Why Russia won’t save Iran

On October 11, a rare high-level international forum took place in Ashgabat, the capital of the Central Asian nation of Turkmenistan.

Leveraging its permanently neutral status, enshrined in its constitution, Turkmenistan provided a suitable platform for Eurasian dialogue which brought together the presidents of Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Armenia, as well as high-level officials from China, Turkey, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Iraq, among others.

While these connections have their intrinsic value, the central stage was occupied by the meeting of the Russian and Iranian presidents, Vladimir Putin and Massoud Pezeshkian.

There was a certain intrigue about it as it was their first meeting after the reformist Pezeshkian’s election in July following the death in an air accident of his hardline predecessor Ebrahim Raisi. As Russia’s relations with the West grow more hostile, Moscow tends to resent Iranian reformists’ attempts to diplomatically engage with the West.

Although both sides were noticeably tight-lipped about what was discussed at the meeting, the situation in the Middle East, as Iran braces for Israel’s strike in retaliation for Iran’s October 1 barrage of missiles on Israel (themselves part of escalating exchange of blows between Iran and Israel), was certainly one of the main items. A few days later, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergey Ryabkov issued a stern warning to Israel “to not even consider attacking Iranian nuclear facilities.” In his words, “this would be a catastrophic development and a complete negation of all existing principles in the area of ensuring nuclear safety.”

Politically, such statements vindicate Iranian hardliners’ view that the outreach to the West promoted by the reformist administration is both futile and foolhardy, whereas relations with Moscow is where Tehran ought to invest its diplomatic capital.

When the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, took to X (formerly Twitter) to inform about his exchanges with EU‘s High Representative on Foreign Policy Josep Borrell on the nature of Iran’s military-technical cooperation with Russia, the conservative journalist Fereshteh Sadeghi sniped that Aragchi should have instead told Borrell that Iran’s relations with Russia were none of the West’s business.

Hardline lawmakers like Kamran Ghazanfari, meanwhile, are pushing for Pezeshkian’s impeachment based on alleged illegalities regarding the appointment of one of Iran’s chief proponents of dialogue with the West, former foreign minister Javad Zarif’s as vice president for strategic affairs.

Meanwhile, the West is not helping matters. With the U.S. presidential elections a mere two weeks away, the two candidates are competing over who will out-hawk whom on Iran. The Democratic candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, bizarrely claimed that Iran is America’s “greatest adversary”, blithely ignoring the olive branch Pezeshkian extended during his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York last month.

The Republican contender and former president, Donald Trump, meanwhile, alternates messages suggesting openness to a more constructive relationship with Tehran, notably saying that he won’t seek regime change in Iran, with advising Israel to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. His real track record on Iran in office, however, squarely puts him in the hardline camp: it was Trump who recklessly withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 and brought the U.S. and Iran to the brink of war with the assassination of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Al-Qods commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani.

The EU doesn’t seem any more eager to explore diplomatic opportunities with Iran than the U.S. While Borrell and the deputy secretary general of the European External Action Service he leads, Enrique Mora, are still engaged in dialogue with Araghchi, the EU last week imposed fresh sanctions on Iran for an alleged transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia. The hawkish president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, threatened more sanctions. Borrell is on his way out, to be replaced in a few weeks by the former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas who is likely to look for more ways to punish Iran for its role in Russia’s war in Ukraine. The EU also pushed for more aggressive language on Iran’s regional ambitions at this week’s first EU summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – it is only thanks to the GCC countries’ own delicate diplomacy that, despite its past animosity, the importance of the “diplomatic engagement with Iran to pursue regional de-escalation” was finally agreed in the joint statement.

That context inevitably pushes Tehran ever closer to Moscow and may even blunt the domestic political opposition to these ties. While hardliners welcome the EU’s hostility as a further evidence of the wisdom of their favored “Turn East” policy, reformists may reluctantly conclude that, in the absence of any Western interest in responding positively to their overtures, the concerns about regime survival leave Tehran with few realistic options other than to throw its lot with Moscow, at least for the foreseeable future.

Where the reformists are on a surer footing is in being clear-eyed about Moscow’s real capabilities and limitations in helping Iran. One of the areas where Moscow and Tehran stepped up their cooperation is reportedly in the intelligence realm, particularly in regards to Israel – in parallel, with Moscow’s own deteriorating relationship with Jerusalem. However, being aware of Israel’s vulnerabilities is not the same as having sufficient capabilities to exploit them to a decisive effect. Iran can certainly step up its game, but the results, if any, will only be felt over a longer period of time.

As to Iran’s immediate needs, Russia’s Su-35 fighters and S-400 missile systems could certainly boost its air defenses, but Russia still hesitates in delivering those despite years of speculations over the matter, and that is because it is careful not to antagonize its key partners in the Persian Gulf, like Saudi Arabia and UAE – notably, both pushed back at the EU’s insistence to align the EU and GCC positions on Russia, particularly on the EU’s criticisms of their role in circumventing Brussels’ Russia sanctions. Of note, neither Tehran nor Moscow are disclosing whether the ambitious strategic cooperation document they plan to sign in the near future will contain any security commitments.

Russian expert on Iran Nikita Smagin went further and suggested that Moscow might even secretly be pleased with Israel’s strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure, as it would remove a key competitor for Russian oil on the Chinese market, and thus provide a significant boost for Russia’s budget.

The best Iran could hope for would be that the dust somehow settles after an exchange of blows with Israel, and a new administration is elected in Washington that is willing to pursue diplomacy with Tehran and restrain Israel’s excesses. That would widen Iran’s options while lessening incentives to support destructive forces in the Middle East and one-sided alignment with Russia. On current trajectory, however, there is preciously little hope that that would be happening. That sets Iran for what could at best be described as a deeply imperfect alignment with Russia, in the hope that it would accrue Tehran at least some benefits as Moscow juggles its own interests in the Middle East and beyond.