The November 6 summit between President Donald Trump and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Washington, D.C. represents a significant moment in U.S.-Central Asia relations (C5+1). It was the first time a U.S. president hosted the C5+1 group in the White House, marking a turning point for U.S. relations with Central Asia.
The summit signaled a clear shift toward economic engagement. Uzbekistan pledged $35 billion in U.S. investments over three years (potentially $100 billion over a decade) and Kazakhstan signed $17 billion in bilateral agreements and agreed to cooperate with the U.S. on critical minerals. Most controversially, Kazakhstan became the first country in Trump's second term to join the Abraham Accords.
However, behind the big numbers and fanfare of handshakes lies a critical question: is this a real partnership, or just another round of great power competition dressed up in new clothes?
The critical minerals trap
Critical minerals were at the center of the summit. Trump called Central Asia “an extremely wealthy region” and made it clear that “one of the key items on our agenda is critical minerals.”
Before the main meeting with Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Central Asian foreign ministers in Washington, “You are looking to take the resources... that God has blessed your nations with, and turn them into responsible development that allow you to diversify your economies.”
There’s nothing wrong with building economic partnerships around natural resources. Done right, cooperation can be mutually beneficial. Central Asia holds at least 25 of the 54 minerals identified by the U.S. government as “critical.” The Trump administration wants access to those minerals to diversify supply chains and reduce reliance on China.
But when U.S. media frames U.S. engagement with Central Asia as a way to “counter China and Russia” or win a “resources race,” it sends the wrong message. This framing contradicts Central Asian preferences and reinforces zero-sum thinking, turning countries into prizes, not partners. It keeps old habits alive, treating relationships as transactional, not as something lasting or meaningful.Respecting strategic autonomy
Central Asian leaders have made it clear they don’t want to get dragged into another “great game.” They’re finding their own ways to solve problems. Take for example the recent Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border conflict. The two countries resolved the century-long dispute on their own. In March 2025, the respective presidents signed a historic treaty to end the violence, which had killed dozens and displaced thousands.
The 2022 Treaty on Allied Relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is another good sign. The region is moving past old border disputes and focusing on cooperation, trade, and new regional projects. These developments demonstrate the region’s growing autonomy and that Central Asia isn’t just waiting around for the next big power to swoop in.
As political analyst Alexandra Sitenko wrote in RS earlier this year, the Trump administration “would be well advised to take advantage of the increased interaction among Central Asian states, as well as within their widespread network of strategic partnerships and alliances, that includes Russia, China, Turkey and the Arab world.”
This fits well with Trump’s 2019-2025 U.S. Strategy for Central Asia that sets the goal of “building a more stable and prosperous Central Asia that is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own terms.”
It’s important not to slip back into a military-first approach. For years, U.S. involvement in the region was dominated by military basing tied to the Afghanistan War. Now that the war is over, the U.S. doesn’t need bases there, and the current approach stands in sharp contrast to the 2001-2021 period, when the U.S. ran operations in Afghanistan out of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Still, the U.S. conducts military exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As QI’s George Beebe and Alex Little wrote in Responsible Statecraft, “These military activities in a region with a robust Russian security presence are dangerous and unnecessary.” The U.S. should steer clear of new bases and rethink security assistance that could create dependencies.
President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021, while controversial, was a sound decision that freed the U.S. from costly entanglements and let countries handle their own security challenges. Since then, the Central Asian states have started dealing directly with the Taliban on border issues, economic relations, and humanitarian needs.
The Abraham Accords diversion
Kazakhstan’s announcement that it would join the Abraham Accords introduces a problematic element into an otherwise productive summit. Kazakhstan called the decision “a natural and logical continuation of Kazakhstan's foreign policy course – grounded in dialogue, mutual respect, and regional stability.”
The move is largely seen as symbolic. Kazakhstan and Israel have already had diplomatic ties since 1992. So, the announcement looks less about real progress and more about handing Trump a foreign policy headline.
Israel cheered Kazakhstan’s announcement. Palestinian officials, not surprisingly, slammed it. The Abraham Accords have been criticized for bypassing rather than advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace in that Israel gets recognition, but there’s no pressure to change its approach to occupation, settlements, or Palestinian rights.
Moreover, the Abraham Accords serve to deepen U.S. entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts rather than support the kind of prudent disengagement that some experts recommend. Now, with Kazakhstan on board, the Trump administration is tying economic partnerships in Central Asia to U.S. policy in the Middle East. This risks pulling these countries into tensions that serve neither their interests nor broader regional stability.
A new US approach
The C5+1 framework has the potential to genuinely advance U.S. and Central Asian interests. For Washington, engagement with Central Asia should recognize that the region is not a core U.S. security interest. There’s no reason to pour in huge military or economic resources.
This does not mean disengagement, but rather proportionate engagement through diplomacy and economic partnerships (the kind we saw this week in Washington), and, most of all, respect for the independence and choices of Central Asian countries. Right now, there’s a risk of getting carried away just to counter China or Russia. That kind of enthusiasm leads to overreach.
Broader U.S.-Central Asia engagement should respect multi-alignment. This means acknowledging that Central Asia’s relationships with Russia, China, and other powers serve national interests and do not require U.S. countermeasures. A pragmatic foreign policy approach would recognize that Central Asia’s economic engagement with China through the Belt and Road Initiative, or continued energy and labor migration ties with Russia, do not inherently threaten U.S. interests.
Central Asia's emergence as a more cohesive, autonomous region represents a success story. These countries have peacefully resolved long-standing border disputes, increased regional cooperation, and demonstrated pragmatic diplomacy in managing relationships with multiple great powers.
All this gives the U.S. a chance to engage on a healthier footing, through diplomacy and real partnerships. Washington can advance its interests without the overextension, militarization, and zero-sum thinking that have caused problems in the past.
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