The letter, which was signed by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, asks the White House to pursue the Minsk agreements which would "demilitarize the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine and guarantee meaningful political autonomy to the region while retaining Ukrainian sovereignty over the area and its borders." QI fellow Anatol Lieven has detailed the agreement and the promise it would hold for peace in the region here.
De-escalation is key, wrote the signing organizations, which also emphasized the need to stop NATO expansion and resist calls to send U.S. troops to defend Ukraine.
We echo the call by over 100 former U.S. officials and leading scholars who stated that, in addition to addressing urgent security challenges, we must engage in a serious and sustained strategic dialogue with Russia “that addresses the deeper sources of mistrust and hostility” while deterring Russian military aggression. These dialogues must engage with President Putin’s explicit pursuit of “reliable and long-term security guarantees” that would “exclude any further NATO moves eastward and the deployment of weapons systems that threaten us in close vicinity to Russian territory.
Interestingly, reports emerged Friday that suggested that the White House was willing to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe and scale back military exercises in the region — for an equivalent reduction of Russian troops in the area. In an accompanying statement, the White House disputed that Washington was weighing troop cuts.
Thanks to our readers and supporters, Responsible Statecraft has had a tremendous year. A complete website overhaul made possible in part by generous contributions to RS, along with amazing writing by staff and outside contributors, has helped to increase our monthly page views by 133%! In continuing to provide independent and sharp analysis on the major conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the tumult of Washington politics, RS has become a go-to for readers looking for alternatives and change in the foreign policy conversation.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.
Yavoriv, Ukraine – U.S. Army soldiers assigned to the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine observe a Ukrainian Army live-fire exercise at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center Dec. 7, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Alexander Rector)|Yavoriv, Ukraine – U.S. Army soldiers assigned to the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine observe a Ukrainian Army live-fire exercise at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center Dec. 7, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Alexander Rector)
Top image credit: F-35 Lighting II maintainers from both the United States Air Force and Royal Norwegian Air Force work together at Orland Air Base, Norway, to turn two American jets after a sortie June 17, 2019. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Austin M. May.)
Elon Musk has turned his attention to the F-35 program, and he isn’t impressed. The world’s richest man – who owns SpaceX, the sole provider of reliable American space launches – threw shade at the most expensive weapon program in history in a post on X on November 25.
“The F-35 design was broken at the requirements level, because it was required to be too many things to too many people. This made it an expensive & complex jack of all trades, master of none. Success was never in the set of possible outcomes,” Musk posted on X.
Elon Musk is absolutely right…and not just because I have been saying the exact same thing for a decade!
The American people need to come to grips with the fact that the F-35 program is a complete flop. Most leaders of the national security establishment are unlikely to say so in such blunt terms, but some of them are now tacitly admitting the truth probably without realizing they are.
The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, effectively the hometown newspaper for the F-35 program, recently published an article loaded with quotes from lawmakers, defense officials, and university professors. They all made an economic argument to defend the program.
That should send shivers down the spine of every Lockheed Martin executive. When the best argument that can be made for a weapon program is its economic impact, it is clear the program has limited military value.
For a program in development for more than 23 years, at the expense of nearly $300 billion so far, the American people have received little in return. New F-35s coming off the Fort Worth assembly line have only limited combat capabilities. It will reportedly take years for engineers to complete the hardware and software necessary for new F-35s to achieve full combat capability. The jets already in service have demonstrated an appalling lack of reliability. During all of 2023, the F-35 fleet only managed a 30% full mission capable rate.
The F-35 has proven to be a deeply flawed aircraft that is far from meeting the needs of the services and therefore jeopardizes national security. Focusing attention on the program’s economic impact is simply a desperate attempt to prevent Congress from cutting funding.
Such a strategy has been used by industry before, but it usually just delays the inevitable. National security establishment leaders attempted to save the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship with similar arguments in the last decade. The LCS program was initially praised by its supporters as a revolutionary surface ship capable of affordably filling multiple roles. As more of the ships were built and entered active service, it became increasingly clear the program failed to live up to expectations and Navy leaders wanted to cut their losses. But lawmakers kept the program sputtering along for a few years longer because of its economic impact.
Providing for the common defense is enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution. The American people tolerate, however grudgingly in many cases, the government spending their tax dollars to build weapons for the military. The expectation is that Congress will spend wisely to buy things that work and that fill capability gaps. Lawmakers shouldn’t buy weapons simply to stimulate the economy. There are far better ways to boost the economy with taxpayer dollars than wasteful defense spending. Imagine the effect on the overall economy if just a fraction of the money spent on the F-35 was spent on the country’s transportation network.
The military value of a weapon program is the only valid justification for its expense. If someone does feel the need to defend a program, the argument should be based on the weapon’s demonstrated effectiveness and its centrality to the nation’s defense. If a weapon doesn’t work or can’t be purchased in the numbers the services need, then what is the point?
The American people today spend far more on defense than they did just a generation ago. Pentagon spending levels are nearly 50% higher than they were in the year 2000. That extra money has been sunk into numerous acquisition failures. The Littoral Combat Ship, the Army’s Future Combat System, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, the KC-46 aerial tanker, and the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle are just a few significant disappointments from the past 25 years.
The system is clearly broken. The incoming Trump administration will have to take drastic steps to rein in the excesses of the past 25 years. With influential people now at least unwittingly admitting the F-35’s failures, it could be a good starting point. Cancelling the program outright would be very difficult because of all the foreign entanglements that were baked into it from the beginning. But limiting production until engineers complete the F-35’s design may send the proper signal to the defense industry that the status quo is intolerable.
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump walks offstage with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (R) at the conclusion of a joint news conference at the White House in Washington, U.S., February 13, 2017. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
The Trudeau government faces a perfect storm of political and economic upheaval following Chrystia Freeland’s abrupt resignation and mounting anxieties over the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to power.
With Trudeau’s popularity at record lows and calls for his resignation mounting, Canada’s leadership crisis could not come at a worse time. Freeland’s departure, opposition gains, and the specter of renewed U.S. protectionism and pressure on NATO spending threaten to leave Canada unprepared to defend its national interests in a volatile international environment.
Freeland’s resignation has sent shockwaves through Ottawa and underscored growing disarray within the Liberal government. As a key figure in Trudeau’s cabinet and Canada’s chief negotiator during Trump’s renegotiation of NAFTA into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Freeland played a central role in managing U.S.-Canada relations at a time of considerable tension. Her ability to navigate Trump’s unpredictable leadership, while securing a deal that protected Canada’s core trade interests, earned her broad praise in Canada. (She chose to skip a recent meeting with Trudeau and Trump at Mar-a-Lago; Trump called her "behavior...totally toxic".)
Her resignation now leaves a vacuum of experience and credibility at a time when Canada may again need steady hands to manage Washington’s demands.
While official explanations cite personal reasons, many speculate that Freeland’s departure reflects her reluctance to continue propping up a government mired in declining popularity and internal dissent. Trudeau’s approval ratings are at historic lows, weighed down by inflation, rising living costs, and a growing perception of Liberal incompetence.
Within his own party, frustrations are mounting over the inability to reverse these trends, and the prospect of Pierre Poilievre’s Conservatives sweeping to power looms ever larger. Poilievre has seized on Freeland’s resignation to paint the Liberals as leaderless and adrift, resonating with Canadians eager for economic and political renewal.
This domestic instability could not come at a worse time. Donald Trump’s 2024 campaign rhetoric already signals a return to the aggressive economic nationalism of his first term. His promises to expand tariffs and bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States are a cornerstone of his appeal to his voter base, and Canada’s trade surpluses — particularly in energy, agriculture, and critical minerals — make it a convenient target. The memory of Trump’s punitive tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum under dubious “national security” justifications remains fresh.
Though the renegotiation of NAFTA brought temporary relief, Trump’s willingness to ignore trade rules and override multilateral dispute mechanisms highlights how vulnerable Canada remains to U.S. economic coercion.
Should Trump return to power, Canada could find itself once again in Washington’s crosshairs. Unlike 2017, however, Ottawa is now confronting this prospect from a position of unprecedented domestic weakness. A government collapse or prolonged political crisis would leave Canada paralyzed and unable to respond effectively. A caretaker government, constrained by electoral uncertainty, would lack the political mandate to negotiate with a Trump administration intent on imposing demands unilaterally.
The result could be a replay of the 2018 trade crisis, but with Canada even less prepared to defend its interests.
Trump’s return would also bring renewed focus on Canada’s defense spending. Throughout his first term, Trump repeatedly criticized NATO allies for failing to meet the alliance’s benchmark of spending 2% of GDP on defense, and Canada was often singled out as one of the worst offenders. Despite Trudeau’s rhetoric about supporting multilateralism and NATO solidarity, Canada’s defense spending remains well below the target, hovering at just 1.4%. While Ottawa has promised new investments —ranging from Arctic defense infrastructure to NORAD modernization and the procurement of new submarines — progress has been slow, hampered by bureaucratic inefficiency and procurement delays.
Freeland’s departure raises further concerns about who will manage this critical aspect of Canada-U.S. relations. Her ability to balance Trump’s unpredictability with Canada’s strategic priorities was a key asset during the NAFTA renegotiation. Without her, Ottawa risks struggling to present a credible case to Washington, particularly if domestic instability undermines the government’s ability to commit to significant defense investments. Trump’s likely demands for Canada to “pay up” will only intensify the pressure. Failure to act decisively could strain the bilateral relationship and call Canada’s credibility as a defense partner into question.
While Ottawa struggles to respond, Canada’s provinces are stepping in to address challenges that a second Trump administration might exacerbate. Regional leaders, particularly in border provinces, are taking proactive measures to mitigate risks linked to U.S. economic disruptions, border security challenges, and rising transnational crime.
In Quebec, irregular migration remains a significant concern, particularly at unofficial border crossings like Roxham Road, which saw an influx of asylum seekers during Trump’s first term. Premier François Legault, frustrated with Ottawa’s perceived inaction, has redirected the Sûreté du Québec to assist federal border agents and accelerate the processing of asylum claims. Legault’s calls for tougher immigration measures reflect growing provincial frustrations, a sentiment Trump could exploit to pressure Canada into new border agreements.
Ontario, home to key trade corridors with Michigan and New York, has prioritized efforts to combat illegal firearms trafficking and organized crime. Premier Doug Ford has expanded Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) involvement in cross-border task forces, collaborating directly with U.S. law enforcement to address smuggling networks. Ford has criticized Ottawa for lagging on border security, suggesting provincial authorities may escalate their efforts independently if necessary.
British Columbia faces unique challenges as Canada’s gateway to trans-Pacific trade. Vancouver’s ports are critical for both legal commerce and illicit contraband, drawing scrutiny from U.S. agencies and exposing Canada to allegations of insufficient enforcement. In response, B.C. has expanded anti-smuggling operations, reallocating RCMP resources to monitor transport routes and border crossings. Discussions are underway to establish a task force focused on dismantling organized crime networks linked to cross-border activity.
In Alberta, Trump’s return is viewed with a mix of anxiety and resolve. As Canada’s energy powerhouse, Alberta has the most to lose from renewed U.S. protectionism targeting Canadian oil and gas exports. Premier Danielle Smith has made it clear that Alberta will resist federal concessions on energy policy that undermine the province’s economic interests. Alberta has also bolstered enforcement at key crossings, such as Coutts, to ensure trade security while managing smuggling risks.
Domestically, the political fallout from Freeland’s resignation and the Trudeau government’s broader crisis has emboldened Pierre Poilievre’s Conservatives. Leading in the polls, Poilievre has capitalized on frustration with Liberal leadership, inflation, and economic stagnation. Should Trudeau’s government collapse, Canada risks entering a period of paralysis that Trump could exploit to impose unilateral measures on trade, border security, and defense.
Despite these challenges, Canada can prepare. Stabilizing political leadership must be the first priority. If Trudeau cannot rally his party, a leadership transition may be necessary to project competence and unity. Ottawa must also insulate the economy from U.S. protectionism by diversifying trade with Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Meeting NATO’s 2% defense spending target will signal Canada’s seriousness as a security partner, while investments in Arctic infrastructure, NORAD modernization, and procurement are critical.
Finally, Canada must strengthen ties with U.S. stakeholders beyond Trump, including Congress and state governors, to reinforce shared interests.
How Canada navigates this moment will test its leadership, resilience, and ability to prioritize national interests. A coherent, strategic response is essential to safeguard Canada’s economic and security interests in an increasingly unpredictable world.
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Top photo credit: The fall of the Syrian regime, Syrians celebrate Bashar al-Assad's escape. Damascus, Syria, December 8, 2024 (Mohammad Bash/Shutterstock)
The lightning speed with which Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, toppled the brutal Assad regime in Syria on December 8 has signaled the demise of global Islamic jihad, the rise of territorial political Islam, the collapse of the half-century old Shia alliance between Iran and Syria, and the failure of Iran’s proxy-based strategic doctrine.
These are some of the new realities of the Middle East that the incoming Trump administration will face.
Assad’s fall also put an end to secular nationalist strongman rule of Ba’athism whose aspirations for “unity, liberty, and socialism” were never achieved in the multi-ethnic and -sectarian polities of Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon (where the ideology was born 80 years ago). Different variants of Islam have continued to dominate Arab political systems. The question now is what are HTS’s leanings in that regard.
During my many interactions with Islamic political parties and groups across the Muslim world in the 1990s and early 2000s, my interlocutors acknowledged that a state-centered ideological political agenda, as opposed to a violent global jihadist one, was the only possible path to remove autocratic, brutal, and corrupt regimes from their societies. Several leaders from these parties — for example, PAS in Malaysia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Refah in Turkey, al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Progress and Development in Morocco — told me during my visits that to win national elections, they had to espouse platforms centered on bread-and-butter issues and a commitment to a peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box, not bullets.
The public statements made thus far by HTS’s leader, Ahmad al-Shara, also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, suggest he may fall more into that political tradition of Islamist parties notwithstanding his more radical roots. Despite HTS’s less-than-inclusive rule in Idlib in recent years, the group under his leadership focused far more on delivering key public services than enforcing a brutal and strict version of Sharia law associated with al Qaeda.
Reasons for cautious optimism
My own optimism stems from at least three observations based on my study of HTS since its creation: 1) it broke with al Qaeda years ago; 2) al-Jolani has been explicit in his recognition of the ethnic and religious diversity of the country; and 3) he has relied on indigenous Syrian leadership.
Of course, there is the possibility that wild cards — domestic and regional — could develop that would derail al-Jolani’s stated commitment to establishing a stable and unified Syria that is respectful of its minorities.
Indeed, as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State or ISIS in Iraq and Syria were being decimated by American, Russian, and Syrian air strikes in the middle of the last decade, Jabhat al-Nusra and a few smaller Islamic militant groups in Syria broke away from Al Qaeda and formed HTS, or the Front for the Liberation of Syria, whose principal goal was to topple the Assad regime.
Significantly, HTS adopted a local agenda and selected only Syrian indigenous activists to lead the group. Unlike ISIS and Al Qaeda, HTS did not invite non-Syrian leaders — for example, Saudis, Yemenis, Iraqis, Central Asians, or North Africans — to join the new Front. HTS also viewed the radical Salafi concept of global jihad and terrorism as having failed to change Muslim societies or to dislodge autocratic rule in several Muslim countries, including in the Levant.
Al-Jolani himself made clear already in 2016 that his new group sought the liberation of Syria from the Assad regime and the establishment of a new, pluralistic political order that reflected the ethnic, religious, and racial diversity of Syrian society. As a Syrian national, Al-Jolani is aware that Syria comprises Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, including the Alawite minority, Kurds, Armenians Christians of different denominations, Druze, and other small minorities. Since the demise of the unspeakably brutal Assad regime on December 8, he has also called explicitly for the protection of minorities and human rights, including women’s rights.
While he has urged the population to forgo revenge and retribution, notably against the Alawite community, which served as the sectarian base of the Assad dynasty, he has promised to prosecute former high-level military, security, and intelligence officials responsible for the worst abuses of the Assad era and urged other countries and international organizations to help in bringing them to justice.
Of course, in many regime-change rebellions, history has shown that aggrieved members of the public often hunt down targeted officials of the old regime and summarily execute them without trial. Unfortunately, Syria is unlikely to fully escape this pattern, but there are hopeful signs that these sporadic executions may not descend into a new reign of terror.
None of this is assured. As in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, too broad a crackdown against former regime officials, particularly if it is perceived as motivated by sectarianism, could trigger a violent backlash. Similarly, strict enforcement of Sharia law against minority sects could turn key communities against the new administration in ways that external powers could exploit.
And having governed only Idlib province, HTS, especially if it fails to share power with key representative constituencies, could quickly find itself completely overwhelmed regardless of its more benign and inclusive intentions.
The new government could also face serious external challenges, particularly if Turkey mounts more military operations against its perceived Kurdish enemies in northeastern Syria and if Israel continues with its strikes across Syria and its occupation of the neutral zone in the Golan Heights.
Fortunately, Iran, like Russia, has seemingly decided not to challenge the new regime. The Gulf and other Arab states, following their recent meeting in Jordan, have embraced it so long as it pursues inclusive and anti-terrorist national policies in Syria.
The path forward
It might be pollyannish at this time, less than two weeks since the fall of Damascus, to expect stability and calm to prevail and government departments to be fully functional.
External actors will also influence the future trajectory of the new Syria.
HTS is currently listed by the United States as a terrorist organization, and there is a huge reward on al-Jolani’s head. This designation, however, was made nearly a decade ago before the Syrian rebels broke with Al Qaeda.
While the Biden administration is watching the actions of the new Syrian government closely, as it should, the incoming administration could contribute greatly to domestic Syrian stability if it considers a new designation for HTS if the new government, when fully formed, reflects the country’s diversity and follows through on the commitment to respect human rights and the rule of law by its actions as well as statements.
The post-Assad government should also reach out to its neighbors, particularly Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq, with an eye toward settling border conflicts and the return of Syrian refugees. It should also seek the help of the United States, and the European Union in constraining Turkey’s interventions against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria and in persuading Israel to withdraw its forces from the buffer zone in the Golan Heights.
My assessment of HTS and its leadership’s intentions may yet prove wishful thinking, but thus far, the signs are positive for a country and a region that have endured far too much suffering.
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