S. preferences on key American concerns–migration, crime and Chinese exports to Mexico.
Last Thursday, she oversaw the transfer of 29 high-profile drug lords to US custody, signaling a willingness to align more closely with Washington in the fight against drugs and organized crime. And on Friday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Mexico was going to impose tariffs on imports from China to match those set by the U.S., a step he urged Canada to follow.
The measures announced by the Mexican government likely have or would have had associated costs — potential violent retaliation by drug gangs, and forgoing inbound investment from China, the world’s current leader in electrical vehicle technology. But evidently, this was a price Sheinbaum felt was worth paying to avert the tariffs.
Canada has taken a much more combative approach, with tempers likely inflamed further by the relentless taunts (if not yet actually threats) of the country’s incorporation as America’s 51st state. Large parts of Canada’s political spectrum have united against these suggestions. The outgoing Liberal Party Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has drawn closer to the European Union and sought common ground with them on the subjects of global trade and Ukraine. Ontario Premier Doug Ford of the Conservative Party has been threatening for months to turn off Canada’s power supply to parts of the Northeast, a step he said today he would take, with a smile on his face. The complexities of power transmission might make this hard to do but it is still an indication of how fraught the current relationship across the 49th parallel has become.
Yet despite these differences between Canadian and Mexican approaches, both are being hit with the same tariffs (assuming nothing happens between now and when then they are due to take effect). The measures could lead to a massive shock as total trade between the three countries in the USMCA free-trade area accounted for more than $1.3 trillion in 2023. The resulting shock is not just about the volume of trade between the countries but also the composition. Trilateral trade involves lots of intermediate goods and parts crossing borders multiple times, particularly in the highly integrated automotive sector. A recent story showed how a single piston crosses borders 6 times in the course of its manufacture.
The entire process thus far suggests that uncertainty might be here to stay — not just for businesses but even for governments. The parallel treatment of Canada and Mexico, despite their very different approaches to Trump, suggests that even commercial diplomacy is now a much less predictable enterprise when it comes to U.S. foreign policy.
Karthik Sankaran is a senior research fellow in geoeconomics in the Global South program at the Quincy Institute. Previously, he served as Director for Global Strategy at the Eurasia Group, where he worked with country and regional teams to chart feedback loops among political and geopolitical risks, macroeconomics, and market responses. He has written for the Financial Times, Barron’s, and FPRI.
Top photo credit: Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum (Shutterstock/Octavia Hoyos)
Top image credit: U.S Vice President JD Vance arrives at the U.S. military's Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28, 2025. Jim Watson/Pool via REUTERS
According to a report in the Wall Street Journal last week, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to increase collection of information on Greenland.
The topics of interest include independence sentiment among Greenlanders, attitudes regarding U.S. mining interests, and individuals in Greenland and Denmark who might be supportive of U.S. objectives in Greenland.
It is not unusual, and can be appropriate, for the intelligence community to respond positively to peculiar interests of whoever is the incumbent administration. Such intelligence directives do not necessarily foreshadow actual administration policy and may be part of an exploratory effort to see what the possibilities are.
In this instance, the leak of the reported directive evoked sharp negative reactions in both Denmark and Greenland. The Danish government summoned the U.S. ambassador in Copenhagen for an explanation. The newly elected prime minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, stated that the reported intelligence collection was “completely unacceptable,” “entirely abnormal” and “disrespectful toward an ally.”
A further downside of devoting intelligence resources to an administration hobby horse is that such resources are limited. Thus, there inevitably are opportunity costs in having fewer resources available to monitor matters more important for U.S. interests, including threats to U.S. national security, elsewhere in the world.
Gabbard’s directive may or may not point to future U.S. policy, but President Donald Trump has repeatedly indicated that he is serious about wanting U.S. ownership of Greenland. His sending of Vice President JD Vance on a trip to Greenland in March demonstrated the depth of the administration’s interest in the island.
The key policy question at hand is not whether Greenland is relevant to U.S. interests, but rather whether those interests are better advanced through current ownership and sovereignty arrangements or through the United States somehow acquiring the island.
The security interests stem from Greenland’s geographic location. It is underneath many air and missile routes between Russia and the United States. The location also is relevant to naval operations, with Greenland being on one side of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap between the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean, as well as next to Northwest Passage navigation routes that will see increasing usage with the melting of arctic sea ice.
Under a 1951 treaty with Denmark, the United States already has what amounts to military sovereignty in Greenland. It is free to erect installations and conduct operations there without compensation to the Danes. During the Cold War, the United States constructed more than a dozen military installations in Greenland. Most have since been abandoned, only because they became obsolete or unneeded and not because of resistance from Denmark.
The United States still operates the Pituffik Space Base, the northernmost U.S. military installation in the world. The base’s main declared mission is to keep watch on the atmosphere and space to the north for any Russian and Chinese missiles and satellites.
The Danish and Greenlandic authorities have fully cooperated with the United States on security matters in other respects. This has included responding positively to U.S. prompting, from both the Biden and Trump administrations, to rebuff Chinese attempts to establish investments and infrastructure in Greenland. Greenland’s own foreign, security, and defense strategy published last year states that the territory “plays a key role in the defense of the United States against external threats, especially from the Arctic region.”
NATO ally Denmark recently has expressed its willingness to expand further its security cooperation with the United States in Greenland. Denmark also is augmenting its own defense activities in Greenland.
The economic interests, in a land that has only about 57,000 people and is mostly covered with ice, are minimal. Most talk on economic matters in Greenland focuses on minerals, echoing what Trump has talked about concerning Ukraine. And also like Ukraine, mineral exploitation in Greenland is mostly a matter of potential that is as yet unproven and undeveloped.
To the extent there is valuable potential to be developed, Greenlandic officials are not only willing but eager for the United States to participate in that development. This is part of a larger Greenlandic eagerness for U.S. economic involvement, to include tourism and other forms of investment.
Greenland’s minister of business and trade wrote earlier this year — while pointing out that 39 of the 50 minerals that the United States has classified as critical to national security and economic stability can be found in Greenland — that “the big obstacle to development of Greenland’s mineral resources is a lack of capital.” He noted that Greenland “has been collaborating with the U.S. State Department for several years to provide new knowledge about our critical minerals.” The latest agreement on this subject was signed in 2019 during the first Trump administration, and the minister expressed his “high hopes of signing a new agreement with the United States as soon as possible.”
In short, it is hard to imagine anything in Greenland that would serve U.S. security or economic interests that the United States cannot get already, simply by working harmoniously with the Danes and Greenlanders. Acquiring U.S. sovereignty over the island would not serve those interests any better.
The downsides of the act of acquisition also need to be factored in. So far, Trump has been vague about how this would be accomplished and has not ruled out any method, including even armed force. If it did come to a military operation, this would be an even more cataclysmic turnabout of the U.S. security posture than Trump already has caused with his shattering of alliances and cozying to authoritarians. It would be not only a naked act of aggression, but one against the territory of a NATO ally.
Even if military force were not used, acquisition would be an act of coercion because it would be contrary to the clear and strong preference of the people of Greenland. A recent poll showed that 85 percent of Greenlanders are opposed to becoming part of the United States. The Greenlandic prime minister before last month’s election in the territory reflected this sentiment in declaring “we do not want to be American.” The government of Denmark has supported this position and emphasized that the future of Greenland is for Greenlanders to decide, including eventually through a referendum.
It is not hard to understand this preference. While Greenland has had self-government since 2009, its people still have full Danish citizenship and mobility within the European Union. They also enjoy Nordic-type welfare rights including health care, social security, and free education.
Although most Greenlanders eventually want complete independence, the substantial support they get from Denmark — including a direct subsidy that amounts to $12,500 per capita — is the main reason they have hesitated to make that move by holding the promised referendum. The Trump administration has tried to exploit the pro-independence sentiment as a wedge issue between Greenland and Denmark, but the administration’s approach has backfired. Greenlanders’ anger over the U.S. attempt at a takeover has pushed them closer to Denmark.
This result is similar to what occurred in recent elections in Canada and Australia, in which right-of-center parties were punished by voters who associated them with Trump’s policies. In each case, citizens of an allied nation responded to what they perceived as unfriendly actions — either a trade war or threat of annexation — in a direction opposite to what the Trump administration presumably preferred.
The problems of coercively taking over a nation whose people do not want to be taken over would occur partly within the nation itself. A taste of that came during Vance’s visit, when concerns about popular demonstrations in opposition resulted in scrapping most of the planned itinerary and limiting the visit to a stop at a U.S. military base.
The problems also extend to other parts of the world, with the green light that coercive annexation would give to Russia, China, or other powers that might want to seize territory whose residents do not want to be annexed.
The overall conclusion is that U.S. acquisition of Greenland would be a clear net negative for the United States.
Trump’s determination nonetheless to pursue this project probably has multiple motivations. Partly it is nostalgia for his view of the late nineteenth century, in which imperialism as well as tariffs were the external counterparts of a domestic Gilded Age dominated by robber barons. Partly it is a desire to show a highly visible “accomplishment” as something some of his predecessors considered but never achieved. Partly it is a crude acquisitiveness that was reflected in Trump’s resistance to surrendering classified government documents that he claimed to be “my” documents.
What it is not is a well-reasoned pursuit of U.S. interests.
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Top image credit: Vietnam's communist party general secretary To Lam (R) poses with Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) during a meeting at the office of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi on April 14, 2025. NHAC NGUYEN/Pool via REUTERS
On April 2 — christened “Liberation Day” — President Donald Trump declared a national emergency in response to the “large and persistent U.S. trade deficit” and “unfair” economic practices by foreign countries that, according to Trump, hurt the American people by undermining the U.S. industry and employment.
In response, the president announced a minimum 10% tariff on all U.S. imports, plus higher tariffs, ranging from 11% to 50%, on imports from nearly 60 countries. These “reciprocal tariffs,” based on trade deficit calculations, targeted over 180 countries and territories. After a week of turmoil in the stock and bond markets, Trump announced a 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs over 10 percent for most countries except China.
However, the reality of imposing tariffs and changing global trade dynamics is more complex. For example, Vietnam, like other Southeast Asian countries, has long maintained a non-aligned stance on the global geopolitical front and navigating through the choppy waters of great power competition. Hence, Vietnam's response to Trump’s moves should be seen as a reflection of its foreign policy priorities rooted in its national interests, including economic development, and its commitment to non-alignment.
Vietnam has long been a central figure in the escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions since they began in earnest back in 2018, when President Trump placed 10% tariffs on Chinese imports. In the years since, the U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam has tripled, reaching $123.5 billion in 2024, the last year with complete data. One of the key catalysts for this change is the strategic “decoupling” approach by companies that have relocated production and manufacturing from China to other countries, including Vietnam, in an effort to diversify their supply chains and appease Washington’s concerns about Beijing’s economic ascendancy. With rising geopolitical uncertainties, cheap alternative manufacturing hubs, of which Vietnam has become a prime example, have become attractive substitutes for China.
Vietnam is also a backdoor for Chinese exports, importing and assembling Chinese goods with minimal added value before reexporting them to the United States. Peter Navarro, Trump’s senior counselor for trade and manufacturing, alleged in a recent interview that Vietnam is guilty of “nontariff cheating,” by which he meant Hanoi permits China to ship its products through Vietnam to disguise their origin and thus avoid U.S. tariffs. These reasons, coupled with Vietnam’s large trade surplus, have resulted in the administration’s perception that the country poses a major threat to the U.S. economy and the welfare of American workers.
Vietnam has tried to be responsive to the Trump administration’s demands, which have centered around reducing the trade deficit, addressing transshipment issues, and enhancing intellectual property rights. Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance is currently working on enhancing customs information-sharing with the U.S. and drafting a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement that includes provisions on taxation and intellectual property rights — all in response to concerns raised by the Trump administration. In fact, Vietnam was the first and remains the only Southeast Asian country whose leader has spoken directly to Trump about the tariffs.
After receiving a whopping 46% tariff rate on Liberation Day, Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam reached out to Trump in a call that the U.S. president would later describe as “very productive,” Vietnam offered to reduce tariffs on U.S. goods to zero, according to Trump, who said Hanoi is also addressing non-tariff issues raised by U.S. officials. Vietnam’s various ministries are tasked with examining existing legal frameworks and proposing changes.
Vietnam also authorized the operation of Starlink, the satellite internet service owned by Elon Musk, and agreed to expedite approvals for a proposed $1.5 billion Trump resort. Most important, Vietnam sent a top official, Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc, to the U.S. for negotiations centered on improving the trade imbalance and tackling transhipment issues, where goods (specifically Chinese goods) are shipped through Vietnam to avoid tariffs or other trade restrictions imposed on countries such as China. To increase U.S. exports to Vietnam, Hanoi has struck a deal under which Hanoi agreed to buy a fleet of F-16 fighter jets.
So why is Vietnam yielding and moving to comply with the Trump administration’s demands?
One of Vietnam’s core interests includes defending its territorial claims in the South China Sea against Chinese pressure and aggression. Over the past few years, China has harassed Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands, most recently in an assault and seizure incident last October. By maintaining close diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Washington, Vietnam feels more protected from Chinese aggression. There is, however, a fine line between enhancing military cooperation with the Americans in pursuit of deterrence and provoking escalation in a potentially explosive conflict. The F-16 fighter deal could “stir up troubles” in the region, signaling to China increased U.S. military influence in the region that could call Hanoi’s non-alignment into question.
The Trump administration should realize that Vietnam is centering its foreign and trade policy on its own national interests and will happily engage with whichever foreign power is willing to help it enhance its economic development and bolster its national security. As a result, at the same time that Vietnam is responding in a friendly manner to Trump’s trade demands, it continues to cultivate close trade relations with Beijing, whose large manufacturing base, high technological capacity, and vast market make it its most important trade partner.
For example, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam on April 14, the two countries signed 45 deals ranging from increasing digital connectivity and infrastructure to cooperating in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and green energy, to further deepen bilateral economic ties. For his part, Xi vowed to expand Vietnam’s access to the Chinese market.
Vietnam’s recent actions with regard to the trade war are ultimately a reflection of its own national interests. Its decision to strike a deal with the U.S. for the purchase of fighter aircraft signals that, even while looking to cater to Trump’s trade demands, it will do so only in ways that enhance its economic and national security interests, as defined by the national government.
The U.S. should work with like-minded countries to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties while decreasing its dependence on Chinese manufacturing exports. Through strategic partnerships, the U.S. can help address important issues like the transshipment of Chinese goods. Targeting Vietnam alone on that issue, however, will likely result only in Chinese companies diverting goods to Vietnam’s neighbors, such as Cambodia, Thailand, or Myanmar.
Rather than growing frustrated at Vietnam’s burgeoning trade relationship with China and seeing it as a direct threat to U.S. interests within the prism of great power competition, Washington should take the opportunity presented by Hanoi’s vow to open its markets much wider to U.S. exports. Indeed, there have been recent talks of collaboration between the two in areas such as energy, technology, and education.
By embracing policies based on pragmatism and mutual interest, the U.S. can remain a strategic partner to Vietnam while addressing its concerns amid the historic shifts in global trade dynamics.
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President Woodrow Wilson (center) waves his top hat from the deck of USS George Washington (ID # 3018), as she steamed up New York Harbor upon the President's return to the U.S. from the World War I peace conference in France, 8 July 1919. (public domain)
The United States looms large on the world stage, but it wasn’t always so important. President Donald Trump retrospectively applied America’s present role to yesterday’s world when he declared: “We won both [World] Wars, nobody was close to us in terms of strength, bravery, or military brilliance, but we never celebrate anything.” Henceforth, he wants to call Veteran’s Day “Victory Day for World War I.”
While the U.S. played a decisive role in that conflict, shifting the balance of power irreversibly against Imperial Germany after the other participants had exhausted themselves, Washington’s contribution remained much less than those of many allied belligerents. While U.S. soldiers were brave, their commanders were anything but brilliant, failing to learn from the allies and running up unnecessary casualties.
The most important contribution measure is the number of military personnel killed. American sacrificed 116,700 men in the war. That was a huge loss, to be sure, though less than a fifth of the number killed during the Civil War. However, America’s toll was small compared to that of the other allied combatants, with the U.S. ranking only number 8 on the allied side. Russia lost around two million men. (Most of the casualty figures for World War I are rough estimates.) France had 1.4 million deaths. Great Britain suffered almost 900,000. Estimates of Italy’s toll run as high as 700,000. Serbia lost in the range of 400,000 men. Romania endured around 300,000 deaths. British dominions and colonies—most importantly Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand—collectively lost about 215,000. Washington was only ahead of Belgium, Greece, Montenegro, Portugal, and Japan.
There are much bigger problems with Trump’s claim, however. First, the U.S. had no reason to join Europe’s tragic murderfest. Second, the military triumph turned into a political fiasco, and just a couple decades later, a military disaster for the entire world. So bad were the consequences that by entering that conflict Woodrow Wilson staked his claim to being the country’s worst president.
Terry W. Hamby, chairman of the WWI Centennial Commission, dedicated a memorial to World War I, intoning: “The doughboys we are honoring today were the best of their generation. Their average age was 24.” Why were they sacrificed?
It surely wasn’t for America. None of the combatants threatened the U.S., for which the Atlantic acted as a vast moat. Although Anglo-Saxons, who originally populated the colonies, dominated U.S. politics and finance, that was no reason to go to war on Britain’s behalf. Indeed, German descendants were almost as populous. And still are. As of 2020, the number of Americans with British ancestry was 62 million. The number with German ancestry was 41 million. Nor was Washington’s entry into the war justified to ensure that financial interests got repaid on their generous loans to the Entente powers. Americans should not die to preserve lenders’ profits.
Finally, talk of a war for democracy, or to end war, or to destroy Prussian militarism, was just nonsense. The allies included an antisemitic despotism (Russia), a militant revanchist republic (France), the world’s leading colonial power (Great Britain),the globe’s cruelest colonial master (Belgium), a populist regime that chose war for territorial plunder (Italy), and a terrorist state that enabled the royal murder that triggered the conflict (Serbia). The so-called Central Powers were no friends of liberty, but they were generally evolving in a more liberal direction and likely would have continued to do so had war not intervened.
Unfortunately, America’s president at the time was the megalomaniac and sanctimonious Woodrow Wilson. A virulent racist, he also resisted women’s suffrage. He advocated imposing national conscription for the first time, proposed making it illegal to criticize him, and created what is widely recognized as the low point of American civil liberties.
Why did he decide on war? He was an Anglophile, who essentially believed that London could do no wrong. He wanted to transform the global order and recognized that he had to make the U.S. a belligerent to gain a “seat at the table” ending the war. Why worry about the many Americans who would needlessly die as a result?
The closest issue to a casus belli was the German U-boat (“unterseeboot” or submarine) campaign. Submarine warfare is terrible, but so was the British starvation blockade. It was illegal under international law and struck civilians as well as soldiers, killing several hundred thousand innocents by war’s end. The Germans began the war by having U-boats surface to seek the surrender of merchantmen, but the British armed civilian ships, designated them as reserve cruisers, and ordered them to ram any subs so foolish as to rise—prompting U-boats to remain submerged and sink vessels without mercy.
Moreover, even civilian liners, including the celebrated Lusitania, carried munitions through what amounted to a war zone. In the Lusitania’s case, the German embassy purchased ads warning Americans not to book passage on a legitimate military target. In May 1915 near Britain’s coast, it was sunk. Wilson bizarrely asserted that just one American baby on a commercial liner or cargo ship carrying bullets and bombs immunized its passage. This while the British navy was stopping even the ships of neutrals, like America, to prevent food from reaching the European continent. Wilson admitted that he was committed to London’s victory: “England is fighting our fight, and you may well understand that I shall not, in the present state of the world’s affairs, place obstacles in her way when she is fighting for her life—and the life of the world.” So much for his pretense of neutrality.
Germany restricted its U-boat operations until January 1917. Then, in a desperate move to win amid a two-front fight, it again targeted nominally civilian shipping. Wilson called for war, claiming “the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States.” It was a lie, but one that conveniently advanced his desire to sit among the victors. Never were America or American interests threatened. Never was there anything at stake that warranted jumping into a merciless continental abattoir.
There was more movement on the eastern front, but it wasn’t until the first Russian revolution, in the February 1917 (March in the Western calendar), that victory there seemed possible for Germany, and even then, a compromise peace in the west was likely, given the allies’ advantages there. It was Washington’s entry that empowered the Entente to win, though not immediately. The conflict raged on, as the allies figured U.S. reinforcements would lead to victory while Germany gambled on another major offensive before American troops were ready for action. The offensive failed, so Germany finally yielded and sought an armistice, which took effect on November 11, 1918.
What might have been a compromise peace that preserved enough of the old world order to forestall revolutionary chaos and violence turned into a rout. The Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian empires all collapsed, leading to authoritarian, and sometimes totalitarian systems. The Ottoman Empire’s disintegration yielded multiple rounds of conflict. Italy abandoned democracy and embraced the blustering dictatorship of Benito Mussolini. Communism, followed by fascism and, most virulently and aggressively, Nazism, reshaped Europe.
The Versailles Treaty with Germany (and related pacts with the other defeated Central Powers) rewarded the allies’ desire for vengeance and Wilson’s fantasy to transform the globe. The winners plundered the losers and traded peoples and lands as if playing a global game of Monopoly. The allies claimed to exalt self-determination. However, they forced disfavored minority groups, most notably Germans, to remain inside newly independent allied nations, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland. Some Germans called these new nations Saisonstaaten, or “states for a season,” which provided the grievances used by Adolf Hitler and were soon swept away.
Alas, the resulting settlement failed in almost every particular. It treated Germany badly enough to create an enduring grievance against the allies and the post-World War I order they created. However, it was not truly “Carthaginian,” severe enough to prevent Germany, with its large population and significant industrial might, from reviving and seeking revenge. The allies tried appeasement too late. It could have prevented The Great War, but Hitler was the one political leader on the European continent who could not be appeased, having an agenda that could be achieved only through war.
It took just 20 years for the next conflict to arise. World War II caused even greater material destruction, loss of life, political disintegration, and future threats. That fight had barely ended after Germany’s surrender when the Cold War emerged. Although the U.S. and Soviet Union avoided open conflict, there were numerous limited but costly battles and proxy wars involving allied states. Only in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, end of the Warsaw Pact, democratization of the former Eastern bloc, and collapse of the Soviet Union, did the world return to the age before, in which Germany’s short-lived Brest-Litovsk Treaty proved to be a lot more realistic than the Versailles debacle.
None of this looks very much like a “victory” for the U.S. Trump should drop his embarrassing triumphalism which denigrates Europe’s contribution to both World War I and World War II. Even more, he should stop calling what was a political disaster an American achievement. Instead, he should reiterate his message that Americans should not get involved in endless wars around the globe.
That certainly is what the Founders would do. In his famous Farewell Address George Washington warned Americans against undertaking “projects of pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives.” This foreign policy approach “gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; guiding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.” Sounds like the U.S. today.
Instead, America’s first president urged his fellow citizens to have with other nations “as little political connection as possible,” and not to “entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils” of other states’ “ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice.” Had past presidents followed this approach, imagine the lives that would have been saved and wealth that would have been preserved. And imagine what Americans can achieve in the future if President Trump adopts that approach today.
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