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Nukes up: North Korea tests absent US policy

Kim Jong Un appears to be ramping up for a serious provocation around the presidential election

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

North Korea may carry out its seventh nuclear test to coincide with the U.S. presidential election, according to a briefing South Korean lawmakers received from their National Intelligence Service (NIS).

The last North Korean nuclear weapon test was in September 2017 during the heightened tensions between Washington and Pyongyang that year. A new test would be viewed as a serious provocation in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, and it would almost certainly be a warning to the next administration that the U.S. will have to pay more attention to North Korea in the years ahead.

If the test does take place this fall, it will be a reminder of the consequences of Trump’s failed North Korea policy and an indictment of the Biden administration’s neglect of this issue. Another North Korean nuclear test should force Washington to rethink U.S. policy and make a renewed push for an arms control agreement with the DPRK no matter who wins the election in November.

Ever since the failed Hanoi summit in 2019, there has been no real U.S. attempt to resume diplomatic engagement with North Korea. For the remainder of Trump’s presidency, the issue was put on the back burner, and it remained there for the duration of Biden’s term. Aside from a few initial probes by U.S. officials shortly after Biden took office, there has been no interest in the White House in reopening negotiations.

Instead, it’s been the usual mix of sanctions and threats with predictably poor results. According to the same NIS briefing that mentioned the possible nuclear test, North Korea has amassed enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to build dozens more nuclear weapons.

Kim Jong-un was embarrassed by the Trump administration’s refusal to accept his proposal at the Hanoi summit. Kim was never going to agree to Washington’s maximalist demands for the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons program, but he had been prepared to make some real concessions concerning their Yongbyon facility.

According to former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker in "Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea's Nuclear Program," the concessions offered at Hanoi were significant: “More importantly…was that without Yongbyon, the North could not produce additional plutonium and tritium, thereby limiting its ability to enhance the sophistication of its nuclear weapons.” By insisting on an all-or-nothing solution, Trump missed a key opportunity to make real progress in limiting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

There might be a temptation in Washington to shrug off any new North Korean provocations as more of the same behavior that the U.S. has seen for years, but it would be unwise to be so complacent. In the absence of any constraints on North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal, the South Korean government will feel increasing pressure to consider developing their own weapons program.

The U.S. has correctly been discouraging South Korea from doing this, but if there is no credible arms control agreement imposing some limits on the growth and deployment of North Korea’s arsenal there may be no amount of “reassurance” from Washington that will satisfy our ally.

North Korea policy has received almost no attention from the candidates this year, except when Vice President Harris has wanted to criticize Trump for “cozying up” to dictators and Trump mused that Kim Jong-un was missing him. The North Korean government was quick to respond to Trump’s remarks, saying that they “don’t care” if he is elected and that they don’t expect any change from the U.S. The North Korean leadership felt burned by the experience of negotiating with Trump, and it seems that they aren’t eager for a second round.

The party platforms released this summer had very little to say about North Korea, and there was no evidence that either party was seriously contemplating a major diplomatic initiative. The Democratic Party platform touched on Trump’s North Korea record, but only to complain about how he had been “embarrassing the United States on the world stage including by flattering and legitimizing Kim Jong Un, exchanging ‘love letters’ with the North Korean dictator.” There was no suggestion that a new Democratic administration would pursue a different kind of diplomatic approach. The Republican platform said nothing at all about this issue.

Given the candidates’ apparent lack of interest in renewed diplomacy with North Korea, it is unlikely that arms control negotiations would normally be on the agenda for the next administration. If North Korea conducts a new nuclear test, that might be the external shock needed to focus Washington’s attention on this issue and force a serious reconsideration of existing policy. After almost 20 years of trying and failing to “denuclearize” North Korea, the U.S. will need to change course and set less ambitious arms control goals that can be reached.

North Korea’s growing arsenal cannot be ignored for another four years. Regardless of the election outcome, the U.S. does not have the luxury of relying on the same ineffective policy of sanctions and shows of force.


North Korean president Kim Jong Un (Alexander Khitrov/shutterstock)|
North Korean president Kim Jong Un (Alexander Khitrov/shutterstock)|
Analysis | Asia-Pacific
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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Asia-Pacific

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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