President Trump announced today that he would impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico starting tomorrow. The tariffs were originally set to take effect on February 4, but he then announced a last-minute reprieve of one month.
The announcement comes despite very different responses from Canada and Mexico to Trump’s tariff threats. President Sheinbaum of Mexico has gone to some lengths in recent days to accommodate U.S. preferences on key American concerns–migration, crime and Chinese exports to Mexico.
Last Thursday, she oversaw the transfer of 29 high-profile drug lords to US custody, signaling a willingness to align more closely with Washington in the fight against drugs and organized crime. And on Friday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Mexico was going to impose tariffs on imports from China to match those set by the U.S., a step he urged Canada to follow.
The measures announced by the Mexican government likely have or would have had associated costs — potential violent retaliation by drug gangs, and forgoing inbound investment from China, the world’s current leader in electrical vehicle technology. But evidently, this was a price Sheinbaum felt was worth paying to avert the tariffs.
Canada has taken a much more combative approach, with tempers likely inflamed further by the relentless taunts (if not yet actually threats) of the country’s incorporation as America’s 51st state. Large parts of Canada’s political spectrum have united against these suggestions. The outgoing Liberal Party Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has drawn closer to the European Union and sought common ground with them on the subjects of global trade and Ukraine. Ontario Premier Doug Ford of the Conservative Party has been threatening for months to turn off Canada’s power supply to parts of the Northeast, a step he said today he would take, with a smile on his face. The complexities of power transmission might make this hard to do but it is still an indication of how fraught the current relationship across the 49th parallel has become.
Yet despite these differences between Canadian and Mexican approaches, both are being hit with the same tariffs (assuming nothing happens between now and when then they are due to take effect). The measures could lead to a massive shock as total trade between the three countries in the USMCA free-trade area accounted for more than $1.3 trillion in 2023. The resulting shock is not just about the volume of trade between the countries but also the composition. Trilateral trade involves lots of intermediate goods and parts crossing borders multiple times, particularly in the highly integrated automotive sector. A recent story showed how a single piston crosses borders 6 times in the course of its manufacture.
The entire process thus far suggests that uncertainty might be here to stay — not just for businesses but even for governments. The parallel treatment of Canada and Mexico, despite their very different approaches to Trump, suggests that even commercial diplomacy is now a much less predictable enterprise when it comes to U.S. foreign policy.
Karthik Sankaran is a senior research fellow in geoeconomics in the Global South program at the Quincy Institute. Previously, he served as Director for Global Strategy at the Eurasia Group, where he worked with country and regional teams to chart feedback loops among political and geopolitical risks, macroeconomics, and market responses. He has written for the Financial Times, Barron’s, and FPRI.
Top photo credit: Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum (Shutterstock/Octavia Hoyos)
Top image credit: EVERETT (WA), USA – JANUARY 30 2015: Unidentified Boeing employees continue work building its latest Boeing 777 jets at its Everett factory (First Class Photography / Shutterstock.com)
As the U.S. and Iran engage in fraught rounds of nuclear talks, deep distrust, past failures, and mounting pressure from opponents continue to hinder progress. Washington has reverted to its old zero-enrichment stance, a policy that, in 2010, led Iran to increase uranium enrichment from under 5% to 20%. Tehran remains equally entrenched, insisting, “No enrichment, no deal, No nuclear weapons, we have a deal.”
In Washington, the instinct is to tighten the screws on Tehran, make military threats credible, and explore strike options to force capitulation. Yet history shows that these coercive tactics often fail. Sanctions have not secured compliance and have proven costly to U.S. interests. Military strikes are unlikely to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities; instead, they risk convincing Tehran to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.
Breaking this impasse requires a strategic pivot from punishment to pragmatic economic engagement. Economic incentives are not rewards; they are essential diplomatic tools. By directly linking benefits to verified nuclear compliance, Washington can foster real cooperation and strengthen U.S. security. And it would be a real boon for both U.S. and Iran markets, which have been closed off from each other for decades.
The limits of sanctions-only diplomacy
The sanctions-first strategy sought to convert foreign economic pressure into domestic political upheaval, forcing political capitulation. In reality, sanctions have impoverished ordinary Iranians without significantly altering the regime’s calculus. Rather than capitulation, Iran has advanced its nuclear capabilities and developed a sophisticated sanctions-evasion network.
Despite significant economic hardship, Iran has maintained a modest annual economic growth rate of 4% since 2020. However, this growth conceals more profound economic challenges. Persistent inflation ranging from 30% to 40% and budget deficits between 20% and 25% have forced the government into unsustainable financial practices, such as printing money and imposing heavy taxes on the private sector, which worsen the country’s ongoing stagflation. Although sitting on some of the world’s largest energy reserves, Iran struggles with significant energy inefficiencies and shortages due to a lack of investment.
With no viable domestic political backlash, Iran’s leadership prefers “resistance” to capitulation with no payoff, calculating it can outlast sanctions as long as no real benefits are on offer. To change this calculation, the U.S. must offer targeted economic advantages to Iranian elites and citizens, creating domestic pressure for compliance and coexistence. This does not mean abandoning sanctions or rewarding adversarial behavior; rather, it involves strategically linking economic gains to verified nuclear restrictions.
By clearly tying diplomatic compliance to tangible economic improvements, Washington can build powerful constituencies in both countries committed to preserving the deal. I explain this in a new brief for the Quincy Institute entitled, "The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal."
Economic engagement as a catalyst for change
A growing number of Iranian elites now believe that unlocking Iran’s geo-economic potential and addressing escalating economic challenges hinges on the U.S. economic engagement. While military-linked hardliners resist any economic ties with America, most elites have reluctantly recognized that even under a JCPOA-like deal, partnerships with non-U.S. economies remain fragile without U.S. involvement.
Hardliners understand that greater openness would erode the power of military-linked conglomerates and undermine the rationale of economic militarization. Meanwhile, moderates acknowledge that Iran’s economy requires a durable deal that includes strong American constituencies with vested interests in maintaining sanctions relief.
Targeted economic incentives could deepen these elite divisions and pressure Tehran toward compliance.
A flexible, incentive-driven framework
A practical step includes launching an economic dialogue parallel to the technical nuclear discussions to explore options for selectively opening Iran’s substantial consumer market to American businesses. Even without fully repealing primary sanctions laws, President Trump can selectively license up to $25 billion in annual U.S. exports and enable U.S.-owned subsidiaries to engage with up to $4 trillion in untapped Iranian investment opportunities by 2040.
Licensing up to $25 billion annually in U.S. exports, particularly in aviation, agriculture, and automobiles, could create and sustain over 200,000 American jobs each year. Beyond this $25 billion export figure, Iran needs to immediately import approximately $180 billion worth of equipment and machinery to renovate just 30 percent of its outdated industrial base, $50 to $60 billion to expand and upgrade its electric transmission and distribution systems, and another $60 billion to modernize and expand its rail network. If permitted, these imports could be sourced primarily from the U.S. market.
Facilitating these exchanges provides durable incentives for both sides. Reinstating Boeing deals could revitalize manufacturing hubs in Washington and South Carolina. Similarly, American farmers, especially in the Midwest, would directly benefit from increased agricultural exports to Iran, where billions of dollars’ worth of staple commodities such as soybeans and corn are consistently imported.
Beyond immediate trade benefits, Washington can authorize a new General License H, providing a five-year window for U.S.-owned subsidiaries to operate in Iran’s designated sectors. With the largest untapped market in the Middle East, without sanctions, Iran could add $600 billion to $1 trillion in GDP by 2040. Meeting these goals requires $2.3 to $4 trillion in capital by 2040. Allowing indirect American investments, without repealing primary sanctions laws, provides a pragmatic, politically feasible pathway to integrate Iran’s economy into a broader regional economic network. As the payback period for most Iranian projects with a high return rate is less than five years, if compliance endures, it can be extended or evolve into permanent relief. It gives U.S. businesses a foothold while preserving leverage.
Engaging regional partners such as Saudi, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE to participate in joint ventures with American subsidiaries could further amplify the deal’s economic and geopolitical benefits. This regional economic cooperation would bolster stability across the Persian Gulf and raise Iran's costs if it breaches compliance terms, significantly strengthening diplomatic leverage.
A dynamic “snap-forward” mechanism could also be introduced, allowing Iran’s economic openings to accelerate as Tehran demonstrates sustained compliance and cooperation. This incentive-driven approach contrasts sharply with the reactive, punitive “snap-back” sanctions of previous agreements, creating a positive, mutually reinforcing cycle of compliance and reward.
Anchoring nuclear diplomacy in economic incentives offers U.S. policymakers a chance to achieve security goals that decades of coercion alone have failed to deliver. When tied to verifiable compliance, economic benefits become powerful leverage to force sustained Iranian compliance. Now, Washington faces a choice: double down on a sanctions-driven strategy with a track record of failure, or embrace a smarter, incentive-based policy that brings nuclear security, regional stability, and economic gains for American workers.
It’s time to recognize the limits of sanctions-only diplomacy and prioritize economic engagement as the foundation of a more effective Iran strategy for lasting security and diplomatic stability.
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Top photo credit: A cover dance band performs during an event devoted to the Spring Festival, at a shopping mall in Khimki, on the outskirts of Moscow, Russia, February 10, 2024. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov
Russia is no stranger to costly, grinding wars. Soviet authorities made a point of allowing the performing arts to continue during the 872-day battle for Leningrad during World War II, widely considered the bloodiest siege in history.
Thousands of displaced and starving locals flocked to the Mariinsky, Komissarzhevskaya, and other theaters to the unrelenting hum of shelling and air raid sirens. The 1942 Leningrad premiere of Shostakovich's Seventh Symphony stands as both a singular cultural achievement and a grim reminder of Russian tenacity in the face of unspeakable hardship.
The situation today is very far removed from the horrors of the Eastern Front. I found nary a hint after spending over a week in Moscow that I am in a country prosecuting the largest and most destructive war in Europe since 1945. Business is booming. Previously vacant storefronts in Moscow’s luxury GUM department store and the city’s many other shopping malls are, for the most part, reoccupied by Chinese companies and multibrand stores selling the same Western high-end products that continue to flood into Moscow through countless parallel import schemes that have proven highly lucrative for Russia’s neighbors.
It was striking how convincingly Chinese car manufacturers have tightened their grip over the Russian market. “What, did you expect us to walk?” one of my interlocutors said, perhaps sensing my incredulity. “We have to drive something.” Yet German cars remain a clear status symbol for well-off Russians — one can find far more Mercedes and Maybach makes on the streets of Moscow than in Washington, D.C.
It is true the city is peppered with military recruitment posters, but this, too, is a remarkable testament to the normalcy the Kremlin has been able to maintain over three years into this war. Russian President Vladimir Putin resisted calls from Moscow’s hardliners — more on them shortly — to pursue full-scale wartime mobilization, instead creating a soft semi-mobilization model that draws large numbers of contract soldiers with generous compensation and benefits packages.
The government enjoys popular confidence, stemming in no small part from its effective handling of the economy. It is shocking to the Western imagination that, even amidst this war and the many personal tragedies that come with it, there is a sense among the people I spoke to that the post-1999 Russian Federation is the most stable, comfortable iteration of Russia in recent and even distant memory.
The rhythm of Moscow life is dictated by an insatiable hunger for upward mobility and ever-greater consumption — there is a brazenly capitalistic quality to it all that would take many Americans, let alone our more staid Western European friends, by surprise. Russians generally still do see themselves as Europeans and as part of a broader Western civilizational inheritance, but there is a realization that must have crept in somewhere between 20,000 sanctions imposed since 2014 that life will go on with this conflict in the background and without the West, even if the vast majority of Russians strongly prefer to be part of a common Western commercial and cultural space.
I came away from my contacts with the Moscow elite, including officials, with the conclusion that there are two broad camps in Russia. Most elites are what I would describe as situational pragmatists. These aren’t people who would give away the farm for a peace deal, but they are well aware of the long-term costs of prosecuting this war — including a deepening dependence on China that far from everyone in Moscow is comfortable with.
They are also cautiously interested in working with the Trump administration on a settlement that doesn’t just end the war but potentially addresses a broader constellation of issues in the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West.
Then there is a smaller faction of hardliners who treat this war not as an arena for resolving larger strategic issues between Russia and the West but as a bilateral conflict wherein Moscow’s goal is simply to crush Ukraine and secure its unconditional capitulation. Though the political balance of power decidedly tilts toward the moderates, especially with the advent earlier this year of a U.S. administration that supports a negotiated settlement, the hardliners’ influence wanes and waxes proportionally with the belief that the U.S. is unable or unwilling to facilitate a settlement that satisfies Russia’s core demands.
What exactly these demands are, and whether Russia is willing to compromise on them, is a complex issue that hinges on all the potential linkages involved. To what extent would Russia, for example, be willing to scale back its territorial claims in exchange for a reopening of Nord Stream 2, reintegration into the SWIFT financial messaging system and other financial institutions, or an agreement foreclosing NATO’s eastward enlargement?
Still, nearly everyone I spoke to identified a baseline set of conditions for any peace deal. These include Ukrainian neutrality and non-bloc status, limits on Ukraine’s postwar military, guarantees against the deployment of any Western troops on Ukrainian territory, and at least de facto international recognition of territories controlled by Russia. My interlocutors argued that an unconditional ceasefire without a roadmap for addressing these issues is a recipe for freezing the conflict in Ukraine’s favor, something they say the Kremlin will never agree to.
These points are of course subject to numerous caveats and provisos. For one, Russia’s insistence on non-bloc status never extended to Ukraine’s ability to seek EU membership, something Kyiv can hold up as a victory in a settlement. There is also an implicit recognition that Moscow can’t prevent Ukraine from maintaining a domestic deterrent, even if subject to certain restrictions along the lines discussed during the 2022 Istanbul negotiations, against a Russian reinvasion.
I developed the impression from my meetings that Russia would demonstrate a great degree of flexibility in other areas, including rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine and the status of around $300 billion in Russian assets frozen in the West, if the strategic issues rehearsed above are resolved to Moscow’s satisfaction.
No one in Moscow who favors a settlement, which is almost everyone I spoke to, wants America to “walk away” from this war in the way that U.S. officials have previously suggested.
There is a widespread recognition that, if the White House permanently extricates itself from the conflict, Moscow would be left with European and Ukrainian leaders who will reject anything that can be remotely perceived as a concession. In that case, the Kremlin will undoubtedly decide that it has little choice but to take this war to its ugly conclusion.
I return from Russia with the conviction that such an outcome is neither inevitable nor desirable from Moscow’s perspective. A deal is possible, which is not to say that it can be achieved in short order or that Russia won’t drive a hard bargain. But for all of the destruction and tragedy visited by this war, it is not, mercifully for all involved, Leningrad in 1942.
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Top Image Credit: Donald Trump and Xi Jinping (White House photo via Flickr)
Last week President Trump finally had the phone call with Xi Jinping that he was reportedly “obsessed” with arranging. Today Trump's top trade, treasury, and commerce officials are set to meet a Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier He Lifeng at an undisclosed location in London for talks.
This followed a week of Trump suggesting he would blow up the crucial relationship with China that was only recently steadied after an alarming month of spiraling economic warfare. That began when, without advance warning, Trump posted that China “HAS TOTALLY VIOLATED ITS AGREEMENT WITH US.” Then at 2am the day before the call, he wrote that Xi is “VERY TOUGH, AND EXTREMELY HARD TO MAKE A DEAL WITH!!!”
Trump’s readout of his call with Xi was very optimistic, suggesting progress resolving recent disputes and promising another meeting of trade negotiators on both sides as well as a future trip to China. The Chinese readout, in contrast, indicated that the basic impasse in trade talks was unresolved, but also spoke encouragingly about reviving talks.
What to make of this commotion? Are we on the verge of a diplomatic breakthrough or on the brink of the runaway great power crisis that seemed almost inevitable a few weeks ago? As so often with Trump, either of both extremes is a real possibility.
Trump is more open to genuine dealmaking with China than Biden and has shown himself willing to back down when necessary. The Chinese behavior that Trump is denouncing seems to be a response to discrete U.S. actions that could be reversed. The rapid accumulation of aggressive anti-China measures in recent weeks might be driven more by Trump’s search for leverage in negotiations than an unalterable commitment to confrontation.
Yet the world’s two most powerful countries are playing with fire. Almost a decade of intense mutual antagonism has significantly exacerbated the zero-sum global pressures that fractured the relationship in the first place. Both sides have assiduously built the institutional and ideological infrastructure to sustain great power violence.
The key question is whether Trump can pivot away from his domineering negotiating style and either pursue the substantive possibilities that China has already suggested or offer a different agenda. If not, the multiplying flashpoints in both economic and military realms might soon send the U.S. and China over the brink.
In April, Trump risked such a permanent rupture with China when he transformed his “liberation day” trade war against the whole world into a tariff assault focused on China. With tariff rates on both sides soaring past 100 percent, economic relations between the world’s two largest economies were effectively severed overnight. The Trump administration’s aim of imposing exclusionary measures against China on third countries dramatically compounded the sense of siege on the Chinese side.
Weeks of bickering followed, in which Trump repeatedly insisted that Xi wanted to de-escalate but would have to call him first. He intimated that China had already reached out at lower levels, but China consistently replied that no such communications were underway. World financial markets reeled, and global trade flows were thrown into disarray.
Despite the truculent personalities on both sides, the two countries somehow found their way to a graceful exit from this impasse. On May 12, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer met with Xi’s top economic official He Lifeng in Geneva for extended discussions. Their breakthrough agreement went further than observers had expected, temporarily reversing the tariff onslaught and restoring the situation prior to liberation day except for an added 10 percent rate on both sides. Notably, that 10 percent increase is in line with Trump’s minimum increase on all countries, so it does not single out China.
The agreement included two crucial additional provisions. The United States agreed to a structure for negotiations, which China had been seeking for months. China agreed to allow exports of rare earth elements it had blocked in its retaliatory measures, alarming top U.S. officials.
The surprise truce of May 12 seemed to create a path to lowering tensions and perhaps even to a meaningful diplomatic agreement. May 13 derailed those hopes.
That day, Trump’s Commerce Department issued new guidance, warning that anyone using Huawei-designed advanced semiconductors anywhere was likely in violation of U.S. export controls and thereby risking “substantial criminal and administrative penalties, up to and including imprisonment, fines, loss of export privileges, or other restrictions.”
This guidance makes use of the Biden administration’s blockade on advanced computing technology, but creatively turns export restrictions into an offensive weapon in the arsenal of economic warfare. Seeking to sow panic in Huawei customers in order to strangle demand for the company’s products, it builds on previous measures under Trump 1 and Biden aimed at felling China’s most successful multinational company.
Commerce has issued a host of additional new restrictions on China’s access to technology since Trump’s inauguration, including a significant expansion of Chinese companies restricted by the department’s Entity List, a cutoff of previously permitted computer chips used in China’s AI sector, and bans on the sale of products and technology used by China’s aircraft and computer chip companies.
Such measures represent continuity with the Biden administration’s progressively expanding campaign to keep China in a position of permanent technological subordination. But the Trump administration is also opening new fronts against China. Most prominently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced last week that the administration will “aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students,” embracing the conspiracy theory that Chinese people are a national security threat by virtue of their nationality.
How should we interpret these moves? On the one hand, the possibility of the Trump administration breaking permanently with China is all too real. Vilification of China provides common ground in an otherwise fractious Republican Party and specifically among the key personnel in the Trump administration. Whatever their motivating aim — be it domestic reindustrialization, reducing the trade deficit, establishing “independent” supply chains, preserving corporate profits, damaging elite universities, dominating the Western Hemisphere, focusing American geopolitical power on Asia, or seeking “social solidarity” by driving foreign elements out of the U.S. — China exclusion is an organizing principle and policy goal.
On the other hand, one of Trump’s most consistent patterns is to pile on negotiating pressure by attacking his counterpart’s most sensitive concerns. He has shown himself willing to reverse course on such measures — even when his advisers might argue for more confrontation — in order to strike a bargain. And there is some reason to interpret recent anti-China moves in this light.
For example, the Commerce Department’s plan to ban Nvidia’s H20 chip was reportedly put on hold after company CEO Jensen Huang paid $1 million to attend a dinner with Trump. On the day Trump postponed liberation day and directed all his aggression against China, Nvidia was informed that the ban would go forward after all.
Likewise, the plan to expel Chinese students was announced hastily, apparently without any operational preparation — just as Trump’s frustrations about rare earths and Xi’s failure to call him were reaching the breaking point. In his call with Xi and in subsequent comments, Trump spoke positively about Chinese students in the U.S.
Now that China has discovered what a potent source of leverage its rare earths restrictions are, it is unlikely to cede the issue unless Trump reins in his Commerce Department’s aggressive moves. Yet even if the U.S. makes such a concession, other threats to diplomacy loom over the relationship. U.S. moves to cut China off from its economic partners and the Pentagon’s confrontational posture in Asia are particularly ominous.
Coupled with Trump’s predilection for using negotiations to display his own dominance — guaranteed to drive China away — the conditions for stable great power relations are dark. But if Trump were to insist that his hawkish advisers direct their energies into driving a hard bargain rather than driving the two countries toward open conflict, the U.S. and China might yet move off the path of mutually destructive hostility.
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