Follow us on social

Wagner's Africa momentum tested by deadly clash with Mali rebels

Wagner's Africa momentum tested by deadly clash with Mali rebels

The loss at Tinzaouaten suggests that Russia’s path to power here is not as simple as pumping in men and money

Analysis | Africa

In late July, the Malian army and its allies in the Wagner Group/Africa Corps battled Taureg rebels — and possibly jihadists — at Tinzaouaten in far northern Mali.

The battle resulted in dozens of casualties, especially for Wagner, as the mercenaries themselves have acknowledged. The Taureg claim to have killed some 84 Wagner soldiers, but there has not been any confirmation of the number dead on the Russian side to date.

The clash shows, first, that Wagner and Russia do not have unstoppable momentum in Africa; and second, that no national or foreign government can kill its way out of the Sahel conflict.

Mali is currently ruled by a military junta that seized power in August 2020. For nearly four years, the junta has defied regional and international pressure to permanently cede power to civilians. The junta also expelled French forces and a United Nations peacekeeping mission, fulfilling the longstanding wishes of some Malians — how many is difficult to measure, but protests and criticisms against the French had surged even before the coup — for a redefined version of sovereignty.

The junta turned to Russia and the Wagner Group as security partners, earning rebukes from Washington and other Western capitals. The Wagner Group proved appealing to the junta in part because of the junta’s own exterminationist instincts vis-à-vis jihadists, perceived jihadists, and the northern rebels who had defied Bamako again and again since Mali’s independence in the 1960s. Together, the Malian Armed Forces and the Wagner Group have repeatedly massacred Malian civilians in the name of hunting jihadists.

Meanwhile, in the second half of 2023, Wagner helped the Malian Armed Forces in their push to recapture the key northern town of Kidal, which had been mostly under rebel control for more than a decade. The conquest of Kidal fed into narratives about a “rise in power” under the junta and a reclamation of supposed national unity and strength. Yet as the rebels melted into the desert and staged sporadic attacks, the taking of a fixed target proved to be merely one of the more straightforward pieces within a highly complex war in the north.

The battle at Tinzaouaten confirms that the rebels have not been broken. Moreover, the battle may be part of yet another reshuffling of the political deck in Mali, as it remains unclear whether rebels (in a formation currently called the Permanent Strategic Framework or CSP) and jihadists (here meaning the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims or JNIM) are working together, as they sometimes have in the past.

Also unclear is the role of Ukraine. Did Ukraine provide intelligence support to the CSP, to help strike a blow at Russia’s ventures in Africa, as a Ukrainian official has claimed? The CSP made no mention of Ukraine when claiming victory. Yet Mali has already broken diplomatic ties with Ukraine, decrying “Ukraine's involvement in a cowardly, treacherous and barbaric attack by armed terrorist groups.” If Ukraine’s support is confirmed, it will be yet another instance of very strange bedfellows in the Sahel.

Where does this apparent defeat leave Wagner? Sometimes, Wagner strategically abandons a fight, as the example of their brief deployment in Mozambique shows. On the other hand, the mercenaries have a high tolerance for setbacks, as shown by their ability to withstand the death of their founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023 and their willingness to deploy to turbulent theaters such as Syria, Libya, and the Central African Republic. A willingness to absorb casualties could increase Mali’s (and other Sahelian governments’) confidence in Wagner and Russia. Wagner also has financial interests in Mali, including not just payments from the state but also its reported ventures into gold mining.

Yet the loss at Tinzaouaten suggests that Russia’s path to power in Africa is not as simple as pumping in men and money. The political-military landscape of northern Mali has flummoxed numerous actors, including successive governments in both Bamako and Paris. One could argue that Wagner benefits from instability writ large, even instability that the group itself helps to provoke and that then boomerangs back onto Wagner. Yet part of Russia’s appeal to ordinary people – an appeal that the Sahelian juntas seem to cater to – is in its image as a strong, supposedly anti-imperialist, tough-minded alternative to France and the West.

All this to say that the best way for Washington to “counter Russia'' in Africa is to let events run their course, and then be ready to offer a meaningful alternative (and not just an “I told you so”) once Russian ventures collapse.

The knottier problem for Washington, if it wishes to be a long-term partner to Mali and the Sahel, is this: state violence, whether applied in supposedly surgical ways or in more indiscriminate and punitive ones, will not bring stability to the Sahel. In different ways, Paris and Washington and Moscow have all promised Sahelian countries that these outside powers each understand the correct doses of violence to apply in order to remedy the region’s conflicts. But there is no correct dose of violence, no formula that kills certain actors and intimidates others while creating space for “the return of the state” (a slogan used by France) or the Malian junta’s mantra of a “rise in power.”

There is simply a war that keeps changing forms, and whose only serious reprieves and genuine breakthroughs come about through negotiations, deals, and compromises. When Wagner eventually exits Mali and the Sahel (nothing lasts forever), and when the military governments eventually either cede power or remold themselves into more benevolent-seeming autocrats, Washington should be ready not with the standard menu of “counterterrorism” and “good governance,” but with support for negotiations and ceasefires, even with the jihadists.


Daily life of french soldiers of barkhane military operation in Mali (Africa) launched in 2013 against terrorism in the area. (Shutterstock/Fred Marie)|

Taureg secessionists in 2012 (Magharebia/Creative Commons)

Analysis | Africa
Bukele Trump Garcia
Top photo credit: S President Donald Trump (2nd left) received his Salvadoran counterpart, Nayib Bukele (left), at the White House on April 14, 2025. The Salvadoran president offered his US counterpart assistance in combating crime and terrorism. Bukele also asserted that he will not return the Salvadoran "terrorist" sent to the Cecot (Cecot) to the US.

In Garcia, SCOTUS risks handing Trump a ‘loaded weapon’

Washington Politics

Mark Twain was spot on. History does not repeat itself but it commonly rhymes.

President Richard Nixon was bent on flouting an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to surrender White House tapes to a federal grand jury in Nixon v. Sirica (October 12, 1973). Mr. Nixon backed down in the face of overwhelming public and congressional opposition.

keep readingShow less
Yemen strikes
Top Image Credit: A fighter plane takes off, said to be, for an operation against the Yemen's Houthis at an unidentified location in this screengrab taken from a handout video released on March 18, 2025. US CENTCOM via X/Handout via REUTERS

Officials: US 'open' to supporting a Yemen ground operation

QiOSK

Amid its persistent, so-far largely ineffective aerial campaign against Yemen’s Houthis, the U.S. may now move to support Yemen’s internationally recognized government in a ground operation against them.

Indeed, the WSJ reported yesterday that the “U.S. is open to supporting a ground operation by local forces” in Yemen. U.S. officials told the WSJ, however, that the U.S. hasn’t finalized a decision to do so, nor is it leading relevant ground operation talks. However, the paper reported that American private contractors are providing advice to Yemeni factions.

keep readingShow less
10,000 US troops begin arriving at Mexico border
Top Photo: El Paso, TX USA December 21, 2022 National Guard troops and Texas State Troopers deployed to the border to deter migrants from crossing. Access via Shutterstock

10,000 US troops begin arriving at Mexico border

QiOSK

The 10,000 troops deployed by the Trump administration have begun arriving at America’s southern border.

Despite border crossings dropping, President Trump is continuing with his plan to militarize the U.S. border with Mexico. However, the soldiers will not be arresting illegal crossers but are instead focused on providing support and additional eyes and ears for the Border Patrol agents who are already on the ground.

keep readingShow less

Trump transition

Latest

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.