Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments about dealing with China and Taiwan contradict key elements of the Biden administration’s Asia policy and have created a maelstrom of reactions in the United States.
But Macron’s comments may help deliver a stiff (and much needed) dose of reality to Washington elites, who are still clinging to 90’s-era notions of America as the unrivaled global superpower and “indispensable nation” — ideas which have long since lost their currency in much of the world.
China’s rise is only one factor that heralds the arrival of a “multipolar” world in which global power is slowly diffusing away from the United States. It should come as little surprise to Washington that middle powers like France hope to navigate this emerging reality in a manner that their leaders believe best suits their nation’s interests.
In an interview following his meeting with President Xi, the French president warned of Europeans becoming “vassals” of a world dominated by Washington and Beijing, and framed a potential confrontation between China and Taiwan as a crisis that is “not ours.” He pitched an alternate vision of European strategic autonomy and an independent French foreign policy.
This did not go down well in Washington, to put it mildly. Congressman Michael Gallagher, chairman of the new Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and a China hawk, called Macron’s interview a “massive propaganda victory” for the CCP. Texas senator John Cornyn criticized Macron’s “vow of neutrality against Chinese aggression in the Pacific.” Though the White House tried to douse the fire, it is unlikely to have placated anyone.
It remains to be seen if Macron is able to achieve his goal of greater European policy independence on China. Much will depend on his ability to forge a consensus with Germany and some other EU states, which will not be easy.
Had dissent from U.S. strategy been limited to France, that would not have been so surprising. After all, the French strains of Gaullism and Left populism have always chafed at American dominance, even as France has remained a committed U.S. ally on most common challenges.
The most glaring example in recent decades was France’s defiance of Washington’s illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003. Macron may be an unlikely messenger of Gaullism, or even more so, of French left populism. But if we zoom out to the rest of the world, his is hardly a lonely voice.
The fact is that the U.S. alliance and partnership system is going through a substantial shift, especially in the Global South. Whereas during the Cold War, many U.S.-backed regimes in South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa could be counted on to back Washington in regards to major rivals (though even then there were significant plays at autonomy), this is much less true today.
Witness Egypt’s alleged covert planning to supply as many as 40,000 lethal rockets to Russia in recent months (a development it vehemently denies). Or the surprise Saudi peace deal with Iran achieved with Chinese assistance. Or India’s continuing purchase of huge volumes of Russian oil. In Southeast Asia, Singapore has a pointed message on the U.S.-China rivalry: this is not our fight.
This is what multipolarity looks like. As an American mayor once notoriously said: “get over it.” But the United States is not ready for a post-unipolar world. Its moral hectoring on democracy and human rights (with all the glaring contradictions evident) falls on deaf ears, from New Delhi to Havana. Its strident calls for a global coalition against Russia and China — with Iran thrown in somewhere for good measure — is met with a shrug of shoulders. Its frequent appeals for a “rules-based international order” mystify more than clarify.
Make no mistake: the Global South has not roundly or warmly welcomed Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. And China’s intrusive behavior has put Southeast Asian states on the edge. But that doesn’t mean that these states are willing to fall in line behind the United States either.
There will certainly be some instances when Global South states align or ally against Washington’s pet rivals — Singapore on Russia or India on China or Israel on Iran. But those are more the exceptions than the rule.
Rather than universalize its preferences, Washington might benefit from abandoning its tendency to moralize when it sees behaviors and governments it doesn’t like. Of course, when core American interests — that is the safety and security of the American homeland, its people and prosperity, and the U.S. political system — are directly threatened, the United States must act.
But expecting states as distant and dissimilar as Egypt and India and Brazil to fall in line on a global battle against other great powers is futile and counterproductive. The United States must realize that, in a multi-civilizational and messy world, its strategic preferences and cherished values (to the extent it itself abides by them) may be increasingly a part of an a la carte choice rather than a set menu for a hungry world.
Global South states, as also important voices in Europe, still prefer American leadership as long as it serves their interests. Otherwise, they will go where the best deals are to be found. In a sense, a freer market of interest-shopping has arrived. Surely, this is a very American thing?
