US Central Command announced that it sent a Ohio-class guided missile submarine to the Middle East Sunday and accompanied this social media post with pictures already showing the sub in the Suez Canal.
This sends "a message of deterrence clearly directed at regional adversaries as the Biden administration tries to avoid a broader conflict amid the Israel-Hamas war," according to CNN's reporting.
According to CNN, this is one of the Ohio-class subs that were built for ballistic missiles but had been converted to carry a payload of up to 154 Tomahawk conventional cruise missiles instead, each with the capacity to carry a 1,000-pound warhead.
If this indeed is the mission, the submarine joins a host of U.S. military assets in the region, including, according to Cato's John Hoffman in RS today: "two aircraft carrier strike groups, with roughly 7,500 personnel on each, two guided-missile destroyers, and nine air squadrons to the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea region. Washington also deployed an additional 4,000 troops to the region, with another 2,000 on standby, adding to the roughly 30,000 troops already in the region.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced on Oct. 26 that nearly 1,000 of those standby troops have already been activated and sent to the Middle East. “Approximately 900 troops have … deployed or are in the process of deploying,” said Air Force Brig. Gen Pat Ryder, the Pentagon’s top spokesman to reporters. “These include forces that have been on prepare-to-deploy orders and which are deploying from the continental United States.”
In the meantime, the Pentagon has acknowledged there are U.S. special forces commandos in Israel helping to find American and Israeli hostages held by Hamas. According to the New York Times, defense officials have confirmed there are "several dozen" commandos in the country but would not say exactly where they are, and they had joined a small team that was already there.
Top photo credit: A man with his face and body painted, celebrating the Alliance of Sahel States, is seen at the Festival sur le Niger, also known as Segou'Art, as it occurs in the wake of Mali and its neighbours Niger and Burkina Faso leaving the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), in Segou, Mali February 6, 2025. REUTERS/Aboubacar Traore
The decision by the military-led Alliance of Sahel States to impose a 0.5% import duty on goods from the nations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has added a new twist in the rift plaguing the West African bloc.
The tariff, which exempts only humanitarian aid, threatens to upend free trade and provoke retaliation, effectively creating a trade war within the region at a time when Africa’s exports to the crucial U.S. market face new challenges.
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) comprises Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger — Sahelian countries racked by a wave of coups that overthrew pro-Western regimes between 2020 and 2023. Launched as a security pact formed in 2023 in response to ECOWAS’ threat to take military action to restore the democratic order in Niger, the AES has grown into a rival bloc with its own regional aspirations.
The AES countries have also switched international alliances by ending ties with their former colonial power, France, and expelling troops of other Western nations, including the United States, while befriending Russia from which it has received military support.
The AES trio is at the epicenter of jihadist violence that has rocked the entire Sahelian region. Last year, Washington closed a $100 million drone base and withdrew some 1,000 troops at Agadez in compliance with a demand by the junta in Niger. Strained relations with ECOWAS nations like Nigeria have also stalled joint military operations like the Multinational Joint Task Force that has mounted important counter-terrorism operations in the Lake Chad Basin.
Just last week, Niger dumped French and announced Hausa as its new official national language, following a pattern already set by neighboring Burkina Faso. The three countries have also pulled out of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, but, curiously, retained their membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA/WAEMU), which means they remain tied, through the common CFA franc currency, to France’s sphere of influence.
The new tariff is the AES’ most audacious economic measure yet. It has the potential to escalate the price of food and other essential commodities while disrupting trade flows across the region.
“I could imagine a slowdown in demand by AES consumers for certain ECOWAS goods,” Danielle Resnick, a Senior Research Fellow at International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), told RS. But the impact could be much worse for the alliance member states, which are already among the world’s poorest nations, she noted. “Adding this tariff will increase the price of imports, including food, for their consumers.”.
The three AES countries are all classified as a major global hunger hotspot with a significant portion of their populations experiencing food insecurity and acute hunger in early 2025. Both Burkina Faso and Niger rely on their ECOWAS neighbors – Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria – to meet their food and electricity needs.
Compared to ECOWAS’s total GDP of $2.091 trillion, the AES can boast a combined GDP of only $62 billion.
At the same time, the three AES countries are landlocked; hence their heavy reliance on imports via ports controlled by their ECOWAS neighbors. In 2022, for example, 92% of the cargo unloaded at the port of Lomé, Togo, was destined for Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. This makes them especially vulnerable to any counter-measures the ECOWAS nations may choose to take in retaliation for the AES’s new levy.
In 2023, when ECOWAS countries closed their borders and cut vital supply to Niger, the country was nearly brought to its knees.
Nevertheless, the AES tariff on its own is not so large as to disproportionately divert trade. ECOWAS countries can easily navigate the headwinds it might bring by diversifying its export markets. “Another scenario is that ECOWAS retaliates with its own import duties,” Resnick noted.
Given the truculent character of key actors on both sides of the divide, as well as the geopolitical dynamics behind the rift, this scenario – amounting in effect to a trade war – cannot be ruled out.
But this will only make a bad situation worse. A regional trade war is the worst possible scenario at a time when Africa is bracing for the consequences of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff plans and their implications for world trade. Trump has levied a 10% baseline tariff on all U.S. trading partners and an additional 14% tariff on countries that charge higher tariff rates on American goods, although the latter has now been suspended for 90 days.
The new tariffs affect African countries like Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, whose exports to the U.S. have enjoyed preferential treatment under the U.S. flagship trade program, the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA).
Since 2000, AGOA has helped eligible sub-Saharan African countries export about 6,400 products duty-free to the U.S., leading to the growth of local manufacturing while creating between 300,000 direct and 1.3 million indirect jobs in its first decade. The new U.S. tariffs means the future of this important cornerstone of U.S.-Africa relations now hangs in the balance.
As of this moment, it is unclear whether AGOA will be renewed when it expires at the end of September.
If so, Africa’s exports to the U.S. will lose their competitive edge and decline in the longer run. The effects would be uneven, but the most devastating impacts would be felt in Lesotho, Mauritius and Madagascar, all of which host significant apparel industries that are highly reliant on the U.S. market. Overall, the U.S. is Africa’s third largest trading partner, after China and the EU. In 2022 alone, the value of ECOWAS exports to the U.S. came to $9.4 billion, up 38.8% from the previous year.
With its large population and a combined GDP of $2 trillion, sub-Saharan Africa possesses the wherewithal to absorb some of the worst impacts of the growing global trade crisis. To do so, however, it must better develop its internal market, a difficult prospect given the history of sometimes acrimonious relations among African countries that have hindered the realization of the goals of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
As a result, African countries trade more outside the continent than within it. For example, intra-African trade in 2023 stood at $192.2 billion, just 14.9% of total African trade, and the global share of intra-African exports and imports actually declined from 14.5% in 2021 to 13.7% in 2022. Within the region, intra-ECOWAS trade stood at less than 12% in 2023 of total trade by member countries.
The unfolding crisis in global trade calls for Africa to strengthen itself by leveraging the immense potential that exists for creating a single continental market encompassing 54 countries with a combined nominal GDP of $3.4 trillion.
To reach that potential and remove all barriers to continental free trade, AfCFTA’s ambition will require far more cooperation and commitment than has been evident to date. A trade war between AES and ECOWAS goes in the opposite direction.
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Top Photo: An aerial view of the Pentagon, in Washington, District of Columbia. (TSGT ANGELA STAFFORD, USAF/public domain)
An aerial view of the Pentagon, in Washington, District of Columbia. (TSGT ANGELA STAFFORD, USAF/public domain)
In 2011, Marc Andreessen penned an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal proclaiming that “Software is eating the world.” Andreessen argued that every industry — even national defense — would have to embrace the “software revolution” sooner or later.
Now, Andreessen’s acolytes just have to convince the Pentagon – so long as it’s their software the department buys. Last week, the Atlantic Council launched an effort in partnership with dozens of defense industry executives — several of whom are funded by Andreessen’s firm a16z — calling on the Pentagon to usher in an era of “software-defined warfare,” a term which includes artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
In his opening remarks, the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig claimed that policymakers adopted over 70% of the recommendations from a previous commission on defense acquisition. In other words, government officials are likely taking note of the Atlantic Council’s new report.
Pointing to the threat of China, its authors argue that the Pentagon should quickly embrace software-defined warfare by increasing reliance on digital weapon testing tools, cutting software funding restrictions, and prioritizing commercial technologies. For instance, it recommends the Pentagon “enforce commercial as the default approach for software” instead of building its own custom software.
Roberto Gonzalez, a professor at San Jose State University and author of a recent paper on how Silicon Valley is transforming the military-industrial-complex, told RS in an interview that these recommendations could remove critical checks and balances; “Once you’re going full commercial and abandoning efforts in-house to produce technologies that might be of use for the Pentagon, you are putting yourself entirely at the mercy of these firms,” said Gonzalez.
The Atlantic Council’s recommendations echo those of a Pentagon commission tasked with reforming the department’s budgeting and acquisition process, known as Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). Much like the Atlantic Council’s Commission on “software-defined warfare,” the PPBE commission was largely composed of individuals with ties to the defense industry.
Both groups recommend that the Pentagon eradicate restrictions on software funding by using research and development, procurement, or operations and maintenance funding for the “full cycle of software development, acquisition, and sustainment.” The argument is that software programs require iterative development, rendering the acquisition system’s industrial-era life-cycle stages irrelevant.
The problem is that removing funding restrictions threatens the Pentagon’s ability to evaluate program cost growth and, ultimately, its ability to terminate defective programs — many of which are dangerous and unnecessary.
"Beware of promises to speed delivery of weapons by cutting regulations,” explained Quincy Institute Senior Research Fellow William Hartung. “They may go well beyond cutting unnecessary paperwork to eliminating essential functions like independent evaluations of weapons cost and performance or guidelines to help Pentagon officials reduce price gouging.”
Additionally, the Atlantic Council Commission recommends that the Pentagon modernize test and evaluation infrastructure by simulating the “capability viability” of “digitally enabled technologies.” In other words, the Pentagon should rely on digital engineering tools and simulators to test new technologies rather than testing them in real life — which they suggest slows down the timeline for deployment while presenting operational security challenges.
Digital simulation to test and evaluate weapon systems is not new. In fact, the most expensive weapon acquisition program in U.S. history — the F-35 fighter jet, now expected to exceed $2 trillion over the course of its life cycle — can attribute some of its schedule delays to its Joint Simulation Environment (JSE).
The JSE is a digital training and testing tool designed to evaluate the F-35’s potential performance in a heavily defended airspace. The Pentagon completed testing the F-35 through the JSE in September 2023 after over seven years of development, during which time the department produced F-35s at a rate commensurate with a program already cleared through testing and evaluation.
Lockheed Martin was the primary contractor responsible for producing the F-35 while reluctantly cooperating with the Navy to develop the JSE. One can only imagine the cost growth and schedule delays possible for a software program built and tested by its own developers without any funding restrictions.
“With talk of boosting the Pentagon budget to $1 trillion per year and the procurement of complex, software-driven products on the rise, it's quite possible that more regulations may be needed to avoid shouldering the taxpayer with costly systems that do not work as advertised,” said Hartung.
Perhaps most striking about the report, however, is the fact that the authors barely mention AI. The commission is sponsored almost entirely by defense technology companies that create AI software and autonomous weapons. Gonzalez explained that if you try to sell AI to the Pentagon, some top brass may see you as a snake oil salesman. “Software, by contrast, has been around for a long time and seems less mysterious. It makes you think about floppy disks instead of autonomous swarms,” he said.
Software is much more than floppy disks. +972 Magazine reported last year that Israel employs a software known as Lavender that assigns a 1-100 score to almost every Gazan based on how likely it is they are a militant, even though it has a 10 percent false positive rate. Israeli Defense Forces then use a separate software called “Where’s Daddy?” which tracks when targets are home and marks them for bombing. In its report, the Atlantic Council makes the case for investment in “AI-enabled and software solutions” by pointing to their use by the Army’s 101st Airborne Division to address challenges with “automatic-target recognition.”
The report claims that the commissioners and consulted experts on the report participated in a “personal, not institutional, capacity.” However, the commission’s recommendations, if accepted, would pay dividends for the employers of these commissioners — the likes of which include Trae Stephens of Anduril, James Taiclet of Lockheed Martin, and Mark Valentin of Skydio. The commission is co-chaired by former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who is now a partner at Red Cell, a venture capital firm that invests in military start-ups such as Epirus.
The Atlantic Council's project director even closed the report launch event by telling the audience to consider investing in the commission sponsors.
“Our foundational sponsors (are) Booz Allen Hamilton, CAE, Helsing, Lockheed Martin, and Second Front Systems. As well as Aalyria, Accrete AI, Adarga, Domino Data Lab, Edge Case Research, Fathom 5, Fortem Technologies, Kodiak Robotics, Latent AI, Peraton, Primer AI, SAAB, Saronic, Scale AI, and Skydio. Phew, that was a list,” she said.
“For those looking to invest, those are companies you might want to look at,” she added.
In true DC fashion, industry-funded think tanks are happy to provide portfolio recommendations on top of national security advice — for the right price.
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Top photo credit: S President Donald Trump (2nd left) received his Salvadoran counterpart, Nayib Bukele (left), at the White House on April 14, 2025. The Salvadoran president offered his US counterpart assistance in combating crime and terrorism. Bukele also asserted that he will not return the Salvadoran "terrorist" sent to the Cecot (Cecot) to the US.
Mark Twain was spot on. History does not repeat itself but it commonly rhymes.
President Richard Nixon was bent on flouting an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to surrender White House tapes to a federal grand jury in Nixon v. Sirica (October 12, 1973). Mr. Nixon backed down in the face of overwhelming public and congressional opposition.
As incriminating evidence of President Nixon’s obstruction of justice and abuse of power mounted, he resigned under an impeachment cloud on August 9, 1974. The rule of law held despite President Nixon’s staggering 1972 electoral triumph over Democratic nominee George McGovern winning 49 States, over 60 percent of the popular vote, and capturing 520 electoral votes. An electoral mandate did not supersede the Constitution.
Fast forward to the pending case of Noem v. Abrego Garcia in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The undisputed facts are shocking.
In 2019 during the first Trump administration, an immigration judge entered an order prohibiting Abrego Garcia’s removal to El Salvador because he confronted a “clear probability of future persecution” there and “demonstrated that [El Salvador’s] authorities would be unable or unwilling to protect him.” Mr. Trump declined to challenge the order.
On March 15, 2025, some six years later, the second Trump administration seized Abrego Garcia and swiftly transported him to El Salvador. This was allegedly due to an “administrative error,” which was acknowledged by Trump’s Department of Justice . The United States has cited no legal basis for Abrego Garcia’s warrantless seizure, his removal to El Salvador, or his confinement in a Salvadoran prison.
The deportation was challenged in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. On April 4, the court entered an order directing the United States to “facilitate and effectuate” the return of Abrego Garcia no later than April 7. The Trump administration filed an application to the United States Supreme Court seeking to vacate the District Court’s order.
On April 10, the Supreme Court emphasized the Trump Administration’s concession that Abrego Garcia was unconstitutionally deported to El Salvador. It generally affirmed the District Court but remanded to clarify the meaning of “effectuate” giving deference to the lead role of the executive branch in foreign affairs.
Since then, the Trump administration has maintained that it is a pitiful, helpless giant, unable to secure the return of Abrego Garcia from the clutches of featherweight El Salvador sporting military forces and budget that is a miniscule fraction of the Pentagon’s. Trump, who spent the last two months threatening Panama, cannot secure the return of Garcia by threatening an invasion or trade sanctions?
On April 14, the President of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, met with President Trump in the Oval Office and pleaded that he was powerless to return Abrego Garcia. President Bukele amplified, “How can I return him to the United States? I smuggle him into the United States? Of course I’m not going to do it. The question is preposterous. How can I smuggle a terrorist into the United States?”
President Bukele was being disingenuous, a euphemism for lying. The United States has presented zero evidence that Garcia is a terrorist, a Trump term of art meaning anyone President Trump dislikes. We are in Lewis Carroll’s Through The Looking Glasswith Humpty Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” Moreover, Trump has represented to the District Court that he would place no obstacle to Abrego Garcia’s return.
The Trump administration and the District Court remain at an impasse. Secretary of State Marco Rubio fired a shot across the bow, belligerently proclaiming, “No court in the United States has a right to conduct the foreign policy of the United States.” In other words, the President is empowered to kidnap and to disappear into dungeons of foreign nations any American citizen without any judicial redress — a constitutional violation with no remedy like a crime with no punishment?
The Supreme Court in Zivotofsky v. Clintondeclared that foreign policy is subject to judicial review. Indeed, in the middle of the Korean War, it held that President Harry Truman’s seizure of steel mills to keep armaments flowing was unconstitutional in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer. And in New York Times v. United States, the Court prohibited President Richard Nixon from suppressing publication of the Pentagon Papers in the middle of the Vietnam War despite protestations of a foreign policy calamity.
The Supreme Court’s decree largely echoed the 1868 Hostage Act, directing steps the President must take to obtain the release of citizens wrongfully detained in foreign countries. It was not encroaching on forbidden presidential territory. The Act provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.
It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court will wave the white flag of surrender and allow President Trump's illegal deportation of Garcia and apparent refusal to secure his return. SCOTUS was unanimous on April 10 in declaring his deportation unconstitutional.
But the idea of a constitutional right without a remedy feels a bit like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will. Moreover, if President Trump can defy the Supreme Court in foreign affairs, there is no constitutional firewall against the precedent carrying over into domestic affairs and burning the entire Constitution.
Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury…The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”
President Trump may indeed attempt to defy an order of the Supreme Court over Abrego Garcia. He will repeat the lie that Garcia is a terrorist and declare “he who saves the country violates no law.”
If this precedent stands, it will lie around like a loaded weapon ready for use against citizens or non-citizens alike under the banners of “foreign policy” or “national security” — which mean whatever Mr. Trump wants them to mean for this day and train only.
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