President Trump announced today that he would impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico starting tomorrow. The tariffs were originally set to take effect on February 4, but he then announced a last-minute reprieve of one month.
The announcement comes despite very different responses from Canada and Mexico to Trump’s tariff threats. President Sheinbaum of Mexico has gone to some lengths in recent days to accommodate U.S. preferences on key American concerns–migration, crime and Chinese exports to Mexico.
Last Thursday, she oversaw the transfer of 29 high-profile drug lords to US custody, signaling a willingness to align more closely with Washington in the fight against drugs and organized crime. And on Friday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Mexico was going to impose tariffs on imports from China to match those set by the U.S., a step he urged Canada to follow.
The measures announced by the Mexican government likely have or would have had associated costs — potential violent retaliation by drug gangs, and forgoing inbound investment from China, the world’s current leader in electrical vehicle technology. But evidently, this was a price Sheinbaum felt was worth paying to avert the tariffs.
Canada has taken a much more combative approach, with tempers likely inflamed further by the relentless taunts (if not yet actually threats) of the country’s incorporation as America’s 51st state. Large parts of Canada’s political spectrum have united against these suggestions. The outgoing Liberal Party Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has drawn closer to the European Union and sought common ground with them on the subjects of global trade and Ukraine. Ontario Premier Doug Ford of the Conservative Party has been threatening for months to turn off Canada’s power supply to parts of the Northeast, a step he said today he would take, with a smile on his face. The complexities of power transmission might make this hard to do but it is still an indication of how fraught the current relationship across the 49th parallel has become.
Yet despite these differences between Canadian and Mexican approaches, both are being hit with the same tariffs (assuming nothing happens between now and when then they are due to take effect). The measures could lead to a massive shock as total trade between the three countries in the USMCA free-trade area accounted for more than 1.3 trillion $ in 2023. The resulting shock is not just about the volume of trade between the countries but also the composition. Trilateral trade involves lots of intermediate goods and parts crossing borders multiple times, particularly in the highly integrated automotive sector. A recent story showed how a single piston crosses borders 6 times in the course of its manufacture.
The entire process thus far suggests that uncertainty might be here to stay — not just for businesses but even for governments. The parallel treatment of Canada and Mexico, despite their very different approaches to Trump, suggests that even commercial diplomacy is now a much less predictable enterprise when it comes to U.S. foreign policy.
Karthik Sankaran is a senior research fellow in geoeconomics in the Global South program at the Quincy Institute. Previously, he served as Director for Global Strategy at the Eurasia Group, where he worked with country and regional teams to chart feedback loops among political and geopolitical risks, macroeconomics, and market responses. He has written for the Financial Times, Barron’s, and FPRI.
Top photo credit: Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum (Shutterstock/Octavia Hoyos)
Top image credit: Hezbollah Member of Parliament Ali Fayyad stands in Burj al-Muluk, near the southern Lebanese village of Kfar Kila, where Israeli forces remained on the ground after a deadline for their withdrawal passed as residents sought to return to homes in the border area, Lebanon January 26, 2025. REUTERS/Karamallah Daher
The Lebanese Hezbollah movement is facing unprecedentedly challenging times, having lost much of its senior leadership in its latest war with Israel.
Events in neighboring Syria have further compounded the organizations losses. Not only did Hezbollah lose its main transit route for weapons deliveries with the fall of the Assad dynasty, but it now has to live with the reality of a new leadership in Damascus affiliated with the very same Sunni-extremist groups Hezbollah had fought against in support of the former leadership.
However, the recent funeral procession for the movement’s former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was a stark reminder that it continues to enjoy broad public support. The procession was one of the largest events in Lebanon’s history, with hundreds of thousands of mourners taking to the streets.
Responsible Statecraft sat down with Hezbollah parliamentarian Ali Fayyad to discuss the party’s future following the latest developments. Fayyad has been an active member of Hezbollah since its founding and previously headed its think tank: the Consultative Center for Documentation and Studies.
Fayyad emphasized that under the current circumstances, the organization’s approach is for the Lebanese state to handle the situation with Israel, which continues to occupy parts of Lebanese territory. He is quick to highlight, however, that Lebanon reserves the right to use force, if necessary, in order to end the Israeli occupation. Any talk of integrating Hezbollah militarily into Lebanon’s state institutions is premature, says Fayyad, and hinges on factors like the state building its defensive capabilities.
Regarding the Trump administration’s policies towards Lebanon, the Hezbollah legislator argues that attempts to marginalize Hezbollah will not stabilize Lebanon. He also raises the possibility that Washington may be attempting to stir up a confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Shiite movement, warning of the dire repercussions resulting from such a scenario. Fayyad explained however that the issues Hezbollah has with the United States are not bilateral in nature, but rather stem from U.S. support for Israel and what he terms “unjust hegemony” over world affairs.
On the situation in Syria, he does not shy away from admitting that the fall of former president Bashar Al-Assad was a major setback for the movement, questioning the stance of the new Syrian leadership towards Israel.
Below is the full text of the interview:
RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT: What is the future of Hezbollah after Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah?
ALI FAYYAD: Hezbollah is committed the path of Sayyed Hassan and to the principals and to its resistance role and vision towards the situation in Lebanon and the region. But there were also big shifts that took place in Lebanon and the region that must be taken into consideration, and Hezbollah is heavily focused on understanding these shifts and on contemplating how to deal with them. The charismatic leadership of Sayyed Hassan played a very fundamental role in leading the party and in managing the organization, politically and militarily. Now, under the leadership of the new secretary Sheikh Naim Qassem, it is expected that we will move more towards an institutional type of party rather than the party of a leader. This is consistent with the convictions of the new secretary general.
RS: When we speak about an institution-like party, will this be reflected in more focus on the domestic arena and somewhat lesser focus on the region?
FAYYAD: The issue of the party led by a leader and a party that focuses more on the institutional dimension in decision making has nothing to do with the shifts that took place in the region and in Lebanon. When we talk about shifts, we have that which relates to Lebanon after the document on implementing U.N. resolution 1701 was issued (the latest Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement), and the rampant U.S. attempts to reshape the region. Regarding Lebanon, we underscored our commitment to 1701 and to the implementation measures document. We committed completely to the obligations related to the South of the Litani River, and because the implementation document is concerned with explaining and implementing resolution 1701, its reference and geographical scope is subject to international resolution 1701.
RS: What can we expect from Hezbollah when it has more of an institutional nature?
FAYYAD: The presence of Sayyed Hassan was overwhelming. When he decided anything, this decision would be embraced by everyone given his historic leadership role. Now, the new secretary general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, is more in favor of the institutions playing their role in decision making; now, we have moved more towards a collective institutional leadership that makes decisions based on the internal bureaucracy, the internal institutions.
RS: Is Hezbollah in the process of becoming solely a political party?
FAYYAD: No, Hezbollah, despite the shifts that took place, remains a resistance party on the one hand and a political party on the other. However, every stage requires a different approach when it comes to resistance. Hezbollah remains committed to resistance and considers that it is Lebanon’s right to confront any Israeli aggression. But this current stage, given its unique nature and the shifts that happened, perhaps requires a different approach.
For example, one of the major developments of the current stage was that the Lebanese state stepped forward to manage the situation against the Israeli enemy, and Hezbollah accepted this role and is giving the state the opportunity to take charge of the situation with the Israeli enemy. This doesn’t mean that Hezbollah is no longer committed to its role as a resistance.
RS: The clearer question, which people want to know the answer to is that of arms, because there is this understanding that the ceasefire agreement tacitly includes ultimately getting rid of Hezbollah’s arms.
FAYYAD: I was saying that 1701 geographically refers to the South of the Litani River. Now, regarding the North of the Litani River, the implementation document said that no weapons can be imported and developed. We call on the Lebanese state to exercise its role completely regarding controlling the situation on the borders. We have no problem in this regard, however, everything that is related to the resistance in the North of the Litani River, we consider to be a sovereign issue that concerns the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah calls on the government to reach an understanding regarding the situation in the North of the Litani.
RS: So you view President Joseph Aoun’s call for addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons via dialogue positively?
FAYYAD: This is consistent with what Hezbollah wants.
RS: Should an understanding be reached regarding the weapons, is Hezbollah ready to be integrated into the state militarily?
FAYYAD: It is too early to speak about these issues. There are a number of issues that are intertwined. This issue can’t be dealt with on its own, but rather has to be approached holistically. When I say that, it means it is closely linked to making sure the state is able to exercise its role of defending the land and the people in Lebanon.
RS: There are five positions which Israel still occupies in Lebanon. How will Hezbollah deal with this should the state fail in addressing this issue?
FAYYAD: We consider that this stage — the stage of implementing the measures of 1701— we consider it to be the responsibility of the state and we are closely following the situation. When the state reaches a dead end, we call on it to assess the situation and identify the opportunities and to look into the options that will liberate the territory. But in any case, the Israelis being in five points is something which we consider to be occupation and this gives Lebanon the right to use all possible means to liberate these occupied territories. This is the exact same official Lebanese stance because the meeting of the three leaders (the president, prime minister and parliament speaker) in Baabda (the Lebanese presidential palace). … When the Israelis announced that they will stay in Lebanese territories, the three leaders met and issued a very important statement announcing that the Israeli presence in this area is occupation and Lebanon has the right to use all possible means to liberate these territories.
RS: All possible means, does this include armed resistance?
FAYYAD: The term “all possible means,” which was included in the Taif Agreement and in the Cabinet manifestos for many years, and was reintroduced in the presidential statement, means diplomatic and non-diplomatic means.
RS: I am getting a sense that there is a kind of optimism towards this government bearing in mind that we know what happened with the Iranian planes (Lebanon’s top officials have decided to halt direct flights between Tehran and Beirut indefinitely after Israeli threats). Are you optimistic in light of what happened?
FAYYAD: We think that this Lebanese government deserves to be given an opportunity to prove itself and to show that it is able to fulfill the promise made in the Cabinet manifesto. It said the priority is to liberate the land and defend the people. It also said this is the state’s main role,and it is true there is no meaning of state sovereignty without being able to protect the people and land. Number two, this government promised to rescue, reform and rebuild the state, and we are completely ready to cooperate in both issues
RS: How does the party view the American role, specifically the Trump administration? The American envoy (U.S. Deputy Middle East envoy Morgan Ortagus) said Hezbollah has been defeated and must be excluded from the government. What is your stance regarding these statements and the Trump administration more broadly?
FAYYAD: These stances are irresponsible, and they are an intervention in Lebanese internal affairs, in addition to the fact that they don’t take into consideration the sensitivities and the delicate foundations on which Lebanese political stability is based. They put pressure on the Lebanese state more than it can take and therefore don’t help in achieving stability and recovery.
Hezbollah is the most popular political movement in Lebanon and a prominent political player, and it enjoys widespread public support as a resistance. The American stances ignore the will of a large segment of the Lebanese people and a parliamentary block representing Hezbollah elected democratically. Furthermore, these stances look more like media propaganda than actually being a responsible political approach towards the situation in Lebanon, because Ortagus set a condition that Hezbollah not be represented in the government, but while the American envoy was issuing this statement in Baabda, the government was being formed and Hezbollah was part of it. So, Hezbollah is represented with two ministers in the government.
The stances issued by the American administration and the way in which the Americans are approaching Lebanon contradicts the declared American goal that expresses a firm commitment to stability and rebuilding of a strong state in Lebanon. Hezbollah calls on the government and the other factions to discuss the outstanding issues domestically via dialogue. The American stances don’t go in that same direction, but rather their end result would be Lebanese infighting. And we fear that the American goal is for there to be confrontation between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah and its supporters. This is something very dangerous for Lebanon and we don’t want it, and want to avoid it. Rather, we want the best possible ties with the Lebanese army and we support the army.
RS: Since you mentioned this point, how do you view the American support for the Lebanese military?
FAYYAD: Never did we announce a stance rejecting grants, especially in light of the difficult economic and social circumstances. But we always stressed that we place emphasis on the independence of the military institution and it not being hostage to any foreign power, and that foreign aid must not be linked to political conditions.
RS: Wafik Safa (the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit) recently said that the Americans always try to contact the party and meet Hezbollah directly and that this continues to be the case. What is the stance of the party regarding any attempts to establish direct contact with the United States?
FAYYAD: Internationally, we have very good ties with a large number of countries in the world including countries in the EU. But when it comes to the United States, because of its complete alignment with Israel which occupies our territories and committed genocide against the Palestinian people, we have a political stance that rejects establishing any form of contact with the American administration. But we also differentiate between the American administration and American society, whether it be media organizations or academic institutions or activists or intellectuals. There is no problem whatsoever with having such nonofficial meetings between Hezbollah and these parties.
RS: Many say that Hezbollah is a common danger to Israel and the U.S. and go back to the (1983) marine barracks attacks, accusing Hezbollah of being involved in terrorism activity and targeting Americans. But based on what I’m understanding from you, the only problem between the party and the U.S. is the American support for Israel. Is that the case?
FAYYAD: We don’t have bilateral problems with the Americans. The stance towards the Americans is linked first of all to the Palestinian cause and this alignment (with Israel) which ignores human rights and the U.N. laws and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. And as a follow up to this point, this American armed support to Israel which used its weapons to destroy 200,000 (Lebanese) homes in the recent war, and killed the Secretary General (Hassan Nasrallah) with weapons that only America possesses — the bombs weighing 2,000 pounds, and the Israelis admitted this. The Israelis were rearmed recently with 9,000-pound bombs. These kinds of bombs are the heaviest non-nuclear bombs in history. So, the problem with the American administration is this issue first of all and second this intervention in the affairs of other societies and countries, and exercising unjust hegemony over international relations. So, we have two problems, one related to the Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict and the intervention in our internal affairs, and the other related to the American approach towards the global system. This contradicts completely with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points. It also contradicts with all of the constitutional and humanitarian ideals that were established by the founding fathers in the United States.
RS: How do you respond to Hezbollah being accused of pursuing terrorist activities and plans in places like Cyprus and Thailand and other faraway places?
FAYYAD: Hezbollah doesn’t pursue any terrorist activity be it in Lebanon or abroad. Hezbollah openly operates in Lebanon to liberate territories occupied by the Israeli enemy. This right is enshrined in the laws of the United Nations and is one of the basic principles concerning the rights of nations and human societies. And second, we have the right to defend ourselves against the Israeli aggressions. These societies pay a heavy price and are killed in the thousands, and their institutions and homes are destroyed. They are also victims of internationally-banned weapons, like the use of white phosphorus in south Lebanon. If you compare Israel’s losses with those inflicted on us, these losses are almost negligible.
RS: How heavy of a blow were the events in Syria for Hezbollah, and how do you assess the repercussions on Lebanon domestically and on Hezbollah’s supporters, because we saw confrontations on the border (between Lebanon and Syria).
FAYYAD: There’s no doubt that the political transformation which took place in Syria was a major strategic loss, we can’t deny that. We did not support the approach which was taken in regards to the complicated ties between the former Syrian regime and the Syrian people. We don’t support any kind of oppression and corruption or sectarian practices.
RS: Then why did you support the regime?
FAYYAD: Our previous ties with the regime are linked to one specific issue related to the necessity of establishing a balance against Israel in a complicated regional struggle, whereby Israel receives all forms of international support and for the sake of having regional depth. Our ties with the regime were strictly tied to these considerations.
RS: And regarding the confrontations on the boarder?
FAYYAD: Regarding the new leadership in Syria, we are not looking for trouble and we adopt the stance of the Lebanese state that called for balanced ties between the two countries. But we underscore the importance of protecting minorities, respecting freedoms and not having a new oppressive leadership in Syria. We are also keeping an eye on the stance of the new leadership in Syria towards Israel. This stance is confusing and poses a lot of questions, as Israel infiltrated and occupied Syrian territory without any stance taken from the new leadership. This is something strange from every legal and political standpoint which you wouldn’t find in any other country.
The confrontations (on the Lebanese Syrian border) have been linked to smuggling and smuggling gangs, but we believe it is more than that. It aims to put political pressure on Lebanon, and what we want is for the eastern northern borders to be stable.
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Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy as U.S. Vice President JD Vance reacts at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 28, 2025. REUTERS/Brian Snyder
The sort of clash that occurred between President Trump and Vice President Vance and President Zelensky is common enough between leaders in private. As a public spectacle however it is almost unprecedented, and certainly in the surroundings of the White House. There was fault on both sides for the way things got out of hand; but Zelensky was the more foolish participant, because (as Trump pointed out) he is the one in the weak position.
There were multiple reasons for this diplomatic debacle, but the most important was a fundamental divergence of views on how the war began and how to end it. President Zelensky, like many people in the U.S. and European establishments, puts all the blame for the war on Russia, believes that the Russian government is not only still pursuing not only maximalist aims in Ukraine, but intends to attack the Baltic States and NATO.
Zelensky therefore does not really believe that a negotiated settlement is possible or will last; unless that is NATO European members provide a force to defend Ukraine with the full backing of the United States. Since the Russian government has repeatedly rejected this idea, setting it as a condition in talks would mean that there will be no peace settlement and the war will continue indefinitely.
Based on their own view of the world and international relations (shared in private by a good many tough-minded members of the U.S. establishment) Trump and Vance by contrast believe that Russia had certain legitimate reasons to see Western ambitions in Ukraine as a threat to its security and vital interests. They see this war as part of a broader geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia over NATO expansion and Europe’s security order. Absent diplomacy, they think the spiral of action and reaction in this geopolitical conflict will only escalate, risking, in Trump’s words, “World War III.”
Trump and Vance see Putin as a ruthless but rational actor (much, perhaps, as Trump sees himself) who will make a deal and stick to it if it meets Russia’s essential conditions. They do not believe that Putin has any intention of going on to attack NATO. Above all, they are determined not to make any more U.S. security commitments in Europe beyond NATO’s existing borders.
They were therefore furious when Zelensky at the press conference put public pressure on them to promise a U.S. military “backstop” for a European “peacekeeping” force in Ukraine. And while Trump’s words about Zelensky have been extremely undiplomatic, in another reply to a question he did utter some diplomatic common sense: “You want me to say terrible things about Putin and then tell him, ‘Hey, Vladimir, how about a deal?’” Trump also stated something that should be a truism, but has too often been forgotten by the U.S. foreign and security establishment: that his primary responsibility is to the United States of America.
Zelensky for his part does not seem to have understood the very different character of the Trump administration from that of Biden or the European governments. Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials became used to criticizing Western governments in public for not giving enough aid to Ukraine, and going over their heads with public appeals to Western media, publics and parliaments.
And very often, Biden and his European counterparts then gave in to Ukrainian demands that they had previously rejected. This appeared to condition Zelensky to believe that public pressure and moral blackmail on Washington would still be a path to success when dealing with Trump. It says little for his Ukrainian advisers that Zelensky went into this meeting so terribly briefed. The Ukrainian ambassador was seen with her head in her hands during the argument, and she had good reason.
Trump and Vance reacted very differently to Zelensky’s public pressure and reproaches. It was, however, unnecessary for them to respond so harshly in public. As one of the authors pointed out in an article for Responsible Statecraft earlier this week (that, alas, none of the principals at this meeting seem to have read) there is an awful lot to be said for public silence in the conduct of international affairs.
Zelensky’s illusions needed to be dispelled by some clear and firm U.S. words; but there was no need to utter them in public. Incidents of this kind do not accord with the dignity of the White House or the image of the United States. Trump should have ended the press conference before the conversation turned contentious and voiced his admonitions to Zelensky in private.
The way in which this argument got out of hand partly reflects Trump’s and Vance’s personal resentments (of which Zelensky should have been aware, and that should have made him more cautious and polite) over Zelensky’s perceived political support for the Democrats, including his role in Trump’s first impeachment and his de facto campaign appearance for Biden in Pennsylvania during the 2024 elections.
This deep public rift, and the collapse of the minerals deal that Trump clearly regarded as central to the U.S.-Ukrainian aspect of the peace process, leave that process in a parlous state. The Russian government has two choices in how to respond. On the one hand, there will doubtless be hardliners who will tell Putin that with Ukraine’s relationship with the U.S. gravely weakened, Russia should harden its negotiating stance and refuse to compromise on its demands.
It is certainly possible, however, that wiser counsel will prevail, and that Putin will see this as an opportunity to portray Russia as the party that is seeking peace. This is what most of Russia’s partners in the Global South (that Russians like to call the “Global Majority”) would wish. This is also of course the greatest opportunity ever to establish a wholly new relationship with the U.S. and achieve the wider agreements on common security that Moscow has been seeking for so many years.
Ukraine’s position is gravely weakened; and if in the next round of negotiations the U.S. and Russian teams can come up with a reasonable compromise, Ukraine would be well advised to accept it in principle and try to negotiate as many advantages as possible over the details of the ceasefire and any changes to the Ukrainian constitution — negotiations in which Ukraine will of course have to be involved, whatever the state of relations between Trump and Zelensky.
For if Ukraine continues to oppose a deal and Trump withdraws U.S. support (including not just weapons but even more importantly Starlink and real-time battlefield intelligence), Ukrainian forces will face huge difficulties in holding their present positions and warding off a catastrophic defeat.
This will be true even if European countries continue their support. The governments of the EU and UK are now facing a critical dilemma, to which they will have to respond at their summit (including Zelensky) this coming Sunday, March 2. They will no doubt pledge to continue supporting Ukraine with aid.
If however they also continue to insist to the Trump administration that they and Ukraine be included in the first rounds of peace talks, to insist on a European peacekeeping force, and to encourage Ukraine to reject a deal, they will lose whatever influence they retain in Washington and may also expose themselves to retaliation in the form of tariffs. They will also vastly increase the risk of a catastrophe for Ukraine.
Finally, this incident raises profound questions about Zelensky’s political future. It may temporarily create a rally-round-the-flag effect in Ukraine, bolstering his popularity for standing up to U.S. pressure. Before too long however, as Ukrainians confront the dire circumstances they face and the need to mend fences with the Trump administration, challengers to Zelensky may emerge and lead calls for presidential elections.
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Top photo credit: April 11, 2024, Port of Seattle, WA. Container ship Singapore Express with shipping containers under tow by two Crowley tug boats in harbor.(Shutterstock/Robert V Schwemmer)
In a little more than one month, President Trump has taken a series of economic actions that could have a huge impact on the global South.
Tariffs have commanded the most attention, but his activism has taken other forms as well — a deepening of export and investment control regimes, cutbacks in aid, and measures that could hit global financial stability. Beyond these, policy shifts in Washington also influence other countries through two key variables in global financial markets. These are the levels of the dollar and of U.S. interest rates, arguably the most important prices in the world.
The headlines about tariffs have been constant, but not consistent. This reflects Trump’s tendency to treat tariffs as a catch-all tool of coercion. These rationales could be economic — imbalances caused by alleged subsidies, dumping, currency manipulation, tariff or non-tariff barriers, IP theft, or just large bilateral trade surpluses. But they could also stem from non-economic complaints about migration and drugs as in the case of Mexico and Canada.
This also means scrambled timelines — an inauguration day Executive Order, America First Trade Policy, laid out a set of questions for key cabinet members, asking them to return with reports on April 1. This was welcomed as a measured pause, but within hours Trump threatened 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico to begin February 4. He then suspended their imposition for a month and announced yesterday that they would indeed be imposed on March 4.
But Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum has just agreed to transfer more than 30 senior drug cartel members to U.S. custody, which he may see as a sign of compliance with U.S. wishes.
All this is against the backdrop of a review of the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement ) that needs to be completed by July 1, 2026. USMCA itself is the result of a renegotiation by Trump during his first term of the original NAFTA agreement from 1994. The updates led to new Rules of Origin for the highly-integrated North American automotive market, boosting the minimum required levels of U.S.-made content, and also provided the U.S. mechanisms to force improvements in working conditions in Mexico, satisfying two key demands of organized labor.
Even so, the president likely intends the review to function as yet another renegotiation of the agreement.
One result of the welter of trade policy actions is a big increase in corporate uncertainty, including about the future of the trading relationship between the world’s two largest trading partners (roughly $800 billion of bilateral trade last year) with deeply intertwined supply chains. This is a prospect that could weigh on American and local investment decisions in Mexico, a country where exports to the U.S. amount to about roughly 25% of GDP.
Given the extent of Mexico’s dependence on U.S. markets, any reversal in bilateral integration could lead to social and economic outcomes that exacerbate two key non-economic irritants on the U.S. side —pressures from migration and organized crime.
This policy uncertainty applies beyond USMCA. Trump has also threatened "reciprocal tariffs", i.e., measures to impose the same tariff on other countries as they put on U.S. exports. Any such move would hit developing countries particularly hard as they tend to have higher average tariff levels than the U.S. does. Brazil and India, e.g., have average tariff rates above 10%. U.S. threats here could lead to potentially positive tariff reductions applicable to all countries if the “escalate to deescalate” strategy works. Or they could create a patchwork where tariffs levels depend both on product and country of origin, undoing decades of precedent where product tariffs have been largely uniform across all trading partners (i.e., Most Favored Nation status).
The White House is also expanding the regime that controls both inbound and outbound investments in high-technology sectors. The primary target is China, but as with the rules that emerged during the final days of the Biden administration when countries were put in three tiers of trustworthiness, a country’s “geopolitical distance” from China will be a key driver of decisions. This too could run into potential issues with country preferences in portions of the Global South.
The executive order says it welcomes investments from “partners and allies,” noting that some of them have large sovereign wealth funds (very likely a reference to Saudi Arabia and the UAE). However, it also notes that increased foreign investment would include “requirements that the specified foreign investors avoid partnering with United States foreign adversaries.” The aim seems to be to push towards a division of technology stacks.
But this could meet with resistance for two reasons — a desire to gauge cost effectiveness across stacks (particularly in the wake of China’s DeepSeek breakthrough), and reservations about being “trapped” in a single stack amid broader uncertainties about the very structure of alliances and partnerships in a more fluid international system.
Meanwhile, parts of the U.S. technology industry are pushing back more aggressively against the Biden-era rules and urging the new administration roll them back, arguing that “the unintended consequence of this approach is to encourage Tier Two countries to look elsewhere for AI infrastructure and services.”
At the other end of the income spectrum, Global South countries could be hit by U.S. cutbacks in foreign aid, with some of the most vulnerable countries potentially experiencing severe setbacks that spill over into global public health or security issues. The Center for Global Development lists countries most exposed to USAID cuts based on development assistance as a fraction of national income and the U.S. share of global assistance. South Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan — all three being unstable states from a security standpoint — stand out as strategic locations highly exposed to such cuts.
Financial stability in the Global South also could also be affected by changes in Washington’s stance on regulation. One big shift from the previous administration is the encouragement of crypto “stablecoins” — privately issued digital currencies that maintain a fixed valuation against the dollar. The linked Executive Order talks of “promoting and protecting the sovereignty of the United States dollar, including through actions to promote the development and growth of lawful and legitimate dollar-backed stablecoins worldwide.”
One rationale has been that this could create “trillions of dollars” of additional demand for U.S. Treasury securities, thus helping lower the government’s financing costs. But the flip side could be a significant increase in the risk of capital flight from developing countries that could more easily tip them into a financial crisis.
The litany above suggests a series of perils for the Global South from President Trump’s economic policies. Are there grounds for hope? The one that is invoked most frequently (as I suggested here) is that this is a president who likes deals, and there might be opportunities in this realm, particularly for sizable economies that have opportunities to offer, the capacity to retaliate, and are seen as important in U.S. financial markets.
But there might be another channel for relief — the economic impact of such measures in America itself. There have been signs that individuals, corporations, and financial markets are concerned about increasing uncertainty, rising inflation, and lower growth in the U.S. as well. This has led to a sharp fall in U.S. interest rates on fears of a slowdown in America, which may even temper a rise in the dollar, a combination that would reduce financial stresses in some countries.
It might not be much solace, but large economies in the Global South that are not as dependent on exports to America could find some partial respite if the measures in Washington prove to be a drag on growth even at home.
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