After a spirited debate on the House floor Saturday, the chamber voted 335-91 for a "clean" stop gap measure without Ukraine aid that would continue funding the government for another 45 days. It then sent it along to the Senate, which had already passed its own bill, but with $6 billion in new funding for Kyiv.
With hours to spare the Senate did not take up the fight and approved the House measure. Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and Minority Leader Mitch McConnell then issued a joint statement vowing to use the time to put the money for weapons and non-military aid back on the table in the coming weeks.
The votes reflect growing backlash, all in Republican ranks, against what they say is a "blank check" for Ukraine as it pursues its war against the 2022 Russian invasion. The U.S. allocated $113 billion in 2022 to Ukraine, more than $40 billion in which went to war-related assistance. Among the reasons, critics say the conflict has slid into a grinding war of attrition and little is being done to shift away from daily bloodletting and towards a negotiated settlement before Ukraine is destroyed. Others say the money is best spent at home, or on other military challenges, like China.
Democratic supporters of Kyiv lashed out on Twitter Saturday, suggesting Republicans were pursing an agenda on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin and needed to be stopped. "We have to stop being naive about what is happening right now in Washington," charged Simon Rosenberg, longtime Democratic strategist. "There is an a (sic) Russian-aligned American Fifth Column working to undermine the United States and our war effort in Ukraine."
Now that South Korea’s Constitutional Court has upheld the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, attention is now focused on the upcoming snap election to replace him, with the opposition Democratic Party leader, Lee Jae-myung, with a hefty lead in the polls.
A Lee victory would likely lead to major modifications in Seoul’s foreign policy and a possible convergence of interests with Donald Trump in defusing tensions with North Korea, if the U.S. president decides to resume his aborted courtship of Pyongyang’s leader, Kim Jong Un.
In any event, the Constitutional Court’s decision and the formal removal of Yoon Suk-yeol marks a return to normalcy after a period of uncertainty and drift in South Korea that was touched off by what the judges determined was Yoon’s unconstitutional declaration of martial law and deployment of troops to the National Assembly.
Yoon’s power grab, which was effectively undone when hundreds of thousands of citizens rallied to protect the parliament, also provoked a financial crisis. As foreign investors sold off nearly $1 billion in shares in the three days after the martial law declaration December 3, the South Korean won plummeted to its lowest value against the dollar since the 2008-09 global financial meltdown.
Meanwhile, South Korea’s foreign policy engagement has been virtually paralyzed. The leadership vacuum and limited diplomatic capacity constrained Seoul’s much-needed engagement with the new Trump administration to discuss key issues, such as regional security cooperation and addressing tensions over elevated U.S. tariffs. On the whole, the political crisis has kept South Korea out of the Trump administration’s priority list, as evidenced by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s skipping of South Korea during his recent trip to East Asia, which included visits to Japan and the Philippines.
What are the implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and regional geopolitics in East Asia in the case of Lee Jae-myung’s arrival as the next leader in Seoul?
Lee has made a full recovery after being stabbed in the neck by a man pretending to be a supporter at a campaign rally in January 2024. He has been a vocal critic of Yoon Suk-yeol’s so-called “values-based diplomacy,” which hinged on the idea of cooperating with democracies to confront autocracies. Instead, Lee has advocated foreign policy pragmatism. While supporting a close security alliance with the United States, Lee has also emphasized the need for proactive diplomacy with North Korea to reduce intensified military tensions on the Korean peninsula and to maintain cooperative relations with China and Russia. “I’m a realist,” said Lee in an interview with the Wall Street Journal.
There are apparent overlapping geopolitical interests between Trump and Lee that could allow both to work together — particularly on the issue of restarting nuclear talks with North Korea. Compared to Yoon, who was exceedinglyhawkish toward North Korea, had minimal interest in diplomacy, and would have not reacted positively to Trump’s diplomatic overtures to Pyongyang, Lee likely will be a more suitable partner for Trump’s future diplomatic initiative with the North.
Lee has even appeared to empathize with Trump’s transactionalist style in some respects. “Trump would do anything to defend America’s own interests, even if that means having a tariff war with allies or engaging with an adversary to end the war in Ukraine,” he said. ”It’s something we should learn from.”
These apparent shared values between Lee and Trump could serve as a source of synergy if goals and interests align or a source of friction if goals and interests diverge. It remains to be seen whether the two sides will be able to manage potential differences and disagreements on issues such as tariffs, military cooperation against China, and the Taiwan issue.
While it is unclear how Trump himself believes the United States should be approaching China and Taiwan, he is surrounded by advisers who are keen to mobilize U.S. alliances in the Pacific to focus on deterring China and are also eager to reorient the operational priority of U.S. regional forces around a Taiwan contingency.
If Trump ends up going in that direction, Washington might see the Taiwan issue becoming a major tension point with a future Lee administration, as Lee would want to prioritize deterring North Korea and distance South Korea from the Taiwan issue. “Why should South Korea meddle with confrontation between China and Taiwan?” Lee once asked, adding, “let them handle their own business.”
As South Korea is set to fill its leadership vacuum in two months, Washington would be well-advised to explore potential areas of agreement and disagreement, and map out a roadmap to maximize cooperation and overcome differences.
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Top photo credit: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walk on the red carpet during a welcoming ceremony at the Lion's Courtyard in Budapest, Hungary, April 3, 2025. REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo
The European Union likes to portray itself as the last principled bastion of the “rules-based international order” and global justice standing. Yet its true commitment to that order is a bit suspect. By applying double standards, the EU is actually undermining it, rendering hollow its own exhortations to other international players to respect it.
The collisions around the International Criminal Court (ICC) are a case in point.
The EU itself has no standing with respect to the ICC. That means that its members have a sovereign right to decide to join the Rome Statute that established the court — or not. That said, since the inception of the ICC, Brussels has encouraged its current and aspiring members, as well as other nations, to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute and support the Court’s work.
The EU’s leverage on this matter is more political than legal, but it appears to be deploying it selectively, depending on who the Court chooses to place in the dock.
This week during a visit of Israeli Prime Minister of Israel Benyami Benjamin Netanyahu to Budapest, Hungary announced that it will withdraw from the ICC.
The catch, however, is that the ICC has issued an arrest warrant against Netanyahu, having charged him for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Israel’s ongoing campaign in Gaza in which more than 50,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in retaliation for Hamas’ October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks (thousands more are presumed dead, still missing under rubble). Hungary’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute, assuming it is ratified by parliament, could still take months to take legal effect. Nonetheless, so long as the process is not finalized, Hungary has an obligation to arrest Netanyahu during his four-day stay.
The EU’s reaction has thus far been muted. The European Commission’s spokeswoman Anita Hipper, reacting to the reports of Hungary’s intent to withdraw from the ICC, only offered platitudes about the EU’s support for the Court, and predicted “deep regret” if Hungary were indeed to leave.
It remains to be seen how the EU’s top brass will react, should such be the case. However, that is not the point. When the EU summons political will, it could theoretically apply sufficient pressure to prevent undesirable outcomes before they materialize, rather than having to react after the deed.
In 2023, for example, the EU exerted pressure on South Africa concerning the potential attendance of the BRICS summit there by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who by then, like Netanyahu now, had already been indicted by the ICC for war crimes in Ukraine. Brussels reminded South Africa that, as a member of the ICC, it had an obligation to arrest Putin if he were to show up in the country, and that his status as a head of state did not grant him any immunity in this case.
The statements of EU officials, including the then-High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell, generally expressed a “with-us-or-against-us” kind of mindset. It left little room for countries like South Africa, which sought to chart a neutral course — neither condoning the Russian invasion of Ukraine nor joining in the U.S.- and EU-promoted sanctions and isolation of Russia.
Such professions of neutrality — common in the Global South — were routinely dismissed as a sign of “siding with Putin.” While there were no overt threats of sanctions, European diplomats at the time hinted that Pretoria’s access to European markets and foreign investment could be affected should Pretoria fail to comply with its ICC obligations.
The EU pressure and the prospect of strained ties clearly played a role in the internal deliberations in South Africa; in the end, Putin did not attend the BRICS summit in Johannesburg and sent his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, instead.
No such leverage was apparent in the case of Netanyahu’s visit to Hungary. That is ironic as Brussels already has a rather confrontational relationship with the Hungarian prime minister. Brussels and Budapest have clashed regularly over domestic governance issues, particularly regarding Orban’s implementation of his “illiberal democracy,” in Hungary. Yet what really made Orban a pariah in Brussels is his insistence on opening space for diplomacy with Moscow to bring the war in Ukraine to an end.
Frustrated with Orban’s position (which, in fact, is widely shared across the political spectrum in Hungary, but also, increasingly, in other EU countries), senior officials in Brussels are reportedly discussing ways to get Hungary expelled from the EU altogether.
Yet, it would seem that Brussels is only exercised with Orban’s perceived flirting with Putin, but not Netanyahu, despite their both having been indicted by the ICC. Indeed, if the EU’s concern with the ICC and global justice were as consistent as it claims, it could already consider the failure to comply with the ICC orders as a breach of the rule of law — to add to the pile of other, preexisting disagreements Brussels has with Budapest. Yet political will is needed for the European Commission to move in that direction, and there is none.
Perversely, Orban is being hammered for all sorts of issues, including diplomatic initiatives to end the war in Ukraine, but gets a pass for hosting a man accused of war crimes.
And there lies the crux of the matter: The Brussels “blob” no longer appears to be worried about optics. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is as staunch a supporter of Israel as she is a Russia hawk. The contrast is even more pronounced in the case of the new EU high representative for foreign affairs, former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas. She is obsessively focused on Russia. Just this week, she spoke in the European Parliament about the need to establish a special tribunal on Russian crimes in Ukraine — presumably in addition to Putin’s ICC indictment. Yet a few days earlier, she talked up friendship and cooperation at a meeting with Israel’s foreign minister, Gideon Saar.
Of note, she also parroted hawkish Israeli talking points about Iran posing an “immense threat to the region and global stability” even though that has never been the EU’s official position.
Such arbitrariness could create a domino effect: Hungary is not the only Israel’s ally in the EU. Other countries, such as the Czech Republic and Austria, may follow suit by ignoring their obligations under the ICC, literally with no consequences. And Netanyahu will have every incentive to exploit these cracks in the EU to vindicate his claim to his increasingly restive domestic audience that he is respected and authentic statesman.
When the EU pressures other countries, such as South Africa and others in the Global South, to align with its geopolitical priorities (on Ukraine/Russia), while giving itself a pass when convenient (on Israel/Palestine), it grates in other parts of the world and undermines the very case for the “rules-based international order” that the EU purports to defend and exemplify.
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Top image credit: Bernd von Jutrczenka/dpa via Reuters Connect
Between 2015 and 2018, the United States supplied Saudi Arabia with tens of millions of dollars worth of jet fuel in support for the kingdom’s bombing campaign in Yemen. Seven years later, the Saudis refuse to repay most of their debt. And they are being rewarded for it.
A Department of Defense report that was sent to Congress last October, reviewed by Responsible Statecraft, and previously unreported suggests that Pentagon officials are becoming increasingly desperate to recoup an outstanding $13.7 million in fuel costs that Saudi Arabia owes the U.S.
“DLA energy and US central command will continue to engage the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance through United State Military Training Mission - Saudi Arabia scheduled meetings, various MOD/MOF and DoD Key Leader Engagements, face to face meetings within the CONUS and Saudi Arabia, and through email correspondence until the SLC fuel debt is paid in full,” the report stated.
In 2018, the Pentagon realized it had made an accounting error. The Pentagon had undercharged Saudi Arabia and the UAE by $36 million for jet fuel and another $294 million in flight hours for U.S. tanker aircraft that refueled Saudi and Emirati warplanes in midair.
With Washington’s help, the arrangement allowed Saudi and Emirati jets — which, besides actual military targets, bombed hospitals, schools, marketplaces, and weddings — to stay in the air for up to three hours instead of a mere 15 minutes. But instead of the two oil-rich Gulf nations footing the bill for the aerial-refueling process, as is required by law, it was the American taxpayer.
Seven years later — while the larger flight hours bill has been paid — Saudi Arabia has yet to pay $13.7 million worth of its jet fuel debt. The UAE, which owed the U.S. around $15 million for jet fuel, has reimbursed Washington in full.
The kingdom certainly does not lack the funds. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund oversees $925 billion in assets.
Rather, Saudi Arabia appears to be pleading ignorance; the Intercept reported that Saudi officials told representatives of the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Central Command last year that they were “not aware of the outstanding debt and requested some additional time to investigate the issue.”
This defense is at odds with the recent Pentagon report, which maintains that Department of Defense officials are exhausting various avenues to bring up the debt, including email, virtual meetings, and in-person meetings with multiple agencies.
The report also notes that the last payment, just over $1 million, was made in 2023. The Defense Logistics Agency confirmed it submitted the report, but did not elaborate if there have been any further payments since it was submitted in October.
Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told RS that Saudi Arabia’s refusal to pay up speaks to the “privilege the Saudis enjoy with the U.S., as they fear zero repercussions for failing to repay a debt to American taxpayers.”
Despite groveling about an unpaid debt privately, the U.S. continues to reward Saudi Arabia. Since 2018 when the accounting error was discovered, Washington has showered the kingdom with $14 billion in major arms sales, according to a tracker from Forum on the Arms Trade. Most of those transfers took place during the presidency of Joe Biden, who memorably fist-bumped Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after promising to make the de facto Saudi ruler “a pariah” during his 2016 campaign for office.
Trump is now reportedly eyeing Saudi Arabia as the destination for his first overseas trip next month, just as he did during his first term.
“I said I will go if you put a trillion dollars to American companies,” Trump told reporters in March. “Meaning the purchase over four years of a trillion dollars. They agreed to do that. So I am gonna be going there.”
While he’s at it, he could ask for the couple million in pocket change that Saudi Arabia owes the American taxpayer. The paltry $13.7 million sum may be small, but the foot-dragging speaks volumes.
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