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2023-05-08t065321z_158633182_rc21p0a5d28k_rtrmadp_3_sudan-politics-southsudan-scaled

The conflict in Sudan threatens to devolve into a regional maelstrom

Given the number of potential spoilers and intruders, the US and other peace brokers urgently need to bring in the United Nations.

Analysis | Africa

Sudan’s war is on the brink of igniting a regional ring of fire. That can be prevented — but it needs the United Nations to play its role.

At the weekend, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia convened talks in Jeddah on a short-term ceasefire to allow aid in and civilians out. That is a tough ask. But the American and Saudi diplomats face a second, equally difficult challenge: how to insulate the Sudan crisis from becoming ensnared in regional and global antagonisms.

No outside player wanted the war, and none want it to escalate — and that includes Russia and China. External powers, especially in the Middle East, may have their favorites to head the country, but none of them want to see their candidate ruling over ruins. With every passing day, the risk is rising that outside powers become entangled.

Egypt openly favors General Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, head of the Sudan Armed Forces, or SAF. Turkey and Qatar, both of which have close ties to Sudan’s Islamists, lean that way. The United Arab Emirates has ties to both generals, but has closer political and commercial ties with his rival, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as “Hemedti,” and his Rapid Support Forces, or RSF.

The Arab League has followed the Egyptian position, identifying al-Burhan as representing the Sudanese state, implicitly labeling Hemedti as a rebel.

The Wagner Group has a partnership with the RSF, but the Kremlin also has interests in a Red Sea naval base and in SAF-controlled military businesses. China has investments in Sudan, especially in the oil sector, and sees the Red Sea as a strategic link in its Belt and Road Initiative — the waterway is its main maritime trade corridor to Europe.

The conflict poses a national security risk for Sudan’s neighbors. Egypt is struggling to cope with a mass influx of people that already tops 100,000. Privately they expect a million, including many dual Sudanese-Egyptian nationals. Saudi Arabia is receiving evacuees across the Red Sea. The Gulf monarchies all have Sudanese diaspora communities who will be bringing their extended families. They, and countries such as Turkey, have major investments in Sudan’s agriculture that face collapse.

The re-ignition of conflict in Darfur will ensnare Sudan’s western neighbors. One group to watch is the Arab militia of Musa Hilal, the Janjaweed commander defeated by Hemedti when the RSF took control of Darfur’s gold mines. Others are fighters loyal to Minni Minawi’s Sudan Liberation Army and Jibreel Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement, both of which have stayed neutral thus far. But as the SAF tries to close the borders, attack the gold mines, and burn Hemedti’s home base, Darfur is likely to explode, with terrible humanitarian consequences.

Libya is already entangled. Khalifa Haftar, head of the so-called Libyan National Army — and another member of the Wagner group of friends — is already supplying Hemedti with logistics. RSF fighters and others with different allegiances back home have fought on different sides in Libya: some will return to join the fray, others may fight one another in Libya. All these groups are also armed and dangerous in Chad and Central African Republic. Chadian President Mahamat Deby knows that his father, and his father’s predecessor, both took power in invasions from Darfur, and that his opponents will be assessing their chances.

There is upwards of a million South Sudanese in Sudan — refugees, labor migrants, and residents who stayed after the 2011 secession. They have few attractive options as their home country is fragile. South Sudan is in the path of the storm as trade from the north is cut, oil exports through Sudan are imperiled, and militias on both sides of the two country’s common border become emboldened. South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir has offered to mediate, but has made no progress.

Sudan’s war also intersects with Ethiopia’s. In recent weeks, the federal government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has switched horses — he has a new common front with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front against Amhara militias and Eritrea. The war zone is adjacent to Sudan, including the al-Fashaga Triangle — an area disputed between the two countries. There are 80,000 Tigrayan refugees inside Sudan in danger, and battalions of Tigrayan soldiers who had served with the UN and been given asylum there. Meanwhile, Egypt will be wondering if this might be a moment to disrupt the scheduled filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam during this summer’s rainy season, a step it fiercely objects to.

The only neighbor that sees potential benefits is Eritrea. The chaos is a chance for Eritrean security agents to roam freely, rounding up dissidents who will disappear into that country’s gulag and press-ganging refugees to replenish the depleted ranks of its army. And the more Eritrea’s neighbors are in turmoil, the more the Eritrean despot Isseyas Afewerki becomes the region’s military hegemon.

This regional tinderbox risks, first, that every neighbor will be involved, and, second, each will use its leverage to impede its rival’s. Any government that tries to step into the role of mediator will be seen by others as pursuing its interests, at the expense of others.

The U.S., China, and Russia share the basic agenda of stopping state collapse. But if Washington is visibly acting as the powerbroker, the other two will be tempted to play the spoiler.

On Thursday, President Biden issued an executive order authorizing sanctions against “individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan” or who are obstructing the democratic transition or committing serious human rights abuses. This isn’t likely to frighten the Sudanese generals or their foreign backers, who are accomplished sanctions-busters. But it will rile China, Russia, and African states, who are united in their opposition to unilateral U.S. sanctions wherever they are deployed.

The U.S. appears to have given up on the UN. True, it’s weakly led, it abandoned Sudan in its hour of need, and making it work demands careful diplomatic footwork. But if a regional conflagration is to be avoided, all the potential spoilers need to be neutralized, and for that the UN is indispensable.


A woman who fled the war-torn Sudan following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) arrives to register at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) after crossing at the Joda South border point, in Renk County, Upper Nile state, South Sudan April 30, 2023. REUTERS/Jok Solomun
Analysis | Africa
Trump Zelensky
Top image credit: Handout - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, on Tuesday, September 23, 2025. Photo via Ukrainian Presidential Press Office/ABACAPRESS.COM via REUTERS

Trump's latest line on Ukraine isn't a 'shift,' it's a hand-off

Europe

U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetorical shift on Ukraine isn’t a call to arms. But it’s a dangerous attempt to outsource escalation to Europe. And it’s a strategy that could easily reverse again.

Trump’s recent social media pronouncement on Ukraine, following his meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky, appears to be a stunning about-face. Just days ago, the core of his “peace plans” was the grim realpolitik of forcing Kyiv to accept territorial losses. Now, he declares Russia a “paper tiger” and seems to endorse fighting to Ukraine’s “final victory”, including “winning back” all the territories it lost to Russia since 2014.

But a closer look reveals this isn’t a genuine shift toward a hawkish policy. Instead, it’s the unveiling of a profoundly dangerous strategy. To understand it, we must see it as the outcome of a successful influence campaign by Kyiv, its European partners and their allies within the U.S. administration, who, after Trump's meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, faced a clear set of objectives.

Their minimum task was to prevent Trump from applying intense pressure on Zelensky to accept Putin’s terms for a peace settlement, most notably Russia’s territorial gains in Donbas and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality (i.e. no NATO membership). More ambitiously, they sought to convince Trump to return to a Biden-era policy of direct aid. And their maximum, albeit distant, task was to gain approval for high-risk actions like a no-fly zone over Ukraine.

Faced with these pressures, Trump had three broad options: pressure Zelensky (facing major resistance from Ukraine, Europe and powerful forces within the U.S.), pressure Putin (with limited leverage and high escalation risks), or essentially “wash his hands” of direct responsibility.

The latest events show that Kyiv and Europe have achieved their minimum goal. Trump is not pressuring Zelensky to accept Putin’s terms. Moreover, he has effectively taken the issue of a rapid ceasefire off the table, a major win for leaders who fear a negotiated compromise. They now have a “green light” from the American president himself to continue fighting.

However, this shift is almost entirely rhetorical. While the tone has swung from advocating a deal to cheering for victory, the underlying substantive policy — American disengagement — has remained remarkably consistent. Before, he argued that Ukraine should cede land because the U.S. should not be involved. Now, he argues Ukraine can win back its land because the U.S. should not be involved, except as a merchant. The core “America First” principle of avoiding costly entanglements is unchanged; only the public justification for it has flipped to accommodate political pressures.

This disengagement is articulated not just by Trump’s transactional arms-sales approach, but by his key officials. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently laid bare the doctrine’s stark logic, dismissing fears of Russian expansion by stating, “All I hear from you is that Putin wants to march into Warsaw. The one thing I'm sure of is that Putin isn't marching into Boston.”

This statement is a clear signal that the administration’s fundamental priority is insulating the American homeland, not defending the NATO frontier, much less a non-NATO country like Ukraine. This “re-orientation” was likely influenced by a combination of factors, including Trump’s genuine frustration with Putin’s refusal to accept a ceasefire without a broader political settlement, incidents with Russian drones and aircraft violating NATO’s airspace, and a concerted flow of information suggesting Ukrainian strength and Russian weakness.

Yet, this apparent victory for Ukraine and its allies comes with a massive catch. Trump has not chosen deeper U.S. involvement. Instead, he has chosen his third option: to “wash his hands.” While his rhetoric is bellicose, his policy is transactional. The U.S., he suggests, will be a weapons wholesaler to Europe, not a direct funder. For Kyiv, this is far from ideal, as it must now rely primarily on European aid, which may be insufficient.

Critically, we must remember Trump’s penchant for abrupt reversals. Not long ago, he claimed Zelensky had “no cards” and that Ukraine would lose to Russia, a more powerful nation. Then he threatened Putin with sanctions, only to later drop those ultimatums, meet with him, and hailed a breakthrough. Now, Russia is a “paper tiger.”

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Recent remarks about the necessity of disarming Hezbollah by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack have stunned Lebanese leaders, who are concerned that any forcible attempt to carry out Washington’s wishes risks plunging the country into renewed sectarian violence and possibly even civil war.

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Israel’s September 9 strike against Hamas leaders in Qatar’s capital, Doha, marked yet another escalation in Israel’s nearly two-year military campaign that has now extended its operations to Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Tunisia, and Qatar — all while perpetuating the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and aggressive settlement expansion on the West Bank.

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