Follow us on social

2022-05-24t031859z_2_lynxnpei4n01v_rtroptp_4_japan-quad-scaled

Quad Summit: US China-Containment strategy slowly gelling

Though the grouping is unlikely to become a formal alliance it's essentially a security bloc by stealth.

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

While a degree of competition with Beijing is inevitable, the United States needs to stress cooperation with China in key areas such as climate change and public health.

With its latest summit in Tokyo, the four-nation Quad (U.S., India, Japan and Australia) has taken a few steps further in its focus on countering China. The announcement of a new initiative against illegal fishing (the “Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness”) and the commitment of $50 billion in "assistance and investment" over the next five years for infrastructure in the region were the two most concrete initiatives from the meeting. 

Apart from these, progress was reported in the Quad's climate change (mitigation and adaptation), cyber, space, critical technologies, and educational areas of activity. However, the exact sources and relative contributions from each state for the $50 billion in infrastructure investments have not been clarified.

As I wrote in a previous article, the Quad has until recently been essentially a talk shop sending diplomatic signals of a joint front against China. A major concrete deliverable however (unmentioned in its summit and officially disavowed by the grouping) has been hard security, with the Malabar exercise by the same four states steadily growing in terms of sophistication and contingency planning.

Since 2021, a vaccine initiative has also gotten off the ground delivering hundreds of millions of doses to Asia. Though behind its original schedule, the vaccine initiative has made a positive contribution to the region. Supply chain resilience is also an important activity the Quad can contribute to, though here the preferences of some Asian states may be weaker or divergent from Washington’s preferences of strong decoupling from China.

Despite the Quad's new economic and developmental initiatives, the U.S. still lacks a clear economic strategy in Asia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, also announced during the Biden trip, is still lacking in details and appears to contain few incentives for regional states to sign on to.

Though Beijing is still not officially mentioned anywhere in the Quad's statements, the China focus of the Quad is becoming even clearer. However, the Quad pointedly excludes China in all its initiatives, including climate change. Since President Biden has called climate change an "existential" threat (and this term is also used in the joint statement's accompanying fact sheet), it makes sense for the Quad to include China in this arena, including in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 

This is also true for the Quad's approach to ASEAN. Though "ASEAN unity and centrality" was mentioned in the joint statement as before, the Quad appears to be building structures parallel to and separate from ASEAN. There is room in Asia for multiple groupings and initiatives, but as the continent's most successful experiment in integration and peace, ASEAN ought to be engaged much more seriously by the Quad.

More broadly, the Quad's continued gelling as a part of President Biden's China-containment Indo-Pacific strategy, along with China's intrusive activities in maritime and terrestrial domains, adds to sharpening divides in Asia. With Russia and China converging even further in wake of the Ukraine crisis, as evidenced by their joint nuclear flyby near Japan yesterday, these trends accelerate the division of major powers into two blocs reminiscent of the Cold War. Though the Quad is unlikely to become a formal alliance in the foreseeable future, it is essentially a bloc by stealth — increasingly looking and feeling like an alliance.

 "We're not seeking a new cold war or a world divided into rigid blocs" said President Biden in his speech at the United Nations in 2021. It behooves upon him (as also the leadership in Beijing) to be true to his word and try his best to find ways to cooperate and even launch joint initiatives with China, especially in arenas such as climate change and public health, thereby helping arrest the current dangerous trend in Asia toward confrontation and potential conflict. 


Prime Minister of Australia Anthony Albanese, U.S. President Joe Biden, Prime Minister of Japan Fumio Kishida, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, pose for photos at the entrance hall of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan in Tokyo, Japan, May 24, 2022. Zhang Xiaoyu/Pool via REUTERS
Analysis | Asia-Pacific
Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare
Top photo credit: Seth Harp book jacket (Viking press) US special operators/deviant art/creative commons

Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare

Media

In 2020 and 2021, 109 U.S. soldiers died at Fort Bragg, the largest military base in the country and the central location for the key Special Operations Units in the American military.

Only four of them were on overseas deployments. The others died stateside, mostly of drug overdoses, violence, or suicide. The situation has hardly improved. It was recently revealed that another 51 soldiers died at Fort Bragg in 2023. According to U.S. government data, these represent more military fatalities than have occurred at the hands of enemy forces in any year since 2013.

keep readingShow less
Trump Netanyahu
Top image credit: President Donald Trump hosts a bilateral dinner for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Monday, July 7, 2025, in the Blue Room. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

The case for US Middle East retrenchment has never been clearer

Middle East

Is Israel becoming the new hegemon of the Middle East? The answer to this question is an important one.

Preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon — a state with a preponderance of military and economic power — in Eurasia has long been a core goal of U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, Washington feared Soviet dominion over Europe. Today, U.S. policymakers worry that China’s increasingly capable military will crowd the United States out of Asia’s lucrative economic markets. The United States has also acted repeatedly to prevent close allies in Europe and Asia from becoming military competitors, using promises of U.S. military protection to keep them weak and dependent.

keep readingShow less
United Nations
Top image credit: lev radin / Shutterstock.com

Do we need a treaty on neutrality?

Global Crises

In an era of widespread use of economic sanctions, dual-use technology exports, and hybrid warfare, the boundary between peacetime and wartime has become increasingly blurry. Yet understandings of neutrality remain stuck in the time of trench warfare. An updated conception of neutrality, codified through an international treaty, is necessary for global security.

Neutrality in the 21st century is often whatever a country wants it to be. For some, such as the European neutrals like Switzerland and Ireland, it is compatible with non-U.N. sanctions (such as by the European Union) while for others it is not. Countries in the Global South are also more likely to take a case-by-case approach, such as choosing to not take a stance on a specific conflict and instead call for a peaceful resolution while others believe a moral position does not undermine neutrality.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.