Mexico and Chile’s recent referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for an investigation on crimes against civilians in Gaza during the current Israeli campaign (and the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks in Israel) is another sign of increasing support in the Global South for an international legal route against the ongoing war and siege of Gaza.
The question of whether Israeli troops are committing war crimes in a continuing and devastating war has been met with deep resistance and anger in Israel and among its supporters in the United States. As the core backer of Israel’s war, there are reputational implications for the United States here, too.
Several developing countries have explicitly come out in support of South Africa’s case (or “application”) against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in late December 2023 on the even more serious charge of genocide, while others have done so indirectly, as a part of resolutions passed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League.
And in November, South Africa, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Comoros, and Djibouti made their own referral to the ICC on possible crimes committed against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.
There is also another case making its way through the ICJ on an advisory opinion “in respect of the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” The case is the outcome of a UN General Assembly resolution asking for such an opinion adopted on December 30, 2022. Indonesia has recently announced that the foreign minister herself, Retno Marsudi, will fly to the Hague to make oral arguments backing Palestine in this case.
Mapping the increasing recourse to international legal action by Global South states against Israel’s actions in Palestine is revealing, indicating that time does not seem to be on Israel’s side when it comes to winning friends in this space. States either leading or supporting such actions span across almost all of the Global South, including Latin America, Africa, West Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. And the actions initiated by South Africa, Mexico, and Chile, and the wide support for the UNGA resolution of December 2022, shows that this sentiment extends well beyond Arab or Muslim-majority states.
When tallied by the populations of these states, about 59% of the Global South has now led or backed international legal action against Israel. Moreover, as our mapping of the UNGA resolution of December 12 showed, a vast majority of Global South states have gone on record supporting an unconditional humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
Dan M. Ford is a junior research fellow at the Quincy Institute's Global South Program. Previously he served as a research and communications associate at the Global Interagency Security Forum in Washington, D.C.
I wrote a book about Lockheed Martin — the world’s largest arms-making conglomerate. But even I was surprised to learn that for a number of years now, they have also been involved in the fashion industry.
The revelation came in a recent New York Times piece on Kodak, which has had a minor resurgence, not by selling its own products, but by selling its name for use on a range of consumer products, produced by other firms, from luggage to eyewear to hoodies and t-shirts.
Deeper into the article it was mentioned in passing that Lockheed Martin had been doing the same. It linked to another article that noted that Lockheed Martin-branded cargo pants and hoodies have been a hit in South Korea since they were introduced a few years back. Brisk sales are continuing, with the Lockheed brand adorning streetwear with slogans like “Ensuring those we serve always stay ahead of ready.” One blue t-shirt dons the outline of an F-35 on the back, emblazoned with the motto “The F-35 strengthens national security, enhances global partnerships and powers economic growth.” It doesn’t exactly roll off the tongue, but at least it’s free advertising.
Not to be outdone, emerging tech firms are selling limited edition fashion lines of their own. Palantir recently dropped a line of hats and tees that quickly sold out. Eliano Younes, Head of Strategic Engagement for Palantir, has noted that when they re-launched the Palantir shop that “the site almost crashed within four minutes.” And Anduril has partnered with Reyn Spooner to launch a limited drop of Hawaiian shirts — a favorite uniform of company founder Palmer Luckey.
Not everyone welcomes the entry of weapons makers into the fashion world. A critic of Lockheed’s apparel line who goes by the name of Opal noted, “They stopped killing people for just a minute to help them kill those looks . . . The people who made these decisions are either so out of touch or like unbelievably acutely aware of what’s going on, and I can’t really tell the difference.”
As Opal fears, the marriage of fashion and weapons makers may be a sign of the times, as shoppers welcome the entrance of arms makers into the consumer sector rather than seeing their foray into fashion as an exercise in poor taste. This is probably because military firms and the weapons they produce are so deeply embedded in our culture that many people view the companies as purveyors of neat technology while ignoring the devastating consequences that occur when those weapons are actually used.
Lockheed Martin’s efforts at reputation laundering come at a moment when many arms industry leaders are vocally supporting — even applauding — armed violence. Prominent Silicon Valley military tech executives like Luckey and Palantir CEO Alex Karp, have no compunction about glorifying war while their companies are paid handsome sums to build the tools needed to carry it out. Luckey, the 32-year old head of the military tech firm Anduril, asserts that “Societies have always needed a warrior class that is enthused and excited by enacting violence in pursuit of good aims.” He didn’t discuss who gets to decide what “good aims” are, or why being “excited” about killing fellow human beings could ever be a good thing.
And Karp held his company’s board meeting in Israel at the height of the Gaza war to cheer on Israel’s campaign of mass slaughter. At the time of the meeting, the company’s Executive VP Josh Harris announced that “Both parties have mutually agreed to harness Palantir’s advanced technology in support of war-related missions. This strategic partnership aims to significantly aid the Israeli Ministry of Defense in addressing the current situation.”
These attitudes contrast with the efforts of old school arms company leaders like former Lockheed Martin CEO Norman Augustine, who was a master at burnishing the image of his company while downplaying its role as a primary producer of weapons at war.
Augustine led by personal example, working closely with the Boy Scouts and the Red Cross, championing science education, and speaking regularly of the need for corporate ethics, which he seemed to equate mostly with acts of charity by company employees, not with grappling with moral questions about how his company’s weapons were being used.
To a lesser degree, Augustine’s approach continues to this day. Company press releases describe Lockheed Martin as a firm that is “driving innovation and advancing scientific discovery.” The company’s image-building efforts include support for scholarships in STEM education, funding programs to build and upgrade facilities serving veterans, supporting food banks and disaster response programs, and more. There’s nothing wrong with helping fund a good cause, but it shouldn’t be allowed to obscure the company’s other activities.
The weapons produced by Lockheed Martin have fueled the war in Gaza, and they were integral to Saudi Arabia’s brutal war in Yemen, an effort that included bombing funerals, a school bus, hospitals, civilian markets and water treatment plants in Yemen, in a war that cost nearly 400,000 lives through the direct and indirect means, from indiscriminate bombing the the enforcement of a blockade the hindered imports of food and medical supplies.
On the rare occasions that arms industry executives are asked about the human impacts of their products, they usually say they are only doing what the government allows. They fail to mention that they spend large sums of money and effort trying to shape government policy, making it easier to rush weapons to foreign clients without adequate consideration of their possible uses in aggressive wars or systematic repression.
Given all of this, Lockheed Martin’s endorsement of a line of street clothing seems like a relatively harmless side show. But celebrating weapons makers, even with a nod and a wink, serves to normalize the U.S. role as the world’s premier arms producer while ignoring the consequences of that status.
America needs to be able to defend itself and its allies, but celebrating war and preparations for war is not the way to do it. We need more reflection and less celebration. And we need to call weapons makers what they are, not welcome the use of their names as marketing tools designed to sell consumer products.
The real question as we try to dig ourselves out of a period of devastating wars and increasing global tension is whether we need huge weapons firms like Lockheed Martin at all, or if there is a more efficient, humane way to provide for the common defense, less focused on profit and PR and more focused on developing the tools actually needed to carry out a more rational, restrained defense strategy.
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Top photo credit: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits the construction site of the Ragwon County Offshore Farm, North Korea July 13, 2025. KCNA via REUTERS
President Donald Trump’s second term has so far been a series of “shock and awe” campaigns both at home and abroad. But so far has left North Korea untouched even as it arms for the future.
The president dramatically broke with precedent during his first term, holding two summits as well as a brief meeting at the Demilitarized Zone with the North’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. Unfortunately, engagement crashed and burned in Hanoi. The DPRK then pulled back, essentially severing contact with both the U.S. and South Korea.
The Biden administration did little to break the stalemate, during which Pyongyang expanded both its nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities. The North’s objective appears to be an effective deterrent against Washington, meaning the ability to target the American homeland. In that effort, Kim likely benefits from his close partnership with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. For the latter, enabling the DPRK to put the U.S. at risk would be payback for Washington’s vigorous proxy war-plus against Moscow in Ukraine.
The North has so far demonstrated no interest in reviving the two leaders’ relationship. However, Trump remains the only sitting American president to reach out to the North, and thus apparently willing to consider relaxing economic sanctions, a major North Korean objective. Pyongyang has reason to both play hard-to-get for negotiating purposes and pursue diplomacy if Trump again opens Washington’s door.
Still, convincing Kim to take a risk after his humiliating failure in 2019 might require more than just a love letter or two. To entice Pyongyang, Trump should demonstrate his commitment to establishing a serious relationship with Pyongyang and bringing the North into the larger global order. Toward this end, he should drop the ban on American travel and propose diplomatic relations with the DPRK.
Trump imposed a travel ban in 2017, prohibiting North Koreans from coming to America. The policy was bizarre on its face. After all, the number of North Koreans attempting to visit the U.S. was vanishingly small. The harm they could do to America was inconsequential. The policy appeared to be an afterthought, an attempt to present Trump’s original “Muslim travel ban” as something else with North Korea’s (and Venezuela’s) inclusion.
Next, the administration banned Americans from traveling to the DPRK. This policy also made little sense. By what measure is North Korea too dangerous for Americans? Over the previous two decades a score of Americans was detained; all but one survived mostly brief imprisonments. In contrast, Syria, left open for extreme tourists, enterprising journalists, and warrior-wannabes, claimed several American lives. Indeed, the risks of my two trips to North Korea paled compared to those to Syria, Afghanistan (twice), Sudan, South Sudan, Haiti, Iraq, Burma/Myanmar (several times in Karen-held territory during the civil war), Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia (including in the Moluccan Islands, then aflame between Muslim and Christian militias). Yet Washington restricted travel to none of the latter lands.
Nor did the Trump ban serve any useful purpose. The administration acted in the aftermath of student Otto Warmbier’s tragic death. However, the exact circumstances of his arrest and injury are, according to those involved in North Korean tourism, more complicated than the official version of events. Indeed, neither doctors nor a coroner found evidence of torture.
Moreover, the North long recognized that American prisoners were valuable only if alive and always returned those who violated its rules after winning Washington’s attention. Only four of the 15 Americans held after 2009 were tourists, and they all knowingly violated the North’s dictates. Of course, that didn’t warrant punishment, let alone death, but the regime is even more brutal and unforgiving toward its own people. The Trump ban achieved little other than to further isolate a country and system that desperately requires the opposite treatment. Indeed, U.S. regulations prevent almost all tourism, journalism, and even humanitarianism, given the practical difficulties in winning State Department approval for travel.
After his latest inauguration, Trump issued an expanded travel ban, affecting 19 countries, with another 36 potentially similarly targeted. This time the North was not cited despite reportedly being originally considered for inclusion. Some have speculated that the exclusion was intended to ease any move toward bilateral negotiations. More likely, however, it resulted because North Korea is not required to suggest faux balance to the latest list, which is not otherwise limited to Muslim-majority nations. Pyongyang ostentatiously dismissed the issue as having minimal practical relevance: “one obvious fact is that we are not in the least interested in the matter of entry into the US.”
Only the ban on Americans remains, and it expires annually. The administration should have allowed it to end on August 31, but unfortunately in May extended it through next year. Lifting the ban would demonstrate that Washington welcomed contact between the two countries. Allowing more Americans to travel there would also create a window, albeit small, into a very opaque society.
The DPRK has an obvious if somewhat inconsistent interest in revitalizing tourism. It recently opened the Kalma Coastal Tourism Zone, reportedly with space for 20,000 tourists, in Wonsan on the east coast. Although the area is open primarily for domestic tourists, Russian travel operators have begun advertising tours. Moreover, North Korea is again operating sightseeing boats on the Yalu River out of Sinuiju, though so far the tours are for North Koreans only.
Indeed, after only three weeks, Pyongyang shut down foreign tourism in the Rason Special Economic Zone, which had opened in February. The reason is speculative, but the authorities probably underestimated the negative information gleaned by travelers. Tourists also pushed the limits at the recent Pyongyang marathon, and the firm SI Analytics believes that Pyongyang is presently developing tighter controls. Noted CBS, “there is no word on when the country will fully reopen to foreign visitors.”
Trump also should propose that the two governments establish diplomatic relations. They could start small, with liaison offices, but with the expectation that full embassies would eventually follow. Having diplomats in Pyongyang, with some opportunity to travel outside of the capital, would provide American policymakers with at least minimal knowledge of conditions within the North and modest opportunity to view changing circumstances.
Official ties would also facilitate ongoing dialogue. Diplomacy should be recognized as a requirement, not treated as a reward, especially when the government involved is seeking to target American cities with ICBMs topped with multiple warheads filled with nuclear weapons.
If in October 1950, Washington and Beijing had diplomatic missions in each other’s capitals, they might have discussed the danger of a military clash as allied forces marched north and reached a modus vivendi, perhaps preserving a rump North Korea as a buffer for the PRC. An accommodation, no matter how imperfect, could have forestalled another two and a half years of war. In contrast, consider had there been no U.S. communication with the Kremlin as the Cuban Missile Crisis nearly exploded, literally. Later “Ostpolitik,” which led to mutual recognition of the two Germanys, reduced Cold War tensions between them and their mutual patrons, the U.S. and USSR.
Obviously, talking more routinely would not ensure that the most important issues were covered, let alone resolved. However, treating the North as an equal sovereign country worth engaging would encourage dialogue, including on controversial topics such as human rights. The two governments could discuss a framework for peace, perhaps starting with an end of war declaration and negotiation of a peace treaty. Rather than demand a commitment to denuclearize, Washington could push for an initial nuclear freeze in return for partial sanctions relief.
The price might be high, but Kim has dramatically increased his leverage. In the more than seven years since the first summit, he has added and improved nukes and missiles and forged a profitable alliance with Russia. Is Trump prepared to play tough and end up with an Asian nuclear crisis while embroiled in the Mideast and fighting a European proxy war?
North Korea is important. The issue is also increasingly urgent. A report from the Asan Institute/Rand Corporation in 2021 warned that before decade’s end “North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons.” Assume those ICBMs can accurately target American cities. Washington policymakers would have to reconsider the ROK alliance, which requires being willing to go to war against a state capable of destroying America.
The president is busy, but North Korea won’t wait. With Pyongyang seeking to create an effective nuclear deterrent against the U.S., engagement is a must. President Trump needs to lead, and he should do so by seeking to increase contact not only between Washington and Pyongyang, but also Americans and North Koreans. Such efforts won’t substitute for serious diplomacy. However, they might make serious diplomacy possible and even eventually successful.
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Top photo credit: U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Brad Cooper speaks to guests at the IISS Manama Dialogue in Manama, Bahrain, November 17, 2023. REUTERS/Hamad I Mohammed
If accounts of President Donald Trump’s decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities this past month are to be believed, the president’s initial impulse to stay out of the Israel-Iran conflict failed to survive the prodding of hawkish advisers, chiefly U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Michael Kurilla.
With Kurilla, an Iran hawk and staunch ally of both the Israeli government and erstwhile national security adviser Mike Waltz, set to leave office this summer, advocates of a more restrained foreign policy may understandably feel like they are out of the woods.
They would be sorely mistaken.
CENTCOM’s incoming commander, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, is Kurilla’s deputy, and he would become just the second Navy officer ever to command CENTCOM. Unanimously confirmed by voice vote in the Senate and championed by both Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and his immediate predecessor, Cooper’s Senate confirmation testimony indicates more continuity than change.
For an administration that once talked a big game about realigning U.S. foreign policy in a more restrained direction, this selection implies the opposite: an indefinite commitment to U.S. primacy in the region in the name of counterterrorism and great power competition.
Forces in Iraq and Syria don't make America safer
In his responses to written questions for his confirmation, Cooper argued that the United States should retain military forces in Iraq and Syria to “maintain the defeat of ISIS.” The primary reason for this, he argues, is that the U.S. presence denies the terrorist group safe haven from which to attack the U.S. homeland.
Yet, as the Trump administration itself acknowledged by reducing U.S. troop levels in Syria earlier this year, ISIS lacks the capacity to pose a serious threat to the U.S. homeland and other regional actors have an interest in suppressing ISIS. As Rose Kelanic at Defense Priorities writes, “While ISIS has morphed into an international ‘brand’ adopted by affiliates in far-off locales, notably ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a group based in Afghanistan and Iraq that was responsible for attacks in Russia and Iran earlier in 2024, whatever original ISIS elements still exist in Syria appear incapable of conducting sophisticated, international terrorist attacks.”
Furthermore, the “safe haven” concept has serious flaws — namely, that it is incredibly difficult to mount sophisticated military operations across the globe in a dysfunctional environment, especially given sophisticated U.S. over-the-horizon intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities and the interest regional partners have in suppressing terrorism. This is precisely why Afghanistan did not become a safe haven for terrorism after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal.
Finally, the vulnerabilities of U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria exceed the purported benefits. U.S. military infrastructure in Iraq and Syria sits in proximity to Iranian forces and extremist groups while lacking sophisticated air defense systems. It is little wonder that these forces have faced more than 400 attacks since the October 2023 breakout of the Gaza war, according to CENTCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While there have thankfully been few casualties, withdrawing U.S. troops entirely removes that risk.
Great power competition is a bad framework for the region
Another assumption underlying Cooper’s testimony is that America needs to reform its arms sales process to ensure its continued influence with regional partners at the expense of Russia and China. He expresses support for the administration’s industry-friendly Foreign Military Sales (FMS) reforms, which eschew important congressional oversight and human rights conditions.
There are two problems with this approach:
First, if arms bought influence, America is getting a raw deal. As long as arms keep flowing, reckless regional partners engage in behaviors that threaten to entangle the United States in conflict or violate human rights. Israel, for example, launched air strikes against Iran in defiance of the stated U.S. preference of a negotiated agreement to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Additionally, during its conflict with Yemen’s Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia received American military assistance in creating what the United Nations called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Finally, these sales give “reverse leverage” to U.S. partners, whose threats to diversify their arms imports induce concessions that are not in the U.S. interest.
Secondly, as Jon Hoffman argues, China (the more capable of the two aforementioned powers) lacks the will and ability to project power in the Middle East, is more focused on political developments in its own region, and shares an interest with the United States in regional stability to protect its economic and energy interests. There is accordingly little to gain and everything to lose from a war with China over the Middle East.
Threat inflation on Iran
Troublingly, Cooper asserted that a nuclear Iran would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Middle East, enabling Iran to “become a global hegemon and maintain regional dominance for many years.”
This is simply not plausible.
First, one should challenge the assumption that Iran currently has regional dominance. While militarily formidable and populous, Iran has no serious claim to even regional hegemony. In the past 21 months, Iran’s Axis of Resistance has been degraded by Israel, and the collective military power of the Gulf states, buttressed by oil revenues (which, unlike Iran’s, are not under sanctions), poses a significant challenge. The U.S. and Israeli strikes in June, while likely strengthening Iranian long-term resolve to pursue nuclear weapons, also may have degraded Iran further, by diminishing Iran’s air defenses and assassinating Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists.
Another impediment is Israel, a nuclear-armed quasi-ally of the United States that has spent those 21 months projecting power across the region in the midst of a crushing war that has killed more than 57,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, in Gaza. Given the degradation of the Axis and that Tehran’s land forces are structured for defense in depth and lack long-range maneuver capability, Iran faces serious headwinds.
If Iran is incapable of regional hegemony, global hegemony is but a pipe dream.
Even a nuclear deterrent would not make Iran a global hegemon. With a GDP akin to Romania’s and a military whose power projection capabilities are dwarfed by those of true great powers, Iran is no hegemon-to-be. If nuclear weapons and a highly militarized society were sufficient to ensure global dominance, then North Korea would be a great power. This is serial threat inflation of the highest order.
Combatant commands incentivize threat inflation
This was all predictable. Ever since the combatant command system originated in 1986, the commands have, in the words of The Washington Post 25 years ago, “evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls — well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy.”
These mini-Pentagons act as less accountable versions of embassies and sources of threat inflation, all while siphoning resources away from diplomacy. By creating vested peacetime interests in U.S. intervention that compete for resources, CO-COM commanders are incentivized to treat regional problems as threats to U.S. security to garner funding and forces. At a time when some in the Administration are rightfully urging deprioritization of the Middle East theater, CENTCOM’s rhetoric threatens to keep the United States locked in the region for the long haul.
The hawks haven't lost yet
The confirmation of another fervent Iran hawk as CENTCOM commander ought to serve as a wake-up call to those who want to prevent further U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. These restrainers must not only resist the urge to take a victory lap, but also reexamine whether the present combatant command structure is still fit for purpose.
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