Update 12/1: Rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have taken most of Aleppo with Syrian army forces pulling back amid losses. According to reports, rebel forces were making their way to Hama early Sunday and "claiming control of government-held areas along the way."
HTS is derived from al Qaeda’s Syrian branch. Al Qaeda was pushed out of Syria by more radical splinter factions early in the civil war. HTS evolved once the conflict was well underway. When the smoke cleared, HTS remained in control of Idlib, which it turned into a mini-Islamic republic under Turkish protection. It was a good fit for Idlib, which had been a source of militant resistance to the Assad government at the very outset of the civil war.
As of this writing, HTS fighters have reached the center of Aleppo and seized a town that commands the M5 highway, a key route Assad’s forces would need to reach the city and try to pry the HTS militants from within. Assad had only taken Aleppo back from insurgents in a battle during the summer of 2016 with the help of Lebanese Hizballah.
Turkey’s role in this offensive is murky. The attackers, according to news reports, include not only HTS formations, but Sunni militias that have been mobilized and equipped by Turkey over the past few years. This suggests that the HTS campaign might be a Turkish wedge to complicate Assad’s already tenuous reach across Syrian territory and establish de facto Turkish control over a large swath of Syria and one of its largest cities. In this scenario, management of the area’s two million people could be left to HTS, while Turkey reaped the dubious strategic benefit.
For Assad, this is nearly the equivalent of October 7 for Israel. But he has none of the advantages that Israel enjoyed in stabilizing the situation after the attack, going on the offensive, and pulverizing Hamas. Although there are rumors of Russian airstrikes against HTS, the fact is that the Russians are stretched thin by their war against Ukraine and will find it hard to rescue their man in Damascus. And there will be no help from either Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah. Tehran lacks the means and whatever it can muster will be in Israel’s gunsights very quickly. And Hezbollah is reeling from Israel’s recent offensive and couldn’t mobilize the fighters needed to get HTS out of Aleppo let alone reach Aleppo on the ground.
Looking around Syria’s outer perimeter, it’s hard to see Saudi Arabia intervening militarily on behalf of Assad. With Turkey pressing from the North, Israel from the West and no countervailing pressures from the East or South, Assad could find his statelet shrinking fast.
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Steven Simon is a Distinguished Fellow and visiting lecturer at Dartmouth College and Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, he was the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in International Affairs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as the National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House and for the Middle East and North Africa in the Obama White House. He is the author of "Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East" (2023).
Earlier this week, European leaders including newly-minted EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and several prime ministers; including Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Italy’s Georgia Meloni, and Finnish PM Petteri Orpo, met in Finland’s Lapland region for the North-South Summit on European security.
A major theme of the meeting: Bolstering Europe’s defenses to counter Russia’s “direct threat.”
"To prevent war we really need to do more on defense. We have to invest in critical capabilities," Kallas said. "Russia poses a direct threat to European security, but security comprises different elements, and they are different in east, south, north and west, but we can tackle these issues if we act together.”
Meloni likewise posited that Russia poses a holistic threat to European Union security, spanning not only defense, but ultimately vis-à-vis politics and society at large.
"We have to understand the threat [from Russia] is much wider than we imagine," Meloni explained. "It's about our democracy, it's about influencing our public opinion, it's about what happens in Africa, it's about raw materials, it's about the instrumentalization of immigration. We need to know it's a very wide idea of security.”
NATO countries “will need to spend more than 2%” of GDP on defense, Mitsotakis concurred at Lapland. “It will become clear, once we interact with the new [U.S.] president, what is the figure that we will agree on within NATO.”
Mitsotakis’ comments echo new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent calls for NATO alliance members to commit to Cold War levels of military spending by 2030 — a call that has been critiqued by some, including former diplomat Ian Proud, writing for RS, as undoable and unnecessary relative to the actual threat levels to the alliance today.
Kallas and friends may be doubling down on the Russia threat, however, other European leaders are starting to break ranks.
Notably, Hungarian PM Vitkor Orban emphasized last week that fellow EU leaders must fundamentally change their Ukraine strategy. Indeed, Orban said 2025 would bring about an end to the conflict; “Either it will end with peace negotiations, or one of the warring sides will be destroyed.”
Noting that incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s re-election “has changed the state of the war,” Orban also argued in a television appearance that the over $300 billion Europe had put into the war effort could have instead bolstered its infrastructure, economy, and military capacities for them all. “European people would be living much better than today,” he charged.
Meanwhile, Slovak PM Robert Fico met with Putin last weekend to discuss the war and Russian natural gas deliveries. The move was quickly and thoroughly slammed by myriad European leaders, some of whom questioned Fico’s political allegiances outright.
“Robert Fico just kissed the ring of a mass murderer in the Kremlin,” Czech EPP MEP Danuše Nerudová wrote on X. “It is a betrayal and another immoral step that will serve Russian interests. Robert Fico is a security risk for us.”
"Leaders observed that Mr. Fico does not want to participate in the common European work on energy independence or seek replacement for Russian gas, but rather wants to assist Russia in pushing American gas and energy resources of other partners away from Europe,” Zelensky said on X. “Implying that he wants to help Putin earn money to fund the war and weaken Europe.”
“Why is this leader so dependent on Moscow? What is being paid to him, and what does he pay with?,” asked Zelensky.
Interestingly, Zelensky’s comments come amid fresh allegations from PM Fico that he’s refused a bribe from Zelensky, worth over $500 million in Russian assets, in exchange for a vote in favor of Ukraine joining NATO.
As European leaders chart paths forward, one constant appears to be discord.
Six Ukrainian drones hit a residential building in the Russian city Kazan on Saturday, with another hitting an industrial facility, according to Al Jazeera. Putin hinted at possible retaliation in a subsequent statement, saying “Whoever, and however much they try to destroy, they will face many times more destruction themselves and will regret what they are trying to do in our country.”
CNN reported that a Russian ship sunk in the Mediterranean after an apparent engine room explosion on Monday evening. Russian shipping company Oboronlogistika, in charge of Russia’s Defense Ministry cargo, claimed the vessel was bound for Vladivostok, Russia; Ukrainian officials conversely allege the ship was headed for Syria to salvage myriad military materiel following Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s ouster.
Russia launched an energy infrastructure attack against Ukraine on December 25 with over 100 strike drones and 70 ballistic and cruise missiles, according to the New York Times, leading to at least six injuries and one death. Ukrainian air defense teams reportedly intercepted or otherwise disabled many projectiles utilized in the attack, which still caused major energy outages across a war-embattled nation.
In a developing story, Ukraine says its air forces have struck a military facility in Russia’s Rostov region.
This article was adapted from remarks made by the author for the Institute of China-America Studies on December 12, 2024.
Overall, the primary threat to U.S. (and global) interests derives not from China or the United States separately, but from the deeply negative and worsening nature of the U.S and Chinese interaction, in which each side: worst cases the motives and intentions of the other, ignores how they themselves contribute to this spiral, and one-sidedly stresses deterrence over reassurance in many policy spheres (especially regarding Taiwan), which could lead to conflict.
This interactive dynamic is driven by two sets of largely zero-sum views:
In the U.S.: the quixotic U.S. belief that it still retains Cold War-level dominance or absolutely needs such dominance or sole leadership to sustain an acceptable global order. In fact, the conditions allowing for such dominance are disappearing; and there is no effort underway to define a shared structure of leadership between the U.S., China, and other major powers for the future; the stress in the current U.S. administration is on keeping talking with China, and little else.
In China: a belief that U.S. decline is underway, is systemic, and benefits China, and (more importantly) a belief that the U.S. is committed to undermining China’s overall development and collapsing the Chinese Communist Party. This set of beliefs drive Beijing more toward seeking dominance and undermining the U.S. in the process.
Overall, this interactive dynamic inclines both sides toward ever-greater levels of suspicion and zero-sum thinking and increases risk taking, making crises more likely.
In this environment, the incentives for continued peace and prosperity through a stable form of mutually beneficial and peaceful coexistence among the two powers exceed any possible incentives for engaging in zero-sum military, political, and economic rivalry and a sharp, open-ended competition for dominance and control.
So, given this general context, what should China be doing?
First: Beijing should not overreact to Trump’s posturing and threats, or his promises of what he will achieve in relations with China. He speaks and acts for effect, often moving in contradictory directions, responding to what he thinks will make him look good or please his base, or what he sees as challenges from others to his self-image.
He could move toward a basic deal-making approach, possibly based on mutual benefits and the idea that he and Xi Jinping have a good relationship, or he could adopt a more confrontational, reckless, high-pressure approach that reflects the hardline China views of many of his subordinates. But his major focus will likely be on trade, investment, and technology issues.
Whatever direction Trump moves toward will depend on several factors: domestic political developments (and in particular the reaction of his base), what China (and in particular Xi) does, and in general how he views events influencing his image as a tough, no-nonsense, “America First” leader.
Beijing needs to resist the temptation to engage in rigid tit-for-tat actions in response to Trump, and instead convey an image of restraint, prudence, pragmatism, and support for international law, while making it clear where certain red lines are, e.g., regarding Taiwan.
In particular, Beijing needs to become more credible in its support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and its support for international law-based regimes in the areas of trade and investment, technology development and legal protections, human rights, and an overall free, open, and inclusive economic and security order in Asia and beyond. Chinese leaders often make statements supporting such policies and values. But Beijing does not do enough to convince others that it is truly committed to them.
Of course, the U.S. is also falling short in many of these areas. But rather than use this fact as a way of arguing for the weakness or decline of the U.S. or America’s opposition to other nations, Beijing should offer to work with the United States and other nations on specific issues, to strengthen these values.
Regarding Taiwan, Beijing should take actions designed to counter the growing U.S. assumption that Xi Jinping is more likely to employ force against the island while he is in office, perhaps to bolster his legacy. But it also needs to convey the notion that Taiwan is a war or peace issue for China, while also acting to reduce the chances of conflict – a difficult balancing act.
Several actions need to be taken to achieve these objectives:
First, make it unambiguously clear, via repeated statements by Xi Jinping (NOT a subordinate) that there is no deadline for resolving the Taiwan issue, and that China remains committed to resolving the issue peacefully, as a first priority
Second, indicate a willingness to reduce military deployments and exercises around Taiwan in response to greater U.S. reassurances regarding the One China Policy, e.g.,
Clarification that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) does not constitute a security guarantee to Taiwan
A reaffirmation that the U.S. remains supportive of any resolution of the Taiwan issue by peaceful, uncoerced means
A reaffirmation of US limits on ties with Taiwan, by clearly stating: no senior Cabinet trips to Taiwan; no invitations to senior Taiwan leaders to visit Washington; and no “official-designated” trips to Taiwan by senior U.S. politicians or Congressional entities;
Beijing should also be receptive to neutralizing Taiwan as a source of strategic competition between the U.S. and China, by rejecting the notion that the island is a strategic location essential to either the U.S. or Chinese security posture in Asia. It should also call on the U.S. to take a similar action.
Finally, to stabilize the Taiwan situation, and enhance overall stability in the relationship, Beijing should overcome its current resistance to engaging in extensive, substantive crisis prevention and management dialogues with the U.S, at both the Track One and Track Two levels.
There has been some progress recently on this issue, but it remains slowed and obstructed by mutual suspicions, the basic definition of the issue as a military-to-military problem involving incidents at sea or in the air, and Beijing’s stress on crisis prevention, defined as ending U.S. policies that could create a crisis.
Regarding the last point, the two sides need to reach agreement on how to define both crisis prevention and crisis management. Beijing should be willing to define crisis prevention in ways that do not require impossible changes in basic U.S. security policies in Asia;
Moving the Sino-American crisis dialogue forward requires a clear signal from the very top. In support of this, Beijing should convey a desire for the two presidents to make a clear statement to subordinate officials on both sides supporting more extensive crisis dialogues, with significant civilian involvement beyond the two respective military systems.
I have offered ideas on how to move forward in this area in a recent Quincy Paper, an article appearing in War on the Rocks, and in a Sinica podcast with Kaiser Kuo.
There is probably no other issue in the relationship that demands greater attention.
In conclusion, these are all difficult actions, especially in the face of an initially unpredictable and potentially reckless Trump administration.
But I believe Beijing has an opportunity to take actions that might significantly improve the relationship if it has the courage and willpower to undertake these and other initiatives, and not merely point a finger at the U.S. and expect Washington to do all the heavy lifting.
In short, Beijing needs to show its willingness to work with the United States to achieve specific, mutually beneficial ends, not only via words but through repeated and persistent actions.
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Top photo credit: Rep. Josh Gottheimer (New Jersey National Guard photo by Mark C. Olsen ) ; Rep. Nancy Pelosi (Nancy Pelosi/Flickr/Creative Commons) and Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.)(U.S. Army photo/Dustin Senger)
At least 37 members of Congress and their families traded defense stocks in 2024, using a list of the top 100 Pentagon contractors compiled annually by Defense Security Monitor.
A Responsible Statecraft analysis of data from investment research platform Quiver Quantitative shows that these lawmakers traded between $24 million and $113 million worth of Pentagon contractor stocks this year (lawmakers merely have to provide a range for stock trading disclosures).
Eight of these members even simultaneously held positions on the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, the committees overseeing defense policy and foreign relations. Members of Congress that oversee the annual defense bill and are privy to intelligence briefings have an upper hand in predicting future stock prices.
But who traded the most defense stock this year?
That distinction goes to Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.). Gottheimer may have faked his Spotify Wrapped — fabricating an image to make him look like a Bruce Springsteen superfan — but he can’t fake his way out of being crowned the most avid trader in Congress.
Gottheimer traded at least $22 million worth of stock of the top 100 Pentagon contractors, including Microsoft, Northrop Grumman, and IBM. Microsoft — which received $414 million from the Department of Defense in 2023 for software and cloud computing services — accounted for the vast majority of his trades. Gottheimer simultaneously holds positions on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the National Security subcommittee in the Committee on Financial Services.
Gottheimer says his trades are made by a third-party financial firm; “I literally have no idea what they do,” he stated in a 2022 CNBC interview. Given Springsteen’s lifelong skepticism of the military-industrial complex, I’m not sure the Boss himself would approve.
The second most active defense stock trader was Speaker Emerita Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), who sold over $1 million worth of Microsoft stock in late July. The FTC opened a wide-ranging anti-trust investigation into Microsoft in November.
The timing of Pelosi’s Microsoft trades in the past have garnered attention, too; in March 2021, she bought Microsoft call options less than two weeks before the Army announced a $22 billion contract with the software company to supply augmented reality headsets.
Pelosi had the most profitable 2024 of any lawmaker, netting an estimated $38.6 million from all stock trading activity, according to Quiver Quantitative.
Rep. Tom Kean Jr., who comes in at number five for defense stock trading, traded between $106,000 and $365,000 worth of defense stock while sitting on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Kean Jr. exchanged Jacobs stocks after a merger with Ammentum in September.
At number six, Rep. Jonathon Jackson (D-Ill) traded between $80,003 and $200,000 worth of Pentagon contractor stock, including snapping up as much as $50,000 worth of General Dynamics stock while sitting on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala) was the seventh-most active defense stock trader. Despite his perch on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Tuberville disclosed between $63,007 and $245,000 worth of trading in defense stocks this year, selling stakes in IBM, Honeywell, and Accenture, among others. Last September, Tuberville— who owns up to 50,000 in Lockheed Martin stock — participated in an committee hearing on defense innovation headlined by Lockheed CEO James Taiclet.
Tuberville has said that limiting lawmakers’ ability to trade stocks would be “ridiculous” and that “it would really cut back on the amount of people that would want to come up here and serve.”
What about lawmakers who embrace the buy-and-hold strategy, rather than actively trading? In September, Sludge’s David Moore published an investigation that found that lawmakers may own as much as $10.9 million in defense company stock.
Moore also found that Honeywell — which provides sensors and guiding devices to assist the Israeli military in airstrikes in Gaza — is the most commonly-held defense company stock, followed by RTX (formerly known as Raytheon).
During a hearing in June of this year, Rep. Pat Fallon (R-Texas) held up to $250,000 worth of Boeing stock while questioning Navy officials during a hearing about repeated crashes of the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor helicopter made by Bell and Boeing. Rep. Fallon left in the middle of the hearing, shaking hands with family members of Osprey crash victims on the way out.
If Congress wants to wash itself of conflicts of interest it can start by passing a stock trading ban. The Ending Trading and Holdings in Congressional Stocks Act, or ETHICS Act, would prohibit Members of Congress from trading individual stocks. “Lawmakers like me, we’re kind of like umpires in a baseball game, we call balls and strikes. And you definitely don’t let umpires bet on the outcome of the game,” said Sen. Jon Ossoff (D-GA), who introduced the bill alongside three other Senators. The ETHICS Act passed the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs in July but has not yet had a full Senate vote.
President Joe Biden announced his support of a stock trading ban this week.“I don’t know how you look your constituents in the eye and know, because the job they gave you, gave you an inside track to make more money,” said Biden.
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