Joe Bidendelivered his foreign policy farewell address Monday at the State Department. The speech was largely a celebration of his own (perceived) accomplishments — all the things he wants to be remembered by as a foreign policy president. One of them is enacting a historic redistribution of wealth from the public to private weapons companies:
“We’ve significantly strengthened the defense industrial base [read: arms industry], investing almost $1.3 trillion in procurement and research and development. In real dollars, that’s more than America did in any four year period during the Cold War.”
Foreign policy for the one percent
The type of direct, trillion-dollar-plus government investment Biden promised for climate and social welfare only happened for arms companies. The amount Biden just bragged about giving to the weapons industry is about $540 billion more than the combined value of all the projects announced under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the CHIPS Act (as of Jan. 10: $756,247,845,330).
The combined effect of Biden’s flagship domestic accomplishments isn’t particularly climate-friendly, either. For example, over 40% of the funding in the infrastructure law — often marketed as a climate bill — is exclusively for highways, roads, and bridges. That’s not just not green, that’s anti-green. Biden described the climate crisis as “the single greatest existential threat to humanity” in yesterday’s speech, but it definitely wasn’t budgeted like one during his administration.
At least there are more robust climate programs now than there were in 2020. The same can’t be said for social welfare — the U.S. social safety net is considerably weaker now than it was when Biden entered office. You might be thinking “but the pandemic assistance Biden inherited was intended to be temporary,” which is true. Also true: the purpose of Biden’s “Build Back Better” plan was to make the bulk of those programs permanent and establish several new ones.
It was never enacted. In 2021, Biden abandoned the strategy needed to overcome the challenge posed by the GOP and a couple recalcitrant Democrats and pass the social spending plan. In early 2022, Biden ditched the trillion-dollar-plus welfare agenda he campaigned on entirely and rebranded himself as a foreign policy president. From that point on, pandemic assistance was nolonger something Biden sought to expand or preserve; in fact, the more of those programs that expired, the more he could brag about reducing the deficit. Ending that assistance during a historic bout of inflation devastated the working class. Many people lost their homes because of it.
The Pentagon budget was exempt from Biden’s deficit reduction regime. Little wonder — it takes serious cash to implement a foreign policy as bellicose and destructive as Biden’s. As key social welfare provisions expired or were eliminated, military spending soared. This is not the hallmark of a “foreign policy for the middle class” and it’s definitely not one for the working class.
The beneficiaries of Biden’s foreign policy are part of a much more exclusive group. Here are a few of them:
Stephen Semler is co-founder of the Security Policy Reform Institute, a think tank that develops policy ideas for the working class. He writes the Polygraph newsletter on Substack.
Top photo credit: President Joe Biden on the White House Lawn, July 14, 2023. (Shutterstock/Salma Bashir)
Despite positive recruitment reports from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, the Army is struggling with high attrition rates. Nearly 25% of recruits have failed to complete their contracts since 2022.
The Army reported in September that it exceeded its FY2024 recruitment goals. It even witnessed a backlog of new recruits waiting for training, as around 11,000 were placed in the delayed entry program. The question seems to be, can they keep them? The numbers aren’t promising.
Army data reviewed by Military.com suggests that, since 2022, nearly 25% of recruits have left the military before completing their initial contracts. The quality of recruits is one of several factors contributing to high attrition rates. According to service data, the military placed 25% of all enlistees in at least one of the Future Soldier Preparatory Courses, a series of trainings designed to assist recruits who do not meet academic or health standards set by the Pentagon. Of those who attend these courses, 25% do not complete their first contract. Those who did not attend the course still had a 20% attrition rate.
The number of eligible recruits in the country has also shrunk dramatically. According to a senior Army official, only 8% of the population is eligible for “clean enlistment” with no waivers, much lower than the 23% found in a 2020 DOD study. To combat this, the Army more than doubled the number of medical, academic, and criminal waivers granted to recruits in 2024 compared to 2022. More than 400 felony waivers were included in the 2024 waivers, up from 98 in 2022.
Not only did the Army reduce its recruitment goal to 55,000 from 65,000 in 2023, but the previous recruitment gains are muddled by the high attrition rates.
Hegseth previously mentioned the need to strengthen the military’s standards. President Trump signed an executive order in January to end the Department of Defense's Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion programs but has not addressed slipping academic or health standards within the recruitment pool.
The military has been suffering from a credibility problem overall. A survey from 2022 found that only 48% of the public “expressed a great deal of trust and confidence” in the military. Of the respondents, 47% said that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were reasons for their lack of confidence. Some have blamed the post-9/11 wars and growing mistrust in government institutions for lagging recruitment over the last several years. In addition, broader access to secondary education and job training have offered other options to kids who, in years past, would see the military as the only ticket to school and work after high school.
But that doesn’t explain the crisis of attrition, which appears to be a much more complicated issue.
“I don't know what an acceptable attrition rate is, but we have to meet people where they are," stated a senior Army official. "The quality of new soldiers is an enormous problem we're paying for. But that's just where the country is."
When asked about the quality of recruits, service spokesperson Madison Bonzo said, “U.S. Army Recruiting Command remains committed to recruiting young men and women into our Army that are ready and qualified to join the most lethal fighting force in the world to ensure our nation's security."
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Top image credit: Ecuador's President and presidential candidate for reelection Daniel Noboa addresses supporters during his closing campaign event for the upcoming Sunday presidential election, in Quito, Ecuador February 6, 2025. REUTERS/Karen Toro
As Ecuador heads to a second round of presidential elections on April 13, incumbent Daniel Noboa has made headlines by calling to incorporate foreign military special forces into the country’s fight against drug traffickers and transnational organized crime.
The announcement came just months after Noboa, the 37-year-old Miami-born heir to the South American country’s banana fortune, sought to amend Ecuador’s constitution to permit the installation of foreign military bases amid the country’s rapidly deteriorating security landscape.
Since Noboa won snap elections in October 2023, Ecuador has become the most violent country in Latin America, with 1,300 homicides in just the first 50 days of 2025 — a 40% increase over the same period in 2023. Nestled between the world’s two largest cocaine producers, Ecuador has also emerged as the global leader in cocaine exports to Europe, with a growing presence of Mexican, Colombian, and Albanian cartels taking advantage of the country’s weak institutions, porous borders, and strategic location.
After heavily-armed gangs took over a live news broadcast early last year, U.S. security analysts and editorial boards have called for a "Plan Colombia" — the largest U.S. military and counternarcotics aid package ever in the Western Hemisphere — for Ecuador, which just years prior had been hailed as an “island of peace.”
The $15 billion aid plan to Colombia, Washington’s top security partner in the Americas, brought down crime in the country's urban centers. But after a 2016 peace deal with Colombia’s largest insurgency led to its partial demobilization, transnational actors moved in to fill the void and drug trafficking was rerouted through neighboring Ecuador.
The Biden administration responded to Ecuador’s de facto declaration of war on 22 criminal gangs in January 2024 by sending its SOUTHCOM commander, the “drug czar,” and White House and State Department officials to meet with Noboa, leading to agreements in defense, intelligence and law enforcement.
These visits came on the heels of signing a bilateral “status of forces” agreement (SOFA) that granted U.S. military personnel the exemptions and immunities typically afforded to diplomats. As part of a five-year, $93 million aid package promised by SOUTHCOM, the U.S. delivered 20,000 bullet-proof vests, deployed a mobile border police unit and FBI agents, and donated a Lockheed Martin C-130H aircraft and two island-class Coast Guard patrol boats.
In July 2024, South Florida-based Matrix Aviation Inc. registered with the Department of Justice as a foreign agent for Ecuador’s Defense Ministry to help the Noboa administration access new funds under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and implement the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Ecuador program. Its objective is to “secure U.S. government funding and assistance programs to combat drug trafficking, border defense, human trafficking and other crimes,” according to the FARA records.
The foreign principal, Defense Minister Gian Carlo Loffredo, has no formal military experience, but was previously a counter-terrorism instructor at the Israeli Tactical School, which was founded by former Mossad officials, and has claimed to be the only certified National Rifle Association instructor for Latin America.
Meanwhile, Noboa is actively courting the Trump administration to shore up his electoral bid and urge increased U.S. military support amid the country’s worsening security environment. Noboa was one of few foreign leaders at President Trump’s inauguration, and some U.S. lawmakers are openly urging Ecuadorians to not vote for Ecuador’s progressive opposition candidate, Luisa Gonzalez, who is currently favored to win the run-off after major third-party candidate Leonidas Iza signaled his support.
Gonzalez, who lost to Noboa in the 2023 contest, is a protégée of former President Rafael Correa (2009-2017), whose administration reduced levels of violent crime and enjoyed relative economic prosperity during a period of high commodity export prices. In October 2024, Correa and former Vice President Jorge Glas — whom Noboa had arrested six months earlier as he sought asylum at the Mexican Embassy in Quito — were sanctioned by the U.S. in what was perceived as a signal of support for Noboa.
Despite a 16% reduction in crime during Noboa’s first year, 35 “states-of exception” have been declared since Correa left office in 2017, and conflict zones across the country’s Pacific coast have become thoroughly militarized. Noboa’s approval ratings have suffered as a result, plummeting from 72% to 45% through 2024.
According to Pedro Labayen Herrera, a research associate at the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research, the victor of next month’s election can reduce spiralling crime by strengthening state presence in long-neglected areas and adopting social policies to curb poverty and inequality — rather than allowing U.S. naval patrols around the Galapagos Islands or re-inviting U.S. forces to operate out of the Manta air base after they were expelled by Correa in 2009.
Isabel Chiriboga, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, similarly cautions against the adoption of a “Plan Colombia”-like U.S. security package for Ecuador, arguing that investment in education and youth development programs, as well as securing preferential tariffs for Ecuador’s U.S.-bound exports, as contemplated in the bipartisan IDEA Act, could help stem the tide of violence.
A May 2024 SOUTHCOM publication similarly recognizes the perils of an overly militarized approach to Ecuador’s multi-faceted crime problem, finding “the increased presence of U.S. military forces in Ecuadorian territory may provoke public opposition among some segments of the population who argue that the SOFA grants unprecedented privileges and immunities to foreign military personnel, which undermine Ecuador’s legal jurisdiction and sovereignty.”
The country’s grim economic reality could further complicate the Noboa administration’s hopes of scoring a robust U.S. security package. After Ecuador agreed to turn over its Soviet-era arms scraps to the U.S. for transfer to Ukraine in exchange for $200 million in modern materiel, Russia retaliated by cutting off imports of Ecuadorean bananas and flowers. Unwilling to jeopardize nearly $700 million in annual sales to Moscow, Noboa backtracked on the deal.
In late 2022, Congress passed the U.S.-Ecuador Partnership Act aimed at expediting bilateral assistance and shoring up investment for the country, but the framework has proven ineffective as Ecuador’s economy contracted 1.5% in late 2024, compounded by IMF-imposed austerity measures and 14-hour blackouts in some areas of the country.
Amid surging U.S.-bound migration, a feud with his vice president and the residual economic fallout from Covid, Noboa faces an uphill battle on April 13, hoping that foreign military presence in Gonzalez’s coastal stronghold can stabilize conditions and give him a last-minute electoral boost, Chiriboga explains.
Yet as Ecuador becomes the new front line of the U.S. war on drugs, Noboa’s reliance on worn-out strategies has so far failed to yield concrete results — and April 13 may not give him enough time to prove to voters that he’s the man to usher in the peace and security that Ecuador desperately seeks.
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Top photo credit: Saint Augustine in His Study, a fresco painting of Augustine of Hippo executed in 1480 by the Italian Renaissance master Sandro Botticelli. It is in the church of Ognissanti in Florence. (Wikimedia Commons)
The art of grand strategy is often treated as an exercise in power projection, deterrence, and securing national interests in an anarchic international order. Yet, the great thinkers of the Western tradition provide a deeper moral and philosophical framework for thinking about statecraft.
Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, drawing on the classical tradition, particularly Plato, developed an enduring vision of virtue that should inform our understanding of leadership and strategy. Their articulation of the cardinal virtues — prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance — offers a timeless lens through which to frame and evaluate grand strategy.
Each of these virtues plays a role in crafting a sound approach to foreign policy, but temperance stands out as the most vital in a world where great powers risk overextension, unnecessary conflicts, and countless other self-inflicted wounds ultimately grounded in hubris and the desire for primacy.
A grand strategy of restraint, rooted in the cardinal virtues as understood by Augustine and Aquinas, provides a sustainable and morally coherent alternative to the excesses of primacy and other hubristic temptations. By analyzing each virtue’s relevance to grand strategy, we can see how restraint emerges not only as an ethical pathway but as a practical approach to strategy too.
Prudence: The Foundation of Strategic Wisdom
Prudence, or practical wisdom, is the ability to make sound judgments in uncertain and complex environments. Augustine and Aquinas saw prudence as the first among virtues, for it guides and orders the others, ensuring that justice, fortitude, and temperance are properly exercised. It is the intellectual cornerstone of grand strategy, guiding leaders to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary conflicts, essential and peripheral interests, and achievable versus illusory objectives.
A prudent grand strategy acknowledges the limits of power. The United States, for example, has learned – sometimes at great cost – that power projection without clear strategic objectives leads to quagmires, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prudence dictates that policymakers recognize the costs of overextension and the diminishing returns of military interventions that lack clear, attainable goals.
Restraint, as a strategic posture, aligns with prudence by prioritizing essential interests, avoiding unnecessary entanglements, and preserving national power for when it is truly needed. This means distinguishing between existential threats and those that can be managed through diplomacy, alliances, and economic statecraft rather than through military force.
Justice: The Ethical Dimension of Statecraft
Justice in grand strategy involves the fair and proportional use of power. Aquinas, building on Augustine, linked justice to the proper ordering of society and the common good. It recognizes that the ends do not always justify the means and that a great power’s legitimacy depends on its adherence to certain moral principles, both at home and abroad.
A restrained grand strategy is more just than one based on primacy or interventionism because it avoids unnecessary wars, minimizes collateral damage, and upholds national commitments responsibly. The reckless use of force, even if tactically successful, can erode long-term legitimacy, as seen in the reputational costs borne by the United States in the aftermath of the Iraq War.
Justice also requires that great powers respect the sovereignty of other nations rather than engaging in coercive regime change or perpetual military interventions. A restrained strategy, therefore, upholds international stability by avoiding the cycle of intervention and backlash that has characterized much of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.
Fortitude: Strength Without Hubris
Fortitude, or courage, is essential in grand strategy, but it must be directed toward sustainable goals rather than reckless ambitions.
Augustine viewed fortitude as the virtue that enables a ruler to endure hardships for a just cause, rather than seeking dominance for its own sake. True fortitude lies in balancing power and blunting threats without succumbing to the overconfidence of primacy and hegemony. Seeking dominance in every region, engaging in endless conflicts, or assuming global leadership in all matters is not strength — it is hubris. Strength, by contrast, involves carefully defining national objectives, defending core interests, and acknowledging limits.
A grand strategy of restraint requires fortitude because it demands the discipline to avoid unnecessary conflicts while still maintaining credible deterrence. Balancing power means ensuring that no single actor dominates a strategic region, while blunting threats involves using a mix of diplomacy, alliances, and selective military capabilities to check adversaries without excessive entanglement.
This approach reflects a realist understanding of power: it is finite and must be applied judiciously rather than squandered in futile attempts to maintain global hegemony.
Temperance: The Keystone of Restraint
Among the cardinal virtues, temperance — or self-restraint — is the most directly applicable to grand strategy. Augustine and Aquinas emphasized temperance as the virtue that ensures wisdom, courage, and justice work in harmony rather than excess. In strategic terms, temperance means avoiding overreach, avoiding unnecessary conflicts, and being disciplined when it comes to allocating resources.
A grand strategy of restraint is, at its core, a strategy of temperance. It acknowledges that national power is finite and that preserving strength for essential objectives is wiser than dissipating it through excessive military commitments in pursuit of chimerical goals. The decline of past great powers — from Rome to Britain — illustrates the dangers of imperial overreach.
The lesson for the United States is clear: strategic patience and careful prioritization are necessary to avoid repeating these historical patterns.
Temperance also applies to economic and diplomatic tools. Overuse of sanctions, for example, can lead to diminishing returns, driving adversaries toward alternative financial systems and undermining long-term leverage.
Similarly, a foreign policy that demands ideological conformity from allies can backfire, alienating partners who might otherwise share strategic interests. A restrained grand strategy, grounded in temperance, avoids these pitfalls by exercising measured influence rather than attempting to dominate every aspect of international affairs.
The Virtue of Restraint
A grand strategy of restraint, built on these virtues, is not an abdication of leadership but a recalibration of it. It recognizes that true strength lies not in trying to maintain and police the so-called Rules-Based International Order but in the wise conservation of national power and the application of that power to achieve more limited ends.
It accepts that some global challenges must be managed rather than solved through force. And it embraces a long-term vision in which stability and national security are preserved through judicious, rather than excessive, engagement.
The United States faces a world of multipolarity, regional rivalries, and shifting alliances. In such an environment, the cardinal virtues, as articulated by Augustine and Aquinas, offer not just an ethical compass but a strategic blueprint. Restraint, guided by prudence, justice, fortitude, and above all, temperance, provides the surest path to sustainable global engagement in the twenty-first century.
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