'Security guarantees' dominate talks but remain undefined

President Donald Trump met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and a host of European leaders in the White House Monday to discuss a framework for a deal to end the war. The big takeaway: that all parties appear to agree that the U.S. and Europe would provide some sort of postwar security guarantees to deter another Russian invasion.

What that might look like is still undefined. Trump also suggested an agreement would require “possible exchanges of territory” and consider the “war lines” between Ukraine and Russia, though this issue did not appear to take center stage Monday. Furthermore, Trump said there could be a future “trilateral” meeting set for the leaders of the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia, and reportedly interrupted the afternoon meeting with the European leaders to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the phone.

The Trump administration’s approach to negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine has been unorthodox and at times wrongheaded. But its commitment to pursuing diplomacy in the face of an obstacle-ridden path has nonetheless been commendable.

Sadly, for much of the past three and a half years, it has been difficult to say the same of Europe. Today’s meeting evinced a more constructive tone, along with a clear desire to carry forward the positive momentum from Trump’s summit with Putin in Alaska.

Yet some of the positions that European leaders were advocating for heading into the Monday meetings leave much to be desired.

For one, NATO membership for Ukraine remains unrealistic. There is a lot of talk suggesting the U.S. and European will extend some non-NATO “Article 5” guarantees but NATO’s Article 5 relies on credibility to be an effective deterrent — and any American promise to fight for Ukraine would not be credible, given that two consecutive U.S. administrations have made clear since Russia’s invasion that they will not send troops to defend Ukraine.

If Europe were a serious “geopolitical actor,” it would have recognized this fact long ago and sought more realistic security guarantees for Ukraine, rather than continue down the dead end of continually advocating for Kyiv’s right to pursue NATO membership — something its leaders were still doing as recently as this weekend.

History and geography ensure that Ukraine will always matter more to Russia than it does to the United States. If Kyiv were offered NATO membership, Russia would very likely test the West’s commitment to Ukraine’s security in short order. NATO members could then either choose not to retaliate, thereby severely undermining the credibility of Article 5 more generally, or they could respond militarily and risk a tit-for-tat escalation that could culminate in a nuclear exchange.

European Atlanticists, who presumably care deeply about the security of NATO members, should have concluded long ago that Ukraine cannot be one such member. While NATO expansion was certainly not the only cause of Russia’s invasion, it was strategic folly to insist repeatedly that Moscow could have no say over the security orientation of a large state on its border — even worse, to have done so in part because, as a matter of principle, Russia as a non-NATO member could not be seen to retain a veto over NATO decision making.

Europe’s position that a ceasefire should precede any discussion of substantive issues — reiterated by French President Macron and German Chancellor Merz in their meeting with Trump today — is also bound to go nowhere. European leaders were only belatedly brought around to the idea that there should be a ceasefire at all, preferring up until Trump’s inauguration to support Ukraine’s failing war effort for as long as it takes.

Trump has focused on reaching a ceasefire for the past several months likely due to his desire to notch a quick win. But he has correctly come around to the conclusion that a comprehensive settlement offers the only viable path forward. European leaders, for their part, only backed Trump’s calls for a ceasefire to keep him onside and, by doing so, delay having to make difficult political compromises with Moscow.

Putin launched this war of aggression to achieve certain political aims, including settling the question of Ukraine’s military alignment and creating a European security order in which Russia’s interests are treated seriously. His main leverage to get the West to entertain these goals is to press on with a military campaign that he appears to be winning. Simply put, Putin is not going to agree to an unconditional ceasefire in exchange for nothing.

It is particularly shocking that EU leaders — who are meant to be the embodiment par excellence of a peace project — have pushed for an unstable ceasefire rather than a comprehensive peace deal. Far too many characterize a peace deal as a “win” for Putin when in fact it is in the interest of all parties.

A comprehensive settlement that provides long-term stability offers the best chance at securing the private-sector investment necessary to rebuild Ukraine’s economy. It can also strengthen the country’s demographic base, which has shrunk nearly by half since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by encouraging the return of Ukrainians who have fled the country. Without the reconstruction that a settlement can facilitate, Ukraine has little chance of ever joining the EU. And the U.S. cannot responsibly draw down its forces in Europe and adjust its grand strategy to the realities of a multipolar world if it continues to be dragged back into a region beset by the threat of recurring conflict.

Can we trust Putin not to invade Ukraine again, even after a peace deal? The question is moot, since there has not been much trust between Russia and the West for years. The United States has also been prone to withdrawing from agreements that previous administrations had signed onto, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (under George W. Bush) and the Iran nuclear deal (under Trump).

There is no guarantee of perpetual peace in this world. Getting all sides to stick to their end of the bargain will require a mixture of inducements and penalties, deterrence and reassurance. It will require ending Ukraine’s position as a “grayzone” state whose security status is unclear and providing it with sufficient guarantees of its future security that all sides can live with.

Above all, it will require an ongoing commitment to robust diplomatic dialogue and a concerted effort to craft a more inclusive continental security order, without which neither Russia, Ukraine nor the West will enjoy any security.