Another American contractor has reportedly come forward with horror stories about his time working for the Global Humanitarian Foundation, the outfit responsible for food distribution in Gaza.
The operation has been likened to the "Hunger Games" as the Israeli military has been accused of shooting and killing hundreds of Palestinians, reportedly for not straying out of the lines and other supposed transgressions, if for any reason at all, as they scramble and claw their way desperately for food.
U.S. security contractors hired to work with GHF have been accused of joining in with the lethal and non-lethal crowd control, with reports of live ammunition, stun grenades, and the use of pepper spray. Last week at least 20 were killed in a stampede; the UN says over 1,050 people have been killed trying to get to food since May, over 700 of them at these increasingly violent aid centers.
Last month two contractors from UG Solutions, one of the U.S.-based companies (the other is Safe Reach Solutions), told the Associated Press that fellow Americans were shooting into the crowds with live ammo. Now another has come forward. He claims to be a military veteran who has deployed to multiple conflict zones but “never in my entire military career... have I been a part of, allowed...the use of force against unarmed innocent civilians. Ever. And I’m not going to do it now."
“There is no fixing this. Put an end to it,” the man said in the report, first given to Israel news Channel 12. His identity is not verified and the company he supposedly works for, UG Solutions, has denied earlier reports of lethal tactics by its operators at the sites.
The contractor, his voice and image distorted, told Channel 12: “There was a man who was on the ground. He was on his hands and knees and he was picking up individual noodles. This guy wasn’t armed. He wasn’t a threat. This UG contractor sprayed an entire can of pepper spray on to this guy's face. That’s lethal.”
In another case, he claimed he was standing next to a Palestinian woman hit by a stun grenade. “She collapsed, fell to the ground. That was the moment I knew I couldn’t continue.”
The man also insisted that U.S. contractors were firing live rounds at Palestinians after they had gathered their food.
These kinds of stories are all but corroborated by IDF soldiers who told Haaretz reporters in June that they were ordered to shoot unarmed civilians at the sites even when there was no threat presented. The Wall Street Journal reported Sunday that IDF soldiers had shot into a crowd of Palestinians holding white flags because they crossed a "red line."
American contractors, many who are former U.S. military, have been working in Gaza since April. They are being paid, reportedly, $1500 a day for the work. That may not be enough to stomach what they are witnessing. As more come forward, it may be that the Israeli government made a big mistake thinking it would put an American face on its barbaric food scheme in Gaza. Those outsiders might eventually help bring the whole thing down.
Top photo credit: Mali's junta leader Assimi Goita attends the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger July 6, 2024. REUTERS/Mahamadou Hamidou
Since early September, members of the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) terrorist organization have been attacking and kidnapping truck drivers transporting fuel to the Malian capital of Bamako. The effects of this blockade appear to be reaching a high point, with images this week showing residents jammed into long lines in the city’s supply-squeezed gas stations.
This comes after several days during which the blockade’s cuts to fuel forced many gas stations across the city to close. Some of the stations that have since reopened are only able to sell diesel to the city’s residents.
JNIM’s recent offensive has included a wider onslaught on surrounding businesses, attacking many local and foreign firms operating in the periphery of Bamako and in surrounding cities. Among the businesses that have endured attacks include those operating cement and sugar factories as well as mines — each of which is a critical sector to the country’s struggling economy.
According to Beverly Ochieng, a Sahel regional expert and senior analyst at the security consulting firm Control Risks, JNIM’s tactics to disrupt life in the Sahel include violent attacks against the region’s residents and militaries.
Ochieng told the BBC that JNIM plants “IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on key roads, and have long-range capabilities. They [also] target security forces in military bases, so a lot of their weapons come from that. They have also attacked civilians — in instances where communities are perceived to be cooperating with the government."
JNIM’s remarkable ability to bring the transport of fuel to the country’s capital to a near halt is the clearest sign yet of the organization’s extraordinary growth from a collection of disparate armed groups to a powerful player whose actions implicate the physical and economic security of Malians.
Formed in Mali in 2017 from the coalescence of five preexisting armed groups, JNIM is an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization seeking to overtake the governments of Sahelian countries and implement its strict form of Sharia law.
In recent years, the armed group has dramatically increased the territory under its control. According to Dr. Daniel Ezienga, a research fellow at the Pentagon-affiliated Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “The JNIM coalition now exerts much more influence and control over territory in Mali than at any other previous time during the 13-year insurgency.”
Along with the group’s geographic expansion have come a rise in attacks. According to the BBC, in the first half of 2025 JNIM was responsible for carrying out 280 attacks — double the amount of attacks for which the organization was responsible over the same six-month period last year.
Beyond a rise in the number of attacks overall, JNIM’s geographic expansion has increased the breadth of attacks across parts of the country that had previously experienced only limited JNIM activity.
Whereas last year the vast majority of JNIM’s offensive was concentrated in the country’s north — with only 8 percent of JNIM-induced violence occurring in the country’s southwest — this year, close to 20 percent of JNIM’s violent activity has taken place in southwest Mali. Bamako, which houses the seat of the country’s junta government, is located in the far southwest and is increasingly surrounded by JNIM activity and violence.
Among the major cities JNIM has aggressively bombarded in recent months is Kayes, located about 380 miles northwest of Bamako in the heart of the country’s southwest region. Kayes is the country’s second-largest contributor to national GDP, after Bamako, and a major transport route. Straddling the Senegal River, many of the goods transported from neighboring Senegal travel through Kayes on their way to the rest of the country. Both the cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, located to Bamako’s north, have been primary locations of JNIM’s blockade. JNIM has banned all fuel imports from Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania, and has placed fighters on strategic locations along the country’s roads and riverways to ensure the blockade holds.
JNIM hopes the rippling effects of the blockade will upend the social contract between a population unable to obtain fuel and other basic necessities and a junta government that JNIM views as governing in violation of Islamic principles.
According to Ochieng, “JNIM [has] an ability to embed in local communities or to be able to use local grievances as a means of recruiting or winning sympathy towards their cause.” The economic strife created by the successful blockade, therefore, serves as a way to recruit disaffected Malians.
This fuel blockade and its effects have potential geopolitical consequences. The Malian junta had been receiving extensive support from the Russian Wagner mercenary group until recently, when the Kremlin decided that they would replace Wagner fighters with those from Africa Corps. In exchange, Russia receives payment and access to Mali’s resources. The Russian government has more control over Africa Corps, and uses this group less offensively than
Wagner, which suffered a major loss on the battlefield in 2024 when 84 Wagner fighters were reportedly killed in an ambush in Mali’s northern border city of Tinzaouaten. Whereas Wagner traditionally conducts more direct counterterrorism operations — such as ground-to-ground combat — Africa Corps is focused more on training and logistical support for national militaries with whom it partners.
Russia’s influence in the region grew after the United States and France left. The United States and France — the two traditional counterterrorism partners for Sahelian countries — have completely pulled their troops out of Mali and the neighboring junta states of Niger and Burkina Faso following failed counterinsurgency efforts there, and the rise of coup governments that oppose Western influence. The junta governments then turned to Russian mercenaries for counterterrorism support, believing that Russian aid would come with fewer stipulations.
This recent fuel blockade and its widespread effects on the residents of Bamako is an indication that Russia’s influence in the region is limited, and has thus far failed to defeat the armed groups against which Russian mercenaries have been fighting.
With JNIM threatening the stability of the Malian government and beating down on Bamako’s economic health, Russia’s Africa Corps has a difficult task ahead. If the war’s current trajectory continues, Africa Corps, too, could soon be on its way out of Mali, having failed to deliver peace for a junta government that might not survive the pressures caused by the country’s collapsing economic and security situation.
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Top image credit: US Representative Adam Smith (L) and Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng attend a meeting at the Shanghai's municipal government in Shanghai on September 25, 2025. JADE GAO/Pool via REUTERS
In the midst of the U.S. government shutdown and controversy over military deployments in American cities, partisanship in Congress sometimes seems out of control. But legislators of both parties can still set aside their animosities when it comes to hyping conflict with China.
On Monday, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch introduced his Deter PRC Aggression Against Taiwan Act. On Tuesday, the House Select Committee on China issued a bipartisan report pressing to tighten the U.S. embargo against China on advanced semiconductors. On Wednesday, the Senate Committee on Aging highlighted “the terrifying reality” that, on generic pharmaceuticals, “our nation is completely beholden to Communist China.”
But the bipartisan China panic might finally be facing pushback — not from partisan passions but from a nascent bipartisan coalition that has long feared confrontation with the world’s other superpower but up to now was cowed into silence.
Rep. Adam Smith’s (D-Wash.) recent congressional delegation to China is illustrative of the potential. Joined by Reps. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), Chrissy Houlahan (D-Pa.), and Michael Baumgartner (R-Wash.), this was the first visit by members of the House of Representatives since 2019.
Congressional delegations to China used to be routine. In the 2010s, an average of nearly six delegations made the trip each year, with members participating well over 200 times that decade. Though China’s post-Covid re-opening is now almost three years long, only one Senate delegation made the trip, along with a single-member visit by Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.).
This sharp decline is driven by Washington’s growing hostility and fear toward China in recent years. China’s “malign influence” and “economic aggression” became prominent themes in congressional hearings. Conspiracy theories about the Chinese government orchestrating the fentanyl crisis, the Covid pandemic, or TikTok’s political content flourished. The House Oversight Committee’s view that the Communist Party “actively seeks to destroy America” was widely shared.
Just as important, animosity toward China emerged as a rare point of agreement between Democrats and Republicans, leading legislators and lobbyists to reach for even tenuous connections to China in order to marshal support for their causes. Worried about U.S. business offshoring jobs? Attack China. Worried about the effects of social media? Attack China. Worried about teenagers vaping? Attack China. The outcome was an avalanche of antagonistic legislation.
If members of Congress saw China hostility as an opportunity, they also viewed constructive policy as a threat to their careers. Claims that a candidate might be spying for China or helping it steal American jobs were common in 2024 campaign attack ads. Although polling showed overwhelming popular support for diplomacy with China and deep concerns about the possibility of conflict, pervasive anti-China sentiment in Washington blinded politicians to the advantages of a more moderate stance.
Even at the height of China panic, however, a handful in Congress warned that turning China into our enemy is a disaster in the making. In 2023, Smith condemned the idea that we need to “punch [adversaries] in the face repeatedly at every opportunity and that’s what’s going to help us. … [A]ll this overheated rhetoric about how you can’t even talk to China because that just shows you are weak is really troubling.”
Such independent thinking may have an opening thanks to President Trump’s enthusiasm for dealmaking. After the U.S. and China demonstrated their respective leverage in an exchange of economic attacks earlier this year, substantive negotiations are now under way for the first time since Trump’s first-term trade war. An agreement on TikTok ownership could open the way to more serious efforts.
The Chinese response to the Smith delegation shows that Trump has a receptive partner in Beijing. Premier Li Qiang, meeting with the delegation, called it an “icebreaking trip that will further ties between the two countries.” Even nationalist outlets expressed hopes that “this window might open wider and wider.”
Trump officials will be doing the direct negotiating, but members of Congress have two essential roles to play. First, they can reinforce the new atmosphere of openness by pushing back against continued attempts to discredit diplomacy. Even as the Smith delegation was speaking of U.S.–China communication and reciprocity, their colleagues on both sides of the aisle were vilifying China, comparing Xi Jinping to Hitler and claiming that China’s “ultimate goal is to see America divided and weakened.”
Second, members of Congress can press the administration toward a more careful and constructive set of agreements. Trump’s personal priorities are landing Chinese orders for Boeing airplanes and Midwest soybeans, goals that could benefit both sides in the short term but will not change the overall trajectory toward conflict.
For that, the United States and China will need a new foundation for healthy competition. In line with Trump’s interests, one key measure would be a framework for Chinese investment in the United States ensuring security to both sides. Another priority is something Smith highlighted in Shanghai: renegotiating the rules of the global economy to accommodate countries like China, India, and Brazil without sacrificing American interests. With few detailed proposals coming out of the administration, members of Congress have a valuable opportunity to shape this new phase of U.S. relations with China.
Last week, analysts from three think tanks penned a joint op-ed for Breaking Defense to make the case for mobilizing the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, a pivot from one exceedingly costly approach to nuclear modernization to another.
After Sentinel faced a 37 percent cost overrun in early 2024, the Pentagon was forced to inform Congress of the cost spike, assess the root causes, and either cancel the program or certify it to move forward under a restructured approach. The Pentagon chose to certify it, but not before noting that the restructured program would actually come in 81 percent over budget.
The Pentagon later revealed that a major driver of the program’s cost growth was a faulty assumption that it could refurbish existing missile silos for Minuteman III, the current generation of ICBMs, to accommodate the needs of Sentinel. Now, the Pentagon is planning to build entirely new silos, at a significantly higher cost.
The three analysts from the Hudson Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute — we’ll call them the Three Missileers — essentially argue that the restructured plans for the Sentinel ICBM are so over budget that mounting Sentinel on heavy trucks instead of in fixed silos would now cost less than building new silos for Sentinel. Their case rests on two assumptions. The first is that taking Sentinel on the road will cost less than building new silos, a dubious and unsubstantiated claim. The second and more fundamental assumption is that the United States needs ICBMs to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. It doesn’t.
Regarding cost, the Three Missileers claim that “while a mobile option may have appeared too costly when Sentinel plans were set in 2014, the total cost is likely lower relative to the information we now have about the realistic cost of fixed silos.”
But they offer no evidence to support that conclusion beyond the Sentinel’s cost growth. They also don’t address the potential costs of abandoning or scaling back current contracts for the Sentinel in favor of new ones. Pentagon contracts often include provisions that penalize the government if it backs away from a planned project, and with the vast array of contracts and subcontracts involved in the Sentinel program, those costs could be significant. Without concrete plans in hand, it’s admittedly difficult to estimate the costs of a mobile approach relative to a stationary one. But even if the authors are correct that a mobile option would be cheaper, as they put it, “make no mistake, it will be costly.”
As for the strategic underpinning of their case, ICBMs are simply no longer necessary to ensure an effective and secure nuclear deterrent. As Taxpayers for Common Sense (where I work as a policy analyst) laid out in a report on the Sentinel last year, the combined explosive yield of nuclear warheads deployed on B-52s could reach up to 30 megatons if variable yield bombs are dialed up to their maximum potential. That’s 1,200 times the explosive power of the bomb the U.S. dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945.
Our fleet of ballistic missile submarines likely carries warheads with a combined explosive yield of 200 megatons, roughly 8,000 times the explosive yield of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. The notion that we need 400 ICBMs on top of all that firepower is absurd. Furthermore, ICBMs used to offer capabilities that our nuclear submarines and bombers didn’t, but no longer. With advances in the range, accuracy, and destructive power of missiles and bombs deployed on the air- and sea-based legs of the nuclear triad, ICBMs don’t belong in silos or on the back of heavy trucks — they belong in a museum.
This isn’t a radical position. As Gen. George Lee Butler, the director of U.S. Strategic Command from June 1992 to February 1994, said in a 2015 interview, “I would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long time ago.”
In fact, the loudest cheerleaders for forging ahead with Sentinel despite its astounding cost growth are folks with a vested interest in the program — lawmakers in states where it’s being developed, and companies who stand to profit from modernizing an obsolete leg of the triad. According to an in-depth analysis of the ICBM lobby, “ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone.” Eleven of those contractors spent $226 million on lobbying over that same period.
As programs to modernize our nation’s nuclear arsenal forge ahead, we also need to modernize our nuclear weapons strategy. That means ditching an exceedingly expensive and outdated approach to nuclear deterrence that views a nuclear triad as the only way to stand up to our adversaries. For those of us without a vested interest, two legs are more than enough to stand on.
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