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US think tanks are the world's least transparent

US think tanks are the world's least transparent

A new global survey finds American institutions lagging behind in disclosing their donors

Analysis | Washington Politics

According to a new survey, North American think tanks are tied as the least transparent of any region. The poll, conducted by On Think Tanks, surveyed 335 think tanks from over 100 countries. The accompanying report, released today, found that only 35% of North American think tanks (mostly from the U.S.) that responded to the survey disclose funding sources. By comparison, 67% of Asian think tanks and 58% of African think tanks disclose their funding sources.

And there are signs that think tank funding transparency is trending towards more opacity. Just last month, the Center for American Progress — a major center-left think tank with $46 million in annual revenue — announced that it would no longer disclose its donors. The think tank said it was taking this “temporary protective step” out of concern that the Trump administration could target them.

In response to conservative influencer Charlie Kirk’s murder, both President Trump and Vice President JD Vance have suggested the White House will target left-wing groups and their donors.

Mark Schmitt, the Director of the Political Reform program at New America, suggests that think tanks should learn a lesson from other organizations that have drawn the ire of the Trump administration. “There’s no advantage or safety in bargaining with this administration or conceding wrongdoing where none exists,” he said.

Fear of political retribution is not the only reason U.S. think tanks may be reluctant to share financial information. Even before these new threats against left-leaning groups, a Quincy Institute report found that over a third of the major foreign policy think tanks do not disclose any donor information, oftentimes because of their heavy reliance on special interests. The top 50 American think tanks received at least $110 million from foreign governments and $35 million from defense contractors in the past 5 years alone.

Despite their positioning as objective and independent institutions, reliance on special interests can lead to self-censorship and perspective filtering. Researchers Kjølv Egeland and Benoît Pelopidas found in a study of think tank research on nuclear weapons that “the most generous funders exercise significant influence on the evolution of the foreign policy marketplace of ideas by affecting which questions are asked and which expert milieus are enabled to thrive.”

Transparency can invite scrutiny, but in a healthy democracy that is the point of transparency. It can help the public, media, and lawmakers understand a think tank’s values. Thomas Medvetz, an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego suggests this in his book “Think Tanks in America,” “Why not define a think tank in terms of its dependence on the very same institutions from which it is usually described as independent? After all, the vast majority of organizations labeled as think tanks typically rely on a patchwork of other outfits — for example, private foundations, government agencies, activist networks, and business corporations — for donations and other forms of material support, such as research contracts.”

Another key finding of the new On Think Tanks report is that optimism in think tank sector growth is declining, as 46% of think tanks said the political situation in their country impacted them unfavorably over the past year. Between 60-70% of think tanks surveyed are concerned about a shortage of new funding sources.

This is likely in part because of the retreating U.S. government funding of think tanks. In March, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that he would be canceling 83% of USAID’s programs and that the remaining initiatives would be absorbed by the State Department. The decision impacted think tanks all around the world that rely on USAID funding for policy research. USAID funded a variety of research organizations from CASE Ukraine, a Ukraine-based economic reform think tank, to Accountability Lab, an open government network that noted a drop of about 60% in its organizational budget in Pakistan after the cuts.

The Trump administration also cut funding for the Wilson Center and U.S. Institute for Peace, two congressionally-established think tanks that have been around since 1968 and 1984 respectively. The Wilson Center has hinted at a return, posting on X on September 4 that “Over the past months, the Wilson Center has been charting a path forward to strengthen our role as a trusted, fiercely nonpartisan bridge between scholarship and public policy.” On Monday, the Wilson Center announced new distinguished fellows, though did not respond to a request for comment from RS on its future.

Fundraising is the single most pressing challenge for the think tank sector currently, with 71% of think tanks identifying it as a main capacity gap, up from 66% in 2024. Many think tanks will no doubt look to other sources to fill the gaps in U.S. funding, particularly private companies and foreign governments willing to dole out millions of dollars with the intent to influence think tank research. Those sources will likely come with strings attached, spoken or unspoken. It’s up to the think tanks themselves whether they are forthcoming about those ties.


Top image credit: Metamorworks via shutterstock.com
Analysis | Washington Politics
Pedro Sanchez
Top image credit: Prime Minister of Spain Pedro Sanchez during the summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union at the European Council in Brussels in Belgium the 26th of July 2025, Martin Bertrand / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect

Spain's break from Europe on Gaza is more reaction than vision

Europe

The final stage of the Vuelta a España, Spain’s premier cycling race, was abandoned in chaos on Sunday. Pro-Palestinian protesters, chanting “they will not pass,” overturned barriers and occupied the route in Madrid, forcing organizers to cancel the finale and its podium ceremony. The demonstrators’ target was the participation of an Israeli team. In a statement that captured the moment, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez expressed his “deep admiration for the Spanish people mobilizing for just causes like Palestine.”

The event was a vivid public manifestation of a potent political sentiment in Spain — one that the Sánchez government has both responded to and, through its foreign policy, legitimized. This dynamic has propelled Spain into becoming the European Union’s most vocal dissenting voice on the war in Gaza, marking a significant break from the transatlantic foreign policy orthodoxy.

Sanchez’s support for the protesters was not merely rhetorical. On Monday, he escalated his stance, explicitly calling for Israel to be barred from international sports competitions, drawing a direct parallel to the exclusion of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. “Our position is clear and categorical: as long as the barbarity continues, neither Russia nor Israel should participate in any international competition,” he said. This position, which angered Israel and Spanish conservatives alike, was further amplified by his culture minister, who suggested Spain should boycott next year’s Eurovision Song Contest if Israel participates.

More significantly, it emerged that his government had backed its strong words with concrete action, cancelling a €700 million ($825 million) contract for Israeli-designed rocket launchers. This move, following an earlier announcement of measures aimed at stopping what it called “the genocide in Gaza,” demonstrates a willingness to leverage economic and diplomatic tools that other EU capitals have avoided.

Sánchez, a master political survivalist, has not undergone a grand ideological conversion to anti-interventionism. Instead, he has proven highly adept at reading and navigating domestic political currents. His government’s stance on Israel and Palestine is a pragmatic reflection of his coalition that depends on the support of the left for which this is a non-negotiable priority.

This instinct for pragmatic divergence extends beyond Gaza. Sánchez has flatly refused to commit to NATO’s target of spending 5% of GDP on defense demanded by the U.S. President Donald Trump and embraced by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, citing budgetary constraints and social priorities.

Furthermore, Spain has courted a role as a facilitator between great powers. This ambition was realized when Madrid hosted a critical high level meeting between U.S. and Chinese trade officials on September 15 — a meeting Trump lauded as successful while reaffirming “a very strong relationship” between the U.S. and China. This outreach is part of a consistent policy; Sánchez’s own visit to Beijing, at a time when other EU leaders like the high representative for foreign policy Kaja Kallas were ratcheting up anti-Chinese rhetoric, signals a deliberate pursuit of pragmatic economic ties over ideological confrontation.

Yet, for all these breaks with the mainstream, Sánchez’s foreign policy is riddled with a fundamental contradiction. On Ukraine, his government remains in alignment with the hardline Brussels consensus. This alignment is most clearly embodied by his proxy in Brussels, Iratxe García Pérez, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament. In a stark display of this hawkishness, García Pérez used the platform of the State of the Union debate with the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to champion the demand to outright seize frozen Russian sovereign assets.

This reckless stance, which reflects the EU’s broader hawkish drift on Ukraine, is thankfully tempered only by a lack of power to implement it, rendering it largely a symbolic act of virtue signaling. The move is not just of dubious legality; it is a significant error in statecraft. It would destroy international trust in the Eurozone as a safe repository for assets. Most critically, it would vaporize a key bargaining chip that could be essential in securing a future negotiated settlement with Russia. It is a case of ideological posturing overriding strategic calculation.

This contradiction reveals the core of Sánchez’s doctrine: it is circumstantial, not convictional. His breaks with orthodoxy on Israel, defense spending and China are significant, but driven, to a large degree, by the necessity of domestic coalition management. His alignment on Ukraine is the path of least resistance within the EU mainstream, requiring no difficult choices that would upset his centrist instincts or his international standing.

Therefore, Sánchez is no Spanish De Gaulle articulating a grand sovereigntist strategic vision. He is a fascinating case study in the fragmentation of European foreign policy. He demonstrates that even within the heart of the Western mainstream which he represents, dissent on specific issues like Gaza and rearmament is not only possible but increasingly politically necessary.

However, his failure to apply the same pragmatic, national interest lens to Ukraine — opting instead for the bloc’s thoughtless escalation — proves that his policy is more a product of domestic political arithmetic than coherent strategic vision. He is a weathervane, not a compass — but even a weathervane can indicate a shift in the wind, and the wind in Spain is blowing away from unconditional Atlanticism.

Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare
Top photo credit: Seth Harp book jacket (Viking press) US special operators/deviant art/creative commons

Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare

Media

In 2020 and 2021, 109 U.S. soldiers died at Fort Bragg, the largest military base in the country and the central location for the key Special Operations Units in the American military.

Only four of them were on overseas deployments. The others died stateside, mostly of drug overdoses, violence, or suicide. The situation has hardly improved. It was recently revealed that another 51 soldiers died at Fort Bragg in 2023. According to U.S. government data, these represent more military fatalities than have occurred at the hands of enemy forces in any year since 2013.

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Trump Netanyahu
Top image credit: President Donald Trump hosts a bilateral dinner for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Monday, July 7, 2025, in the Blue Room. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

The case for US Middle East retrenchment has never been clearer

Middle East

Is Israel becoming the new hegemon of the Middle East? The answer to this question is an important one.

Preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon — a state with a preponderance of military and economic power — in Eurasia has long been a core goal of U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, Washington feared Soviet dominion over Europe. Today, U.S. policymakers worry that China’s increasingly capable military will crowd the United States out of Asia’s lucrative economic markets. The United States has also acted repeatedly to prevent close allies in Europe and Asia from becoming military competitors, using promises of U.S. military protection to keep them weak and dependent.

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