Experts say that some European countries are exaggerating perceived security threats with recent moves to push their respective publics to prepare for worst-case scenarios.
On Monday, the Swedish government began distributing a booklet that purports to help citizens prepare for war. This 32-page pamphlet advises citizens on digital security, how to seek shelter, and how to identify warning systems.
“We live in uncertain times,” the booklet reads. “Armed conflicts are currently being waged in our corner of the world. Terrorism, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns are being used to undermine and influence us.”
This comes shortly after President Biden gave Ukraine permission to use American-made missiles to strike targets deep inside Russian territory. This move Russia’s foreign ministry said, would result in “an appropriate and tangible” response.
Sweden Defense Minister Pål Jonson singled out Russia as being a “principal threat to Sweden,” and said that “the risk of an attack cannot be excluded.” In response, Sweden will increase its defense spending by 10 percent starting next year, amounting to a boost to 2.4% of GDP.
Sweden also joined NATO in March of 2024 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pamphlet reminds its citizens of its obligations. “Sweden is part of the military alliance NATO,” it reads.“The purpose of the alliance is that the member countries collectively will be so strong that it deters others from attacking us. If one NATO country is nevertheless attacked, the other countries in the alliance will aid in its defense.”
Other regional NATO members have taken similar measures, citizens of Norway and Finland — which also joined the alliance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — have also received similar resources seemingly meant to prepare citizens in the case of "incidents and crises.”
However, experts say that these steps are unnecessary. “Russia has made no military deployments to threaten Finland or Sweden,” says Anatol Lieven, Director of the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia Program. “Given the way that the Russian army is tied down in Ukraine, the very idea is absurd. Nor has any Russian official threatened this.”
QI Research Fellow Mark Episkopos echoed this sentiment. “It is not reflective of the military realities of Russia-NATO relations,” he said, adding, “nor can it be taken as in any way suggestive of an impending Russia-NATO confrontation.”
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Top Photo: Flag of Sweden and Russia on a concrete wall (Tomas Ragina via Shutterstock)
Top image credit: Russia's President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump during a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan June 28, 2019. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
“For every action there’s an equal and opposite reaction,” said President Vladimir Putin on the stage of his yearly economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia in 2017.
I sat among the vast, mostly Russian, audience, and dwelled on Newton’s third law.
During four and a half years at the British Embassy in Moscow, I’d learned one important lesson: Russia always responds in kind, both to aggression and to engagement. President-elect Trump should think how he might trade with Putin on this basis.
Reciprocity is the most predictable tenet of Russian statecraft and Russia’s policy towards Ukraine offers the perfect illustration.
Action: on February 22, 2014, Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych was deposed, in what Russia describes as an illegal coup d’etat, supported by the U.S. and UK governments.
Reaction: eight years and two days later, Ukraine’s pro-Western president, Volodymyr Zelensky, came within a whisker of being ousted by Russian troops.
With its tanks rolling into Ukraine from the north, east and south, Russia launched a massive airborne assault on Hostomel Airport. If they had secured the runway, Russian forces would have poured in to overwhelm Kyiv’s defences. However, a quick and clinical coup eluded Putin.
Yet, three years after the Ukraine war started, Russia has still achieved many of its objectives, albeit at a greater cost. Volodymyr Zelensky may be approaching the twilight years of his presidency; a future ceasefire would trigger calls to lift martial law and hold presidential elections. By that time, Russia will still occupy 20 percent of Ukrainian land. Ukraine’s future membership of the EU is on the very distant horizon and NATO membership is now buried deep in the pending tray.
Putin likely believes the West failed in its attempt to land a decisive strategic defeat on Russia. There are three reasons why he has maneuvered himself into a strong position to negotiate with Trump.
First, clarity.
Putin’s simple, unerring and oft expressed goal is to deny Ukraine’s aspiration to NATO. He may also hope for a longer term renewal of relations with Ukraine as post-war resentment towards the West grows in that country.
Western strategy has been complex, unclear and consistently erring. Western powers never acknowledged the legitimacy of Putin’s consistently expressed claim that NATO enlargement represented a core strategic threat to Russia’s national interest. An open door to possible Ukrainian membership of NATO, if the conditions were right and if every member could agree, was always a fudge that pleased no one. Zelensky was kept out of the tent while Putin fumed that the tent flap was open.
Second, decisiveness.
Russia has demonstrated the ability to act decisively which the collective West cannot do.
Put another way, in the great game of chess, Putin played fractious teams of 32 players in NATO and 27 players in the EU whose every move emerged out of prolonged debate and lowest common denominator ideas. It took almost a year for the UK to agree to send Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine and 15 months for U.S. approval of F-16 aircraft.
That chess game becomes three dimensional when domestic politics get involved. In the teeth of Republican resistance, the U.S. Congress took months to agree a $61 billion package of assistance in April 2024. Germany halved military aid to Ukraine in August 2024, against a rise in popularity among antiwar political parties on the left and right. Foreign policy is always, ultimately, driven by domestic considerations.
Third, political will.
Putin has always shown the political will and had the domestic support to press his strategy, in the way that the West cannot. His calculations were rooted in a single assumption, which proved correct, that the West would not fight Russia head on to protect Ukraine.
He probably knew that the fear of escalation with the world’s largest nuclear power would prevent NATO members from agreeing to a direct military confrontation. When the fighting started in 2022, NATO offered every form of assistance except that more direct help.
Since then, a groundswell in populism has swept Donald Trump to power in the U.S. and undermined liberal coalitions in Germany and France. Alternative voices of the left and right call for engagement with Russia, squeezing the room for the hawkish policy that in the space of a decade has led us to war.
How did we get from the ouster of Yanukovych in 2014 to the attempted removal of Zelensky in 2022, and the devastating war that unfolded?
There’s little evidence that Putin had conquest in his mind all along, rather than reacting to events as they unfolded. There is no evidence that he is driven by a master plan, that includes a suicidal bid to invade the Baltics or Poland.
Putin’s grievances grew steadily in intensity across the eight years before war broke out as efforts to secure a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine conflict through the Minsk agreement failed. Indeed, it was one of the final acts of Zelensky’s pre-war government to declare the Minsk agreement officially dead. Yet, an unprecedented campaign of economic warfare against Russia through sanctions, led by the U.S. and supported by Britain, continued.
The big question remains, how much influence will Donald Trump have in bringing the war to a close? Trump can bring greater clarity to U.S. and Western aims with Russia and Ukraine that moves on from Biden’s disastrous incrementalism. He should be bold and decisive in exploring new ideas as the strength of his mandate provides him with the political bandwidth in which to act.
Which brings us back to reciprocity. In the art of the deal, Trump should prepare to make concessions if he expects Putin to reciprocate. Finally taking NATO out of the equation and a thought-through plan to leverage sanctions relief in a future peace process, would be good places to start.
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Top photo credit: Greg Daddis of San Diego University interviews Oliver Stone at the USS Midway in San Diego, Nov. 14, 2024. (Kelley Vlahos/Responsible Statecraft)
SAN DIEGO — Iconic director Oliver Stone is not optimistic.
Fifty years after the end of the Vietnam War, and nearly 35 years since his film "Platoon" debuted, America is still hopelessly enamored with violence, and Washington, encouraged by the tandem power centers of Wall Street and the media, is still engineered for war.
“Our country is sabotaging itself. Why do we keep going back” in search of a necessary enemy? He asked. “We track a pattern of intervention, there is a repetition” that will eventually lead us to another world war.
Stone’s own experiences as a 20-year-old Army infantryman during the most tumultuous years in Vietnam (and politically, socially, back home in the U.S.) — 1967-1968 — formed the basis for Platoon, which won Oscars for Best Picture and Best Director in 1987 and is considered one of the most important and viscerally impactful Vietnam War films in Hollywood history. It is the first in his Vietnam War trilogy, which includes "Born on the Fourth of July" (1989), and "Heaven and Earth" (1993).
As a young man inspired by the tales of mythological Odysseus and a father who had served in World War II, he was driven to war by wanderlust and the frenetic unfocused energy youth. His time in combat there, in his words, took the scales from his eyes and upon returning to an “country he no longer knew” set him on a course of discovery, his mind and creativity coalescing around a burning skepticism of the government, social convention, and conformity.
This is all detailed in his excellent 2020 autobiography, “Chasing the Light” which charts Stone’s youth, his time in Vietnam, and his screenwriting/directing career though “Platoon.”
He didn’t directly mention the recent elections or the current conflict in Ukraine on Thursday night, but insisted that the “strong compulsion” to use war not only as a driver of industry but as the first tool in the box for resolving foreign disputes, still fueled Washington policy. Despite all of the failures of the last 50 years, “it’s impossible to break that lock” that war has on the collective psyche, he said. Even “Platoon” which is a searing indictment of the what he calls the Three Lies of the military and war, has failed to turn the society against interventionism.
“No film is going to change people if you don’t want to be changed,” he said, charging that military recruitment had actually gone up after the film was released.
In recent years, Stone has courted controversy with his series of interviews with Vladimir Putin and his questioning of the Washington/Western narrative of that war. The only mention he made to that was that “I have been passionately driven and for that I’ve paid a price,” and criticized censorship (his 2016 documentary "Ukraine on Fire" had been initially banned on You Tube and then reinstated).
“Free speech is a right, not a privilege” he said, to applause from the room. Of the current political dynamic, he lamented that the “neocons are here from the last administration as well as this administration, they are not going away."
“We’ve made one mistake after another on foreign affairs, there is no reason why we cannot be partners with Russia and China. We don’t need a war.”
Unfortunately, the country’s love for was is “a religion,” he said. All one can do is keep resisting it. His entire life after Vietnam seems to have sprung from that adage. “Be a rebel, and that’s the best way to be.”
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Top image credit: A Kenyan man reads newspapers at a shop in Nakuru following the U.S. presidential election results, where Donald Trump won against Democrat Kamala Harris in a remarkable political comeback. James Wakibia / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect
As commentators assess the implications of Donald Trump’s election victory for the United States and the world, various publications have asked what Trump’s return will mean for their continent. In one well-informed analysis, the BBC’s Wedaeli Chibelushi highlights “trade, aid, and security” as key sectors. We can also ask what might change in terms of Washington’s political relationships with various African countries, and how such changes would affect the overall balance of U.S. primacy versus restraint.
An initial caveat is necessary – of all the world’s regions, Trump and his team will likely not be thinking much about Africa. When Professor Stephen Walt recently assessed “The 10 Foreign-Policy Implications of the 2024 U.S. Election,” for example, he did not mention Africa – and that’s because the Middle East, Ukraine, NATO, and China, among other issues, will likely consume much more of Trump’s attention than the African continent will.
If Trump ignores Africa, that would be in keeping with a bipartisan neglect of the continent from the time of Barack Obama through the present. Obama and Joe Biden each held a “U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit” (in 2014 and 2022, respectively), but across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, Africa was approached mostly as a theater for counterterrorism, trade, and global influence, rather than as having intrinsic importance to Washington. Vice President Kamala Harris would likely have replicated the largely performative, status quo-friendly approach of Biden. Although Harris had a deep bench of Africa hands on her campaign, that depth more reflects the long line of aspirants who line up for foreign policy jobs in Democratic administrations, more than a now-dashed promise of transformation. Biden and Harris will leave office with little to show for their Africa policy beyond the summit and a slate of high-profile but low-substance trips, including Biden’s upcoming visit to Angola.
As Trump takes office, there will be something of an opportunity for diplomatic outreach and “reset” with Africa. So far, Trump's picks for top foreign policy postings do not include anyone with a pronounced interest in African affairs and his victory has elicited more mixed reactions in Africa than one might expect. Despite his infamous “shithole countries” comment and his numerous racist and Islamophobic remarks, many ordinary Africans admire Trump’s entrepreneurial career, socially conservative platform, and outspokenness. Various African leaders were quick to congratulate the comeback candidate. Trump is, however, likely unaware of and relatively indifferent to whatever opportunity exists for engagement, and so it will probably slip by.
If “personnel is policy,” Trump’s first term did not bring any shocking or unusual appointments for civilian posts related to Africa, and his second term may not either; the true ideologues and hawks are likely to gravitate towards Iran policy, for example. During his first term, Trump appointed veteran diplomat Tibor Nagy as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, think tanker J. Peter Pham as Special Envoy for the Sahel, and another veteran diplomat, Donald Booth, as Special Envoy for Sudan. The situation in the Sahel and Sudan was worse when Trump’s term ended than when it began: a massacre in Sudan in June 2019 brought no consequences for its perpetrators, and Mali witnessed a coup in 2020. Yet those outcomes cannot be laid solely at the feet of the Trump administration. Tellingly, the situation in the Sahel and Sudan in 2024 is also worse than it was when Biden took office, so neither administration earns high marks here.
Trump’s indifference to Africa could lead to continued inertia in Africa policymaking – meaning, concretely, that the military’s U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM would continue to be the main face of U.S. policy on the continent. Although Trump is more dictator-friendly than Biden was, it’s notable that under Biden, AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley has met, seemingly enthusiastically, with autocrats and would-be autocrats in Africa, including, for example, Libya’s Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Trump may show a friendly face to Russia, which could result in a more permissive environment for Russia – although it is not as though the Biden administration’s tough, anti-Russian rhetoric has yielded much actual success in rolling back Russian influence, particularly across the Sahel.
Politically, the biggest shifts could come in the Horn of Africa. It is possible that Trump’s team could recognize Somaliland, a breakaway territory that has been claiming independence from Somalia since 1991. With Somalia itself, the pendulum may swing back towards disengagement; Biden reversed a late Trump-era order to withdraw some troops. It is also possible that in Sudan, “the Trump administration will look to pick a winner” between the two factions – the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – that are fighting for control.
At the same time, the White House’s absorption in other issues will likely mean that politics in the Horn (and in other regions of the continent) will only be considered “through the prism of Trump’s domestic fiscal policy and then on the political side, the Gulf and Israel.” On Somaliland, Trump may wish to avoid antagonizing Egypt, which has aligned with Somalia against Ethiopia, and whose President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi may be glad to see Trump’s return; on Sudan, Trump may defer to the United Arab Emirates, widely accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces, but may also simply let matters play out in Sudan while he focuses elsewhere.
In sum, Trump’s win brings mostly troubling implications for Africa and especially for ordinary Africans, whether because (as Chibelushi notes) key programs relating to aid and public health (above all the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative, both launched by President George W. Bush) may be cut, and/or because Trump may empower dictators even more than Biden did, and/or because inertia will leave AFRICOM to make the day-to-day decisions. Trump’s transactional approach may appeal to some African leaders, and Trump is interested in issues such as critical mineral access (although his previous administration’s “Critical Minerals Strategy” did not mention Africa). Overall, by the end of the decade, U.S. influence in Africa will likely have ebbed to an even lower point that where it stands today.
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