On March 13, speaking to reporters backstage at the 12th Global Baku Forum, Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, unexpectedly broke the news that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally agreed to all 17 points of their framework agreement on the establishment of peace and interstate relations.
This apparent breakthrough comes some four years after the negotiating process began in the wake of Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. While such diplomatic triumphs are to be applauded, especially as an alternative to continued threats of military violence, the devil is in the details. And the details leave much to be desired.
Bayramov, when announcing this news, stressed that Azerbaijan now expects Armenia to implement changes to its constitution to remove a reference in the document’s preamble to Armenia’s declaration of independence, which Baku says implies territorial claims against Azerbaijan by mentioning the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with the then-Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed up with a statement that stressed that such changes are “a prerequisite to allow the signing of the negotiated text.” In addition, the MFA noted the need to dissolve the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, the international body co-chaired by France, the U.S., and Russia and empowered to spearhead a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While Yerevan had effectively already expressed support for this in the event of the agreement’s signing, it would symbolize, in Baku’s view, a definitive Azerbaijani victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev later echoed these sentiments and added that “we do not trust any of their words. Because these are not people we can trust, including today’s government.”
The Armenian side, noticeably caught by surprise by Azerbaijan’s “unilateral statement,” explained that Yerevan had accepted “the proposals of Azerbaijan on the two unresolved articles” of the draft agreement. Furthermore, Yerevan stressed its view that “the Peace Agreement is ready for signing” and that they are “prepared to initiate consultations with the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the time and venue for the signing of the Agreement.”
Those two previously unresolved articles of the agreement concerned the absence of any third-party presence along the border and the mutual withdrawal of claims from international courts. The former is a reference to the presence of European Union civilian monitors on Armenia’s side of the border, whose mandate was recently extended by two years. Yerevan appears to have acquiesced to Baku’s wording of these two points, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan saying that following consultations with his security council “the current content can be considered a compromise option acceptable to Armenia.”
Any current optimism deserves equal, if not greater, levels of accompanying caution as Azerbaijan continues to present further concessions by Armenia, including constitutional changes, as the only means by which the agreement can be signed.
These developments take place as American pressure builds on Iran and discussions between the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia advance, potentially indicating Yerevan’s consideration of the broader international dynamic when agreeing to these additional compromises. Not to mention Armenia’s own interest in precluding, or forestalling, any escalation of violence in the region.
As Russia has been distracted by its war in Ukraine, a unique window of opportunity, amplified by Moscow’s own strategic miscalculations, presented itself to Armenia to decrease its dependencies and exploit new openings.
With the new Trump administration seeking an end to the war in Ukraine and even a potential reconfiguration of U.S.-Russia relations writ large, Armenia’s window of opportunity may be fading. If Russia is able to secure a favorable agreement in Ukraine and, more importantly for the South Caucasus, the start of a broader strategic discussion with the U.S. and NATO, Moscow’s ability to devote renewed attention to its other border regions will likely increase. These broader shifts have also resulted in a European Union that is struggling to adjust to and define its own role in this rapidly shifting world, potentially contributing to Yerevan’s calculations.
Over the last few years, Armenia has made an overt effort to normalize relations with Turkey in the hopes of decreasing its overreliance on Russia and better connecting itself to Europe and elsewhere. In addition to Armenia’s closed border with Azerbaijan, the Armenia-Turkey border has been closed for over 30 years, severely limiting Yerevan’s strategic maneuverability and its economic potential. However, Ankara has linked its normalization with Yerevan directly to advancements in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, the outcome of important Azerbaijani leverage in Turkey and a uniquely close relationship between the two countries.
Armenia likely hopes that this development — Azerbaijan’s obstinance notwithstanding — will be enough for Turkey to press ahead with normalization of relations and the opening of the border, though Ankara has previously said progress will be connected to the signing of the agreement between Yerevan and Baku.
The agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan follows weeks, if not months, of speculation that Azerbaijan is preparing to escalate militarily against Armenia with the intention of pressuring Yerevan to accept Baku’s demands. This is reminiscent of previous Azerbaijani tactics, threatening continued violence in order to exact concessions from Armenia.
This negotiating process has been ongoing while at least 23 Armenians are being held and tried in Baku over their involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as Azerbaijan continues to occupy internationally recognized Armenian territory, and as Baku continues to demand Armenia open the so-called Zangezur corridor for unhindered Azerbaijani traffic, amongst other stipulations.
The most important development to watch is whether the finalized agreement will be signed and ratified in short order or if Azerbaijan will not acquiesce to this until Armenia implements changes to its constitution, a process not expected to take place before parliamentary elections in June 2026.
In addition, Turkey’s response will also be critical: Is this finalized, but not yet signed, agreement enough for Ankara to move its normalization process with Yerevan forward?
While this agreement has received international support, Washington and other capitals must not lose sight of the still unresolved elements of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and their outstanding disputes.
An intense rivalry with decades of heavy baggage cannot merely be resolved by the (still absent) stroke of a pen. In an atmosphere of deep mistrust and lingering insecurities, real peace will likely take a generation to build. There is still much hard work to be done, and the signing and ratification of any agreement would only be the first step along the winding road ahead.
