A former Israeli Ministry of Defense official is leading the Israel and Iran desk at the National Security Council. The report from Drop Site News comes as the Trump administration is negotiating with Iran to curb its nuclear program amid strong opposition from many pro-Israel hawks in Washington who favor war over diplomacy.
The White House confirmed Merav Ceren’s appointment to the NSC calling her “a patriotic American.” Drop Site notes that with her in that role, Israel has “an unusual advantage in internal policy discussions just as the Israeli government has launched a new campaign to pressure the American government to start a war with Iran rather than continue with negotiations toward a nuclear deal.”
Indeed, the administration's internal deliberations on Iran flew out into the open last week when the New York Times reported that President Trump discouraged the Israelis from an impending attack on Iran’s nuclear sites. A wide range of senior Trump administration officials, including Vice President JD Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles supported Trump’s decision.
Ceren's bio at FDD says, "Previously, she worked at Israel’s Ministry of Defense, where she participated in negotiations in the West Bank between Israel’s Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories and Palestinian Authority officials." Drop Site notes that the Israeli agency she worked for is “now refusing entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, sparking a humanitarian crisis of unspeakable proportions."
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top image credti: Runawayphill via shutterstock.com
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
Keys to the Kingdom
John Phelan, freshly-minted as secretary of the Navy on March 25, has no experience building ships. Or, for that matter, in the military. So when he recently tried to figure out how smartly the sea service buys stuff, he turned to something he does know: real estate. “I see numbers on things that are eye-opening to me. … I see a barracks that costs $2.5 million a key [per room],” he said April 9, after two weeks on the job. “My old firm, we built the finest hotel in Hawaii … for $800,000 a key, and that has some pretty nice marble and some pretty nice things in it, and I’m trying to understand how we can get to those numbers.” His audience of Navy officials and contractors tittered nervously.
The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier was delivered incomplete and 32 months late in 2017. The second Ford-class carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, is facing “critical challenges” that will likely delay its planned July delivery date. The next in line, the USS Enterprise, will be 28 months behind schedule if delivered as planned in 2030. And prices aren’t falling: The JFK is now projected to cost $12.9 billion, the Enterprise $13.5 billion, and the Doris Miller, the fourth carrier in the class slated for delivery in 2032, $14 billion (planes not included).
The lead boat in the Columbia class of nuclear-armed submarines, the most critical leg of the nation’s nuclear triad, is facing a delivery delay of up to 18 months.
Only 10% of the lead frigate in the new Constellation class is finished, almost five years after the Navy awarded the contract for its construction. It is based on a European warship. The Navy hoped its version would share 85% of that vessel’s design. But it now has only 15%. Delivery of the first ship has slipped from 2026 to 2029, and its cost has ballooned from $1 billion to $1.4 billion.
Phelan said the Navy’s “gold-plated requirements” and other procurement pathologies fuel such fiascos. “I understand the Navy has its own ways of doing things, steeped in tradition and often inflexible,” he said. “Those ways, when they are dysfunctional, must be confronted daily and relentlessly in order to change.”
Only one thing missing, Lauren C. Williams at Defense Onenoted: “Phelan didn’t say how he would curb shipbuilding cost overruns and delays.”
You can bet top Navy officers will surely sound “Battle stations!” over Phelan’s offensive against how they do business. But whether they end up as his allies or his adversaries remains an unknown “bogey” on the Navy’s institutional radar screen.
World’s costliest chopping block
On April 9, the White House gave the Pentagon 90 days to come up with a list of weapons programs that are at least 15% over budget or behind schedule for potential termination. You know, because we’re getting too little bang for our bucks. That came two days after President Trump said his administration has approved a $1 trillion defense budget for 2026, which represents a 18% boost over its current $850 billion level. “We are very cost conscious,” he said, “but the military is something that we have to build and we have to be strong because you have a lot of bad forces out there now.”
That’s kind of like telling your kids to tighten their belts while you’re boosting their allowance. Needless to say, this isn’t how human nature — in the Defense Department, or anywhere else — actually works. But when you’ve a bureaucracy as hidebound and lethargic as the Pentagon, maybe you have to force-feed and starve it at the same time.
A White House fact sheet accompanying the order cited nine — nine! — Navy ship-building programs and the Air Force’s new Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile as poor performers. There are dozens of other programs that also qualify for the ax.
The Bunker, like others, cheers Trump’s push to buy weapons better. But while we’ve covered a lot of wars, we’ve covered even more Pentagon and presidential pushes for smarter procurement. Unfortunately, his marching order basically reads like he wants to spend more, on more of the same things, more quickly. “Given all the money we spend on the Pentagon,” Trump said, “it’s unacceptable that we would ever run out of ammunition or be unable to quickly produce the weapons needed.”
Aha! Now that gets to the heart of the matter. Until the nation demands simpler and cheaper ammo and weapons, it will never have enough of either.
Antipersonnel landmines return
Bad things come in threes. So if nuclear proliferation is on the rise, and the U.S. is pushing to deploy weapons in space, it should come as no surprise that antipersonnel landmines are making a comeback. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is leading front-line NATO states Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to abandon a 1997 convention banning them.
Moscow has seeded millions of landmines inside Ukraine, making it the world’s most-mined nation. Such weapons, designed to kill troops, too often shred innocent civilians during conflicts and long after those conflicts are over. While 164 nations have signed the treaty, Russia — like China, India, Pakistan, and the U.S. — has not. The Trump administrationis weakening demining operations by cutting foreign aid. Nonetheless, the pact has eliminated more than 40 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines and sharply reduced their production and use.
Even so, the treaty withdrawals do present ominous opportunities. A Finnish company has said it is ready to resume mine production to help defend Finland’s 830-mile border with Russia. And it no doubt will mean more work for Ronin and his fellow African giant pouched rats. Guinness World Records declared Cambodian-based Ronin the most successful rat mine-finder of all time on April 4 — International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, as well as World Rat Day.
Rah-rah Ronin the Rodent!
In these grim times, we’ll take our good news wherever we can find it.
Ex-Air Force boss Frank Kendall questions the Pentagon’s recent decision to make the Boeing F-47 the nation’s first sixth-generation fighter in Defense News April 9.
The Army now has robots that “think, talk, understand like soldiers,” Kapil Kajal reported April 10 in Interesting Engineering.
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Top image credit: U.S Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff shakes hands with Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi in Muscat, Oman, April 12, 2025. Badr Albusaidi served as an intermediary for US talks with Iran. Oman News Agency/ Handout via REUTERS
As the United States and Iran cautiously return to the negotiating table, a familiar question resurfaces: can we pursue diplomacy with a repressive government like the Islamic Republic without betraying human rights principles?
For some, the answer is an unequivocal no.
They argue that engaging with Iran’s theocratic leaders lends them legitimacy and that human rights should be a prerequisite for any agreement. This framing is seductive in its moral clarity, but in practice, it has served as a blueprint for perpetual conflict and a gift to the most authoritarian forces in Iran.
The truth is, how we integrate human rights into diplomacy matters deeply. When they are used constructively, they can guide policy toward meaningful outcomes. But when invoked in ways that derail negotiations, prolong broad-based sanctions, or edge us closer to war, they cease to be a tool for protection and become a tool for obstruction. In the end, it’s the Iranian people — especially the most vulnerable — who bear the cost.
There are, of course, influential and well-funded factions in the U.S., Israel, and Iran that thrive on enmity and escalation. On one end, neoconservatives and pro-Israel hawks in Washington view Iran as a permanent adversary, to be crushed or contained indefinitely. On the other, hardliners in Tehran exploit American hostility to justify repression and militarization. Both camps treat diplomacy as a threat to their ideologies.
Unfortunately, some human rights advocates — particularly in the Iranian diaspora — have adopted a similar stance, insisting that engagement only empowers the Iranian government. But this argument rests on a false premise: that diplomacy and human rights are inherently at odds.
Iranian civil society tells a different story. In fact, many of its most courageous voices — those operating inside the country, often at great personal risk — are not calling for confrontation. They are calling for de-escalation and peace.
Nobel Peace Prize laureate and renowned political prisoner Narges Mohammadi has echoed this stance. In a recent interview, reflecting on the choice between war and negotiations, she declared: “I am fundamentally opposed to war. I do not support an option like war under any circumstances, at any time, in any land, for any country, or any people.” Instead, she emphasized that “given the state of the Islamic Republic and the level of protests, resistance, and perseverance among the people, we will, in fact, achieve gains for the people,” in the short, medium, and long term.
Her interview went far beyond a critique of war. Mohammadi also delivered a forceful condemnation of the Islamic Republic, argued that political change in Iran is inevitable, and stressed that the fractured opposition must commit to democratic values and mutual tolerance. On sanctions, she warned: “People have experienced heavy sanctions. They’ve lost many opportunities. … These sanctions have not only weakened the government — they’ve also weakened Iranian society, the middle class, and everyday people.”
Meanwhile, in a powerful recent letter, more than 400 Iranian academics, journalists, dissidents, and former political prisoners warned that any military strike by the U.S. or Israel would not merely target Iran’s rulers but would also devastate the Iranian people. Among thesigners are some of the country’s leading voices of conscience: Emadeddin Baghi, a leading human rights advocate and political prisoner; Isa Saharkhiz, a veteran dissident journalist; and Shahindokht Molaverdi, a former vice president for women’s affairs turned critic of the country’s status quo.
“An attack on Iran’s infrastructure is not merely an attack on the government,” they wrote. “It is an attack on the Iranian nation.” Addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General, their statement urges the international community to reject war.
Other prominent voices have echoed the same message. The Coordination for a Secular Democratic Republic in Iran — a broad opposition coalition advocating for a democratic future — recently issued a statement rejecting “any kind of military option against Iran’s infrastructure.” They called for “transparent, fair, win-win negotiations” that address Western concerns while respecting Iran’s national interests. They also pointed to the various actors who benefit from sustained tensions: Israel through sabotage campaigns, American war hawks, and the Islamic Republic’s own ideologues.
These perspectives have deep roots inside Iran. For example, when Iran and Israel exchanged strikes last October, there was a groundswell of antiwar activism across Iranian civil society. Four of Iran’s most prominent independent labor unions — the Free Union of Iranian Workers, the Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations, the Group of United Retirees, and the Council of Retirees — warned that escalating conflict would turn the country into “scorched earth.”
These unions, long-time critics of government repression, made clear that war would only deepen poverty and hardship for ordinary Iranians. They warned that conflict would be used as a pretext to suppress workers, women, students, and the poor.
Another statement signed by over 350 civil society activists at the time rejected war “in the guise of opposition” and denounced both state repression and the provocations of foreign actors. They insisted that democracy and peace are intertwined, and that bombs and blockades will not bring justice.
These are not fringe voices. They reflect a core truth: those who suffer most in war are the people already struggling to survive. The same is true under sanctions, which have devastated Iran’s economy, restricted access to essential goods like medicine, and hollowed out the middle class. Indeed, to speak of human rights without acknowledging the economic violence of sanctions is to tell only half the story.
This is the broader reality U.S. policymakers must take seriously. The failure of diplomacy does not simply close the door to peaceful de-escalation; it shifts the balance of power toward those most invested in confrontation. In the United States and Israel, it empowers hawkish voices who advocate for regime change through military force, regardless of the human cost. Inside Iran, it strengthens the narrative of siege and existential threat, providing the country’s most authoritarian factions with justification to escalate surveillance, censorship, and repression in the name of national security.
This doesn’t mean human rights should be sidelined. Quite the opposite — diplomacy, when done right, creates space for engagement on human rights. During the brief implementation of the 2015 nuclear deal, key economic indicators improved significantly: inflation fell, real incomes rose, and the country’s “misery index” dropped. Civil society gained breathing room. European governments engaged Iran on political prisoners and executions. Some joint ventures were even conditioned on labor and gender standards. Constructive engagement offered real leverage.
All of that progress was reversed in 2018 when the Trump administrationwithdrew from the deal and reimposed crushing sanctions. Poverty soared. Repression intensified. And Iran’s most hardline elements — those most opposed to engagement — consolidated power.
To suggest that sanctions and isolation help the Iranian people is not only empirically false — it is morally indefensible.
Let’s be clear: a nuclear deal will not bring political transformation to Iran. Nor should we expect it to. But it can create the conditions — economic stability, reduced isolation, and greater civic space — that make long-term change more possible. Conversely, collapsing diplomacy risks deepening the humanitarian crisis and pushing the region toward war.
Human rights must guide U.S. policy. But they should not be misused as a pretext to sabotage diplomacy. The voices calling for peace from inside Iran are not naïve. They have endured war, repression, and isolation. We would do well to listen to them.
The latest warning from the EU High Representative on foreign policy Kaja Kallas — implying consequences for the member and candidate states if their leaders attend Moscow’s Victory Day parade on May 9 (dedicated to the defeat of the Nazi Germany in the WWII) — is a stark reminder of how the Union is dangerously overstepping its boundaries.
While Kallas did not threaten any specific punishments if her warning is ignored, she said any participation in Moscow’s parade would “not be taken lightly” by the EU, suggesting diplomatic or political repercussions against dissenting countries.
Some leaders did interpret her words as diplomatic blackmail and predictably, it sparked backlash. Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico rebuked Kallas and affirmed his own plans to attend the Moscow celebrations honoring the defeat of Nazism. “The year is 2025, not 1939,” Fico declared.
Fico’s stance reflects a core principle of the European Union: foreign policy remains the prerogative of member states under the Treaty on European Union (Article 24), not the bureaucracy in Brussels. The EU’s foreign policy framework does not grant the High Representative the ability to unilaterally sanction or penalize member states for their foreign policy choices. In that context, Kallas’ statement can be seen as an attempt to encroach on Slovakia’s right to determine its own foreign policy actions.
The Brussels’ warning might be particularly ominous for Serbia, whose president, Aleksandr Vucic, was also invited to Moscow. Unlike Slovakia, Serbia is not a member of the EU, but it is a candidate. As the EU increasingly behaves like a geopolitical bloc, it expects an unconditional foreign policy alignment from those eager to join it.
Serbia has long balanced its ties between the EU and Russia, a pragmatic stance given its history and geography. Yet the Kallas faction pushes the Balkan nation to choose a side — EU’s side — or essentially risk membership. The EU can use Belgrade’s status to arm twist it into submission, or erect hurdles on its path, if not freeze the process altogether.
There is a precedent for that: the suspension of Georgia’s candidate status, ostensibly for democratic backsliding, which some experts, however, believe to be merely a cover for the real reason — retaliation for Tbilisi’s failure to fully join the EU’s sanctions against Russia (there is some credence to that argument given how obsequiously the EU treats Azerbaijan, the real dictatorship next door to Georgia ).
This isn’t integration; it’s coercion. And, when it comes to Serbia, it’s also a dangerous game. By criminalizing attendance at a parade commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany, the EU risks alienating the nation which lost over a million lives in World War II fighting against the Nazis. To threaten them now over a symbolic gesture is not just tone-deaf — it can be perceived in Serbia as forcing a betrayal of its own history as a price of joining the EU.
Apart from Kallas’s overreach, the collective Brussels’ approach also demonstrably lacks pragmatism and realism in dealings with Russia, and in particular, to bring the war in Ukraine closer to an end. Yes, Russian President Vladimir Putin will use the celebrations in Moscow, particularly the presence of the foreign leaders, as a massive photo op. He will try to bridge the Soviet Union’s victory in the WWII with the war in Ukraine which he consistently frames as a “war against the Nazis.”
That said, however, trying to impose a boycott of the event on all EU members and candidates would amount to no more than a form of virtue signaling — without discernible gain for the EU. If Kallas and her allies indeed are worried about handing Putin a diplomatic victory, then their own hawkish ineptitude is already delivering it to him. They are fueling the narrative, not only in Moscow, but in Europe too, of unelected Brussels bureaucrats dictating foreign policies to sovereign nations, running roughshod their historical and political sensitivities.
The prospect of Fico and Vucic’s travel to Moscow echoes the Brussels meltdown over earlier attempts at diplomacy by Hungary’s Prime-Minister Viktor Orban. When Orban visited Moscow in 2024 and met with Putin, instead of learning about what Moscow’s bottom-line on Ukraine was, the EU tried to sabotage Hungary’s rotating presidency of the European Council.
Furthermore, when the U.S. President Donald Trump started his own talks with Moscow, the EU was left scrambling when it could have used Orban’s diplomacy, which was already a few months ahead of Trump’s efforts.
And yet, the EU is repeating the same mistake again — bullying its own members instead of using their outreach to at least explore ways in which the EU could move towards the end of the war in Ukraine, something that its own citizens increasingly expect and demand. As the prominent Cold War historian, professor of the London School of Economics Vladislav Zubok said, by rejecting the diplomacy track, the EU-guided Europe makes itself less, not more relevant in international politics.
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