HTS is derived from al Qaeda’s Syrian branch. Al Qaeda was pushed out of Syria by more radical splinter factions early in the civil war. HTS evolved once the conflict was well underway. When the smoke cleared, HTS remained in control of Idlib, which it turned into a mini-Islamic republic under Turkish protection. It was a good fit for Idlib, which had been a source of militant resistance to the Assad government at the very outset of the civil war.
As of this writing, HTS fighters have reached the center of Aleppo and seized a town that commands the M5 highway, a key route Assad’s forces would need to reach the city and try to pry the HTS militants from within. Assad had only taken Aleppo back from insurgents in a battle during the summer of 2016 with the help of Lebanese Hizballah.
Turkey’s role in this offensive is murky. The attackers, according to news reports, include not only HTS formations, but Sunni militias that have been mobilized and equipped by Turkey over the past few years. This suggests that the HTS campaign might be a Turkish wedge to complicate Assad’s already tenuous reach across Syrian territory and establish de facto Turkish control over a large swath of Syria and one of its largest cities. In this scenario, management of the area’s two million people could be left to HTS, while Turkey reaped the dubious strategic benefit.
For Assad, this is nearly the equivalent of October 7 for Israel. But he has none of the advantages that Israel enjoyed in stabilizing the situation after the attack, going on the offensive, and pulverizing Hamas. Although there are rumors of Russian airstrikes against HTS, the fact is that the Russians are stretched thin by their war against Ukraine and will find it hard to rescue their man in Damascus. And there will be no help from either Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah. Tehran lacks the means and whatever it can muster will be in Israel’s gunsights very quickly. And Hezbollah is reeling from Israel’s recent offensive and couldn’t mobilize the fighters needed to get HTS out of Aleppo let alone reach Aleppo on the ground.
Looking around Syria’s outer perimeter, it’s hard to see Saudi Arabia intervening militarily on behalf of Assad. With Turkey pressing from the North, Israel from the West and no countervailing pressures from the East or South, Assad could find his statelet shrinking fast.
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Steven Simon is a Distinguished Fellow and visiting lecturer at Dartmouth College and Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, he was the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in International Affairs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as the National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House and for the Middle East and North Africa in the Obama White House. He is the author of "Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East" (2023).
On Wednesday, a Ukrainian delegation led by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met with South Korean officials, including President Yoon Suk Yeol. The AP reported that the two countries met to discuss ways to “cope with the security threat posed by the North Korean-Russian military cooperation including the North’s troop dispatch.”
During a previous meeting in October, Ukrainian President Volodomir Zelenskyy said he planned to present a “detailed request to Seoul for arms support including artillery and air defense systems.”
So far, South Korea has participated in sanctions against Moscow, has sent Kyiv financial aid, and supplied vehicles and de-mining equipment. However, Seoul has declined to provide weapons to Ukraine, even as North Korean forces are confirmed to be supporting Russian troops on the frontlines of the war.
South Koreans have been resistant to sending weapons to Ukraine. According to a Gallup poll, 82% of the public opposed such measures. While the government has not ruled out sending weapons to Ukraine, experts question whether Seoul is likely to provide weapons at this stage, as President Yoon’s approval ratings are very low, and South Korea has little to gain from such an escalatory action, even when considering North Korean involvement in the conflict.
“This kind of alleged collaboration between Russia and the DPRK only poses a concern for Seoul insofar as it is being used by Western leaders to rope South Korea into taking a more active role in aiding Ukraine,” says the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos. “The ROK must balance any such pressure from the White House with the looming transition to a Trump administration that approaches the Ukraine war in a fundamentally different way.” He adds, “under the circumstances, Seoul has little to gain from radically upending its cautious, passive Ukraine policy in the waning days of the Biden administration.”
For its part, Moscow has responded harshly to the possibility of South Korea supplying Kyiv with arms. “Seoul must realize that the possible use of South Korean weapons to kill Russian citizens will fully destroy relations between our countries,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko.
Neither Seoul nor Kyiv have commented on whether any agreements were made concerning weapons sharing but agreed to continue sharing security information related to North Korea and Russian cooperation.
Other Ukraine News This Week:
Reuters reports that Ukraine launched American-supplied ATACMS twice in the last week. Both strikes targeted Russian operations in Kursk. The Russian Defense Ministry said that “retaliatory measures are being prepared.”
A record-breaking 188 drones were launched by Russia on Tuesday. The AP reports that most of the drones were intercepted, but that damage was done to civilian infrastructure, with no reported casualties. The drones were launched all at once, targeting 17 of Ukraine’s regions.
An analysis of Russia’s Oreshnik missile indicates that it was potentially not loaded with any explosives, or possibly a very small amount. According to the New York Times, the missile launched last week caused less damage than would have been expected had it been heavily armed. Jeffery Lewis, a nuclear nonproliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies, said that “the damage to the facility is quite specific — no large explosions, just big holes punched in the roofs.”
Even though the missile was seemingly minimally armed, the Times reported that “Nick Brown, an analyst at Janes, the British-based defense intelligence firm, said it was the longest-range weapon to ever have been used in conflict in Europe.”
Russian state media claims that the Kremlin complied with a 1988 ballistic missile agreement by warning the United States of the launch 30 minutes in advance.
According to Reuters, North Korea has begun to expand a plant that makes Russian-used missiles. The plant makes short-range missiles that are assumed to be used in Russia, but Moscow and Pyongyang have both denied the transfer of North Korean weapons into Russia.
The Financial Times reported that Russia has recruited potentially hundreds of Yemeni nationals to assist in its war against Ukraine. The Houthi-connected recruits were apparently promised well-paying jobs and even Russian citizenship, before being coerced into military service.
The Houthi government and Moscow have been working to deepen relations and secure contracts, according to U.S. special envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking. Additionally, a member of the Houthi movement told Russian media that the Houthi government was in “constant contact” with Moscow.
According to FT, many of the recruits had no military training and were tricked into service by signing contracts that they could not read.
Spokesperson Matthew Miller said reports about Yemeni nationals being recruited to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine were concerning and reflected the desperation that Moscow was experiencing at this point in the war.
Miller also said that any deterioration of relations between North and South Korea and Russia would be the fault of the Kremlin, not the West or Ukraine. Additionally, he could not confirm whether Russia had begun to supply North Korea with missile defense systems or not.
Miller did not have any comment on the reports that some European officials were discussing the possibility of deploying forces to Ukraine.
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Top photo credit: US special envoy Amos Hochstein talks to reporters following his meeting with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut, Lebanon, on November 20, 2024. Hochstein arrives in the Lebanese capital on November 19 for talks with officials on a truce plan, which Lebanon largely endorses, to halt the ongoing war between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah group. (Photo by Fadel Itani/NurPhoto)
A ceasefire that ends Israel's indiscriminate bombing of Lebanon is welcomed and long overdue. However, it remains unclear whether this deal actually will work, given that the agreement gives Israel 60 days to withdraw. As long as Israeli forces remain on Lebanese soil, the risk of the conflict reigniting — deliberately or inadvertently — will remain significant.
Had the Biden administration exercised its leverage and prioritized U.S. interests, this conflict would never have reached this level to begin with. And ironically, though the deal was struck by Biden's team, the parties in the conflict appear to have agreed to it mainly with an eye to Donald Trump's expressed desire to see the fighting end before he takes office in January.
Contrary to Biden’s spin at the press conference today, the agreement text appears more balanced. Both Israel and Hezbollah agree not to take any offensive actions against each other, while recognizing both Israel and Lebanon’s right to continue to use force in self-defense.
It puts the Lebanese government — which includes Hezbollah — in charge of supervising and controlling any sale, supply and production of weapons or weapons-related materials.
The agreement also established a committee “acceptable to Israel and Lebanon” to monitor and assist in ensuring the implementation of the deal.
Netanyahu, who is wanted by the ICC for war crimes, has declared victory. There is some truth to Netanyahu's narrative: Through this agreement, Hezbollah appears to have given up a key position, that is, the refusal to disconnect Gaza from Lebanon.
But on the other hand, Netanyahu promised to destroy Hezbollah, which clearly he has not achieved. Though the organization is weakened, its ability to shoot at Israel — including penetrating Israel's air defenses, continues to be intact. Just Sunday, they shot more than 250 rockets and other projectiles at Israel.
Indeed, Hezbollah's capacity to inflict pain on Israel may have been a key reason why Netanyahu agreed to the deal. Had his campaign against Hezbollah been more successful, he'd likely be less inclined to stop the fighting.
Tehran has reportedly pressed Hezbollah to agree to the terms of the ceasefire, even though it betrays Hezbollah's earlier position. Tehran has several reasons for doing this: It has opposed the expansion of the conflict from the outset, given its own challenges at home. While it is in a conflict with Israel, the timing of this war suits Israel far more than Iran.
But Tehran may have also seen this as a gift to Trump, demonstrating Tehran's ability to help deescalate the situation while signaling Iran's own desire to strike a deal with Trump rather than to return to a state of heightened U.S.-Iran tensions.
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Top image credit: Protesters rally outside the parliament building in Sukhumi (Sukhum), the capital of Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia November 15, 2024. DNA News Abkhazia/Handout via REUTERS
As protestors in Georgia continue their still-unsuccessful, weeks-long effort to force their government to announce new elections under international supervision, recent demonstrations in Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia proved successful in forcing the de-facto president, Aslan Bzhania, to submit his resignation to parliament amidst a political crisis over a controversial agreement with Russia.
In effect, this amounts to yet another instance of street power pushing the de-facto authorities out of office in Abkhazia, reminiscent of similar events in both 2014 and 2020.
While a political crisis in Abkhazia may seem far removed from American interests, over the last year Western analysts, media, and official circles were abuzz with the reports that Russia was planning to build a naval base on Abkhazia’s Black Sea coastline. Developments in the strategically located South Caucasus have the potential to reverberate far and wide, and therefore must not be overlooked.
The proximate cause of this crisis was a controversial investment agreement between Sukhumi and Moscow that was signed by the two economy ministers at the end of October without the de-facto parliament’s approval. That agreement was set to be discussed in the de-facto legislature on November 15. That day, however, a large group of protesters were able to storm and occupy government office buildings in the Sukhumi. Protestors began demanding the unconditional resignation of Bzhania who sought to push through the protocol that many ethnic Abkhaz have long viewed as a threat to their position in the republic.
The Russo-Abkhaz agreement mainly concerns land provisions, extended tax holidays, and duty-free imports of building materials for investment projects amongst other preferential economic incentives. While the de-facto authorities in Sukhumi stress the importance of the agreement to further develop the Black Sea statelet, critics are worried that such a move will undermine local economic interests in favor of Russian and other business elites, especially in the lucrative tourism sector.
(Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the resulting restrictions on Western travel, the Black Sea has regained its Soviet era allure for Russian vacationers, and therefore investors).
Unfortunately in the Western media, following the Soviet Union’s demise in the early 1990s most discussion of those resulting quasi-states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnitria, and Nagorno-Karabakh) have more often than not lacked any historical nuance or balanced reporting.
While the proposed agreement might seem anodyne from an outsider’s perspective, one must remember the peculiarities of Abkhazia’s demography and history. During the 19th century as the Russian empire was conquering the Caucasus, many of the region's different ethnic groups, including the Abkhaz, offered fierce resistance. Throughout those decades, tens of thousands of Abkhaz were evicted – mostly to the Ottoman Empire, where a large diaspora still lives – as a result of their opposition to Tsarist rule.
As several Western scholars have written, “the eviction of Abkhazians radically altered the demography in Abkhazia.” It can also be said that this period left a strong wariness towards Russian encroachment, even though today Moscow is Abkhazia’s most important partner in its continued resistance to Georgian rule.
Over the last century or so the Abkhaz polity has in one form or another maintained an autonomous or independent status. In 1921 it was consumed by the nascent Bolshevik movement following decades of imperial Russian domination prior to that. During the Soviet era the Abkhaz polity predominantly existed as an “autonomous republic” within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic between 1931-1992 (though the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet passed a declaration in the summer of 1990 “On Abkhazia’s State Sovereignty”).
According to the imperial Russian census of 1897, 55 percent of the population of Abkhazia spoke Abkhaz as their mother tongue, while 24 percent spoke Georgian languages. Due to immigration of Georgians and others under Soviet rule, by the Soviet census of 1989, 45 percent of the population spoke Georgian and only 17 percent Abkhaz, while Armenians and Russians each represented 14 percent. This new reality had only further compounded the Abkhaz’s fears of ethnic proportions and land ownership.
As the Soviet Union began to unwind (in no small part due to the pressures of ethno-nationalist movements), the Abkhaz saw an opportunity to once again reclaim their independent status and to protect their identity. However, these ambitions unsurprisingly, but most devastatingly, came into direct conflict with Georgia’s own powerful nationalist movement which sought to assert its control.
This clash ultimately resulted in the Georgian-Abkhaz War of 1992-93 and the ensuing forced displacement of almost the entirety of the estimated 240,000 Georgians living in Abkhazia. Since then, Abkhazia has been outside of Tbilisi’s reach and has functioned as a de facto independent state under Russian military protection.
However, Abkhazia (and South Ossetia, Georgia’s other breakaway territory) is extremely dependent on Russia in the security, political, financial, and economic spheres. This is especially due to the fact that following Russia’s recognition of the independence of these de facto republics in 2008 (following Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia in August of that year in a failed attempt to reconquer the territory), Moscow has been their main ally and access point to international markets. Meanwhile, relations with Georgia — their “parent state” — remain extremely limited.
Russia, taking advantage of its dominant position in September of this year suspended the financing of some payments to Abkhazia. This followed Sukhumi’s withdrawal over the summer of a previously controversial bill that would have opened up the Abkhazian real estate market to Russian buyers. In the words of Sergei Shamba, a veteran politician, diplomat and current de facto foreign minister in Abkhazia, Moscow’s action was in response to Sukhumi’s “failure to meet obligations.”
Previously, following the change of power in 2014 Abkhazia had signed a controversial strategic partnership agreement with Russia that significantly enhanced the relationship between the two, including a focus on strengthening the military and economic link. Moscow has long been pushing Abkhazia to open up its territory and economy for outside investment.
While de-facto presidential elections were initially planned for March 2025, they will now be brought forward by several weeks.
Recent history would suggest that some variation of this investment agreement will pass at some point in the future – regardless of who wins the presidential campaign – given the statelet’s level of reliance on Moscow and the latter’s willingness to exact a cost for its continued support.
Nevertheless, it is important to note the still active role civil society and the political opposition plays in Abkhazia. While it might be easy to pejoratively label the territory as a Russian puppet (as many in the West and Georgia do), there has been and remains much autonomous spirit amongst the almost quarter million living in Abkhazia. Amidst the present international (and regional) upheaval the challenge of ensuring their titular national standing as well as their economic and property preservation may prove a serious test for the ethnic Abkhaz and the statelet itself in future.
For those in the West who seek an eventual agreement between Sukhumi and Tbilisi, it would be wise to take the time to understand these local realities and act accordingly, rather than believing in myths and creating self-fulfilling prophecies that ultimately lead to everyone’s detriment.
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