Joe Bidendelivered his foreign policy farewell address Monday at the State Department. The speech was largely a celebration of his own (perceived) accomplishments — all the things he wants to be remembered by as a foreign policy president. One of them is enacting a historic redistribution of wealth from the public to private weapons companies:
“We’ve significantly strengthened the defense industrial base [read: arms industry], investing almost $1.3 trillion in procurement and research and development. In real dollars, that’s more than America did in any four year period during the Cold War.”
Foreign policy for the one percent
The type of direct, trillion-dollar-plus government investment Biden promised for climate and social welfare only happened for arms companies. The amount Biden just bragged about giving to the weapons industry is about $540 billion more than the combined value of all the projects announced under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the CHIPS Act (as of Jan. 10: $756,247,845,330).
The combined effect of Biden’s flagship domestic accomplishments isn’t particularly climate-friendly, either. For example, over 40% of the funding in the infrastructure law — often marketed as a climate bill — is exclusively for highways, roads, and bridges. That’s not just not green, that’s anti-green. Biden described the climate crisis as “the single greatest existential threat to humanity” in yesterday’s speech, but it definitely wasn’t budgeted like one during his administration.
At least there are more robust climate programs now than there were in 2020. The same can’t be said for social welfare — the U.S. social safety net is considerably weaker now than it was when Biden entered office. You might be thinking “but the pandemic assistance Biden inherited was intended to be temporary,” which is true. Also true: the purpose of Biden’s “Build Back Better” plan was to make the bulk of those programs permanent and establish several new ones.
It was never enacted. In 2021, Biden abandoned the strategy needed to overcome the challenge posed by the GOP and a couple recalcitrant Democrats and pass the social spending plan. In early 2022, Biden ditched the trillion-dollar-plus welfare agenda he campaigned on entirely and rebranded himself as a foreign policy president. From that point on, pandemic assistance was nolonger something Biden sought to expand or preserve; in fact, the more of those programs that expired, the more he could brag about reducing the deficit. Ending that assistance during a historic bout of inflation devastated the working class. Many people lost their homes because of it.
The Pentagon budget was exempt from Biden’s deficit reduction regime. Little wonder — it takes serious cash to implement a foreign policy as bellicose and destructive as Biden’s. As key social welfare provisions expired or were eliminated, military spending soared. This is not the hallmark of a “foreign policy for the middle class” and it’s definitely not one for the working class.
The beneficiaries of Biden’s foreign policy are part of a much more exclusive group. Here are a few of them:
Stephen Semler is co-founder of the Security Policy Reform Institute, a think tank that develops policy ideas for the working class. He writes the Polygraph newsletter on Substack.
Top photo credit: President Joe Biden on the White House Lawn, July 14, 2023. (Shutterstock/Salma Bashir)
Donald Trump’s nominee for U.S. secretary of state said this week that he wants the war between Ukraine and Russia to end.
“It is important for everyone to be realistic: there will have to be concessions made by the Russian Federation, but also by Ukrainians,” said Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) during his Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday. “There is no way Russia takes all of Ukraine.”
He added that “there's no way Ukraine is also going to push these people all the way back to where they were on the eve of the invasion.”
He also said sending American aid to Ukraine “for however long it takes” is “not a realistic or prudent position,” sentiment that echoes what Trump has said.
Trump had previously promised to end the conflict within 24 hours of taking office, but his incoming Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, later amended that timeline to 100 days.
The establishment consensus in the U.S. and Europe on the Ukraine war has slowly evolved as the conflict moves increasingly toward Russia’s favor.
“We need a cease-fire line, and of course ideally this (the Ukrainian part) should include all areas currently under Russian control. But we see that this may not be realistically achievable in the immediate future,” former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in December. He added, “if the cease-fire line means that Russia continues to control all occupied territories, this does not mean that Ukraine has to give up the territory forever.”
Ukrainian officials have also reportedly been discussing the option of allowing for a ceasefire, with Russia still controlling part of Ukraine, although not officially or legally. Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy even admitted, "if we want to stop the hot phase of the war, we should take under NATO umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control. That’s what we need to do fast. And then Ukraine can get back the other part of its territory diplomatically.”
During his hearing this week, Rubio emphasized this growing emphasis on diplomacy over a complete Ukrainian victory, saying that ending the war will not “be an easy endeavor… but it's going to require bold diplomacy, and my hope is that it can begin with some ceasefire.”
“Rubio's remarks reflect a pragmatic, constructive approach toward ending the Ukraine war — one that, encouragingly, the administration seems intent on institutionalizing throughout the foreign policy/national security bureaucracy,” said Quincy Institute research fellow Mark Episkopos. “The upcoming peace talks will demand an all hands on deck approach across the agencies if they are to succeed, and Rubio, as the nation's chief diplomat, is poised to play a major role in this difficult but necessary process.”
In other Ukraine war news this week:
Moscow accused Washington of assisting in attempting to sabotage the TurkStream pipeline, the only remaining pipeline that brings Russian gas into Europe. Russian Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called the attack “energy terrorism”
The attack was thwarted, according to Al Jazeera, as the pipeline only suffered minor damage. Ukraine has thus far rejected claims of its involvement in the attempted attack.
This comes at a time when Ukraine has halted gas transits from Russia to Europe sparking a war of words and potentially an energy crisis this winter, wrote Stavroula Pabst in Responsible Statecraft this week. Despite claims from Zelenskyy that the gas transit halt was “one of Moscow’s greatest defeats,” the rest of Europe seems to be bearing the brunt of the consequences, facing high energy prices and outages in some countries.
The New York Timesreported on Monday that Ukraine launched a large drone barrage deep into Russian territory. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, more than 140 drones were launched from Ukraine, and U.S. and UK-made ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles were included in the attack. The strikes were in three Russian regions, with some hitting over 700 miles into Russian territory. Industrial and military sites were reportedly damaged, with no reported casualties.
Russia responded the next day by launching dozens of missiles at Ukraine’s energy grid. President Zelenskyy responded to the attacks on social media, “It’s the middle of winter, and the target for the Russians remains unchanged: our energy infrastructure. Among their objectives were gas and energy facilities that sustain normal life for our people.”
There was reported damage but no casualties.
United Kingdom Prime Minister Kier Starmer says that he will deliver new mobile air defense systems and “more support to Ukraine than ever before,” according to The Guardian. This announcement is part of a 100-year partnership agreement between the two nations, meant to secure previously promised aid in addition to further military assistance under the shadow of Trump’s return to the White House. The deal, which also includes health care and agriculture partnerships, must be approved by the British parliament in the coming weeks.
From this week’s State Department briefing on 01/15
A journalist asked spokesperson Matthew Miller if the United States was considering designating Russia as a state sponsor of terror. Miller indicated that the U.S. had determined that the sanctions already in place were more effective. “If you look at the combined regime that we have put into place – sanctions and export controls – we determined that that would have more of an impact than a state sponsor of terrorism designation.”
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Top image credit: Let’s curb loose talk of using lower-yield nuclear weapons
A primary responsibility of the government is, of course, to keep us safe. Given that obligation, you might think that the Washington establishment would be hard at work trying to prevent the ultimate catastrophe — a nuclear war. But you would be wrong.
A small, hardworking contingent of elected officials is indeed trying to roll back the nuclear arms race and make it harder for such world-ending weaponry ever to be used again, including stalwarts like Senator Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Representative John Garamendi (D-Calif.), and other members of the Congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group. But they face ever stiffer headwinds from a resurgent network of nuclear hawks who want to build more kinds of nuclear weapons and ever more of them. And mind you, that would all be in addition to the Pentagon’s current plans for spending up to $2 trillion over the next three decades to create a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, stoking a dangerous new nuclear arms race.
There are many drivers of this push for a larger, more dangerous arsenal — from the misguided notion that more nuclear weapons will make us safer to an entrenched network of companies, governmental institutions, members of Congress, and policy pundits who will profit (directly or indirectly) from an accelerated nuclear arms race. One indicator of the current state of affairs is the resurgence of former Arizona Senator Jon Kyl, who spent 18 years in Congress opposing even the most modest efforts to control nuclear weapons before he went on to work as a lobbyist and policy advocate for the nuclear weapons complex.
His continuing prominence in debates over nuclear policy — evidenced most recently by his position as vice-chair of a congressionally-appointed commission that sought to legitimize an across-the-board nuclear buildup — is a testament to our historical amnesia about the risks posed by nuclear weapons.
Senator Strangelove
Republican Jon Kyl was elected to the Senate from Arizona in 1995 and served in that body until 2013, plus a brief stint in late 2018 to fill out the term of the late Senator John McCain.
One of Kyl’s signature accomplishments in his early years in office was his role in lobbying fellow Republican senators to vote against ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which went down to a 51 to 48 Senate defeat in October 1999. That treaty banned explosive nuclear testing and included monitoring and verification procedures meant to ensure that its members met their obligations. Had it been widely adopted, it might have slowed the spread of nuclear weapons, now possessed by nine countries, and prevented a return to the days when aboveground testing spread cancer-causing radiation to downwind communities.
The defeat of the CTBT marked the beginning of a decades-long process of dismantling the global nuclear arms control system, launched by the December 2001 withdrawal of President George W. Bush’s administration from the Nixon-era Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. That treaty was designed to prevent a “defense-offense” nuclear arms race in which one side’s pursuit of anti-missile defenses sparks the other side to build more — and ever more capable — nuclear-armed missiles. James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace called the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty an “epic mistake” that fueled a new nuclear arms race. Kyl argued otherwise, claiming the withdrawal removed “a straightjacket from our national security.”
The end of the ABM treaty created the worst of both worlds — an incentive for adversaries to build up their nuclear arsenals coupled with an abject failure to develop weaponry that could actually defend the United States in the event of a real-world nuclear attack.
Then, in August 2019, during the first Trump administration, the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which prohibited the deployment of medium-range missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. That treaty had been particularly important because it eliminated the danger of having missiles in Europe that could reach their targets in a very brief time frame, a situation that could shorten the trigger on a possible nuclear confrontation.
Then-Senator Kyl also used the eventual pullout from the INF treaty as a reason to exit yet another nuclear agreement, the New START treaty, co-signing a letter with 24 of his colleagues urging the Trump administration to reject New START. He was basically suggesting that lifting one set of safeguards against a possible nuclear confrontation was somehow a reason to junk a separate treaty that had ensured some stability in the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear balance.
Finally, in November 2023, NATO suspended its observance of a treaty that had limited the number of troops the Western alliance and Russia could deploy in Europe after the government of Vladimir Putin withdrew from the treaty earlier that year in the midst of his ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
The last U.S.-Russian arms control agreement, New START, caps the strategic nuclear warheads of the two countries at 1,550 each and has monitoring mechanisms to make sure each side is holding up its obligations. That treaty is currently hanging by a thread. It expires in 2026 and there is no indication that Russia is inclined to negotiate an extension in the context of its current state of relations with Washington.
As early as December 2020, Kyl was angling to get the government to abandon any plans to extend New START, coauthoring an op-ed on the subject for the Fox News website. He naturally ignored the benefits of an agreement aimed at reducing the chance of an accidental nuclear conflict, even as he made misleading statements about it being unbalanced in favor of Russia.
Back in 2010, when New START was first under consideration in the Senate, Kyl played a key role in extracting a pledge from the Obama administration to throw an extra $80 billion at the nuclear warhead complex in exchange for Republican support of the treaty. Even after that concession was made, Kyl continued to work tirelessly to build opposition to the treaty. If, in the end, he failed to block its Senate ratification, he did help steer billions in additional funding to the nuclear weapons complex.
Our Man from Northrop Grumman
In 2017, between stints in the Senate, Kyl worked as a lobbyist with the law firm Covington and Burling, where one of his clients was Northrop Grumman, the largest beneficiary of the Pentagon’s nuclear weapons spending binge. That company is the lead contractor on both the future B-21 nuclear bomber and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Sentinel program drew widespread attention recently when it was revealed that, in just a few years, its estimated cost had jumped by an astonishing 81%, pushing the price for building those future missiles to more than $140 billion (with tens of billions more needed to operate them in their years of “service” to come).
That stunning cost spike for the Sentinel triggered a Pentagon review that could have led to a cancellation or major restructuring of the program. Instead, the Pentagon opted to stay the course despite the enormous price tag, asserting that the missile is “essential to U.S. national security and is the best option to meet the needs of our warfighters.”
Independent experts disagree. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, for instance, has pointed out that such ICBMs are “some of the most dangerous weapons we have” because a president, warned of a possible nuclear attack by an enemy power, would have only minutes to decide whether to launch them, greatly increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war triggered by a false alarm. Perry is hardly alone. In July 2024, 716 scientists, including 10 Nobel laureates and 23 members of the National Academies, called for the Sentinel to be canceled, describing the system as “expensive, dangerous, and unnecessary.”Meanwhile, as vice-chair of a congressionally mandated commission on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Kyl has been pushing a worst-case scenario regarding the current nuclear balance that could set the stage for producing even larger numbers of (Northrop Grumman-built) nuclear bombers, putting multiple warheads on (Northrop Grumman-built) Sentinel missiles, expanding the size of the nuclear warhead complex, and emplacing yet more tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. His is a call, in other words, to return to the days of the Cold War nuclear arms race at a moment when the lack of regular communication between Washington and Moscow can only increase the risk of a nuclear confrontation. Kyl does seem to truly believe that building yet more nuclear weapons will indeed bolster this country’s security and he’s hardly alone when it comes to Congress or, for that matter, the next Trump administration. Consider that a clear sign that reining in the nuclear arms race will involve not only making the construction of nuclear weapons far less lucrative, but also confronting the distinctly outmoded and unbearably dangerous arguments about their alleged strategic value.
The Advocate
In October 2023, when the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on a report from the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, it had an opportunity for a serious discussion of nuclear strategy and spending, and how best to prevent a nuclear war. Given the stakes for all of us should a nuclear war between the United States and Russia break out — up to an estimated 90 million of us dead within the first few days of such a conflict and up to five billion lives lost once radiation sickness and reduced food production from the resulting planetary “nuclear winter” kick in — you might have hoped for a wide-ranging debate on the implications of the commission’s proposals.
Unfortunately, much of the discussion during the hearing involved senators touting weapons systems or facilities producing them located in their states, with little or no analysis of what would best protect Americans and our allies. For example, Senator Mark Kelly (D-Ariz) stressed the importance of Raytheon’s SM-6 missile — produced in Arizona, of course — and commended the commission for proposing to spend more on that program. Senator Jackie Rosen (R-Nev.) praised the role of the Nevada National Security Site, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, for making sure such warheads were reliable and would explode as intended in a nuclear conflict. You undoubtedly won’t be shocked to learn that she then called for more funding to address what she described as “significant delays” in upgrading that Nevada facility. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) proudly pointed to the billions in military work being done in his state: “In Alabama we build submarines, ships, airplanes, missiles. You name it, we build it.” Senator Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.) requested that witnesses confirm how absolutely essential the Kansas City Plant, which makes non-nuclear parts for nuclear weapons, remains for American security.
And so it went until Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass) asked what the nuclear buildup recommended by the commission would cost. She suggested that, if past history is any guide, much of the funding proposed by the commission would be wasted: “I’m willing to spend what it takes to keep America safe, but I’m certainly not comfortable with a blank check for programs that already have a history of gross mismanagement.”
The answer from Kyl and his co-chair Marilyn Creedon was that the commission had not even bothered to estimate the costs of any of what it was suggesting and that its recommendations should be considered regardless of the price. This, of course, was good news for nuclear weapons contractors like Northrop Grumman, but bad news for taxpayers.
The Brink of Armageddon?
Nuclear hardliners frequently suggest that anyone advocating the reduction or elimination of nuclear arsenals is outrageously naive and thoroughly out of touch with the realities of great power politics. As it happens though, the truly naive ones are the nuclear hawks who insist on clinging to the dubious notion that vast (and still spreading) stores of nuclear weaponry can be kept around indefinitely without ever being used again, by accident or design.
There is another way. Even as Washington, Moscow, and Beijing continue the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons — such weaponry is also possessed by France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom — a growing number of nations have gone on record against any further nuclear arms race and in favor of eliminating such weapons altogether. In fact, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has now been ratified by 73 countries.
As Beatrice Fihn, former director of the Nobel-prize-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, or ICAN, pointed out in a recent essay in the New York Times, there are numerous examples of how collective action has transformed “seemingly impossible situations.” She cited the impact of the antinuclear movement of the 1980s in reversing a superpower nuclear arms race and setting the stage for sharp reductions in the numbers of such weapons, as well as a successful international effort to bring the nuclear ban treaty into existence. She noted that a crucial first step in bringing the potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race under control would involve changing the way we talk about such weapons, especially debunking the myth that they are somehow “magical tools” that make us all more secure. She also emphasized the importance of driving home that this planet’s growing nuclear arsenals are evidence that all too many of those in power are acquiescing in a reckless strategy “based on threatening to commit global collective suicide.”
The next few years will be crucial in determining whether ever growing numbers of nuclear weapons remain entrenched in this country’s budgets and its global strategy for decades to come or whether common sense can carry the day and spark the reduction and eventual elimination of such instruments of mass devastation. A vigorous public debate on the risks of an accelerated nuclear arms race would be a necessary first step toward pulling the world back from the brink of Armageddon.
This article was originally published at TomDispatch and has been republished here with permission.
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Top photo credit: Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the opening of the Natural Gas Pipeline (turkstream) in November 2018. (quetions123/shutterstock)
In a co-authored paper from April 2024, Keith Kellogg, President-elect Trump’s Ukraine envoy, said “the United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine.”
With Trump’s inauguration just around the corner, there has been increased talk of whether and how sanctions against Russia might be removed.
However, saying the complete lifting of sanctions against Russia after any Trump-brokered peace agreement is as unrealistic as arguing that no sanctions should be removed.
Detailed thinking is needed on how future sanctions relief for Russia might be phased in as part of a longer-term peace plan for Ukraine. That should include realistic and achievable milestones for Russian compliance to avoid the trap of the failed Minsk II agreement.
Any U.S.-brokered future ceasefire in Ukraine may end the fighting but it won’t represent a just peace without a longer-term strategy. Nor will it represent a normalization of relations.
On this basis, it would be premature to lift all sanctions against Russia immediately with these matters unresolved. Some issues may never be resolved to the complete satisfaction of both parties. We therefore need to be realistic about what to demand of Russia in any peace following a war in which it was not defeated.
Because it also seems clear that negotiations to end the fighting will stall unless Vladimir Putin knows there is a realistic prospect of some sanctions relief. And he will be wary of any draft peace agreement that de facto makes sanctions permanent. That would repeat the same mistakes that made the Minsk II agreement fail.
The European Council decision in March 2015 to align its sanctions regime to the implementation of the Minsk II agreement, effectively set European sanctions in stone. The UK, which with U.S. backing had pressed for this Minsk “conditionality,” applied a narrow interpretation by which any sanctions relief would be linked to “Russia’s complete implementation” of Minsk II.
But that was unrealistic. It’s not only that Minsk II would have taken years to deliver even with a fair wind. The agreement contained obligations on the government of Ukraine to offer devolution and special status in the Donbas. These obligations faced widespread domestic resistance in Ukraine.
Sanctions against Russia were locked in on the basis of an obligation which it was not in Petro Poroshenko's or Volodymyr Zelensky’s political interests to push through. Zelensky’s brief attempt to consider devolution in 2019 quickly failed. Dmytro Kuleba, then Ukraine’s foreign minister, effectively killed Minsk II shortly before war broke out in February 2022 by declaring that the Donbas would never have special status.
Making Russia sanctions hostage to Ukrainian decisions won’t work this time.
Putin clearly wants sanctions lifted as part of any future peace deal. But I doubt he expects to achieve that. However, offering no incentives will encourage him to keep fighting.
And although the Russian economy is overheating from the colossal injection of government war spending, it is more resilient than Ukraine’s economy, with low debt, respectable growth, and still considerable reserves. Ukraine is hugely indebted and kept afloat by Western aid, which accounts for almost half of government spending.
So, while he can’t fight forever, Putin can choose to stall. And European states know the financial burden of an already unaffordable war will increasingly fall on them with Trump in the Oval Office.
That’s why a growing number of Central European states will push harder for sanctions removal. Slovakia’s sentiment has stiffened since the ending of gas transit and the direct economic impact it will suffer. Presidents Roberto Fico and Viktor Orban may find themselves in good company with Herbert Kickl, Austria’s putative new far right chancellor.
EU sanctions have held for almost 11 years because the economic and political costs of breaking consensus was always higher than the economic cost of holding firm.That calculus has shifted decisively in Central Europe.
So, we need more granular thinking on what sanctions relief means in the wide gulf between the status quo and no sanctions at all. Russia is subject to more than 20,000 sanctions that extend into the political, social and cultural realm as well as the economic sphere.
Rather than seeing sanctions relief as an event, we should look upon it as a process of peeling the onion. The European Union has taken almost 130 separate decisions since 2014 to impose new sanctions or to extend existing sanctions against Russia.
Most sanctions have zero impact. No less than 92% of individual UK sanctions are against persons who have never traveled to Britain or held assets here. The picture is the same for 77% of sanctioned Russian companies and is mirrored across the EU, U.S. and elsewhere.
Upon the agreement of a peace deal for Ukraine, 16,000 zero-impact Russian sanctions could be struck down in a grand gesture brokered by the U.S., EU and UK. This would offer no economic relief to Russia but give Putin something concrete to sell to his public.
Letting Russia compete once more in international sporting and cultural events such as the Olympics would offer a hugely symbolic gesture that the West was seeking to normalize relations, with no economic relief attached.
To avoid a repeat of Minsk II, the hardest-hitting “economic” sanctions would need to be included in a roadmap for the peace process with realistic milestones that it was in Russia’s power to achieve.
As part of this, Putin will want clarity on the “what and when” of unfreezing Russia’s international reserves plus a normalization over time of trading relationships, in particular with the EU.
Clearly, getting Putin and Zelensky to stand down their forces will be the biggest obstacle facing Trump after he assumes office. If we want to ensure that any short-term absence of war in Ukraine has a chance to emerge as a longer-term peace, we should consider now where sanctions relief fits within the plan.
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