The House of Representatives on Wednesday passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), paving the way for upwards of $848 billion in Pentagon spending. This, combined with additional funding contained in the so-called “Big, Beautiful Bill,” would push the Defense Department budget past $1 trillion for the first time.
That’s far more, adjusted for inflation, than peak levels reached at the height of the Cold War or the War in Vietnam.
And if the NDAA authorizations are turned into actual appropriations, huge sums of money will be wasted — on dysfunctional or obsolete systems like F-35s and $13 billion aircraft carriers that are increasingly vulnerable to high tech missiles. And the potentially most wasteful program of all would be President Trump’s “Golden Dome,” a costly pipe dream that most scientists who are not on the payroll of the Pentagon or the arms industry will tell you can never work.
Despite being a policy bill, the NDAA passed by the House is also silent about our misguided, dangerous “cover the globe” military strategy, which is more likely to draw us into unnecessary wars than it is to defend U.S. residents or anyone else.
House Armed Services Committee Chair Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) marketed the NDAA under the tired old slogan of “Peace Through Strength.” As research by the Costs of War Project at Brown University has demonstrated, America’s wars (and record Pentagon budgets) of this century have brought neither peace nor strength. Instead, they have cost at least $8 trillion, hundreds of thousands killed and displaced on all sides, and a devastating impact on veterans, including a huge number of physical and psychological injuries.
Activities that the bill amply funds include keeping troops in the U.S.-Mexico border. It also gives lip service to “cutting red tape” in the purchase of weapons, but that may include weakening the Pentagon’s independent testing office, one of the few sources of trustworthy analysis of the cost and performance of major arms systems. The House NDAA also endorses increased military cooperation with Israel, and replenishing war reserves that have been used to fuel Israel’s ongoing civilian slaughter and destruction of Gaza and attacks on Iran and Qatar.
The appropriations committed occasionally trim back the NDAA’s spending recommendations, but doing that in the prevailing climate in Washington would be an uphill climb.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
Top image credit: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, President of Ukraine, Keir Starmer, Prime Minister of the UK, and Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland, emerge from St. Mary's Palace for a press conference as part of the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kiev, May 10 2025, Kay Nietfeld/dpa via Reuters Connect
After last week’s meeting of the “coalition of the willing” in Paris, 26 countries have supposedly agreed to contribute — in some fashion — to a military force that would be deployed on Ukrainian soil after hostilities have concluded.
Three weeks prior, at the Anchorage leaders’ summit press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Ukraine’s security should be ensured as part of any negotiated settlement. But Russian officials have continued to reiterate that this cannot take the form of Western combat forces stationed in Ukraine. In the wake of last week’s meeting, Putin has upped the ante by declaring that any such troops would be legitimate targets for the Russian military.
The question remains why European leaders persist with plans that, if implemented, risk putting them directly at war with the world’s largest nuclear power. The answer appears concerning.
One possibility is the credibility of Russian pronouncements. Putin engaged in nuclear signalling earlier in this war — most notably when the full-scale invasion was launched and again after facing military setbacks in the autumn of 2022. Although such signals may have succeeded in deterring the West from intervening directly in the war, the perception that Western countries could transgress supposed Russian red lines without incurring a nuclear response may have diminished the deterrent power of subsequent threats.
Another is the West’s longstanding normative approach to questions of security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This view, expressed just days ago by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, insists that Moscow can have no veto over Kyiv’s sovereign right to accept foreign troops on its soil. The right of states to choose their own security arrangements freely, a principle outlined in the Charter of Paris that marked the de facto end of the Cold War, is often cited in support of this worldview.
Of course, the citing of principles at one another did little to stop Russia from taking matters into its own hands in February 2022. Previous efforts to deny Russia a veto on principle, such as the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit at which Ukraine and Georgia were invited to join the alliance, foreshadowed Russia’s invasion of Georgia just months later. Staunch defenders of the “right to choose” also conveniently ignore the principle of indivisible security, also found in the Paris Charter, asserting that no state should take measures to increase its own security at the expense of another state’s security. They also de-emphasize the fact that Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership is primarily a matter for existing NATO members, and not Kyiv, to decide.
These considerations aside, what is the strategic thinking behind the European approach?
Despite proposals to the contrary by some, any reassurance force would only be deployed to Ukraine after the war has ended. So unless plans currently under consideration are meant to be a mere opening salvo in negotiations with Moscow, insisting that a Western military presence on Ukrainian soil will emerge as soon as a ceasefire takes hold provides Russia with every incentive to continue fighting to prevent such an outcome from materializing. Therefore, continued insistence that such a force will take shape in the face of repeated Russian objections suggests that European calls for a ceasefire are not entirely genuine.
Indeed, European leaders did not voice their support for ending the war before Donald Trump assumed office — they only began doing so once Trump had cajoled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into calling for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire, leaving them with little option but to fall in line given Europe’s heavy dependence on the U.S. for its security. (Since Russia will never accept an unconditional ceasefire before its political objectives have been met, calling for one also serves the tactical purpose of painting Moscow — not altogether unfairly, of course — as the main obstacle to peace.)
With these facts in mind, European calls for a ceasefire appear to be rooted not in conviction but rather convenience. The real purpose of the coalition’s ongoing plans for a postwar troop deployment to Ukraine may be to sabotage the possibility of successfully negotiating an end to the war. This would fit with other aspects of the current European approach, for example threatening more sanctions against Russia but not putting forward any realistic offer of sanctions relief as an incentive.
This conclusion should not be surprising. Although Ukraine may be gradually losing on the battlefield, today’s European elite largely believes that a “bad deal” to end the war would be worse than the war continuing.
Perhaps Europeans believe that Ukraine will be able to hold the line long enough for Russian casualties to mount and the Russian economy to melt. Or perhaps they fear the perceived loss of status that may flow from a climbdown and compromise peace with Russia. More cynically, even if Russia breaks through Ukrainian lines, this could strengthen European unity and finally get European publics on board for higher defense spending — and Moscow will not be able to rule a restive Ukraine in any event.
European leaders should think twice before doubling down on this logic. The recently announced memorandum of understanding on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, if implemented, could consolidate Russia’s pivot to China over the long term by shipping gas from Western Siberia which might otherwise have been destined for European markets. Besides the risks of military escalation, a prolonged war and the attendant rupture in economic relations between Russia and the rest of Europe could breed strategic consequences that are not yet set in stone — and would best be avoided.
Russia will be an adversary of the collective West for the foreseeable future. But succeeding in a multipolar world requires creating the strategic space to engage with all power poles at least to some degree. A world of rigid blocs need not be a self-fulfilling prophecy — and would undermine the survival of a “rules-based international order” to a much greater extent than deferring disagreements over Ukraine’s territorial integrity and beginning the arduous task of rebuilding a shared sense of security in Europe.
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Top photo credit: The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, is standing third from the left in the front row, alongside the Minister of Culture of Qatar, Abdulrahman bin Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad Al Thani, who is at the center, and the Minister of Culture, Sports and Youth of Oman, Sayyid Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said, who is second from the right in Doha, Qatar, on May 9, 2024. (Photo by Noushad Thekkayil/NurPhoto)
On Tuesday, Israel bombed Doha, killing at least five Hamas staffers and a member of Qatari security. Israeli officials initially claimed the US green-lit the operation, despite Qatar hosting the largest U.S. military in the region.
The White House has since contradicted that version of events, saying the White House was given notice “just before” the bombing and claiming the strike was an “unfortunate" attack that "could serve as an opportunity for peace.”
The fallout from the bombing is still unclear, but the U.S. decision to merely chalk up Israel’s attack on a major non-NATO ally to an “unfortunate” attack should at least put to rest one persistent myth: that the Qatar lobby holds more sway over the U.S. than the pro-Israel lobby in Washington.
The “Qatar lobby” is oftentimes invoked as an epithet by pro-Israel hawks to explain away why Americans are suddenly skeptical about Washington's support for Israel. In an August interview, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed Qatar has “spent billions on American universities, vilifying, vilifying Israel, vilifying Jews, and also, frankly, vilifying the United States.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently blamed Qatar for what he claimed was an increase in antisemitism among the American conservative commentariat. They “spent billions on American universities, vilifying, vilifying Israel, vilifying Jews, and also, frankly, vilifying the United States…and all that was left to accumulate primarily in academia, you know, and from there, it sort of distributes itself elsewhere,” Netanyahu argued.
In this, Netanyahu was parroting a trope spread by pro-Israel — and some Israeli government funded — organizations that shifts the blame for nationwide pro-Palestine protests away from the Israeli military’s civilian slaughter and forced starvation in Gaza to Qatar, which allegedly has pushed U.S. college students down a path of raging antisemitism.
The problem with this story is that, while Qatar has spent billions of dollars on American universities, nearly all of that money has gone to American universities within Qatar. In fact, more than 90% of Qatar’s more than $6 billion in higher education funding has explicitly been earmarked to fund higher education in Qatar, where American college students are a distinct minority at schools overwhelmingly filled with Qatari’s and expats living in the country.
Undeterred by this simple fact, Netanyahu and pro-Israel groups have continued to spread the tale that Qatar’s higher education spending is driving students on U.S. college campuses down an antisemitic road. Perhaps no organization has done this more often than the Institute for the Study of Global Anti-Semitism (ISGAP). The institute’s scholars have repeatedly testified to Congress about Qatari funding causing antisemitism, despite ampleevidence that their research on this topic is, at best, flawed.
Just as importantly, the organization has not publicly disclosed that it had been funded by the Israeli government as recently as 2020.
This exemplifies the inherent contradiction of Qatar’s influence in America: While the Middle East monarchy does have enormous influence in America its alleged omnipresence is often wildly exaggerated by Qatar’s critics.
Nick Cleveland-Stout and I sought to demystify Qatar’s influence in America in our just-released Quincy Institute brief, “Qatar’s Influence in America.” We found that in just eight years — after being nearly invaded by then rivals Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — Qatar has transformed from something of an afterthought in the influence game to one of the biggest players around.
Just consider the highlights of this massive operation that we document in the brief:
Qatar currently has more than two dozen Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) registered lobbying and public relations firms working for them.
Scores of revolving door all-stars have been lobbying for the Qatari’s, headlined by former representatives Tom Davis (R-Va.), Jim Moran (D-Va.), Tom Reynolds (R-N.Y.), and Bart Stupak (D-Mich.).
No country’s lobbyists report more in-person meetings with policymakers than Qatar.
Qatar is the third most generous foreign donor to think tanks in the U.S.
Multiple Trump administration officials have previously worked for Qatar, including Lee Zeldin, the Director of the Environmental Protection Agency and Kash Patel the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Patel’s boss–Attorney General Pam Bondi–was a registered foreign agent for Qatar until 2021.
Trump’s family and companies have also inked billions of dollars in deals with the Qatari’s. And, of course, Qatar gifted the President a luxury jumbo-jet dubbed “the Palace in the Sky.”
At the same time, Qatar has been doing a lot of things that are quite beneficial for U.S. interests, most notably serving as a mediator for conflicts around the world, including in Afghanistan, Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Yemen, and, of course, Gaza. All of this led The Guardian to dub Qatar “The global capital of diplomacy.” Our analysis of all FARA reported political activities conducted by Qatar’s lobbyists since the Israel-Gaza war began revealed that Qatar’s lobbyists spend much of their time touting Qatar’s mediator prowess and sending a clear, yet unspoken, message: while Israel is dragging the U.S. into wars, Qatar is trying to end them.
For instance, a one-pager distributed to media contacts by GRV Strategies, on behalf of Qatar, states that “Over the past year, Qatar has worked tirelessly with the United States, Egypt, and other international partners to de-escalate the crisis in Gaza, mediating between Israel and Hamas to try to end the bloodshed, ensure humanitarian aid reaches innocent Palestinian civilians, and secure the release of hostages.” Another Qatari firm, Lumen8 Advisors, facilitated Qatar’s Prime Minister appearing on Tucker Carlson in a segment entitled, “War With Iran? The Prime Minister of Qatar Is Being Attacked in the Media for Wanting to Stop It.”
Carlson was far from the first conservative commentator Qatar’s lobbyists and public relations firms have courted. As early as 2017, Qatar’s agents have been targeting MAGA influencers, with one of the architects of Qatar’s influencer campaign explaining to the Wall Street Journal that, “We want to create a campaign where we are getting into his [Trump’s] head as much as possible.” This is at least partially why Netanyahu’s disdain for Qatari influence overlaps with his aggressive attacks on any conservative that doesn’t recommend unflinching U.S. support for Israel.
Despite Netanyahu and pro-Israel groups’ attacks, however, more and more conservatives are publicly speaking out against Israel’s war on Gaza and questioning how Israel fits into the “America First” mantra. Just last week, for example, at a National Conservatism Conference panel, Curt Mills, editor of The American Conservative, argued, “Why are these our wars? Why are Israel's endless problems America's liabilities?...Why should we accept America First — asterisk Israel? And the answer is, we shouldn't.”
Yet, while there’s currently significant alignment between U.S. interests and Qatar’s interests — namely peace and stability (i.e. not letting Israel pull the U.S. into wars) — this isn’t cause for ignoring Qatar’s influence in the U.S. As we write in the brief, “Qatar’s unprecedented access to and influence of Trump, at the very least, presents a risk of the President putting personal gain over national gain when it comes to Qatar.” While their efforts did not help stave off an attack from the more influential Israel, that is no reason not to keep a watchful eye on Qatari influence in America.
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Top photo credit: Kaja Kallas, Member of the European Parliament, Patron to Creative Business Cup Estonia (Flikr
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has consistently demonstrated a reductive and simplistic approach to geopolitics that betrays a serious lack of strategic depth and historical knowledge for such a critical role. Her failure is symptomatic of a broader decline of European statecraft.
Reacting to the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the military parade in Beijing dedicated to the victory over fascism in World War II, attended by dozens of leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kallas expressed that it was "news" to her that China and Russia were among the victors who defeated Nazism and fascism
This is not a minor gaffe; it is a shocking lack of historical literacy. The Soviet Union (whose primary successor state is Russia) suffered over 20 million casualties in the Great Patriotic War, a sacrifice that, in alliance with the United States and Britain, fundamentally broke the back of the Nazi war machine. China, for its part, endured immense suffering in a brutal conflict with Japan that was a crucial, though often overlooked in the West, theater of World War II. China puts its death toll at 20 million. To be unaware of this is to be ignorant of the foundational architecture of the entire post-war order.
To compound this, in a bizarre caricature, she characterized the Chinese as “very good at technology but not that good in social sciences, while the Russians are super good in social sciences but bad at technology." It surely must be alarming that the EU's top diplomat would present this juvenile dichotomy as a legitimate lens through which to view two of the most complex and serious strategic challenges facing the continent.
Kallas’ statements were so egregious that they prompted an uncharacteristically direct and harsh rebuke from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, a move that signals a worrisome degradation of the EU’s diplomatic standing.
This primitive understanding is now being operationalized into a dangerously rigid foreign policy. Under the leadership of Kallas's European External Action Service (EEAS) and Ursula von der Leyen's European Commission, the EU has systematically severed every channel of communication with Russia. In Brussels, there are no behind-the-scenes diplomatic dialogues, no backchannel explorations, and not even engagement at the think-tank level behind closed doors. The official position is an absolutist moral stance: we do not talk to Putin, a war criminal.
This policy is not just strategically naive; it is laughably inconsistent. The same institutions maintain deep, continuous engagement with Israel, whose prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes. The EU's floundering response to the war in Gaza laid bare this incoherence: aside from principled stands taken by Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia, the bloc has failed to impose any meaningful costs on Israel.
The selective application of the moral principles by the EU masks a strategy of total disengagement with Russia. By refusing all contact, the EU voluntarily blinds and deafens itself, ceding all initiative and forfeiting any ability to probe for weaknesses, explore off-ramps, or even accurately gauge the adversary’s disposition. This is not statecraft; it is self-imposed paralysis.
The EU’s strategic abdication stands in stark contrast to the complex reality of modern global diplomacy. What we witnessed in Beijing was not a formation of some sort of a Chinese-led anti-Western bloc, but a convergence of interests among non-Western powers on two key fronts: minimizing the impact of U.S. secondary sanctions and building independence from the dollar-dominated financial system. For countries like China, India, and Russia, this is not primarily about opposing the West, but rather asserting sovereignty and creating strategic autonomy. They are resisting Washington's ability to unilaterally dictate global economic terms, a concern that resonates far beyond any single alliance.
This is a strategy of multi-vectorism, not monolithic opposition. Nations like Turkey (a member of NATO but cooperating with Russia) and India (balancing ties with the West, China, and Russia) are skillfully playing this game. Even China itself practices it, supporting Russia economically while simultaneously attempting to strengthen ties with Europe.
Russia, largely isolated from the West due to its war in Ukraine, is forced to lean into its Eastern vector, as evidenced by new energy agreements with China. However, this is a pragmatic adaptation, not an ideological marriage. The Kremlin would likely reactivate the Western pivot if offered sufficient economic incentives and political concessions, such as acquiescing to Moscow’s core war aims in Ukraine (namely, recognizing de facto its territorial gains and securing Ukraine’s neutrality, i.e. non-membership in NATO) and lifting all sanctions.
It is currently politically untenable for the West to extend such concessions. Even so, Putin went to meet with Donald Trump in Alaska, which shows his willingness to at least partially restore the Western vector through working bilaterally with Washington. Hence, his visit to Beijing was not any more “anti-American” than his visit to Alaska was “anti-Chinese.”
This pragmatic, multi-vector strategy is not confined to non-Western powers. In fact, it presents a profound internal contradiction for the EU itself, where member states Hungary and Slovakia stand as rare examples of attempting this approach within the bloc. Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico have consistently advocated for — and practiced — a foreign policy that seeks to maintain open channels with Moscow and Beijing, arguing for diplomacy over perpetual confrontation and emphasizing the severe economic costs of decoupling for European economies.
Yet, rather than engaging with this strategic perspective, the dominant EU narrative simply dismisses them as Putin sympathizers. This refusal leaves the bloc with a foreign policy that is neither coherently values-driven nor pragmatically effective. It is stuck in a moralizing limbo, exemplified by the likes of Kallas and von der Leyen.
Alarmingly, as the rest of the world hedges, the EU is not only refusing to do so but is rather actively increasing its strategic dependence on a single, increasingly disinterested, partner: the United States. Examples abound: the one-sided trade deal; the humiliating supplication to Trump on Ukraine; the detached-from-reality discussions on the “coalition of the willing” providing "security guarantees" to Ukraine that the EU and UK are utterly incapable of fulfilling without American military might; the U.S.-backed snapback of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, an act that directly contravenes European economic and security interests by increasing the likelihood of a new war between Israel and Iran and pushing Tehran further into the arms of the Russia and China.
This lack of strategic autonomy is all the more damning as even the United States, despite its rhetoric, is undergoing a pragmatic reassessment of its global positioning.
If Europe is to navigate the treacherous waters of the 21st century, its leaders must show they possess some basic understanding of the great powers with which they must contend rather than the kind of cartoonish mindset propagated by Kallas and her ilk. The unbearable lightness of the current approach will leave Europe not as a protagonist in the shaping an emergent global order, but rather as its helpless, disoriented, and increasingly irrelevant spectator.
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