US Military tells Singapore to take its F-15s anywhere but Guam

The case for the bed down of RSAF fighters at a US Air Force base

The proposed basing of RSAF fighters at AAFB had been agreed to in 2019. The interest of Singapore in basing fighters (with attendant magazine areas) was clear:

“Overseas training detachments are integral to meeting the RSAF's training requirements. The access to vast airspace overseas allows the RSAF to overcome local airspace constraints, and conduct high-end, realistic training to hone its operational competence.”

Having fighters and ordnance staged in Guam would have provided Singapore’s Defence Forces unusually unfettered freedom for both flight and live fire activities in the Marianas Island Testing and Training (MITT) area. As late as December 2023, the U.S. Air Force was bullish on the project, noting the project:

“is needed to enhance DAF (Department of the Air Force) capability to support U.S. and partner nation forces within the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen the U.S.’s ability to respond regionally and worldwide, through…increased support of fighter aircraft, in alignment with evolving DAF and DoD strategies and initiatives for the region. Increasing and improving airfield and munitions infrastructure would address capability gaps and allow for greater efficiencies and agility in the way ground operations are conducted.”

The prospect for this type of activity was heralded in the halls of the U.S. Congress. In addition to the RSAF, the Senate Armed Services Committee Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act expressed the view that “DOD should consider whether there are additional opportunities to host the military forces of other foreign partner countries on a permanent or rotational basis at Andersen.”

As the formal scoping process for developing the infrastructure for the project began it was noted that the project was in “alignment with (the US Department of Defense’s) initiatives for deterrence and stabilization in the Indo-Pacific region.” This process began in April 2021 and did raise concerns (particularly the impacts on native and engaged flora and fauna) as well as the socioeconomic impact of relying on off-base housing to host the accompanied Singapore Defence Forces personnel.

Our Guam-based think tank, the Pacific Center for Island Security, submitted comments of concern on the proposed project. Nevertheless, the final EIS was reported by the U.S. Air Force on April 25, 2025 and seemed to clear the path for project implementation. However, an August 8, 2025 release said the bed down had been scrapped.

The Singapore Ministry of Defense, in a response to media queries on August 12, released a brief statement saying it was a “mutual” agreement to cancel the project. “The RSAF will continue with periodic short-term training and exercises in Guam, such as an upcoming fighter training detachment in Oct-Nov 25,” the statement read.

Cancelling a close ally

Today, it remains unclear what happened in discussions between the U.S. and Singaporean governments from late spring to early summer 2025. It is unlikely, however, that this was an outcome desired by Singapore.

As noted in the ROD, the decision was “based on matters discussed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, input from the public and regulatory agencies, and other relevant factors.” A notice that was published in Guam newspapers on August 8, 2025, contained a similar but slightly different construction:

The decision was based on operational analysis, results of site surveys, and environmental, economic, and technical factors discussed in the ROD; environmental impacts as analyzed in the Final EIS; input from the public and government agencies; and military judgment factors.

But given that the Final EIS published on April 26 did not present environmental obstacles, it is difficult to reconcile how those issues played a significant role in the final decision. Moreover, in Guam, the U.S. military has regularly cleared pristine environmental areas with endangered flora and fauna to make way for military projects. If the U.S. Department of Defense wanted the project to proceed, even if environmental issues had been identified as “significant,” accommodations through “mitigation” would have been made.

Importantly, many of the proposed projects of the bed down are slated to proceed without the RSAF. Specifically, construction for approximately 20 acres of new airfield aprons adjacent to the existing runway, new fuel lines that tie into the existing fuel transfer system, a utilities vault and new utilities lines, security fencing, roadways, parking, walkways, and stormwater management infrastructure are moving ahead.

A recent suggestion that “Guam does not have sufficient space to permanently host Singapore’s fighter jets” overlooks that all of the explanations for this assumption were baked in before the 2019 agreement was executed.

We believe, however, that “other relevant factors” and “military judgment factors” weighed on the U.S. decision to cancel the RSAF bed down. Moreover, the cancellation may be an important bellwether for how other “relevant” and “military judgment decisions” of the U.S. government are executed across the region. In an environment of sharpening U.S. competition with China, and a U.S. expectation that allies do more, spend more, and commit more to U.S. objectives in relation to China, what happens in Guam merits attention.

The U.S. holds all the cards in access to its bases in Guam. Whatever U.S. requirements led to the discontinuation of discussions about the RSAF bed down, it is a safe assumption that the U.S. was leveraging the privileges of a host. Whether the U.S. requested Singapore to “pay up” for the planned improvements or sought the commitment of RSAF fighters on station at AAFB in the event of a conflict with China, Singapore blinked.

That a deal between allies fell through is itself significant, but the implications of what happened in Guam are likely much broader.

Sovereignty  and security

Early in the process, the US Air Force rejected alternative RSAF bed down locations in Diego Garcia (BIOT) and Iwo To (Japan) because these foreign locations could “impede U.S. military activity.” The bed down of the RSAF assets “on U.S. soil” was a determining factor in identifying AAFB, since it was deemed essential that the U.S. maintain full operational control of strategic military assets on U.S. lands to achieve the necessary national objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

Setting aside for a moment the question of American sovereignty in Guam (where the U.S. government has actively obstructed and denied the local self-determination/decolonization of a Territory as outlined by the United Nations), the conditions which the U.S. might put on Singapore for access to its bases are its indisputable prerogative.

What is emerging here are Washington’s policy objectives across the region. There is the general call for Asian allies to pre-commit to join the United States in a conflict with China over a “Taiwan contingency.” There is a specific request for “alliance modernization” and U.S. “strategic flexibility” (with a focus on China) that includes a discussion of “land ownership” of bases in the Republic of Korea. The undercurrent of Australia’s pre-commitment to U.S. control of proposed AUKUS assets is becoming clearer and recently encouraged by U.S.-based think tanks.

In general, the trend is bending toward a U.S. preference for the region, writ large, for both (1) unilateral decision-making and (2) the pre-commitment of others to its future actions.

If Singapore backed out because it did not want a deployment in Guam to signal participation in a U.S.-led containment strategy, which could draw Chinese retaliation, emerging U.S. calls for operational control of basing assets across the region would have provided important context.

The imposition of its U.S. national security objectives and accompanying assignment of local risk defines Guam’s relationship with the U.S. military. It is not a pretty picture if Guam is your homeland. Corrosive and underdeveloped socio-economic circumstances frustrate the development of both sustainable modernity and indigenous government. On the “security” front, there is no better example of the military-first view than the expectation that Guam will be a first-strike community in the event of a conflict with China.

On one hand, the U.S. Department of Defense is developing a multi-billion-dollar “missile defense” network that is likely (at best) only to frustrate a determined attack by an adversary. On the other hand, there are no plans for community shelters or food resiliency in the event of the anticipated conflict. From the military perspective, Guam is all utility and risk with no provision for community security.

As the U.S. military and policymakers look to turn back the clock on spheres of influence to times of client states, advancing a decision structure that has been in place in Guam since 1898 seems ascendant. This approach would benefit operationalization of the military’s self-defined “initiatives for deterrence and stabilization in the Indo-Pacific region.”

How this approach might advance the security of sovereign nations in the region will be a matter for them to determine. As other states enter discussions on these issues with the U.S., they might benefit from understanding what happens in Guam.