A senior Democratic lawmaker on Wednesday said it was ‘a problem’ that many in his party have been trying to out-hawk Republicans on foreign policy and that Democrats need to be more aggressive in advocating for diplomacy approaches abroad, particularly with respect to China.
During a discussion hosted by the Quincy Institute — RS’s publisher — with House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash), QI executive vice president Trita Parsi wondered why — pointing to Vice President Kamala Harris campaigning for president with Liz Cheney and Sen. Elissa Slotkin’s (D-Mich.) recent embrace of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy — the Democratic Party has shifted away from promoting diplomacy, opposing “stupid wars,” and celebrating multilateralism.
“There is no question that that is a problem,” Smith said, adding that he thinks Democrats often fear being criticized for promoting talking with adversaries as being weak and then feel they don’t get enough support from the left. “One of the beefs I have with the left side of the spectrum is they’re always banging on us for not doing one thing or another. … We do four things and it’s the fifth thing we didn’t do.”
Smith said that Democrats need to “much more aggressively embrace diplomacy” and that part of that should be a refocus on how the United States deals with China.
“Everyone wants to talk about what their plan is to beat China. Anytime anyone says that, you got to ask the question, ‘what is your plan to peacefully co-exist with China?’” he said. “We are completely ignoring even trying to figure out how to make that work and constantly focused on how to beat them.”
Smith acknowledged that China “does have expansionist ambitions” and that the U.S. has “to be able to have an adequate deterrence” to push back and that “we need to be able to compete economically.” But, he said, the U.S. needs to work with China on a whole host of shared interests, like global warming, health issues and energy needs.
“What’s your plan to get along with China?” he asked.
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top image credit: https://www.youtube.com/@QuincyInst
Top photo credit: A person holds flags as people celebrate after the Kurdish-led and U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)signs a deal agreeing to integrate into Syria's new state institutions, the Syrian presidency said on Monday, in Damascus, Syria March 11, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Amid all of the violence on the Syrian coast this week, there was one development Monday that may reduce the chaos in the northeast: the new Sunni leadership has struck a deal with the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces to merge with the central government in Damascus.
This is big, since the Kurds had been fighting throughout the Syrian civil war to stake out independent territory in the north. Not only had they been clashing with the former Assad regime, but up until now, with Turkish-led forces, which had vowed to destroy them. More importantly they sit on the oil and gas fields that are critical to a new Syrian economy. And, they have been the benefactors of U.S. military assistance the entire time. That includes airpower and reportedly 2,000 troops sitting in the middle of the conflict who should be coming home, say critics who increasingly see the mission as ill-defined, dangerous, and not in the U.S. interest.
"With Syria’s territorial control restored under a central government backed by Turkey, the case for keeping U.S. troops there to fight ISIS is weaker than ever," said the Quincy Institute's Adam Weinstein, who surmises that the U.S. likely played a role in mediating the SDF agreement with Syria's new interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who hails from the former al-Qaeda-linked rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). He is currently battling accusations that militias linked to his government have been rampaging through villages killing Assad "loyalists" that include hundreds if not thousands of Alawite civilians.The violence had been sparked by government clashes with opposition fighters late last week.
Details of the deal reportedly struck between al-Sharaa's government and SDF were still emerging Tuesday morning, but the outline is this: the Kurdish forces will integrate “all civil and military institutions” into the new Syrian state by the end of the year (it is not clear whether they will remain together as a separate division/units), including the oil and gas fields. According to the New York Times, the SDF will be expected to "to help Damascus combat remnants of the Assad regime." They are also being promised inclusion in the new political process — of course that pledge is already being tested by the violence by Islamist militias on the coast today.
"One must hope the Kurds will enjoy lasting peace thanks to this deal, but one must also be skeptical of the enigmatic Mr. al-Sharaa, especially after the bloodshed in Syria's coastal regions," points out John Allen Gay, director of the John Quincy Adams Society.
However, he added, "the new deal between the Kurds and the authorities in Damascus opens space for America to withdraw from Syria. We did not come to Syria to establish Kurdish autonomy in the northeast. We came to destroy ISIS, and we destroyed ISIS years ago."
Washington has used both its Kurdish partners and battling ISIS as excuses to stay in the country. Indeed, the SDF has helped the U.S. with those ISIS remnants, while the U.S. has helped maintain the Kurds territorial claims, which include the energy resources, and the prisons that hold thousands of Islamic State fighters. “Concerns may still remain over ISIS prisoners in Al Hol and the potential infiltration of Iran-backed militias," said Weinstein, referring to sporadic attacks against the U.S. outposts in Syria and Iraq by Iranian-supported groups — attacks that have been dramatically reduced over the last year.
Anything can happen in year, and the instability in Damascus suggests that anything can happen to this deal even in a day. If the agreement holds, and Kurds have reason to celebrate as they were, reportedly, in the streets yesterday, the U.S. will have to manufacture more reasons — a larger ISIS threat? — to stay, if it wants to. Or, as President Donald Trump has suggested, it might just be time to leave.
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Top image credit: An M23 officer presents Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) members to Rwandan officers at the border where they are repatriated after being captured in the Democratic Republic of Congo, at the Goma-Gisenyi Grande Barrier border crossing, March 1, 2025. REUTERS/Arlette Bashizi
In late January and early February, the M23 militia captured both Goma and Bukavu, the two most important cities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Rwandan-backed rebel group now controls a vast territory — comparable in size to Connecticut — where it is already establishing local administrations, making it clear that M23 and Rwanda are determined to redraw the geopolitical map of Africa’s Great Lakes region.
M23 and Rwanda
The M23 rebellion first emerged in 2012, but was defeated in 2013 — largely through international pressure on Rwanda. In theory, M23 is fighting to protect the Rwandophone community in eastern Congo, most especially its Tutsi community. But its agenda is more ambitious and closely linked with Kigali’s interests in the region. The more recent creation of the Alliance du Fleuve Congo (AFC) — also fits within this strategy; it’s the political wing of M23, which has a broader political agenda of regime change in Kinshasa.
M23 reemerged in November 2021 for a number of reasons, including the failure of the the Congolese government to abide by promises it made to the militia’s veterans, such as their integration into the national army. But the main reason was due to Rwanda’s fears that its interests in the region were under threat.
Kigali has a number of interests in eastern DRC. It considers the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group, which consists of the remnants of the mainly Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, an existential security threat, notwithstanding their diminishing numbers. It also has economic interests: gold is Rwanda’s most important export, and it’s a well-known secret that most of that gold is mined in eastern DRC.
Moreover, with neighboring countries Uganda and Burundi expanding military operations against their own DRC-based insurgencies into territory that it considers within its own zone of influence, Rwanda felt it necessary to reactivate its armed proxy, the M23, to protect its interests there. Rwanda’s elites have long doubted Kinshasa’s ability govern eastern DRC and urged the creation of a buffer zone, which they sometimes refer to as a “Kurdistan.” M23 fits the bill in in this overall picture: trained and supplied by Kigali, the militia is also backed by Rwanda’s own forces on the ground. The U.N. estimated that between 4,000 and 7,000 Rwandan troops were inside the DRC late last year, a number that has surely increased since the takeover of Goma and Bukavu.
The M23’s offensive has exacted a heavy humanitarian price: Over the past 14 months, three million people, including hundreds of thousands who were pushed out of refugee camps, have been displaced; and thousands have been killed. A public health nightmare is also unfolding. Moreover, the risks of a bigger regional conflict have risen sharply.
Burundi
Burundians are increasingly worried about possible war with Rwanda. Tensions between Kigali and Gitega have increased rapidly, with each side accusing the other of supporting rebel forces against their governments. The border between the two countries has closed, and the U.N. has reported that Rwanda’s army has issued direct orders to target Burundian soldiers in the region. In recent weeks, the war of words has escalated: last week, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye urged his citizens to prepare for war and denounced Rwanda as an “enemy of Burundi.”
Rwanda, the more powerful of the two countries, would not oppose regime change in Burundi. But how far it wants to go in redrawing the region’s geopolitical map is not yet clear.
Uganda
Like Rwanda, Uganda has a mix of political, security and economic interests in eastern DRC. Gold, for example, is also Uganda’s most important export, and most of it comes from the DRC. Kampala has a long and complicated “frenemy” relationship with Kigali: the two countries have at times collaborated in eastern DRC; at other times, they have competed for influence there.
In the current conflict, Kampala has played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the U.N. has reported over the past 18 months that Uganda has provided some support to M23; including permitting it to recruit in Ugandan-controlled territory and even incorporating Ugandan security personnel in its ranks. On the other hand, and parallel to M23’s rapid territorial expansion over the last weeks, the Ugandan army has also expanded its presence in eastern DRC. Like Kigali, Kamapala is carving out territory in the region.
Kinshasa losing control
It is clear to all that President Felix Tshisekedi is losing control over the region. His army’s morale seems particularly low: videos of fleeing soldiers have further reduced his credibility. The withdrawal in mid-February of Burundian forces, which had been the DRC’s most important military ally, marked the collapse of Tshekedi’s military strategy.
With M23 increasingly moving its forces southward, Katanga — the center of most of DRC’s industrial mining — is increasingly coming into focus. Here the conflict takes on additional layers of complexities. In an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” logic, many Katangans are not necessarily opposed to M23/AFC; nor do they endorse or support it or Rwanda’s ambitions. But they share a resentment against the Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa: the last two presidents and the DRC’s main opposition leader all hail from Katanga and have felt excluded from power. A recent op-ed by former President Joseph Kabila lends credence to Tshisekedi’s accusations that Kabila is behind the M23/AFC coalition.
Thus, in addition to the risk of regional escalation, ethnic and political tensions within DRC are on the rise. The Congolese “radio trottoir” is filled with rumors of various groups mobilizing for possible violence. In the capital, threats against Swahili speakers, who generally hail from the east, have circulated, spreading and contributing to a vicious circle by lending credence to M23 and Rwanda’s claims that Rwandaphones are at risk.
The current situation looks strikingly similar to the early days of the Second Congolese war, which lasted five years beginning in 1998. In that conflict, neighboring countries sought to effectively partition Congo into zones of influence. The war cost millions of lives.
The importance of US pressure
When M23 first emerged in 2012, international pressure on Rwanda was decisive in ending the conflict in 2013. Donors suspended $240 million in international aid, with the U.S. played a key role, including phone calls by President Barack Obama to his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame.
Isolated, Tshisekedi is desperately trying to revive international pressure on Rwanda to end its support for M23 — but with only very limited success so far.
That effort has included an appeal for military assistance to the administration of President Donald Trump in exchange for exclusive access to DRC’s vast mineral wealth by proposing “minerals for security deals.” In addition to gold, the country holds enormous stores of cobalt and produces other strategic minerals, including lithium, tantalum, and uranium. (Similar offers have reportedly been made to the United Arab Emirates and Russia.)
Acting through one lobbyist, Kinshasa has also offered Washington access to its military bases “to protect strategic resources,” as well as a major stake in a billion-dollar deep-water port project. According to a letter from Africa-USA Business Council, the Tshisekedi government is “signaling a clear desire to shift away from China’s dominant influence and strengthen economic ties with the West.”
According to our interviews, the proposal, which has been conveyed by different actors with conflicting messages, is perceived within the U.S. administration as vague, uncoordinated, and difficult to implement. If anything, the offers have underlined the fragility and desperation of the Congolese leadership.
The more recent announcement by the Trump administration of U.S. sanctions against two Rwandan individuals — notably James Kaberebe, who, as minister of state for regional integration, is central to Rwanda’s support to M23 — marks a step in the right direction. But persuading Kigali to end its support for M23 will likely require significantly more pressure.
The window for international action is closing rapidly, with Kinshasa clearly losing control, M23/Rwanda establishing itself throughout eastern DRC, and the likelihood of a larger and even more deadly conflict in the Great Lakes region increasing rapidly.
Enjoy our new column by the Democratizing Foreign Policy team exposing stealth corruption infecting our system — in plain sight.
For months, the Washington establishment has been raising alarm bells about how the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) could harm the Pentagon.
In January, days after the new Trump administration was sworn in, an American Enterprise Institute (AEI) scholar argued that when it comes to DOGE, “The Pentagon must spend to save,” and that for the “DOGE initiative to succeed at the Pentagon…it must pair persistent efforts to create efficiencies and eliminate waste with increased defense investment.”
In early February that same AEI scholar further explained this Orwellian logic in a hyperbolically titled article, “The U.S. Military is Crumbling,” that those investments should include “plans to grow the fleet, rebuild munitions stockpiles, grow manned and unmanned aerial inventories, upgrade bases, and increase homeland air and missile defense capabilities.”
In other words, those “investments” in savings would cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.
The DOGE dread drumbeat kept rolling at other Washington think tanks. “On the current trajectory, if left unchecked, DOGE could do more damage to the U.S. military than 20 years of war in Afghanistan,” wrote an Atlantic Council senior adviser in late February. Then, last week, the headline of a Foreign Policy article penned by an Atlantic Council senior fellow read: “How Trump is Killing the U.S. Defense Industry,” and argued that, “Eroding the United States’ much-feared defense-industrial complex was almost certainly not what Trump predicted. But the erosion has arrived.”
What isn’t mentioned in any of these commentaries is that these experts all hail from organizations funded by the very same defense industry whose fate they are bemoaning.
As documented in the Think Tank Funding Tracker — which the Quincy Institute created to let the public follow the money behind foreign policy debates — none of the top think tanks in the U.S. have received more money from Pentagon contractors than the Atlantic Council. From 2019-2023 the organization received at least $10.27 million from more than three dozen Pentagon contractors. As noted in a report accompanying the tracker, AEI is a “dark money” think tank that doesn’t disclose any donor information, but staffers have let slip in public events that it too is funded by the weapons industry.
Besides conflict of interest disclosures, another key ingredient missing from these doomsday prophecies about DOGE at the Pentagon is, well, the doomsday part. The simple fact is that Trump and DOGE have cut next to nothing from the Pentagon, and the agency is slotted to receive hundreds of billions of dollars more — not less — funding in the coming years.
The same day Foreign Policy published the Atlantic Council scholars piece, the New York Times published an article explaining that the Department of Defense (DoD) has been virtually untouched by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. As the Times analysis of all federal government contracts explained, while approximately 60% of all federal government contracts are made by DoD, less than 1% of all DOGE cuts have come from the department. Among the top Pentagon contractors — Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing — just one (General Dynamics) had any contracts slashed by DOGE and that amounted to less than one percent of the firm’s total contracts.
That same day the Pentagon announced the grand total of all DOGE cuts at DoD: just $80 million. Defense News put this paltry total in perspective, noting that the Pentagon’s budget is just under $850 billion, so, “[t]he first round of DOGE’s Pentagon cuts represents about .009% of that budget.” Put differently, $80 million is less than the cost of just one F-35, and the Pentagon is planning to buy 145 of these notoriously over-priced and underperforming “part-time” fighter jets next year.
The long-term news is even rosier for U.S. arms makers, as the Pentagon budget is actually expected to soar in the coming years. A recently passed House budget resolution would add $100 billion to the Pentagon’s budget, while the Senate, not to be outhawked, is proposing a $150 billion increase for the Pentagon over the next four years. This week Congress is expected to pass a continuing resolution that will fund the government for the remainder of the fiscal year, and increase Pentagon spending by $6 billion while slashing $13 billion in funding at other agencies.
Despite all of this, the Atlantic Council senior fellow argues that “[i]n recent days and weeks, the markets have been watching the announcements from Washington and unsurprisingly concluded that the Trump administration wants to slash the defense budget.” Yet, literally within hours of the article being published, business media outlets were riddled with headlines like, “Now is the time to buy U.S. defense stocks,” and arguing that, “It’s a great time to buy defense stocks as DOGE cuts fears are overblown,” following an announcement from Wall Street giant CitiGroup that the stocks were a good buy precisely because of a European commitment to increase defense spending as well as Congress’s budget resolutions boosting the Pentagon’s budget.
One of the reasons the Atlantic Council analyst claims that there may be hard times ahead for the U.S. arms industry is the claim that many countries buy U.S. arms not because they provide better capability, but because there is an implicit understanding that buying American means the U.S. will come to your aid in a crisis. In other words, buying weapons from an American company is tantamount to buying security guarantees from the United States. If true, this would be a terrible way to make decisions on defense — locking the U.S. military into a commitment to a foreign purchaser without review by Congress or careful consideration by the executive branch.
If that were the only way to sell U.S. arms, it would not be worth the price. In reality, there are many factors that go into arms sales decisions, including buying systems that are compatible with a nation’s existing arsenal. This factor gives U.S. companies an edge in markets where they have been dominant for many years. The idea that arms sales require a U.S. military commitment to the purchasing country is nonsense.
While think tanks funded by Pentagon contractors have been spreading false-fears of a military industrial complex crisis, they aren’t the only players helping DoD dodge the DOGE. As Responsible Statecraft previously documented, Pentagon contractors have more than 900 lobbyists working on their behalf, including several former members of Congress, and donated tens of millions of dollars to current members in the last election.
But, there’s a key difference between that and think tank influence: transparency. Those lobbyists are registered. Those campaign contributions are public record. Think tank funding usually isn’t. There is currently no legal requirement for think tanks to publicly disclose their funding and more than a third, including AEI, disclose absolutely nothing.
The Atlantic Council, then, should be commended for its donor transparency. But the think tank ecosystem, as a whole, should strive for an even higher level of transparency by disclosing potential conflicts of interest in their publications. Reasonable people can certainly disagree on the best path forward for Pentagon spending and efficiencies but, as we're having that debate, we should strive to be fully transparent with our readers and let them know who is funding our work, particularly when our work relates to those funders’ financial interests.
To analysts without these conflicts of interest, it is abundantly clear that there are few better places to find wasteful spending than the government’s largest bureaucracy — the Pentagon. If the Trump administration is serious about saving taxpayer money, DoD can’t dodge the DOGE forever.
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