Trump the 'peacemaker' faces many obstacles

“My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier,” President Donald Trump promised the American public in his inaugural address on January 20, 2025. About three weeks later, it’s safe to say that no one will remember Trump as a unifier, but he still has a chance to claim the peacemaker title.

Of course, Trump is not talking much like a dove these days. He’s already threatened several U.S. neighbors in service of territorial aggrandizement, mused about making war on Mexican cartels, and proposed occupying the Gaza strip with U.S. troops after its residents are ejected. But at the same time, he’s still pushing for peace talks in Ukraine, signaling openness to a new nuclear deal with Iran, and has mentioned reopening talks with North Korea.

Ultimately, whether Trump can be a peacemaker will largely come down to the president himself, specifically his ability to keep his administration focused and his willingness to persevere through arduous talks and criticism, rather than giving up and reverting to belligerent posturing. Pessimism seems warranted.

As a president and candidate, Trump’s record at making peace is poor. It’s true he didn’t start any new wars last time he was president, but he came close with Iran and engaged in a tempestuous “fire and fury” exchange with North Korea before engaging in unsuccessful talks. He also didn’t end any wars or bring deployed U.S. forces home, despite gesturing at exiting Syria and drawing down in Europe. As a candidate last year, Trump was critical of the Biden administration for carrying out the withdrawal from Afghanistan he negotiated — his signature peacemaking achievement.

Still, Trump appears serious about striking a peace deal with Russia over Ukraine, even if he couldn’t manage it in a day as he promised. He hasn’t said much about North Korea lately, but past statements about “falling in love” with North Korea’s dictator suggest he views some sort of deal with Pyongyang as unfinished business. More surprisingly, Trump has lately said he’s open to a new nuclear deal and broader détente with Iran. He underlined this by suggesting that he’d turn his administration’s Iran file over to Steve Witkoff, a fellow real estate mogul who seems to value deal-making, and by publicly blocking Iran hawks like former Secretary of State Pompeo and his deputy Brian Hook from this administration.

On Israel and Palestine, Trump says he is pursuing peace, but that is not obvious. Yes, his support for the ceasefire plan the Biden administration structured for Gaza was critical in getting the Israeli government to finally agree. And Trump outwardly shares the Biden’s administration’s faith that an Israeli-Saudi normalization can pacify Israeli-Palestinian relations. But it’s difficult to call this a peace plan, especially after he proposed removing Palestinians from Gaza entirely before redeveloping the area into the “Riviera of the Middle East” — hardly a peaceful overture given that it would require the forcible relocation of two million people.

As with the Abraham Accords his last administration brokered, Trump seems more interested in generating benefits for U.S. clients — Israel and Saudi Arabia now — than achieving anything for Palestinians.

Each of these endeavors — Ukraine, North Korea, Iran and Israel — presents unique political challenges, but they face a common set of domestic obstacles.

One is public opinion. Conventional wisdom in U.S. politics is that making peace is riskier for politicians than starting wars. But while being dovish is rarely a big advantage, peace accords can pay electorally, and generally the public will not punish their pursuit.

Various commentators insist that Trump won the election due to his promise to end wars abroad — or at least that Kamala Harris lost it due to her comparative hawkishness, but there is little evidence for this. Very few voters (four percent in exit polls) said foreign policy was decisive to their choice, and those voters were closely split between the candidates. Voters do seem to have preferred Trump on foreign policy overall, but evidence suggests it was due to an aura of strength and change, not his specific proposals. Indeed Trump’s voters seem to disagree with his desire to cut a deal with Iran, his views on NATO, and his statement that he might not defend Taiwan, but they did not punish him for any of it.

The election data thus echoes decades of public opinion research suggesting foreign policy generally lacks salience and presidents have substantial rope to pursue their preferred policies. So public opinion will not much constrain Trump’s pursuit of peace deals.

The main resistance to Trump’s peace agenda, if it lasts, is likely to come from inside the Beltway, from Congress along with commentators, think tank analysts, and foreign lobbies. Recall that opposition from these quarters to the Iran deal is what brought President Barack Obama’s aide Ben Rhodes to coin the phrase “the Blob,” now a short-hand for the protectors of the U.S. foreign policy status quo.

Trump is not immune to elite criticism — he certainly reacts to negative press — but his political success makes him acutely aware of the limited real or lasting effects of the Beltway debate on his ability to push through his preferred policies. Of course, Obama did get his Iran deal and Trump negotiated exit from Afghanistan under similar attacks.

Congress will have little ability to stop any peace deal Trump signs, which are likely to be structured as executive agreements, not treaties the Senate must approve. Opposition in Congress could still lead to difficulties, if for example Democrats decide to hold up appointments or spending to block or shape a Ukraine deal. For now, at least though, the Republican majority is loyal to Trump and disinclined to assert their powers over foreign policy.

Heavier establishment opposition to peace deals might come from the more traditionally hawkish parts of the Trump administration, starting with national security adviser Mike Waltz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (whose inexperience makes him harder to read). But Trump’s second term advisers seem to have been chosen because they are likely to be pliant — unlike John Bolton, Rex Tillerson, and Jim Mattis, who all thwarted Trump in various ways.

If the public, Congress and Trump’s staff are all willing to go along with pushing peace deals, it should be smooth sailing, right? Not quite. Even getting warring sides to the table can take months of talks or more and then negotiations can go on indefinitely. The Korea Armistice talks took two years. The Iran deal took over a year of intense haggling. The exit agreement with the Taliban took about a year and a half to conclude. Even a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire, let alone a true peace deal could take years.

Trump seems ill-suited to tolerate this kind of patient diplomacy. He’s often called a transactionalist, but he’s mostly been a shallow one; more interested in the publicity and spotlight associated with making a deal than its substance. That is not fatal to a peace agenda, but it raises doubts about commitment and endurance. Will Trump stick with peace talks as he did with the Taliban? Or will it be more like the North Korea talks — pomp around merely having talks with little of the staffing and compromise vital to success?

The rash pronouncements of Trump’s first weeks may prove typical. Impulsive ultimatums and radical proposals — like threats to invade Mexico or endorsement of throwing Palestinians out of Gaza — may alienate stakeholders in the U.S. and abroad, shattering coalitions needed to advance his peaceful objectives. At a minimum, the neo-imperialist start to his term raises doubts that he can stay focused on the peaceful legacy he claims to seek.