U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said on Wednesday that a controversial American contracting firm tasked with delivering aid in Gaza is expanding operations, from the 4 hubs it is currently operating to 16.
Israeli forces have killed more than 1,000 Palestinians at or near aid hubs run by the U.S.- and Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), leading to humanitarian organizations and 21 U.S. senators to call on the GHF to cease operating.
“The immediate plan is to scale up the number of sites up to 16, and begin to operate them as much as 24 hours a day, to get more food to more people more efficiently,” Huckabee said.
Huckabee did not directly confirm or deny Axios reporting on Tuesday that President Trump will “take over” aid distribution in Gaza. When asked about that reporting, he said during an interview on Fox News that the Trump administration “stood up” GHF in the first place.
“I think the president of the United States always has a very important role in something like this, if he chooses to do it,” Huckabee said, calling GHF “an American-based operation.”
GHF’s aid hubs are managed by armed American private contractors. Operating with little guidance dictating their activities in the Gaza Strip, witnessescharge that contractors have used dangerous crowd control tactics, including using tear gas, while a whistleblower says he saw contractors shoot at crowds of Palestinians seeking food and water at or near the aid hubs. If the new hubs proceed as Huckabee describes, many more American contractors would be necessary for their operations.
Israeli and American officials say GHF is necessary to prevent Hamas from stealing from aid distribution efforts in the Gaza Strip. But The New York Times recently reported that the Israeli military does not have proof of Hamas doing this.
GHF did not answer an RS inquiry about whether it was expanding its operations in the Gaza Strip.
Sudanese protester stands in front of a blazing fire during a demonstration against the military coup, on International Women's Day in Khartoum, Sudan March 8, 2022. REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig
In a dramatic move last week, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced the selection of its own prime minister and presidential council to compete with and directly challenge the legitimacy of the Sudanese government.
News of the new parallel government comes days before a new round of peace talks was expected to begin in Washington last week. Although neither of the two civil war belligerents were going to attend, it was to be the latest effort by the United States to broker an end to the war in Sudan — and the first major effort under Trump’s presidency.
But the United States, which was planning to host the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), called off the talks scheduled for July 30 just before they were to begin because of disagreement with the Egyptians over the wording of a communique that was expected to be released as part of the summit.
The Egyptians, which have been closely aligned with the military-backed Sudanese government over the course of the civil war, opposed a portion of the document that declared that neither the current Sudanese government nor the paramilitary RSF could play a leading role in the new post-war transitional government. Egypt’s support for the Sudanese government places it in direct opposition to the UAE, which has provided military support to the RSF.
The RSF’s decision to form a new government took root in meetings in Kenya with leaders of other factions also opposed to the Sudanese government, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in February of this year. The different groups joined forces to outline what a future regime should look like, ultimately launching the Government of Peace and Unity in mid-April
As announced on July 26, the prime minister chosen to lead Peace and Unity is Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’aishi. He served as a member of the Transitional Sovereignty Council which was instituted to rule over Sudan in the wake of the 2019 coup that led to the ouster of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir. The presidential council, which will be headed by Mohamed Dagalo (widely known as Hemedti), is composed of 15 members, many of whom are RSF military personnel. Hemedti is the leader of the RSF military operation and the key rebel in the initial split with General al-Burhan, which served as the catalyst for the ongoing civil war.
The war, which has pitted the rival generals al-Burhan of the Sudanese government and Hemedti of the RSF against each other since it began in April 2023, has displaced over 12 million people and has caused arguably the most intense humanitarian crisis in the world.
The latest move by the RSF to put in place political figureheads to take charge of the new government increases the chance that the country’s political and territorial division will continue for years. Sudan is continuing to resemble other countries whose divided governments have caused years of political, economic, and security instability and chaos.
In Libya, for example, two opposing governments led by political and military rivals have each claimed sovereignty over the country and maintained legitimacy over portions of the nation’s territory since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2011 military intervention in the country. The result has been incongruent policy objectives between the rival governments, continued military engagements, and a stifled economy unable to escape from the grip of political and security turmoil.
Similarly divisive political systems have dominated Somalia’s recent history, with the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland both claiming independence from the Somali government, which is in the throes of a years-long counterterrorism campaign against terrorist organizations.
The RSF’s announcement of a prime minister and presidential council was swiftly condemned by regional organizations. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council publicly asked that international actors “not recognise the so-called ‘parallel government’ which has serious consequences on the peace efforts and the existential future of the country” and also “refrain from providing support and assistance” to the new government.
Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretariat warned that the new government would “impose a de facto reality by military force” and risks turning Sudan — which is a member of the Arab League — into a country of “warring cantons.”
With Sudan further fissuring, the United States should follow up on its diplomatic success in the DRC by working intensely with Egypt to correct the point of discord in the communique, and bring together the three foreign actors in a postponed peace summit in Washington aimed at getting each to end its support for its preferred faction in the war. Ending the constant stream of outside military supplies and support for the two major sides in the civil war is the only practical way for the United States to broker an end to this war.
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Top photo credit: A doctor checks Jana Ayad, a malnourished Palestinian girl, as she receives treatment at the International Medical Corps field hospital, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, in Deir Al-Balah in the southern Gaza Strip, June 22, 2024. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem /File Photo
“Child Dies of Malnutrition as Starvation in Gaza Grows” (CNN, 7/21/25)
“More Than 100 Aid Groups Warn of Starvation in Gaza as Israeli Strikes Kill 29, Officials Say” (AP, 7/23/25)
“No Formula, No Food: Mothers and Babies Starve Together in Gaza” (NBC, 7/25/25)
“Five-Month-Old Baby Dies in Mother’s Arms in Gaza, a New Victim of Escalating Starvation Crisis” (CNN, 7/26/25)
“Gaza’s Children Are Looking Through Trash to Avoid Starving” (New York, 7/28/25)
This media coverage is urgent and necessary—and criminally late.
Devastatingly late to care
Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has severely restricted humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, using starvation of civilians as a tool of war, a war crime for which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Yoav Gallant have been charged by the International Criminal Court. Gallant proclaimed a “complete siege” of Gaza on October 9, 2023: “There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed.”
Aid groups warned of famine conditions in parts of Gaza as early as December 2023. By April 2024, USAID administrator Samantha Power (CNN, 4/11/24) found it “likely that parts of Gaza, and particularly northern Gaza, are already experiencing famine.”
A modest increase in food aid was allowed into the Strip during a ceasefire in early 2025. But on March 2, 2025, Netanyahu announced a complete blockade on the occupied territory. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir declared that there was “no reason for a gram of food or aid to enter Gaza.”
After more than two months of a total blockade, Israel on May 19 began allowing in a trickle of aid through US/Israeli “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” (GHF) centers (FAIR.org, 6/6/25)—while targeting with snipers those who came for it—but it is not anywhere near enough, and the population in Gaza is now on the brink of mass death, experts warn. According to UNICEF (7/27/25):
The entire population of over 2 million people in Gaza is severely food insecure. One out of every three people has not eaten for days, and 80% of all reported deaths by starvation are children.
According to the Gaza Health Ministry, at least 147 Gazans have died from malnutrition since the start of Israel’s post–October 7 assault. Most have been in the past few weeks.
Mainstream politicians are finally starting to speak out—even Donald Trump has acknowledged “real starvation” in Gaza—but as critical observers have pointed out, it is devastatingly late to begin to profess concern. Jack Mirkinson’s Discourse Blog (7/28/25) quoted Refugees International president Jeremy Konyndyk:
I fear that starvation in Gaza has now passed the tipping point and we are going to see mass-scale starvation mortality…. Once a famine gathers momentum, the effort required to contain it increases exponentially. It would now take an overwhelmingly large aid operation to reverse the coming wave of mortality, and it would take months.
And there are long-term, permanent health consequences to famine, even when lives are saved (NPR, 7/29/25). Mirkinson lambasted leaders like Cory Booker and Hillary Clinton for failing to speak up before now: “It is too late for them to wash the blood from their hands.”
Barely newsworthy
Major US media, likewise, bear a share of responsibility for the hunger-related deaths in Gaza. The conditions of famine have been out in the open for well over a year, and yet it was considered barely newsworthy in US news media.
A MediaCloud search of online US news reports mentioning “Gaza” and either “famine” or “starvation” shows that since Netanyahu’s March 2 announcement of a total blockade—which could only mean rapidly increasing famine conditions—there was a brief blip of media attention, and then even less news coverage than usual for the rest of March and April. Media attention rose modestly in May, at a time when the world body that classifies famines announced in May that one in five people in Gaza were “likely to face starvation between May 11 and September 30″—in other words, that flooding Gaza with aid was of the highest urgency.
But as aid continued to be held up, and Gazans were shot by Israeli snipers when attempting to retrieve the little offered them, that coverage eventually dwindled, until the current spike that began on July 21.
FAIR (e.g., 3/22/24, 4/25/25, 5/16/25, 5/16/25) has repeatedly criticized US media for coverage that largely absolves Israel of responsibility for its policy of forced starvation—what Human Rights Watch (5/15/25) called “a tool of extermination”—implemented with the backing of the US government.
The current headlines reveal that the coverage still largely diverts attention from Israeli (let alone US) responsibility, but it’s a positive development that major US news media are beginning to devote serious coverage to the issue. Imagine how different this all could have looked had they given it the attention it has warranted, and the accountability it has demanded, when alarms were first raised.
When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lands in Buenos Aires this September, he’ll test more than Argentina’s hospitality — he’ll force a reckoning with the President Javier Milei’s gamble: Is Argentina’s fervent alignment with Israel a strategic masterstroke or a geopolitical liability?
This alignment stems from Milei’s ideologically Manichean worldview, framing global conflicts as a battle between absolute good (Israel/West) and evil (Iran/leftists). Determined to be on the "right side of history," he has visited Israel twice since taking office, including a trip in June 2025 just days before Israel's strike on Iran.
Moreover, Milei’s devotion to Israel borders on the mystical — a Catholic who studies Kabbalah and offers tearful prayers at the Western Wall with rabbis, treating Zionism as both political ideology and personal spiritual awakening.
It remains to be seen whether such devotion will deliver Argentina tangible returns beside Israel’s rhetorical nods, such as the foreign minister Gideon Saar’s repurposing of Milei’s slogan “Viva la libertad, carajo” (Long Live Freedom, Damn It) for the airstrike on Tehran's Evin prison which killed 79 people.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s planned visit has sparked growing concerns among political observers and security experts in Argentina about possible repercussions.
For one, Netanyahu's visit would immediately test Argentina's commitment to international law, as the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against him last November obligates Buenos Aires — a Rome Statute signatory — to arrest him on arrival. Milei's likely refusal would confirm critics' claims that his alliance with Israel trumps international obligations. The irony is particularly sharp given Argentina's exemplary prosecution of its own officials for crimes against humanity during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship.
Second, Milei’s invitation for Netanyahu to visit Argentina, even as he faces the ICC indictment and Israel growing international isolation over its war in Gaza, marks a radical break from Argentina's tradition of maintaining neutrality in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In his 18 months in office, Milei has so far announced plans to move Argentina's embassy to West Jerusalem by 2026, and Argentina’s vote at the UN General Assembly against a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire in Gaza (joined by only 11 other nations) risked alienating many of the 149 countries that supported it, including traditional partners in the Arab world, Latin America (including Argentina’s biggest neighbor and trading partner, Brazil), the Global South more generally, and some key European countries.
Argentine security analysts warn these moves could make the country a target for retaliation by Iran or its allies. A recent detailed report on the June’s 12-day war between Israel and Iran submitted by Iran’s mission to the UN, listed Argentina among nations that supported the Israeli/U.S. attacks. Critics fear that Milei may have compounded the risks of retaliation by explicitly declaring Iran an “enemy” of Argentina. That stance is shared by many Argentines who regard Iran’s support for Hamas as amounting to complicity in the latter’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel in which 21 Argentines were killed or taken hostage.
Critics don’t fear direct Iranian retaliation so much as action by Tehran’s allies, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, or domestic groups opposed to Milei's Israel policy.
Argentina's traumatic history lends credence to these concerns: the 1992 Israeli embassy bombing and the 1994 AMIA Jewish community center attack, in which 85 people were killed, were linked to Iran and Hezbollah. Despite the conclusion by Israel’s own Mossad intelligence, that Hezbollah (with no “operational involvement” by Iran) was behind the bombings, no one has ever been convicted for the crimes, and Argentina's own numerous investigations have been plagued by alleged cover-ups, incompetence and political interference.
The 2015 death of prosecutor Alberto Nisman, just hours before he intended to formally charge then-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner with shielding Iranian suspects in the AMIA bombing, remains a major source of speculation and controversy in Argentina. While the official cause of his death was suicide, one court ruled in 2018 that he was murdered, although the judge in the case failed to establish who was the perpetrator or what was the motive.
A visit by Netanyahu risks reviving these deep emotional wounds and still-unresolved controversies. Argentina’s Jewish community (the largest in Latin America) is divided on the subject. Jorge Knoblovits, head of the Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations (DAIA), dismissed concerns that closer ties with Israel could lead to new attacks on Argentine soil. "The whole world is exposed to terrorism. It has struck under all types of governments, left and right," he said.
In contrast, Pablo Gorodneff of the Jewish group Llamamiento Argentino Judío, noted that a key principle of foreign policy is "don't get involved in conflicts that aren't yours," adding that Milei "in some ways sincerely... believes this fabricated narrative, which I find quite dangerous." He is backed by Héctor Shalom, director of the Anna Frank Center Argentina, who warned that if extremists seek "to strike Jews," Argentina's history of impunity for the two major attacks – emblematic of its vulnerability – makes it a prime target.
Moreover, security vulnerabilities intersect with potential economic risks, diplomatic backlash and reputational costs. Alienating Arab and Muslim-majority markets could damage Argentina's critical commodities and agricultural exports.
It could also limit the potential for new partnerships with the Persian Gulf states: in late 2024, the National Congress hosted a meeting with representatives of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait to discuss prospects for investments of their sovereign wealth funds in Argentina. Milei’s predecessor government negotiated an inventive formula with Qatar to secure a $775 million loan to help Buenos Aires repay its debt to the International Monetary Fund.
On the diplomatic front, Netanyahu’s visit to Buenos Aires also risks undermining Argentina’s appeals to international law as the basis for its claims against Britain in a long-running dispute over the Malvinas (Falklands) islands. The two countries fought a brief but deadly war over the islands in 1982. While most countries of the Global South supported Argentina’s claims precisely on the basis of international law, Milei’s vocal support for Israel in its current war in Gaza capped by a Netanyahu visit will not be well received by those same capitals.
Milei's Israel infatuation appears driven more by his personal convictions than a prudent national interest calculus. While it may curry favor in Washington, the security and diplomatic risks are tangible. Netanyahu's potential visit will reveal whether this policy delivers strategic benefits or exposes Argentina to dangerous consequences for years to come.
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