It's been one year since Israel invaded Gaza in its campaign to destroy Hamas in the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks. Since then, the Biden Administration has given Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government everything it wanted and has posed little resistance as the Israeli military has killed more than 42,000 people, mostly civilians, destroyed most of the buildings and infrastructure,, and created one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent memory. The word "ceasefire" is increasingly absent from Biden's public remarks or the White House briefing room.
A new video, produced by the Quincy Institute, puts these grim statistics in sharp relief.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and U.S. President Donald Trump meet, while they attend the funeral of Pope Francis, at the Vatican April 26, 2025. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via REUTERS
The U.S.-Ukraine minerals agreement is not a diplomatic breakthrough and will not end the war, but it is a significant success for Ukraine, both in the short term and — if it is ever in fact implemented — in the longer term.
It reportedly does not get Ukraine the security “guarantees” that Kyiv has been asking for. It does not commit the U.S. to fight for Ukraine, or to back up a European “reassurance force” for Ukraine. And NATO membership remains off the table. Given its basic positions, there is no chance of the Trump administration shifting on these points.
But since the Ukraine peace process appeared to run out of steam, and Trump threatened to “walk away” from the talks, Kyiv and Moscow have been engaged in an elaborate diplomatic dance of semi-proposals and hints to try to ensure that if Trump does walk away, he will blame the other side for the talks’ failure.
This agreement makes it far more likely that he will blame Russia, and therefore that he will continue military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. He may also, as threatened, try to impose additional sanctions on Russia — though given the resistance of most of the world to these sanctions, and tensions over tariffs between the U.S. and Europe, it is not at all clear how effective new sanctions would be.
Continued U.S. military and intelligence aid will not win the war for Ukraine, nor allow it to drive the Russians from occupied territory. It will however help the Ukrainian army to slow down Russia’s advance on the ground and impose heavy casualties on the Russian army. This should not be taken by the Ukrainians or their European supporters as an excuse to maintain impossible conditions for peace that will make a settlement impossible; because the military and economic odds are still strongly against Ukraine, and a collapse of Ukraine’s exhausted troops is a real possibility.
However, it will make it more likely that Russia will abandon or heavily qualify its impossible demands, for example for Ukrainian disarmament and withdrawal from additional territory.
As far as the deal itself is concerned, it is clearly far more favorable for Ukraine than Trump’s original — and grotesque — proposal that Ukraine should essentially hand its entire reserves of minerals to the U.S. in compensation for U.S. aid. Under the new agreement, the profits of mineral extraction will be equally shared.
As Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “This agreement signals clearly to Russia that the Trump administration is committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term. … President Trump envisioned this partnership between the American people and the Ukrainian people to show both sides’ commitment to lasting peace and prosperity in Ukraine. And to be clear, no state or person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine will be allowed to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine.”
Nor under this deal will any U.S. money go to develop mineral extraction in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
According to Trump, “The American presence will, I think, keep a lot of bad actors out of the country or certainly out of the area where we’re doing the digging."
Despite Western rhetoric, absolute Western security guarantees for Ukraine after a peace settlement have never really been on offer, because the Biden administration and almost every other NATO government stated repeatedly that they would not fight to defend Ukraine. This deal, if implemented, will however ensure a strong continued U.S. interest in Ukraine. It greatly reduces the risk that in the event of future Russian aggression, the U.S. would simply look away and not respond as it has in this war, with military supplies and extreme sanctions.
But the deal won’t be implemented until the war comes to an end. Thereafter, it will depend on the willingness of U.S. private companies to invest in this sector — and that will depend on their assessment of both the risks and the profits involved. For it is vital to note that this agreement does not commit the U.S. government to invest in Ukraine; and to judge by the present profitability of minerals extraction in the world, it is not certain that private investors will see major benefits from doing so.
China has developed its rare-earth sector on such a scale mainly through huge state-directed investment; and no-one has so far done a thorough analysis of the actual profitability and scale of most of these Ukrainian resources. So, only a tactical success for Ukraine and one over which there hang many questions; but nonetheless one that hopefully will lead Moscow to respond with some serious and acceptable peace proposals of its own.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
Bomber builder losing money … for now
When playing Pentagon poker, when is a loss not a loss? When reading the tea leaves convinces you that today’s loss will yield a bigger win tomorrow. You knew this was coming as soon as the Air Force general in charge of dropping nuclear bombs dropped one last month: The Pentagon’s planned buy of 100 B-21 bombers isn’t enough. He really, honestly, truthinessly needs 145 of the bat-winged warplanes.
Things have changed since that original number was set in 2011, and it just won’t do in today’s world, General Anthony Cotton, chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, said March 18. “The production rate that was agreed upon was, I think, in [that] geopolitical environment. That’s a little different than the geopolitical environment that we will face for decades to come,” he said. “Hence, I, as a customer, would love to see larger production rates.”
So, as day follows night, 35 days later Northrop announced that it was taking a $477 million loss on its B-21 program. Largely, that’s so it — wait for it! — can build more of the highly-classified bombers, faster. Much of that sum is dedicated to an unspecified production “process change” for the B-21. “That process change supports the accelerated production rates,” Kathy Warden, Northrop’s CEO, said April 22. “We can ramp beyond the quantities in the program of record,” she added, referring to the Air Force’s piddling 100-bomber buy. “Which is something that we and the government decided was important for the optionality to support the scenarios that they have been looking at to increase the current build rate.”
“Optionality”?
Of course, pretty much everything about the B-21 Raider, including its “build rate” — how many a year we’ll get to buy — remains secret. But Northrop’s website does have a handy-dandy FAQ section dedicated to the bomber. “The U.S. Air Force has stated plans to acquire at least 100 aircraft,” it says. “Some defense analysts believe that the Air Force should plan to purchase at least 200 B-21s.” Gotta wonder how much of a bonus the PR whiz pocketed who added “at least 200.”
The B-21 made its first flight late in 2023, and five more bombers are now under construction in California. Capable of carrying both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, the B-21 is slated to go operational in 2027. Calculating its cost can be challenging. Bloomberg reported in 2022 that the 100 bombers would cost $89.1 billion to produce, or $891 million a copy. But that’s based on 2019 dollars. While the bomber may have some ability to elude enemy radar, it can’t elude inflation.
Hurray for Lockheed! Sure, that’s not The Bunker’s usual take on the Pentagon’s biggest contractor. But on April 22, the company did something refreshing. Instead of challenging competitor Boeing’s recent winning bid to build the Air Force’s new F-47 fighter, it decided to improve the existing Lockheed-built F-35.
Now granted, the F-35 continues to be plagued by cost, production, and readiness woes. But when defense contractors lose a major contract, many opt to file a “bid protest” with the Government Accountability Office in hopes of reversing the decision. It rarely works and only serves to delay the program.
In this case, Lockheed has instead decided to cram some of the unspecified new technologies it has developed for its losing F-47 sixth-generation bid into the fifth-generation F-35. “There are techniques and capabilities … that were developed for [our F-47 bid] that we can now apply here,” Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet said. “We’re basically going to take the [F-35's] chassis and turn it into a Ferrari.” That’s pretty funny, because four years ago the Air Force’s top officer said the F-35 was already a Ferrari. (And for all those years you thought the “F” in F-16s, F-35s, etc., stood for “Fighter.”)
But what’s not funny is something else Taiclet said: “My challenge here on my aeronautics team is, let’s get 80% of six-gen capability at half the price … they wouldn’t have agreed to this if they didn’t think there was a path to get there.” (But don’t think that’ll be a bargain. Best estimates suggest that F-47s will end up costing $300 million each, meaning a supercharged F-35 would cost $150 million.)
Why should it take losing a contract to compel a contractor to build something nearly as good for half the price? No doubt there’s some Lockheed hyperbole there. But it’s no more hyperbolic than the hypersonic frenzy used to justify the F-47. Here’s an inside tip: Foreign foes are never as threatening as those with an (in)vested interest in fighting them claim. And its corollary: Shiny new U.S. weapons are never as good when they roll off the assembly line as they are at conception.
The death of decapitation
You may have seen images of Pope Francis in his open coffin last week. That’s because the Vatican wanted you to see them. But what if some terror group — or rogue state — didn’t want the world to know their leader had been killed by a U.S. missile strike, or offed during a capture-or-kill mission that defaulted to the death option?
That’s no longer a theoretical question. “Synthetic media may allow terrorist organizations to simulate the continued presence of deceased leaders, undermining public belief in their deaths,” Army Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau wrote April 23 at West Point’s Modern War Institute website. “Generative AI is not just a tactical threat; it is a strategic disruptor that challenges the foundations of belief, perception, and reality in modern warfare.”
In other words, the next time a good guy kills a bad guy, AI could generate a fake living bad guy to declare: “You missed.”
James Holmes of the Naval War College autopsies the 1989 blast aboard the USS Iowa that killed 47 sailors and details how and why the Navy compounded the tragedy with its disgraceful investigation, April 23 in The National Interest.
A new book by Phil Tinline, reviewed in the New York Times April 27, examines a 1967 magazine article that argued that war is “the essential economic stabilizer of modern societies.” It was a crafty hoax, but so well done, that it infects U.S. society even today.
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Top image credit: Ursula Von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas via Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com
Amid questions of the over-militarization of U.S. foreign policy and the illusion of global primacy, the European Union is charging headlong in the opposite direction, appearing to be eagerly grasping for an American-esque primacist role.
Last month, the European Commission, the EU’s executive body, proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a part of the EU’s sweeping, $900 billion rearmament plans. This ambition, driven by elites in Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Warsaw rather than broad support from Europe’s diverse populations, reflects a dangerous delusion: that, in the face of a purported U.S. retreat, the EU has to overtake the mantle as leading defender of the “rules-based liberal world order.”
Not everybody in the EU is on board though. Countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Italy and Spain are known for their less than enthusiastic embrace of the rearmament fervor. Last week, a voice of dissent came from the European Parliament, elected directly by the EU citizens — unlike the Commission.
The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs unanimously rejected the legal basis proposed by the Commission for SAFE, namely Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This is more than just an arcane legal-technocratic detail: Article 122 allows the Commission to invoke urgency to bypass the European Parliament and secure approval for its proposals with only a qualified majority in the Council. As the foreign policy decisions are taken by consensus, the purpose of this maneuver is to eliminate potential vetoes from skeptical member countries.
Historically used for crises like COVID-19, this procedure is now being weaponized by Commission hawks, led by Ursula von der Leyen, its president, to operationalize the “rearm” concept. Von der Leyen, alongside High Representative for Foreign Policy Kaja Kallas, a former prime minister of Estonia, has leaned on alarmist rhetoric, exaggerating external threats — particularly from Russia — to justify this rush. This fear-driven narrative pressures all member states to align with a Russia-centric security agenda, often at odds with their own priorities: it is true that Russia is undeniably perceived as a serious threat in the Baltic states and Poland, hence support for hardline policies, but Hungary and Slovakia, on the contrary, have long advocated for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. And Spain and Italy treat migration and failing states in the southern Mediterranean, not Russia, as their main security risks.
Yet the Commission’s move represents a significant overreach, sidelining the Parliament and potentially some member states, a process that undermines democracy. By invoking urgency, the Commission seeks to fast-track SAFE without the scrutiny required for such a transformative shift. The Legal Committee’s rejection of that route highlights the Commission’s failure to justify this urgency or explain why alternative legal routes were ignored.
This vote is procedural — it shouldn’t be confused with a principled stand against rearmament. In fact, the Parliament’s hawkish majority, comprising parties from the center-right and center-left, has endorsed the concept in a resolution on the matter. The opposition came mostly from the right-wing Patriots for Europe (the political group that includes the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s party and the French National Rally, currently the most popular party in France), the Left and a number of independent MEPs.
The vote in the Legal Committee remains focused on technicalities. Some MEPs, particularly from France, even push for a stronger “buy European” clause in SAFE to benefit the continent’s arms industry, whose lobbyists are increasingly active in Brussels. The Parliament, or its dedicated bodies, such as the foreign affairs and defense and security committees, have not so far addressed the issue with strategic clarity — such as asking questions about SAFE’s purpose, the EU’s intended adversaries, or why such a massive military buildup is necessary with such urgency.
Even more worryingly, the EU’s militarization drive exacerbates the neglect of diplomacy. While the elites are indulging in these delusions, EU citizens seem to be much more skeptical about dramatic increase in defense spending. Moreover, the EU, unlike the U.S., has neither the capability to sustain this path, nor the protections the U.S. enjoys, like being buffered by two oceans and situated between unthreatening neighbors.
Meanwhile, in its pursuit of an elusive hard power, the EU is busy squandering the soft power which used to define its global influence, turning a blind eye to Israel’s crimes in Gaza, downplaying democratic backsliding in Turkey, and groveling to autocrats like Azerbaijan’s Aliyev — all that for at best marginal gains.
A vote in the Legal Committee won’t address all these issues, but it does offer a tiny glimmer of hope. It could slow the militarization process, allowing elected representatives and member states to scrutinize SAFE’s long-term ramifications, challenge the Commission’s fear-driven overreach, and prioritize diplomacy with adversaries. If the Commission persists in its power grab, it is liable to challenge, by the European Parliament or member states, in the EU Court of Justice.
The reckless ambition to emulate U.S.-style primacy without its power or protections, risks entrenching a militarized future for Europe at the expense of its democratic principles, its diverse securit needs, and its survival in a region where missteps could prove catastrophic.
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