Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is over two years old, and Kyiv is facing a population crisis. According to Florence Bauer, the U.N. Population Fund’s head in Eastern Europe, Ukraine’s population has declined by around 10 million people, or about 25 percent, since the start of the conflict in 2014, with 8 million of those occurring after Russia began its full-scale invasion in 2022. This report comes a week after Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhiy Leshchenko revealed that American politicians were pushing Zelenskyy to mobilize men as young as 18.
“Population challenges” were already evident before the conflict started, as it matched trends existing in Eastern Europe, but the war has exacerbated the problem. The 6.7 million refugees represent the largest share of this population shift. Bauer also cited a decline in fertility. “The birth rate plummeted to one child per woman – the lowest fertility rate in Europe and one of the lowest in the world,” she told reporters on Tuesday.
Combat losses and civilian casualties have been hard to accurately tally, as Kyiv treats them as a state secret. Best estimates from late 2023 put the number around 70,000, and Bauer confirmed that they are in the “tens of thousands.”
Further decline in Ukraine’s population will likely occur as the war drags on and includes draftees aged 18-25. According to Leshchenko, “American politicians from both parties are putting pressure on President Zelenskyy on the question of why there is no mobilization of those aged 18 to 25 in Ukraine.”
When the war ends, Ukraine will need labor for rebuilding and continued losses are likely to have long-term consequences. George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute, says,
“Demography is not necessarily destiny, but such shocking projections bode ill for Ukraine’s economic prosperity and societal dynamism,” Quincy Institute Director of Grand Strategy George Beebe wrote in RS last year. “The future they portend is a vicious circle of decline. Under such circumstances, simply manning a substantial standing army as a counter to much more populous Russia would be a challenge for Ukraine, let alone mastering and maintaining a large arsenal of NATO-standard weaponry.” Beebe added, “the more resources it must devote to its military, the fewer it will have for launching new commercial ventures and building a productive civilian economy.”
Ukraine is already dealing with war fatigue, evident from shifts in polling, and in the report that a staggering 51,000 soldiers have deserted from the army this year.
Beebe also points to a demographic study that predicts that Ukraine’s working-age population will decline by a third by 2040, with the number of children declining by half, and adds that “mounting damage is likely to discourage many refugees from returning to Ukraine anytime soon.”
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Ukrainian soldiers hold portraits of soldiers father Oleg Khomiuk, 52, and his son Mykyta Khomiuk, 25, during their farewell ceremony on the Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine 10 March 2023. The father and son died in the battles for Bakhmut in Donetsk region. (Photo by STR/NurPhoto)
In the run up to the NATO Summit at The Hague next week, June 24-25, President Donald Trump and his administration should present a clear U.S. plan for peace in Ukraine to the European and Ukrainian governments — one that goes well beyond just a ceasefire.
While it is understandable that Trump would like to walk away from the Ukraine peace process, given President Vladimir Putin’s intransigence and now the new war in the Middle East, he and his team need to state clearly the parameters of a deal that they think will bring a lasting peace. Walking away from the effort to end the war prematurely leaves Washington in continued danger of being drawn into a new crisis as long as the U.S. continues to supply Ukraine with weapons and intelligence.
On the other hand, if Washington abandons the peace effort and stops helping Ukraine, that country’s defenses will be in acute danger of collapse.
The Trump administration therefore needs to use the NATO summit to present Europe and Ukraine with the clear terms of what it regards as a reasonable and practicable peace settlement as the basis for negotiation with Russia. If Kyiv and Brussels accept, then these terms should be presented to Moscow, and if Moscow refuses to negotiate on this basis, then U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue unchanged.
If however the Ukrainians and Europeans reject the proposed terms, then they should be told that their refusal will lead to an end to Washington’s support for Ukraine, and that if European countries wish to continue to support the war, they will have to do so on their own.
This may seem a harsh approach, but in fact it will help the Ukrainian government. For even if leading Ukrainian officials now see that the conditions for peace that Ukraine has set are impossible to achieve, domestic political fears constrain them from changing course.
This is common throughout history. France fought on for years in Indochina and Algeria after it was clear that no French victory was possible, because the French establishment was politically incapable of admitting this. The same was true of the U.S. in Vietnam. The only way that Ukrainian leaders can get away with accepting a compromise peace is if they can truthfully tell their own hardliners that Washington and NATO gave them no choice.
The U.S. administration also needs to show the Russians what they have to gain from a settlement — and by the same token, what they would lose by rejecting it. If the Russian government rejects these terms as a basis for negotiation after Ukraine has accepted them, then U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue, until the Russians are prepared to compromise along these lines.
The peace terms that the U.S. administration should put forward include the following:
The ceasefire line should run along the line where the battlefront stands (with limited possibility for territorial swaps).
Russia and Ukraine pledge not to try to change this line through force, subversion, or economic pressure.
The legal status of all five oblasts (including the parts still held by Ukraine) to be subject to future negotiation under the auspices of the UN, and with reference to the wishes of local populations.
Both sides pledge not to carry out terrorist attacks, subversion, and attempts to undermine sovereignty on each other’s territory (including Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine).
All Western sanctions against Russia are suspended, with a snap-back proviso for violation.
Russian assets held in Europe are paid into a UN fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine, to be split 50:50 between areas controlled by the Ukrainian government and Russia.
Ukraine introduces guarantees for Russian linguistic and cultural rights into the constitution. Russia does the same for Ukrainians in Russia.
Ukraine returns the principle of neutrality to the Ukrainian constitution and abandons its intention of joining NATO.
NATO pledges no further enlargement, and the United States pledges to veto any proposed new candidates.
Russia formally agrees to Ukraine’s EU accession, and EU promises to foster this.
Russia recognizes Ukraine’s right of self-defense and abandons its demand for limits on size of the Ukrainian army.
The U.S. pledges not to provide Ukraine with missiles, main battle tanks, or fighter aircraft.
NATO countries pledge not to send troops to Ukraine; and peacekeepers are drawn from neutral countries under the authority of the UN.
The U.S. pledges not to station U.S. troops in countries on Russia’s borders (including Romania), with a snap-back proviso that this pledge will be canceled if Russia attacks Ukraine again.
The U.S. agrees not to station U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Germany in return for Russia’s withdrawal of its missiles from Kaliningrad and Belarus.
The U.S. and Russia agree to enter into negotiations for a new START treaty.
The UN Security Council creates a Committee on European Security made up of representatives of the five permanent members. If India and/or Brazil agree to send substantial numbers of peacekeepers to Ukraine, they will be added to this committee. In this case, Germany will also be added. The remit of this committee will be to discuss and propose solutions for actual, frozen and potential conflicts on the European continent, and to act as a mechanism for giving the international community early warning of possible impending crises.
The Trump administration should seek public endorsement by NATO of these positions and a second public statement affirming the continued commitment by the United States and other NATO members to NATO as a defensive alliance within its present borders. The United States should reiterate that it will honor its existing formal treaty obligations including its commitment to the defense of existing NATO allies.
It is however under no obligation — neither legal nor moral — to extend those commitments further, in terms of NATO’s membership or NATO’s mission. The United States entered NATO to defend vital U.S. interests in Western and Central Europe, and it was on that basis that the Senate ratified the NATO Treaty in 1949.
Previous U.S. administrations pushed for expansion of NATO territory and mission, with disastrous results; but the Trump administration has adopted a different approach and needs to follow this approach with clarity, consistency, and determination. Any U.S. government has a constitutional right, and a duty to the American people, to declare that due to U.S. commitments and dangers elsewhere, it must reject taking on any extra burdens.
The state of the Ukraine war also illustrates a wider point that the United States and European governments should consider. The advent of nuclear weapons has ended direct war between the great powers, and long may that remain so. Instead, what we have seen is a range of proxy wars, and also actions by the great powers — like the EU threat to block Russia’s maritime trade — that would in the past have been considered acts of war, and would have led to war.
These actions could still do so. And at that point, all the Western and Russian commentators who claim that Russia and the West are “actually already being at war” would discover what actual war really means. So unfortunately would the rest of us.
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Benjamin Netanyahu Donald Trump at the White House in April 2025 (White House/Flickr)
Joining in Israel’s aggression against Iran would hurt, not advance, U.S. interests and international security.
This should not be surprising, given that support for U.S. interests and international security was not what led to Israel’s launching of the war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argues that Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to America and not just Israel, but the nuclear issue was not the main motivation behind Israel’s attack, as reflected in a target list that goes far beyond anything associated with Iran’s nuclear program.
Israel’s principal motivations for the war include ones peculiar to Israel and that the United States does not share, including the sabotaging of U.S. diplomacy with Iran. Another Israeli motivation is to distract the attention of not just the United States but the rest of the world from what Israel is doing to the Palestinians. Some of the most blatant killing of famished residents of the Gaza Strip who were seeking food aid has occurred since the start of the Israeli offensive against Iran.
President Donald Trump’s public statements about Israel’s war have evolved quickly from apparent detachment to enthusiastic support, extending even to use of the first person “we” when claiming air superiority over Iran. As Charlie Stevenson of Johns Hopkins University observes, Trump evidently is experiencing FOMO (fear of missing out) and seeks to claim credit for ending a purported Iranian nuclear threat.
What are either declared objectives (destroying Iran’s nuclear program) or widely assumed ones (regime change in Tehran) of the war are among the criteria according to which possible U.S. involvement in the war should be judged. But so are other consequences, as mentioned below.
The war, with or without U.S. involvement, will not make an Iranian nuclear weapon less likely and might make it more likely. War was not necessary to avoid an Iranian nuclear weapon. The prewar judgment of U.S. intelligence was that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. Iran was willingly negotiating with the United States, with serious intent, to reach a new agreement that would preclude such a weapon.
By signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, and adhering to its terms until after Trump reneged on the agreement three years later, Iran demonstrated not only that a war is unnecessary but that a prohibition on all uranium enrichment is also unnecessary. The JCPOA closed all possible paths to an Iranian nuclear weapon through carefully negotiated restrictions and enhanced international monitoring. It is impossible to reconcile this diplomatic record with any notion that Iran has been determined to acquire a nuke no matter what.
The damage that Israel has inflicted on Iranian nuclear facilities, even if the United States were to add to it by using 30,000-pound bombs to turn the underground enrichment facility at Fordow into a crater, sets back the Iranian nuclear program but does not kill it. Nor does it eliminate Iran’s ability to construct a nuclear weapon if it chose to do so. Centrifuge cascades can be reconstructed, and the relevant specialized knowledge in Iran is not limited to the scientists Israel has assassinated over the past week.
Iranian intentions are at least as important as Iranian capabilities. No event is more likely to lead Iranian policymakers to take the decision they had not so far taken — to build a nuclear weapon — than an armed attack on their country’s sovereign territory. Voices in Tehran arguing in favor of taking that step because Iran needs a deterrent against future attacks undoubtedly have grown stronger in the wake of the Israeli offensive. They will grow stronger still if the United States joins the Israeli war.
If Iran does make such a decision, the subsequent redirection of the Iranian nuclear program toward military purposes will take place outside the view of international inspectors. The Israeli attack already has derailed talks aimed at a new nuclear agreement — thereby accomplishing one of Netanyahu’s objectives — and a U.S. military intervention may kill indefinitely the prospects for future negotiations. The United States and other outside powers will be far less able to track what Iran is doing on the nuclear front than was the case under the intrusive inspection procedures of the JCPOA.
U.S. military involvement in Israel’s offensive carries a high risk of becoming an endless war. Trump may believe he can do a one-and-done, such as dropping bunker-busters on Fordow and then declaring mission accomplished, but this is unlikely to be the end of U.S. combat with Iran. The probable Iranian dispersion of nuclear facilities and materials, possibly following an Iranian decision to build a bomb clandestinely, will mean a prolonged search-and-destroy mission. It will become one more instance of Israel “mowing the lawn,” only this mowing will also involve the United States.
Trump will be under pressure to stay involved, from Israel and from domestic forces skeptical about whether he had solved the Iranian nuclear problem after all.
As for possible regime change, the first thing to remember is how miserable has been the U.S. record of regime change in the Middle East, when considering not only the change itself but subsequent events flowing from the change. A leading example is the offensive war that overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, an eight-year quagmire that caused thousands of American casualties and spawned a terrorist group that would take over large swaths of Syria as well as Iraq.
Another example is Libya, where U.S. backing of the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi — who earlier had willingly, through negotiation, surrendered all his unconventional weapons programs as well as ending involvement in international terrorism — resulted in disorder that spread instability to the surrounding region and left Libya without a single stable government, a situation that continues to this day.
One can add to that list Iran itself, where a U.S.-supported coup in 1953 left Iran in the hands of Shah Reza Pahlavi. The shah’s rule ultimately proved to be weak as well as harsh, leading to the 1979 revolution that brought to power the Islamic Republic that governs Iran today.
The prospects for the current war in Iran, with or without U.S. involvement, to precipitate favorable regime change are dim. The Israeli assault has generated the usual rally-around-the-flag effect. Opposition voices inside Iran are distinguishing between the Iranian nation and the regime, with solidarity on behalf of the former taking immediate priority over discontent with the latter.
If any significant political change were to occur in response to the war, it would at least as likely to strengthen regime hardliners as in the opposite direction. A possibility is something akin to a military dictatorship, led by Revolutionary Guard officers displeased with what they perceive to be excessive softness by the current regime and perhaps in favor of the development of a nuclear deterrent.
The war is not a circumstance in which some moderate element waiting in the wings can create a Switzerland-on-the-Gulf.
Israel, with its proven entrée into opposition elements inside Iran, should be as much aware of this as anyone else. The Israeli government probably would be satisfied with a Libya-type situation of chaos and weakness. One of the last things the Netanyahu government would want to see emerge in Iran is a stable, moderate democracy that enjoys good relations with the United States. Such a development would overturn a centerpiece of Israeli foreign policy — Iran as a bête noire to which Israel constantly draws the world's attention, away from what Israel itself is doing, and which it can blame for the ills in the Middle East.
Beyond the lack of favorable results from U.S. involvement in the war regarding either the nuclear program or regime change, there are the other costs and consequences. Most directly, more people would die, including Americans. Iran certainly would strike back, both against installations that house 40,000 U.S. military personnel in the Middle East and perhaps also through clandestine operations elsewhere.
Regional instability would increase — partly by definition — in that U.S. involvement and the inevitable Iranian response would mean a wider war.
The nuclear dimension of regional instability also must be considered. To the extent Israel’s war is aimed at the ability of Iran to construct a nuclear weapon, the Israeli goal is not to keep nuclear weapons out of the Middle East but rather to maintain Israel’s own regional nuclear monopoly.
That monopoly is part of the background to the impunity with which Israel has become the most destructive actor in the Middle East, attacking more nations with its armed forces than any other state in the region. Direct U.S. involvement in Israel’s current war against Iran would constitute an endorsement and encouragement of that destabilizing behavior.
Instability elsewhere would also increase, by dealing yet another blow to the norm of non-aggression and international law that incorporates that norm. Just as Russian President Vladimir Putin pointed to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in brushing off international criticism of his own acts of aggression against Ukraine, so too would U.S. participation in yet another offensive war add to his rhetorical ammunition, and reduce any inhibitions of Russia, China, or any other aggression-minded powers.
The United States would become even less trusted than before as a negotiating partner, as many observers reach, rightly or wrongly, the same conclusion that many Iranians undoubtedly have reached — that the Trump administration’s apparent seeking of a negotiated nuclear agreement was a cover for an armed attack.
U.S. soft power would suffer another blow, through the ever-closer association of the United States in minds around the world not only with the aggression against Iran but with its client rogue state’s other destructive conduct.
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Top image credit: April 2014 - U.S. Air Force Maj. Michael Jensen, 26th Special Tactics Squadron commander smiles after assuming command of the squadron. The 26 STS, formerly Detachment 1 of the 720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla., is a newly activated squadron based at Cannon. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Senior Airman Eboni Reece)
After months of speculation, Reuters reported earlier this month that retired Air Force lieutenant colonel Michael Jensen has been appointed as senior director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council (NSC), according to two U.S. officials.
Jensen’s appointment marks the first time in recent memory that a president has nominated a special forces operative — let alone a career military officer — to oversee U.S. policy toward Latin America at the NSC.
A review of the last 20 years of Democratic and Republican appointees to the NSC senior director role for the region reveals that the vast majority of Jensen's predecessors have hailed from the Departments of State and Treasury, USAID, Capitol Hill, or the Intelligence Community — not the Pentagon.
Jensen’s new role comes as Trump administration officials have publicly floated sending U.S. troops or executing drone strikes in Mexico to weaken the country's drug cartels, six of which were recently designated as foreign terrorist organizations. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has rebuffed Trump’s offer, yet the former head of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has said that the recent revelation of foreign mercenaries fighting alongside the cartels could justify U.S. actions in Mexico.
Jensen’s appointment also comes amid a drastic restructuring of the National Security Council staff under interim national security adviser Marco Rubio. White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said the NSC was being “right-sized to facilitate more streamlined processes and greater coordination between the White House and the federal agencies.”
Sources briefed on the matter told Reuters that the NSC overhaul is part of a broader strategy to reduce the size and scope of the policymaking body which has doubled in size since the Bush II and Obama administrations, transforming it back into a smaller entity tasked with implementing, rather than shaping, the president’s agenda.
Last month, former national security adviser Michael Waltz was ousted reportedly because he was having private conversations about war with Iran with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
In April, Politico reported that Victor Cervino, the Republicans’ top Latin America staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a former Rubio aide, had been named to the top NSC post on Latin America, but redacted its claim less than a week later, saying he never assumed the role for unknown reasons.
The White House has not formally announced Jensen’s appointment, and his counterpart at the State Department — the assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs — has still not been announced. The duties of the State Department role are currently being filled by Senior Bureau Official Amb. Michael Kozak, a veteran State Department Latin America hand.
Under the first Trump administration, Mauricio Claver-Carone, the recently departed Special Envoy for Latin America at the State Department and a close Rubio ally, held the NSC post for two years, during which he led a “maximum pressure” campaign intended to dislodge the governments in Cuba and Venezuela.
Rubio, Jensen’s new boss, has signaled that the Western Hemisphere will receive renewed focus in Trump's second term, on everything from reducing irregular migration to fighting drug trafficking and curbing China's regional presence. He has already visited the region twice — to Central America and the Caribbean — and announced plans to visit again in the coming weeks.
Yet a glaring hole in Jensen’s background is his apparent lack of experience in the region he's now reportedly been charged with overseeing, according to his LinkedIn profile and other publicly available information.
In February, Jensen was nominated to the top Pentagon post in charge of special operations and low-intensity conflict, but that nomination was withdrawn last month, presumably to pave the way for his job at the NSC.
Over his 20-plus year military career, Jensen has held leadership positions in multiple special tactics groups at the Air Force Special Operations Command, specializing in counterterrorism operations and global defense strategy.
While much of Jensen’s Air Force career is not well known, an Air Force public affairs officer wrote in 2008 that Jensen helped oversee a five-and-a-half-hour “high-value target hunt” in Afghanistan, guiding “31 close air support and surveillance aircraft…which disrupted al-Qaeda operations.”
Jensen also served as lead strategist for the Air Force’s Checkmate office at the Pentagon, “advising the defense secretary and playing a key role in restructuring the Air Force’s approach to warfare.” He also commanded the 26th Special Tactics Squadron “following his leadership responsibility for special operations on four continents.”
Jensen's special ops expertise has also extended to the private sector, including after retiring from military service in 2021 to become chief strategy officer for the air utility transport vehicle company SkyRunner, about which he wrote his postgraduate thesis.
SkyRunner CEO Stewart Hamel brought on Jensen to “oversee strategic partnerships” and “optimize the warfighting configuration of its special light-sport aircraft,” which has been FAA-certified to support DOD and combat search and rescue missions, though its contracts to date with the Pentagon and State Department have been limited.
While President Trump has undoubtedly made the Western Hemisphere a focus for his administration, some critics worry about a militarized approach to the region, with Republicans and some administration officials saber rattling at times about invading Mexico, taking over the Panama Canal, and neutralizing the purported Chinese threat.
“Trump’s gladiator approach to conflict resolution is not improving things in Ukraine, the Middle East, or California, and the same approach in Mexico would not be any different,” said John Lindsay-Poland, an expert on U.S. arms trafficking in Mexico and author of two books on militarization in Latin America.
Though the administration has largely focused — so far — on deportations, making deals over cartels and cracking down on Cuba to please the Republicans’ South Florida base, Jensen’s appointment could fuel fears of increased militarization of U.S. policy in the region. Yet without a clear policy from the top, it remains to be seen how Jensen’s background will align, or conflict, with Rubio’s.
“Jensen’s experience in ‘high-value target operations’ is relevant in Colombia, where, according to a Washington Post investigation, U.S. Air Force special operations units trained Colombian special forces and provided Raytheon-manufactured precision-guided munitions (PGNs) to kill 45 FARC guerrilla leaders from 2006 to 2013, deploying a similar methodology as the one used to target and kill al-Qaeda leaders,” Lindsay-Poland said.
Amid ongoing personnel shake-ups at the highest levels of the Trump administration, Jensen’s background and appointment make increasingly clear the lens through which the president views the issues most plaguing the Western Hemisphere.
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