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Biden official admits US refused to address Ukraine and NATO before Russian invasion

Prior to the war, many analysts said it would be reasonable to deny or delay Kyiv’s ascension into the Atlantic Alliance to stave off conflict.

Reporting | Europe
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A senior Biden administration official recently admitted that prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States made no effort to address one of Vladimir Putin’s most often stated top security concerns — the possibility of Ukraine’s membership into NATO. 

When asked on a podcast published on Wednesday by War on the Rocks — a U.S. foreign and defense policy analysis website — whether NATO expansion into Ukraine “was not on the table in terms of negotiations” before the invasion, Derek Chollet, counselor to Secretary of State Antony Blinken replied that “it wasn’t.” 

Chollet’s remarks confirm suspicions by many critics who believe the Biden administration wasn’t doing enough — including offering to deny or delay Ukraine’s NATO membership — to prevent Russia from launching a war against Ukraine. 

“We made clear to the Russians that we were willing to talk to them on issues that we thought were genuine concerns they have that were legitimate in some way, I mean arms control type things of that nature,” Chollet said, adding that the administration didn’t think that “the future of Ukraine” was one of those issues and that its potential NATO membership was a “non-issue.”

“This was not about NATO,” said Chollet, who contradicted himself moments later, saying, "In perpetrating this totally unjustified and unprovoked war, [Putin’s] goal was to try to divide the U.S. from Europe and weaken NATO."

Of course Putin himself stated publicly many times before the invasion that indeed, Ukraine’s potential NATO membership was a key security concern for Russia. 

Weeks before Russia launched its war against Ukraine, Putin claimed that Russia’s concerns about NATO enlargement were being ignored. “We need to resolve this question now … [and] we hope very much our concern will be heard by our partners and taken seriously,” he later said

War on the Rocks’ Ryan Evans told Chollet that he takes Putin’s claims about NATO “seriously,” adding, “I’m a little struck by the refusal to even talk about the issue of NATO expansion.”

“We talked about NATO in saying that NATO is a defensive alliance. NATO is not a threat to Russia,” Chollet said. 

Before the Russian invasion, Quincy Institute senior research fellow on Russia and Europe Anatol Lieven wrote that as part of a broader package to stave off war, the United States should propose “the declaration of a moratorium on Ukrainian membership of NATO for a period of 20 years, allowing time for negotiations on a new security architecture for Europe as a whole, including Russia.” 


Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in Reykjavik, Iceland, on May 19, 2021. [State Department photo by Ron Przysucha]
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Reporting | Europe
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

QiOSK

Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

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UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Why Tehran may have time on its side
Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

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