“We’ll get there eventually, over time,” said Brown, according to The New York Times, adding that sending them now would put “a bunch of NATO trainers at risk.”
Brown’s comments tacitly concede two realities that Western officials have been loath to acknowledge: the Ukrainian war effort is slowly crumbling and cannot be sustained without a steady escalation of Western involvement.
Yet there is a third factor that should be of serious concern to U.S. and European leaders: sending NATO personnel into Ukraine absent some kind of larger, explicit understanding with Moscow is highly likely to embroil NATO states, including the U.S, in a shooting war with Russian forces.
The Kremlin may very well be open to some kind of formal settlement that establishes lines of demarcation in Ukraine and sanctions the presence of Western military personnel in parts of the country, but that framework is not what’s being proposed here. Absent an explicit agreement with the West over the scope and limits of NATO’s military presence in Ukraine, the Kremlin would likely view the initial wave of NATO trainers as a trial balloon to gauge Russia’s reaction to greater and more direct Western involvement in Ukraine.
Thus, there is a high degree of probability that Moscow would conclude it needs to make a point of targeting these trainers as vigorously as possible to dissuade the prospect of larger-scale NATO military intervention.
Brown reportedly acknowledged that sending these personnel in now would put “a bunch of NATO trainers at risk,” but it is not clear what exactly about the battlefield dynamics in Ukraine leads him to conclude that this scheme would be safer to execute in the future.
This proposal, without a larger strategy for ending rather than escalating the war, is a recipe for disaster. It would not bring Ukraine closer to achieving anything that can meaningfully be considered as victory over Russia, but it would bring NATO and Russia within a hair’s breadth of open conflict — something that all Western leaders should be seeking to avoid.
Mark Episkopos is a Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is also an Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University. Episkopos holds a PhD in history from American University and a masters degree in international affairs from Boston University.
Official Opening Ceremony for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Summit 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. (Shutterstock/ Gints Ivuskans)
Official Opening Ceremony for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Summit 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. (Shutterstock/ Gints Ivuskans)
Top Photo Credit: David Cohen via Shutterstock. Safed, Israel-May 1,2017 Jewish Home parliament member Bezalel Smotrich and Ilan Shohat, mayor of the Tzfat, attend the Israel Memorial Day, commemorating the deaths of Israeli soldiers killed
According to reports, far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said on Sunday that “the goal for 2025 is to demolish more than the Palestinians build in the West Bank.” This comes as the Israeli government is reportedly building almost 1,000 additional housing units in the Efrat settlement close to Jerusalem.
The additional units built for settlers in Efrat would increase the settlement’s size by 40% and block development in the Palestinian city of Bethlehem. The roughly 100 existing settlements in the West Bank host around 500,000 Israeli settlers and are considered illegal under international law.
Sunday’s comments from Smotrich reflect his longstanding hopes for Israeli absorption of the West Bank and the nixing of a two-state solution. He published a lengthy plan in 2017 in this regard entitled “One Hope.”
“We need to and can go back to the post-1948 days, regarding both Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of Judea and Samaria,” he outlined in the plan, the first phase of which is called “Victory Through Settlement.” This, he explained, ”will be realized via a political-legal act of imposing sovereignty on all Judea and Samaria, and with concurrent acts of settlement: the establishment of cities and towns, the laying down of infrastructure as is customary in ‘little’ Israel and the encouragement of tens and hundreds of thousands of residents to come live in Judea and Samaria. In this way, we will be able to create a clear and irreversible reality on the ground.”
"The Arabs of Judea and Samaria will be able to conduct their daily life in freedom and peace, but not to vote for the Israeli Knesset at the first stage” as a way to “preserve the Jewish majority in decision-making in the state of Israel.” He vehemently denies that this system resembles apartheid.
Israel has been carrying out military operations in the West Bank’s north for months now, displacing upwards of 40,000 Palestinians, according to experts, which exceeds displacement levels in 1967 after the Six-Day War when Israel annexed the West Bank from Jordan. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) reports that the IDF has killed at least 876 people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem since Oct. 7, 2023.
“The purpose of the operations is to prevent terror from places a few kilometers from Jewish communities and to prevent a repeat of Oct.7,” said an IDF spokesperson, but the actions have come at a significant cost to civilians. Ramy Abu Siriye, a local barber who was displaced from Tulkarem in January, lamented, “The soldiers are taking over one area after another, destroying homes, infrastructure, and roads.”
Annelle Sheline, Quincy Institute Middle East fellow, said everyone loses with annexation: Palestinians, Israelis, the greater region. “The Israeli government continues to undermine the long-term security of Israeli citizens, which can only truly be achieved alongside security for Palestinians.”
Further normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors may also be in jeopardy if the West Bank is de facto annexed, threatening the prospect of a Palestinian state. Earlier in February, when President Trump floated forcing Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip, the Saudi Arabian foreign ministry confirmed that further normalization with Israel wouldn’t happen until the establishment of a Palestinian state and that their position was “firm and unwavering.”
The State Department has not yet commented on Smotrich’s remarks or the new settlements in the West Bank.
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Top image credit: Secretary Marco Rubio meets with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique A. Manalo in Munich, Germany, February 14, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)
Could a recent meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Philippine counterpart Enrique Manalo be the beginnings of a de-escalation in the troubled waters of the South China Sea?
There are only hints in the air so far. But such a shift by Washington (and a corresponding response by the Philippines and China) would be important to calm the waters and mark a turn away from the U.S. being sucked into what could spiral into a military crisis and, in the worst-case scenario, a direct U.S.-China confrontation. But to be effective, any shift should also be executed responsibly.
The State Department spokesperson’s comments on February 14 about the meeting reiterated familiar points on “bilateral coordination addressing China’s destabilizing actions in the South China Sea” and “reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the United States-Philippines Alliance.” A U.S.readout of an earlier Rubio-Manalo call on January 22 was more expansive, speaking of China’s “dangerous and destabilizing actions” undermining “regional peace and stability” and being “inconsistent with international law.” The readout also reaffirmed Washington’s “ironclad commitments to the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty.”
Intriguingly however, both sets of comments did not repeat the key assertion — first made by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2021 and subsequentlyreaffirmed multiple times by the Biden administration — of the Mutual Defense Treaty extending to “armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea.”
The omission may simply be an oversight. But it is important to keep the overall strategic context in mind. A radical U-turn in the Ukraine theater and various other administration moves have indicated that Trump is not averse to a major reorientation of U.S. grand strategy. It would be highly premature to label the new approach as “Restraint,” but the shift on Europe is telling. A recognition of the hard realities of interests and a move away from self-defeating framings such as “democracy v. autocracy” would also be a good thing for the United States to embrace in East and Southeast Asia.
However, there is much less reason to believe that the Trump team will aim for a grand reset with China. Washington’s push to confront China economically has, if anything, only escalated. Trump has appointed several China hawks in the National Security Council and the State Department, none of whom are expected to counsel a reset.
However, the Pentagon now includes some Restraint-oriented voices. One, Andrew Byers, the new deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, recently suggested (in a paper on U.S.-China relations co-authored with J. Tedford Tyler) “removing U.S. military forces or weapons systems from the Philippines in exchange for the China Coast Guard executing fewer patrols.”
A recent Quincy Institute brief on the U.S.-Philippines alliance in the South China Sea analyzed the stand-off and recommended several specific policy actions by Washington to initiate a de-escalation, keeping the factors of vital interests, proportionality, and sustainability in mind. These include elimination of one or more U.S. military sites in northern Luzon, a withdrawal of the provocative Typhon missile system from the Philippines, a halt to pulling in U.S. allies jointly and militarily into the South China Sea, and a reversal of moves indicating the United States is pulling the Philippines into the Taiwan theater; all in exchange for corresponding de-escalatory actions by China.
But a de-escalation in the South China Sea as a part of a limited security thaw with China (even as economic and security competition intensifies elsewhere), if it indeed comes to pass, must be done responsibly. The Quincy Institute brief also counseled increased support for strengthening Philippine coast guard, naval and infrastructure capacities and continued strong diplomatic support for its lawful claims in the South China Sea.
It’s one thing to de-escalate incrementally, demanding equivalent Chinese actions at each step, but quite another to summarily abandon a weaker ally that Washington has arguably egged on. In all things, the United States ought to keep regional stability and Manila’s agency in mind while attempting an urgently-needed de-escalation.
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Top photo credit: Flags flown ahead of the summit of European leaders to discuss the situation in Ukraine and European security at The Elysee Presidential Palace in Paris, France on February 17, 2025. Photo by Eliot Blondet/ABACAPRESS.COM
European summits are not usually the stuff of poetry, but the latest one in Paris was worthy of Horace: Patrturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus — “Mountains will be in labour; and give birth to a ridiculous mouse.”
President Macron of France called the summit in response to what he called the “electroshock” of the Trump administration’s election and plans to negotiate Ukraine peace without the Europeans. The result so far however appears to have been even less than a mouse — in fact, precisely nothing.
Macron presumably hoped that the leaders of the other major European states would rally behind his own proposal of French and European peacekeeping troops for Ukraine (an idea already categorically rejected by Moscow). Keir Starmer of the UK did indeed make such an offer, only shortly afterwards to say that no European guarantee of Ukrainian security would be credible without what he called a US “backstop.”
Since Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had already publicly ruled out any such U.S. guarantee, Starmer thereby implicitly admitted that his offer of British troops was empty. British parliamentarians have also demanded a vote on the dispatch of British troops. In the meantime, on leaving the Paris meeting, Chancellor Olaf Scholtz of Germany said that a discussion of European troops for Ukraine is “completely premature” and “highly inappropriate” while the war is ongoing. Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland (one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters) ruled out Polish troops altogether:
"We do not plan to send Polish soldiers to the territory of Ukraine. We will ... give logistical and political support to the countries that will possibly want to provide such guarantees in the future, such physical guarantees."
Macron has also emphasized something that makes much more sense: namely that the Europeans need to build up not only their own armed forces, but also the military industries that supply them. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said that:
“We must also develop a fully integrated European defense, industrial and technological base. This goes far beyond a simple debate about spending figures. If all we do is become bigger clients of the US, then in 20 years, we still won’t have solved the question of European sovereignty.”
This is indeed extremely necessary — though it is clear that Trump expects that higher European military spending will be spent on U.S. weaponry, and is prepared to bring pressure to bear to make sure this is the case. But Macron’s interview also brought out the acute difficulty of such European integration. He urged European countries to buy the SAMP-T air defense system, which he said is better than the U.S. Patriot missiles system that several countries are presently using.
For all I know, he may be right about that; but it is surely no coincidence that the SAMP-T is made in France and Italy. The real proof of Macron’s commitment to the integration of European military industries would be if — for example — he agrees to give up production of France’s Leclerc main battle tank in favor of buying Germany’s Leopard tanks for the French army.
The UK exemplifies this problem. With one of the very few professional fighting armies in Europe, it is critical to any independent European defense. But while it has excellent soldiers, its weapons systems have been plagued with breakdowns and deficiencies, largely because the wider British industrial base is now too limited to support an efficient military sector. On the other hand, precisely because British industries have shrunk so far, military industry is critical to maintaining what is left of British technological expertise. Give this up to the Germans? Really?
The kind of radical increases in military spending being demanded by the Trump administration and advocated by Macron and Starmer will also require some combination of increased taxes and savage cuts to social welfare, health and infrastructure budgets, at a time when these are already under intense pressure from economic stagnation, and as a result the discontent of ordinary people is rising steeply.
As Stephen Bush of the Financial Times has written concerning Starmer’s military pledges:
“Politically, whatever choice Labour ends up making will be hard: to increase defence spending without breaking its pledges on tax means overseeing incredibly sharp and painful cuts everywhere else— the road to certain electoral defeat in my view. But an increase in income tax, national insurance or VAT comes with big risks attached too.”
There is however a third way, which if not chosen by the British Labour government will certainly be taken by other future European governments: not to increase military spending at all.
For this is the other problem with expensive and risky commitments by present European governments: Given the tectonic political shifts under way in Europe, it is highly unlikely that future European governments will in fact stick by such commitments. President Macron is already in effect a lame duck. The center ground of German politics is shrinking fast. Starmer’s posturing over Ukraine looks very like a conscious or unconscious attempt to distract attention from near-paralysis in domestic politics. Such diversionary messaging can work for a while, but cuts little ice in an endless queue to see a doctor.
The chaotic state of present European thinking on Ukraine and the Ukraine peace process reflects this underlying lack of public will, as well as the bewilderment of European establishments that for many years have left responsibility for their strategy in the hands of the United States, and now find themselves expected to think for themselves. It also however reflects the fact that the premises on which European policies have been based are in part radically contradictory, and these underlying contradictions are exposed whenever it becomes a question of Europeans acting for themselves.
Thus the advocates of a European force for Ukraine have fallen into a state of mental confusion for which “cognitive dissonance” is a wholly inadequate description. They have created for themselves a belief in Putin’s megalomaniac ambition, leading to the idea that in future he will “test” NATO by attacking the Baltic States, though Putin has never shown the slightest desire to do so, and this would run hideous risks for minimal gains.
Yet somehow this has led them to argue for European commitments to Ukraine that Russia would be absolutely bound to test, and the U.S. will not support. This would radically weaken the credibility of NATO security guarantees. Some of the very same analysts who have written — in part accurately — about the historical, cultural and ethnic roots of Putin’s “obsession” with Ukraine, also write as if Putin, and Russians, have the same obsession with Poland and the Baltic States — a misunderstanding of Russian attitudes that is either totally illiterate or deliberately mendacious.
The idea that Europeans would be defending the Baltic States by intervening in Ukraine is also a very strange one, that reflects the painful experiences of the Baltic States’ past rather than an objective analysis of their situation today. For the greatest threat to the Balts from Russia comes not from Russian ambitions in the Baltic, but precisely from the danger that the war in Ukraine will widen to become a conflict between NATO and Russia.
Moreover, European military commitments to Ukraine would be a direct weakening of the defenses of NATO. Given time, the British could just about cobble together one division to send to Ukraine, but only if they not only stripped out the defenses of Britain itself, but also gave up their existing commitments to Poland and the Baltic States, which the UK is bound by treaty to defend.
Let us hope that this is indeed mere theatrical posturing on the part of British and European hawks; for to judge by some of their present statements, a theatre playing make believe is where this belongs.
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