Follow us on social

190822-f-ff603-0209-scaled

The U.S. military should end its counterterror operations in Africa

The number of extremist groups in North Africa have only grown as the U.S. military presence there has expanded.

Analysis | Global Crises

As the United States sensibly backs its military out of Afghanistan and considers drawing down the remaining 5,000 American troops in Iraq, it is time to review the expanded U.S. military presence in West and East Africa (~7,000 troops), particularly counterterror operations. Such a review was announced by Secretary of Defense Mike Esper in December 2019.

Our African deployments were practically invisible until October 2017, when four American soldiers died in an ambush in Niger. Suddenly Americans — including at least one U.S. Senator — realized that the U.S. military was in Africa getting the U.S. into deeper and deeper trouble.

It is time to pull back these forces. They reflect a militarization of U.S. foreign policy that has accelerated since 2001. Claims to the contrary, the military does not do these operations particularly well and there is growing evidence that they are counterproductive, generating more terrorists than they eliminate and exacerbating instability. They do nothing to counter Chinese or Russian influence in Africa, despite claims that they do. The threat they target is not a vital U.S. interest. In sum, by militarizing U.S. engagement in Africa, security assistance, training, and operations are harming U.S. security interests.

The U.S. military’s African adventure started in 2007. Until then, Africa had been a Pentagon backwater, with forces supplied by other regional commands when Americans needed to be evacuated or humanitarian relief delivered, as in the Rwandan civil war. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created as a separate regional command in 2007 making security relations with the African continent an important part of the Pentagon’s global “Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) program.

The BPC goal included a whole new set of Defense Department legal authorities to provide training, arms, funding, and support for the militaries of other countries. Security, the argument went, took priority before strong governance and economic growth could happen, and DoD was the right agency to do the job.

As a result, almost invisibly, over the past 13 years, the U.S. has established a continuing presence on more than 27 bases in at least 15 African countries, according to research by investigative reporter Nick Turse. The presence is concentrated in the Sahel region (Mauritania, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), and in the Horn of Africa, much of it at Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti. Operations include training and military exercises, supplying arms to local militaries, flight operations and logistical support, drone flights for both attack and intelligence missions, bombing, and even limited ground combat operations, like the one ambushed in Niger. U.S. forces also support French operations in the Sahel.

Critics of this growing military engagement have argued that creating a large security assistance and training program and putting the U.S. in charge militarizes the U.S. engagement in these regions (and elsewhere) at the cost of stability, good governance, and economic growth. As Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, the security focus overwhelms and distorts the orientation of governments, corrupts political institutions, can exacerbate conflict and corruption, lead to human rights abuses, and divert public resources from investment in economic progress.

The American military is not the right tool for the counterterror mission. The Sahel operation is not making progress, despite the claim by one U.S. special operations captain that U.S. forces are “uniquely suited” to provide this training and support. As the U.S. effort has grown, the number of terrorist attacks in the region has grown exponentially. Since 2010 the number of Islamist groups operating in North, West, and East Africa has risen from five to 25, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

The number of violent incidents for which these groups are responsible has risen 14 percent in the past year. AFRICOM and special operators argue that the increase in violence justifies an even greater U.S. commitment. It is equally plausible that a militarized approach to counterterrorism has set in motion a tit-for-tat process that has accelerated the threat.

Supporters of U.S. military engagement also argue that the American presence is essential to counter growing Chinese and Russian involvement throughout Africa. The timing of this “great power” theme may not be accidental. After all, U.S. military operations in the Sahel and East Africa are under review. Discussions of that review suggest that Esper wants to redeploy forces to deal with what the National Military Strategy calls “great power competition” with China and Russia.

Such a redeployment puts AFRICOM resources at risk. The magical response to a budgetary fight is to relabel the program to fit the priority mission. It’s hardly surprising then that special operations commander for Africa Brig. Gen. Dagvin Anderson has called his counterterror operations in Africa “great power competition.”

But counterterrorist operations in Africa are not critical to U.S. security. There is little evidence that the organizations involved constitute a strategic threat to the U.S., though they may be vitally important to the countries in question. The U.S. military presence does little to counter any known Russian or Chinese activity in Africa.

If U.S. truly wished to “compete” with China and Russia, policy should focus on diplomacy, trade, and investment, rather than diminishing state capacity in these countries by bolstering the least accountable, most corrupt institution — the local military.

In sum, the growing U.S. military operations in the Sahel and East Africa involves the U.S. in political events in countries that are not vital national interests. It needs more congressional oversight, and not the boosterism key senators recently provided. Restraining this militarized engagement should be the first step in confronting the “mission creep” that has militarized U.S. foreign policy for the past 20 years.

France is significantly better placed to help with the security mission. Even the French role is a mixed blessing, given the historic French colonial regime which did little to empower local governance and security capabilities. But France has the local presence, knowledge and experience to better assist these countries.

The French government is understandably uneasy about a U.S. pull-back, as it relies heavily on U.S. logistics, transportation, refueling, and drone-supplied intelligence and combat activities. But arrangements can be made to ensure these gaps are filled once the U.S. military leaves.

The U.S. military is the wrong tool for our African engagement. A more restrained U.S. policy in the region would restore the role of diplomacy and help create new multilateral policies that open up opportunities for many African countries — like Ghana, Ethiopia, and Rwanda – already experiencing economic growth and effective security. Interestingly, Mauritania, part of the G5 Sahel, has had significant success in preventing terrorist attacks, attributed to a well-trained military and frequent patrolling, among other things.

Ultimately, the countries in the region are responsible for their own security. It will depend on effective governance and well-distributed economic growth. It is not a case of “security first,” but of governance first, which only the local governments can provide.


Photo credit: U.S. Air Force
Analysis | Global Crises
Trump tariffs
Top image credit: Steve Travelguide via shutterstock.com

Linking tariff 'deals' to US security interests is harder than it looks

Global Crises

In its July 31 Executive Order modifying the reciprocal tariffs originally laid out in early April, the White House repeatedly invokes the close linkages between trade and national security.

The tariff treatment of different countries is linked to broader adhesion to U.S. foreign policy priorities. For example, (relatively) favorable treatment is justified for those countries that have “agreed to, or are on the verge of agreeing to, meaningful trade and security commitments with the United States, thus signaling their sincere intentions to permanently remedy … trade barriers ….and to align with the United States on economic and national security matters.”

keep readingShow less
Kurdistan drone attacks
Top photo credit: A security official stands near site of the Sarsang oilfield operated by HKN Energy, after a drone attack, in Duhok province, Iraq, July 17, 2025. REUTERS/Azad Lashkari

Kurdistan oil is the Bermuda Triangle of international politics

Middle East

In May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that a strong Kurdistan Region within a federal Iraq is a "fundamental and strategic component" of U.S. policy. Two months later, that policy was set on fire.

A relentless campaign of drone attacks targeting Iraqi Kurdistan’s military, civilian, and energy infrastructure escalated dramatically in July, as a swarm of Iranian-made drones struck oil fields operated by American and Norwegian companies. Previous strikes had focused on targets like Erbil International Airport and the headquarters of the Peshmerga’s 70th Force in Sulaymaniyah.

The attacks slashed regional oil production from a pre-attack level of nearly 280,000 barrels per day to a mere 80,000.

The arrival of Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji in Erbil personified the central paradox of the crisis. His mission was to lead an investigation into an attack that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials had already publicly blamed on armed groups embedded within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—components of his own government.

keep readingShow less
Sudan
Sudanese protester stands in front of a blazing fire during a demonstration against the military coup, on International Women's Day in Khartoum, Sudan March 8, 2022. REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig

Sudan civil war takes dark turn as RSF launches 'parallel government'

Africa

In a dramatic move last week, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced the selection of its own prime minister and presidential council to compete with and directly challenge the legitimacy of the Sudanese government.

News of the new parallel government comes days before a new round of peace talks was expected to begin in Washington last week. Although neither of the two civil war belligerents were going to attend, it was to be the latest effort by the United States to broker an end to the war in Sudan — and the first major effort under Trump’s presidency.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.