U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s speech to the Lowy Institute in Australia featured many points he has made before. Prominent among these was a focus on allies and partners, a hallmark of the Biden Administration. Sullivan took pains to assure his audience that he is committed to America’s friends.
Sullivan artfully dodged answering a question on French ire over the announcement of AUKUS, the new alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, by saying he is looking to the future. France was deeply upset that its previous submarine contract with Australia was summarily abandoned over a new deal to build long-range nuclear submarines. It won’t be so easy for Washington to bring the relationship with Paris back to the good old days.
But it was the question of AUKUS that deserved the deepest probing from the event moderator. Sullivan primarily portrayed AUKUS as a technology-sharing initiative that demonstrated how the United States enables the scientific progress of its closest friends. Sure AUKUS is about technology, as it includes (other than sharing methods for fabricating highly sensitive nuclear-propelled submarines) collaboration in areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
More to the point however, AUKUS isn't some high-minded scientific endeavor like curing cancer. It is an explicitly military alliance about arming Australia with offensive, blue-water capability that goes way beyond national and coastal defense (which the French diesel-electric submarines were primarily designed to do). AUKUS-built submarines will be much more expensive than the diesel-electric ones they replaced. Though their deployment may be up to two decades away, the submarines will have chief utility as an additional sword arm for projecting power in the open oceans.
AUKUS may be less about ensuring allies can defend themselves and more about their conversion to frontline states, perhaps in a future coalition of the willing aimed at China. No wonder key Southeast Asian states, who do not want to be run over in a self-interested contest of the great powers, are deeply concerned. They may not belong to the select Anglosphere club, but are America’s friends no less.
If Sullivan had a rationale on AUKUS as a region-wide offensively-oriented pact, and the potential transformation of Australia’s role in U.S.-led plans on China, this was an opportunity to get at it. But in failing to probe the U.S. National Security Advisor further on the nature and intent of this pact, the event moderator missed his chance. The American and the Australian people, as also the people of Southeast Asia, need to know more about the geopolitical logic behind AUKUS, and the risks this entails to their lives and their interests. Mr. Sullivan has yet some explaining to do.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, Jake Sullivan, US National Security Advisor and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in October. (NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Flickr)
Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 28, 2025. REUTERS/Brian Snyder/File Photo
Finally, there is a prospect for bringing the war in Ukraine to an end. President Trump and his foreign policy team have created the conditions for a negotiated end to the war, replacing a fundamentally flawed and dangerous set of policies adopted by his predecessors including, ironically, the Donald Trump of his first administration.
This is true even after the very public blowout in the Oval Office on Feb. 28. What brought on Trump’s ire was Zelensky’s comments on the minerals deal and then his repeated complaints about negotiating with Putin, something Trump has made clear he will do. Trump had apparently expected a quick signing ceremony to convince Ukraine supporters in his own party like Senator Lindsey Graham — who were invited to witness — that a negotiated peace would be advantageous to the United States. When Zelensky turned the meeting into a debating session and aroused Trump’s memories of the bogus “Russiagate” charges that plagued his first administration, Trump reacted predictably.
Indeed, anyone interested in peace rather than the threat of nuclear war should be congratulating President Trump. After all, if the war does end and Russia is brought back into cooperative economic relations with Europe and the United States, everyone will benefit. If the war and the attempted isolation of Russia continues, all will suffer and cooperation to deal with common problems such as environmental degradation, mass migration and international financial crime will become impossible.
I say this not as a Trump supporter — I did not vote for him and have been critical of most of his moves. But in regard to the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia, I believe he is on the right track.
My judgments are based on decades of diplomatic experience negotiating the end of the Cold War and on a close knowledge of both Ukraine and Russia, their languages and their history. I am proud that my generation of diplomats achieved a Europe whole and free by peaceful negotiation. I have been appalled that a succession of American presidents and European leaders discarded the diplomacy that ended the Cold War, abandoned the agreements that curbed the nuclear arms race, and provoked a new cold war which has now become hot.
President Trump’s restoration of the diplomacy that President Reagan and the first President Bush used to end the Cold War should be welcomed. Reestablishment of direct communication between the Russian and American presidents is an essential precondition for any settlement.
The agenda announced by Secretary of State Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov after their meeting in Riyadh makes sense: (1) expansion of diplomatic capacity between the U.S. and Russia, dangerously eroded by a series of mutual expulsions, (2) cooperation on common geopolitical and commercial interests, and (3) ending the war in Ukraine.
Days before the agreement was announced in Riyadh, Vice President Vance and Secretary of Defense Hegseth made policy statements at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich that raised the ire of some European allies and prominent politicians and journalists in the United States.
In fact, these comments were either statements of fact (Ukraine is not a member of NATO) or of policy adjustments that are not only essential if the war is to end but in fact would have prevented the war if they had been adopted by earlier presidents: (Ukraine will not become a member of NATO; direct American involvement in the fighting will end; the U.S. will not act to protect European NATO forces deployed in Ukraine.)
If these had been the policies of previous American administrations, the war in Ukraine would not have occurred. They are not capitulations in advance or appeasement as some critics have charged. They get at the roots of the war.
President Zelensky, French president Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, among others have objected to Trump’s plan to negotiate with Russia first, then bring in the others. Actually, bilateral talks between the U.S. and Russia make sense. Former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin let the cat out of the bag when he observed that the purpose of supporting Ukraine was to weaken Russia. That policy has to end if there is to be peace in Europe in the future and it must be negotiated by the U.S. and Russia.
This is exactly the procedure used by the first Bush administration to negotiate the unification of Germany. In 1990 the United States first engaged in bilateral talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev before referring the agreements to the other four parties involved in German unification: Britain and France because of their rights in agreements that ended World War II, and the two German states directly affected. The other parties were kept informed of these negotiations as they progressed and all accepted the outcome.
As a participant in these negotiations, I can testify that assurances were given to Gorbachev orally by the American secretary of state, James Baker, that NATO jurisdiction would not move to the east if the Soviets agreed to let East Germany join West Germany on conditions specified by West Germany. Soviet approval was required because of agreements that ended
World War II. Declassified documents now available also show that British prime minister, John Major, and also the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, gave similar assurances. In fact, it had been Genscher’s idea.
It is these assurances to which President Vladimir Putin refers repeatedly as broken promises. Although they were not formalized in a treaty, they were promises and they have been broken. President Putin is neither lying nor engaging in baseless propaganda when he says so.
It is often alleged that Russia has nothing to fear from NATO because it is purely a defensive alliance. Yes, it was conceived as a defensive alliance to protect Western Europe from an attack by the Soviet Union. But, after Eastern Europe was liberated and the Soviet Union shattered into fifteen countries, Russia was not a threat or even a potential threat. In the late 1990s NATO began to be used as an offensive alliance.
Proposals to construct a security structure for Europe that would protect all countries were simply sidelined by the United States and its allies. None seemed to ask what they would do if the shoe were on the other foot and how they would react to the prospect of military bases by a hostile alliance on their borders.
If American behavior throughout its history as an independent state is any guide, the prospect of military bases controlled by a foreign power near its borders — in fact, anywhere in the Western Hemisphere — has been a casus belli if not removed.
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 provided an illustration of how the United States reacts to a perceived threat from abroad. I was stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow when the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba and have vivid memories of this crisis.
I translated some of the messages Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sent to President John F. Kennedy. If Khrushchev had not backed down and removed the missiles, Kennedy would have attacked, but if he did local commanders could have launched nuclear missiles against Miami and other cities with the U.S. responding with strikes on the Soviet Union. So Kennedy made a deal: you take your missiles off Cuba and I will remove ours in Turkey. It worked, and the world breathed easier.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was initiated by President Putin because he believed, with reason, that the United States was trying to draw Ukraine into a hostile military alliance. Therefore, in his eyes it was provoked. In 2003 the United States invaded, devastated and occupied Iraq when Iraq posed no threat to the United States. So now, how is it that the U.S. and its allies are conducting an all-but-declared war against Russia for crimes they themselves have not only committed, but have committed with less provocation? The pot is calling the kettle black and trying to damage it.
This is not to justify the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Far from it. It is a catastrophe for both nations and its effects will be felt for generations, but the killing must stop if Europe is to deal effectively with the many challenges it confronts now.
We cannot know what deal President Trump has in mind or how President Putin will respond. The negotiations will be difficult and, most likely, lengthy. But, at last, the American president has defined a viable road to peace and the Russian president has greeted this effort. This is a welcome start of a process Americans and Europeans should support.
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Trop photo credit: Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer and France's President Emmanuel Macron embrace after holding a meeting during a summit at Lancaster House in central London, Britain March 2, 2025. JUSTIN TALLIS/Pool via REUTERS
The flimsy UK, France, Ukraine 'peace plan' discussed Sunday
Full details are yet to emerge of the “peace plan” that the UK, EU and Ukrainian leaders worked out in London on Sunday, and are to present to the Trump administration. But from what they have said so far, while one part is necessary and even essential, another is obstructive and potentially disastrous.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said after the summit that the following four points were agreed: To keep providing military aid to Ukraine; that Ukraine must participate in all peace talks; that European states will aim to deter any future Russian invasion of Ukraine; and that they will form a "coalition of the willing" to defend Ukraine and guarantee peace there in future.
This, Starmer said, would mean a European “peacekeeping” force including British troops. However, he has previously said that it would be essential for the U.S. to provide a security “backstop” for such a force. In other words, after all the talk of Europe “stepping up” and the need for European security “independence” from the United States, this would in fact make Europe even more dependent on Washington, because it would put European troops in an extremely dangerous situation from which (not for the first time) they would expect the U.S. to save them in case of trouble.
While negotiations continue, so should existing levels of Western military aid, for otherwise the Russian government may be emboldened to reject any reasonable compromise. The Russian government has however repeatedly rejected any peacekeeping force including troops from NATO countries, which for Moscow is simply the equivalent of NATO membership. Trying to insert this into a proposed peace settlement is therefore either pointless or a deliberate attempt to derail the negotiations.
There is also a risk that the Ukrainian leadership (which, as Friday’s clash with Trump demonstrated, is prey to some very serious illusions about its position) may be emboldened to reject a compromise peace, and thereby end up with a very much worse one.
The idea that a powerful Western military force is also necessary to “guarantee” a peace settlement against future Russian aggression is moreover based on the fundamental misconception that there can be in international affairs any such thing as an absolute and permanent “guarantee.”
Those terms that Russia could accept and that would provide reasonable hope of enduring peace are the following: Firstly, that Ukraine should continue to receive from the West and help to produce the defensive weapons with which they have so far fought the Russian army almost to a standstill and inflicted very heavy casualties: drones, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, landmines, 155 mm howitzers and the ammunition for them. Long-range missiles capable of striking deep into Russian territory should be excluded as part of the peace settlement, but with the proviso that the West would of course provide them if Russia resumed the war.
Secondly, there should be a United Nations peacekeeping force with soldiers drawn from genuinely neutral states from the “Global South.” Russia calls these countries “the Global Majority” and has made reaching out to them a central part of its international strategy. Several are also fellow members of the BRICS group. Indian, Brazilian and South African peacekeepers would not be able to defeat a new Russian invasion (or a Ukrainian resumption of the war) — but Moscow would be deeply unwilling to risk killing them.
Finally, and obviously, a stable peace settlement must be one that meets enough of Russia’s, and Ukraine’s, essential conditions. If they cannot be made minimally compatible, there will be no settlement. It is however utterly pointless for European leaders to go on imagining that a peace can somehow be imposed on the Russian government, and not negotiated with it. They should pay heed when Secretary of State Marco Rubio says that peace can only come to Ukraine if Putin is involved in the negotiations, and that Trump "is the only person on Earth who has any chance whatsoever of bringing him to a table to see what it is he would be willing to end the war on."
The behavior of the European governments is shaped by a belief in limitless Russian territorial ambition, hostility to the West, and reckless aggression that if genuinely held, would seem to make any pursuit of peace utterly pointless. The only sensible Western strategy would be to cripple or destroy Russia as a state — the only problem being, as Trump has stated, that this would probably lead to World War III and the end of civilization.
Of course, this belief has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine; but here there is a deep contradiction in Western attitudes. For the same "experts” who claim this universal Russian ambition (the title of one book, “Russia’s War on Everybody” is one of the more deranged in a pretty lunatic field) also talk incessantly of Russia’s special obsession with Ukraine, which most assuredly does not apply to Poland or Romania.
Thus after the London summit, President Macron of France stated that “If Putin is not stopped, he will certainly move on to Moldova and perhaps beyond to Romania." How does Macron know this for “certain”? Has Putin said this? Has he not in fact said repeatedly that this is “complete nonsense,” and does this not correspond to the obvious balance of Russian risks and losses against possible gains?
And in any case, can Macron’s advisors no longer read a map? How is the Russian army supposed to get to Moldova, let alone Romania, without crossing the Dnieper River and then the whole of southern Ukraine?
This kind of public hysteria makes thinking rationally about sensible long-term European strategies extremely difficult. Thus if you took seriously Starmer’s speech to parliament last week (in which he announced that Britain would raise its military spending to 2.5 percent of GDP by cutting international aid), you would have to think that not just Warsaw but Paris have already fallen and the Russia's army is in London.
“Russia is a menace in our waters, in our airspace and on our streets.”
What this presumably means is that just as British warships and aircraft regularly patrol close to Russia’s borders, Russians have the incredible audacity to do the same near Britain. As to “our streets” he meant a couple of Russian assassinations or attempted assassinations of KGB defectors in Britain — an approach to alleged “traitors” followed in recent years by India and Saudi Arabia.
These actions were all totally wrong and illegal, and in the British case demanded a strong response, but they did not indicate an Indian intention to invade Canada or a Russian intention or ability to launch a military assault on the United Kingdom.
This officially-sponsored paranoia risks locking Britain into a long-term relationship of irrational hatred of Russia that will endure long after the end of the Ukraine War — which would be a massive distraction of attention from the real dangers facing Britain, which are internal: the steadily increasing Balkanization of British society and degradation of our public culture amidst economic stagnation and institutional decay.
In a new version of Casablanca, a British Rick could say to Putin, “There are parts of London I wouldn’t advise you to try to invade.” I think that every British citizen understands very well that the danger “on our streets” is really, really not the Russian army.
Any peace settlement must be rooted in the first step in reality and if not, it will be a flimsy attempt to assert the stakeholders into the discussion and not a very helpful one.
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Top image credit: Arthur Simoes via shutterstock.com
Fifty years after the end of the Vietnam War, the people in Vietnam and Laos are still cleaning up unexploded U.S. landmines left behind from our war. That is, until Donald Trump's foreign aid freeze.
Shortly after the Trump administration announced its 90-day freeze on foreign aid on January 20, U.S.-funded programs were issued a stop work order, including demining initiatives in Laos. Since the halt, there have been four accidents resulting in six injuries and three deaths, including that of a 15-year-old girl, casualties of a war that ended over 50 years ago.
On February 13, a federal judge ordered the Trump administration to unfreeze foreign aid spending. Despite this ruling, local officials say that deminers in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are still prevented from going back to work in order to comply with the administration’s orders.
While a waiver was issued this month for Cambodia to allow $6.36 million to resume flowing through to November 2025, we are already witnessing the damage from the halt in the pause in clearance efforts and in an accident that claimed the lives of two toddlers.
U.S.-supported demining teams have been forced to stand down and are barred from operating equipment or vehicles funded by U.S. grants. This stop-work order impacts 1,000 demining operators in Vietnam. In Laos, over the past two weeks, local authorities say that more than 100 calls have come into the clearance hotline. Despite having nearly 4,000 deminers in Laos, none of them are allowed to respond due to the executive order. It is only a matter of time before desperate, untrained villagers attempt to handle the explosives on their own.
Children in Vietnam with disabilities — including those suffering from exposure to the U.S. military’s use of the chemical Agent Orange — who were receiving daily rehabilitation services funded by USAID have had their care suspended. Without continued therapy, muscles will stiffen, developmental progress will stall, and some may never regain mobility.
For decades, U.S. programs have addressed the lasting legacies of war. These efforts have not only saved lives and supported vulnerable communities but have also bolstered years of diplomatic progress. Foreign aid is not charity — it's a strategic investment for our country. U.S. assistance in Southeast Asia has consistently garnered bipartisan support due to its clear, tangible benefits: enhanced safety, economic stability, and strengthened bilateral cooperation.
The first priority for the U.S. was the recovery of Americans missing in action (MIA). This effort began in 1985, when the U.S. sent its first investigative team to Pakse, Laos, to recover remains of 13 servicemen from a military plane crash in 1972. Over the years, these recovery missions expanded, and to date, the U.S. has recovered 1,046 of the 2,634 MIAs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
This collaboration on MIAs laid the foundation for addressing the more complex challenges of unexploded ordnance and Agent Orange. This has not been an easy process but great strides have been made to address the impacts of at least 13 million tons of explosive remnants of war that littered the countryside resulting in nearly 200,000 casualties since the end of the war in all three countries.
In Laos, over 2.5 million tons of ordnance were dropped, surpassing the combined total of bombs dropped on Germany and Japan throughout all of World War II. This staggering amount makes Laos the most bombed country per capita in the world. Yet, to this day, less than 10% of these deadly remnants have been cleared.
In 1989, USAID launched its first post-war humanitarian initiative through the Leahy War Victims Fund, providing prosthetics to former veterans of the South Vietnam Army and civilians who had been injured. In 1993, the U.S. expanded its efforts, funding clearance teams for humanitarian demining to remove landmines and unexploded ordnance from villages in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This cleared land for essential infrastructure such as farmland, schools, homes, and hospitals.
Upon learning that nearly half of the casualties were children, USAID and the State Department also began funding educational programs in schools, teaching children not to touch these deadly remnants of war and to alert an adult to notify mine clearance experts. These mine action efforts have led to a dramatic reduction in the number of casualties. In Laos, casualties went from 300 from before 2008 to 60 or fewer over the past decade. Recognizing the benefit of investments, the U.S. has funded programs in more than 125 countries and has been the largest provider of humanitarian demining investing worldwide.
Once a deeply contentious issue between the U.S. and Vietnam, the topic of Agent Orange has evolved into a shared collaboration over the past two decades. The U.S. has, via USAID and other agencies like the Pentagon, invested in dioxin remediation at former military bases in Da Nang and Bien Hoa, as well as funded medical care and rehabilitation for tens of thousands of Vietnamese with severe disabilities living in areas where the dioxin contaminated herbicides were used. Similar initiatives had begun in Laos, but, with the aid freeze, these efforts were halted — which would likely leave a generation of children with birth defects and disabilities without the critical support they desperately need.
As the examples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia demonstrate, strategic use of foreign aid can not only save lives, but can foster reconciliation so that the U.S. can work with new partners to expand its collaboration on many other fronts, including defense, economics,and people-to-people exchanges. Eliminating our USAID specialists with decades of expertise is destroying invaluable institutional knowledge. Stripping services from the most vulnerable doesn’t show care, it puts lives at risk.
Since 1989, the U.S. has invested just over $1.5 billion in addressing UXO, Agent Orange, and war-related disabilities in Southeast Asia. To put that in perspective, in today’s dollars, that is roughly the cost of six days of fighting during the Vietnam War.
This year is not only the 50th anniversary of the end of the American War in Vietnam. It also marks 30 years since the normalization of bilateral relations between the two countries.This year is also the 40th anniversary of the U.S.-Laos collaboration in recovering U.S. MIAs and the 75th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relations. Our ties with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been built through healing the wounds of war together and hopes for a new era of peace and prosperity. These gains can be lost overnight. Washington risks sending a chilling message to the world: that America’s word is worthless, its commitments fleeting, and its moral leadership for sale.
Secretary Rubio should immediately ensure that the already-committed foreign aid is reinstated before the U.S. loses decades of progress and trust.
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