Russian-Israeli relations deteriorated sharply in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli intervention in Gaza. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has just asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to seek the release of Israeli hostages being held by Hamas in Gaza — and Putin has responded positively.
Russian-Israeli cooperation had grown in a number of spheres after Putin first came to power at the turn of the century. One of the most spectacular examples has been the “secret” but well-known deconfliction agreement between Russia and Israel whereby Russian forces have largely turned a blind eye to Israeli attacks on Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria. Israeli commentators have pointed to Israel’s need to preserve this agreement and desire to protect the remaining Jewish community inside Russia as reasons why Israel would not join America and the West in providing military assistance to Ukraine or sanctioning Russia.
But while Israeli leaders went out of their way to avoid undertaking actions against Russia after Putin intervened in Ukraine beginning in February 2022, Russian leaders did not reciprocate when Israel intervened in Gaza beginning in October 2023. In addition to blaming the conflict on American foreign policy, Putin and other Russian leaders were highly critical of Israel’s intervention, called for a ceasefire (something which Netanyahu is dead set against), and were slow to criticize Hamas’s October 7 attack. Israeli officials and commentators have vociferously expressed their dissatisfaction with Moscow’s position on the Gaza conflict.
Considering both the extremely poor state of Russian-American relations, as well as President Biden’s strong support for Israel throughout his career and especially since Hamas’s October 7 attack, the Israeli leader’s request for Russian support might appear to be slighting Biden. In fact, though, Netanyahu’s turning to Putin for help getting hostages released may simply be pragmatic. Since Russia has good working relations with Hamas while the U.S. does not, then Netanyahu would understandably see Moscow as having a better chance of securing a hostage release than does Washington.
For Putin to respond positively to Netanyahu’s request is also highly pragmatic. While Russian-Israeli relations have deteriorated amid Russian criticism of Israel’s intervention in Gaza, Moscow has no interest in seeing Israel end its policy of not joining the West in aiding Ukraine and sanctioning Russia. Whether successful or not, then, Russia’s efforts to get Hamas to release Israeli hostages could help make sure that Israel does not alter its Ukraine-related policies. Putin might also see agreeing to help Netanyahu on the hostage situation as conveying an image of Russia as a more effective mediator than not just the U.S., but also China (to which Iran and Saudi Arabia turned, instead of Russia, to help restore their diplomatic relations earlier this year).
It is not clear, of course, that Moscow can persuade Hamas to release any Israeli hostages. But even if it does, this is not going to bring about an end to the conflict — as Netanyahu and Putin are both undoubtedly aware. But if Russia is able to facilitate an agreement whereby Hamas releases Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel’s releasing Palestinian prisoners, that would benefit the individuals exchanged and their families — and so is at least worth trying.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu in January 2018. (Office of President of Russian Federation/Wikimedia Commons)
Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, R-La., right, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, arrive to address the media after a meeting in the U.S. Capitol on Friday, February 7, 2025. (Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Sipa USA)
First order of House business: Protect Israel’s Netanyahu?
In his farewell address to the nation, George Washington included a special pleading:
"Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government."
It is said that Israel’s influence over American military and foreign affairs is unique — that no small state in modern times has exerted such control over the affairs of a great power. This is a troubling claim. But is it true?
For sure, foreign powers historically have attempted to influence American politics, to steer, or even control our actions in the world. But their interventions never came close to matching Israel’s sustained sway over Washington’s power centers. This intricate grip has now lasted generations and has prevented the U.S., time and again, from acting in its own security interests in domestic as well as foreign affairs.
A comparative analysis would be useful in order to fully grasp the gravity of the situation. Let’s look at four instances in which foreign powers tried to intervene in U.S. politics. How aggressive were they? How much did they threaten American security? Was U.S. sovereignty ultimately damaged?
Only then can we fully take the measure of Israeli influence operations today.
France tries to manipulate its weaker client
Bourbon France was a decisive factor in securing American independence in 1783. Ten years later, France was torn by revolution and invaded by European great power monarchies. In desperation, France tried to suborn its former client, the United States. “Citizen” Edmond-Charles Genêt was sent to petition President Washington for help; instead, he lured Americans into a privateer scheme to raid British and Spanish shipping.
Washington had just declared neutrality in France’s European war. This was a naked bid to drag America into war. Washington quickly quashed Genet; yet the new United States continued to benefit from its fraternal relationship with France. There was the Louisiana Purchase, and then, in 1812, Madison took the U.S. to war with Britain in the belief that Napoleon was about to defeat America’s old nemesis. Hence, American strategy remained under the long, yet mutually beneficial, shadow of its old French patron — and then, after just a generation or so, it was gone.
Britain, France use Confederate States for their own ends
In the American Civil War, Britain made war on the U.S. through its proxy Alt-America, the Confederate States of America. The million rifles it delivered to the Confederates kept the Rebel cause going. Plus, Royal Navy ironclads — massed for several years in Bermuda — deeply degraded the Union blockade. Britain’s strategic goal was a bit like U.S. aims against Russia in the Ukrainian war: to cut off at the knees a threatening great power competitor. This was a double manipulation: arming the South, while also forcing the North to accept their proxy subversion — given that armed resistance would push the federal state into a world war with Britain and France. France tagged along only as Britain’s sidekick, taking advantage of the Civil War to invade Mexico. Yet in the event, England’s opportunity evaporated quickly: By 1864, a losing Southern cause forced Britain and France to “cut bait.”
A desperate Britain manipulates the new world power
After the outbreak of world war in 1914, the Allies found themselves totally dependent on U.S. production of war materials. Their war effort depended on the multiple millions of American-made artillery shells, rifles, and explosives that issued forth from the might of U.S. industry.
Britain’s ruling class desperately sought to bring America directly into the war. To that end, they brought to bear every dark art in His Majesty’s Grey Zone arsenal: over-the-top propaganda, sensational intel leaks, and, just possibly, a very grim false flag operation. A triumphant British intel op — the Zimmerman Telegram — helped tip the scales. The U.S. was led by the hand, and not so gently, into World War I.
Britain’s — and Winston Churchill’s — efforts to corral the U.S. into a second world war were even more strenuously devious than those before 1917. Yet, with the full and enthusiastic support of FDR, they can hardly be called manipulation.
A beleaguered USSR manipulates the world power
Stalin’s Soviet Union — industrially backward and internationally isolated — found a sympathetic helpmate in the “progressive” Roosevelt administration after 1933. However, when Soviet archives were briefly cracked open after 1991 we could see how deeply the U.S. government was interpenetrated by hundreds of Red-American agents at that time, many at the highest levels of influence and counsel. Moreover, the U.S. gave away the store: 1) It basically forgave the entire Russian war debt (accrued during WWI), which was 150% of U.S. GDP (subsident as it was in the midst of Depression); 2) it gave the USSR access to U.S. aviation technology, the world’s best; and; 3) it encouraged America’s preeminent corporations to create and run a new world of Soviet manufacturing, making Stalin’s dreams of world-class industrialization come true. Not to mention that the Soviets also managed to steal both the A-Bomb and its delivery system, the B-29. Overall, a masterclass in strategic manipulation!
In sum, these all share broad characteristics:
Earlier campaigns were substantively non-ideological, “realist” and opportunistic in nature. Genet covered his schemes in a sheen of revolutionary fraternité, just as Stalin pushed democratic brotherhood in the fight against fascism. Yet dreams of eventual world revolution still had U.S. aid as their single-minded goal. The French Republic, Soviet Union, and British Empire (after 1914) desperately needed the U.S. on their side for resources and money. In sharp contrast, Britain and France in the Civil War were simply flint-eyed opportunists. To bring America to its knees, in the steely slang of great power politics, was in Britain’s strategic interest.
These earlier influence operations were focused on the immediate situation. Leverage over American politics was not meant to be permanent. Rather, political influence was designed to achieve short-term relief in the midst of crisis: For a beleaguered French republic, and even more so for an isolated, bankrupt, and industrially backward Soviet Union. Getting the U.S. in the war (after 1914) was Britain’s existential requirement.
In these cases, moreover, all influence was temporary. In fact, after 1865, 1918, and 1945, aggressive attempts to leverage America led to political backlash and blowback; i.e., the Alabama Claims, the renunciation of the League of Nations, and both the Red Scare and Cold War.
Were they cunning, manipulative, damaging on a number of levels? Yes. Yet all these cases of aggressive foreign influence pale in comparison to Israel’s strategic control operations over the last 80 years.
The Israeli operation is driven by ideology, and shares nothing with the boilerplate mantras of Genet or Stalin. The Israeli “operation” in Gaza is infused with messianic goals and objectives that span decades. Moreover, its softest targets in American politics (Evangelical conservatives) are themselves defined by messianic goals and an apocalyptic vision. The prize is Greater Israel, and nothing less can be accepted. It is what drives the most zealous among the Israeli right — and the Likud as a whole — and which has come as well to animate its Republican supporters, some of the most powerful people in Washington today, including House Speaker Mike Johnson, Ambassador Mike Huckabee, even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
How did we get to this place?
Three powerful messianic American constituencies have taken the place of the old Washington realpolitik era, which ended in the first Bush administration. First, there was the rise of messianic (secular) neoconservatism, represented by the likes of Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. They saw Israel as a powerful American interest in the larger fulfillment of America’s world mission. Then there was the emergence of a “Christian Zionist” bloc, which occupies a place of central salience in the Trump administration. Finally, the highly organized and well-funded Israel lobby has never had a more dominant hold on the executive and legislative branches of the United States government.
Together, they have become the mighty engine driving support for the “Greater Israel” vision and Israel’s government, which has been dominated by the right-wing Likud Party for nearly 50 years.
Thus, unlike earlier foreign influence operations in the American experience, there is no short-term situation. Israel is committed to its long march, and grimly determined to pull America along with it. Its forever war with Islam and what it calls “terrorism” point to a protracted, neo-Punic struggle. Indeed, Israel is steeled for centuries of war. This contains within itself far-reaching and dangerous implications.
Yet all foreign influence operations — highlighted by historical cases — are ultimately dependent on the submissive good will of those “under the influence.” Americans had real sympathy for revolutionary France. Confederate leaders truly believed that the British ruling class, or at least King Cotton, was their friend. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt were rooting for the Allies, not the Central Powers. FDR’s regime was full of “fellow travellers” eager to make common cause with Reds against Fascists.
Hence, this influence campaign by a foreign power is unprecedented in its scope and success, and threatens the very sovereignty of the nation more than at any time in America’s history.
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Top photo credit: Servicemen of the Azov battalion are attending a ceremony to remember the victims of the Olenivka camp explosion, in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 28, 2024, (Photo by Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto)
Over the last several weeks, Russia’s 51st Combined Arms Army has achieved a penetration of the Ukrainian defenses northeast of Pokrovsk, seeking to isolate the Ukrainian forces defending the city.
To seal off the penetration, Ukrainian forces committed a large number of formations, spearheaded by the 1st “Azov” National Guard Corps.
While the results of fighting are still uncertain at the time of this writing, the presence of an entire “Azov” Corps and its sister Corps in the regular army has come as a surprise to many observers. Most remember it as a single regiment of about 1000 men and are shocked to find it has grown into two multi-brigade structures of over 20,000-40,000 soldiers each. The growth and far-right leaning of this formation could have an impact on the future of any Ukraine peace deal.
The Azov militia battalion was founded by Andriy Biletskyi, whom many have accused of harboring white supremacists views. At one point it was prohibited from receiving U.S. aid by Congress for its extremist views, The unit earned a reputation for battlefield success for its capture of Mariupol (on the Sea of Azov, from which it takes its name) in early 2014 from Donbas separatists.
Ironically, at the time its reputation may have been exaggerated. There are few videos of actual combat and the unit’s first fatality came a month later during battle for Marinka. This may have been the result of an excellent public relations program that Azov established early on.
Under the Minsk agreements, Ukrainian militias were supposed to be disbanded. Instead, in 2015, Ukraine folded them into the National Guard structure. This was intended to professionalize the militias and remove the extremist ideology from the ranks. It's difficult to assess how well the later plan worked since most of the officers together with rank and files were retained. Military professionalism and radical ideologies are not mutually exclusive, as the Waffen SS, from which Azov has drawn its symbology, demonstrated in World War II.
It is also worth noting that Ukraine fields two armies. One under the Ministry of Defense and the second one in the Ministry of Interior, which is closer to the U.S. Department of Justice, aimed at enforcing domestic laws rather than external defense. This second army is called the National Guard. These troops have nothing in common with the U.S. National Guard, run by state governments and federalized as needed, instead these are regular combat units that answer to the Minister of Interior instead of Defense.
Since the Russian invasion in 2022, Azov has fought with professionalism and great courage in multiple theaters. It started out in Mariupol, together with the 35th Marine Brigade defending the city for several months until finally surrendering in ruins of the “Azovstal” factory. In the meantime, the regiment’s original founder created several other formations around Kyiv also naming them Azov and successfully contributed to defending the city. Eventually these units would merge into the 3rd Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Army.
Accomplishing every one of those tasks was impressive PR. Azov did an excellent job advertising its combat performance. By 2023, Azov has morphed into two highly capable brigades, the Army’s 3rd Assault Brigade led by Andriy Biletskyi, the original founder of Azov militia, and the 12th National Guard Brigade commanded by Denys "Redis" Prokopenko, who commanded the Azov regiment in defense of Mariupol before being captured and eventually exchanged in a prisoner swap.
In addition, Kraken Special Forces Regiment within HUR (Holovne Upravlinnia Rozvidky, which translates to Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense) was also formed by Azov veterans. It is key to note that while Azov fighters were excellent, its leadership refused to commit them to battles that would have resulted in heavy casualties, even if it meant disobeying orders.
For example in 2023, when sent to restore the lines of Avdiivka, leadership of Azov’s 3rd assault brigade realized the futility of the operation and pulled out instead of allowing itself to be ground down in an un-winnable defense. This would remain the pattern of Azov combat performance. It would be brought in to stabilize the situation, counterattack to eject the Russians from advanced positions, but never remain on the defensive to face Russian firepower.
The result is that Azov acquired a legendary reputation for its offensive operations, while preserving its core of combat veterans. When in February 2025, Ukraine began to form corps from the most successful brigades, Azov was at the forefront. Both Army’s 3rd Corps and the National Guards’ 1st Corps were formed around Azov units, with former brigade commanders now elevated to corps command.
As of today, Azov leadership is in charge of nine brigades, the Kraken SOF Regiment, and numerous other support units, for a total of about 40,000-80,000 men or 10% of Ukrainian armed forces.
Azov is now positioned as one of the very last combat capable formations in Ukraine. Its soldiers are still motivated and trained to conduct organized offensive operations. Other formations still exist but the soldiers manning them are unwilling recruits increasingly pulled off the streets by press gangs. For example the Ukrainian Marine Corps was destroyed in the battle of Krinki, while the Air Assault Troops together with many elite mechanized formations like 47th Brigade were badly mauled in Kursk operation.
Apart from a couple of Shturmovie (Storm) Regiments currently fighting alongside Azov around Pakrovsk and the Presidential Brigade in Kyiv, there are few units left in the Ukrainian Army still fully capable of offensive operations. Former Chief of Staff of the 12th Azov Brigade Bohdan Krotevych, claimed that most brigades were at 30% and by doctrine are considered non-mission capable, unable to defend much less attack.
Azov’s leadership isn’t likely to be democratically elected to political office. In a survey of 13 possible candidates, Azov leaders have a combined 4.1% of population behind them, trailing Gen.Valerii Fedorovych Zaluzhnyi by almost 20% — but the combat power at their disposal makes it impossible to ignore. In essence Azov stands to become a modern day equivalent of the Ottoman Janissary Corps, enjoying veto power over the government’s decisions and ability to make and unmake presidents.
They have exercised this power before. In 2019 when Zelensky attempted to implement the Minsk Agreements, he personally ordered Azov fighters to pull back from the line of contact and they refused. Back then Azov was just a regiment of about 1000 men, today has much greater numbers and strength to resist if it chooses.
This is where the peace deal may run into an ideological wall. The Russian war goal of denazification is aimed at groups like Azov. Yet the Ukrainian state would be both unwilling and unable to disarm 10% of its armed forces and most effective ones at that. Furthermore, any other Russian demand related to education, linguistics and religious rights could be blocked by Azov-linked politicians no matter what Ukrainian government signs.
Additional risk is that after the peace deal, Azov would remain along the line of contact continuing low intensity fighting as they did prior to 2022, and supporting resistance on territories de facto ceded to Russia. This will undermine any long-term peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, regardless of Kiev’s intent. It would also place any possible peacekeeping force in a major dilemma. Fight Azov, nominally Ukrainian troops, or turn a blind eye and risk conflict with the Russian army when it retaliates.
The evolution of Azov from a single militia battalion to two combat corps of the Ukrainian Security Forces poses a significant challenge to post war Ukraine. A far right organization with the only real combat-capable formations and demonstrated willingness to ignore orders, risks unhinging any peace deal made with Russia, even if none of the governments involved are interested in fighting.
Western powers need to address the Azov issue as part of any peace negotiations or risk renewal of hostilities with potential for major war across Europe.
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Top image credit: President Donald Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin speak backstage before they participate in a joint press conference after their meeting at the Arctic Warrior Event Center at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, Friday, August 15, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
Lost amid the focus on summit pageantry, land swaps, and security guarantees last week was an issue even more central to a diplomatic resolution of the Ukraine war: whether Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to accept Ukraine’s membership in the EU as part of a settlement deal.
That concession was an important element of a peace deal that Russian and Ukrainian negotiators drafted under Turkish mediation in 2022, which Ukraine subsequently abandoned.
Since then, some Russian officials have opposed such membership, but the Kremlin’s spokesman indicated earlier this year that Russia would not object, in sharp contrast to its adamant opposition to Ukraine’s NATO membership. Then, during his White House meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders, President Donald Trump made two phone calls, first to Putin, and then to Prime Minister Viktor Orban to urge Hungary to ease its opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession process. The timing raises the question of whether the two calls were related.
Why might Putin make such a concession — which would leave Ukraine militarily neutral, but anchored politically and economically in Europe, like Austria and Ireland — if Russian forces are increasingly advancing on the battlefield, and Putin insists Ukraine must be returned to Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence, as many allege?
One possibility, of course, is that Russia doubts Ukraine will make it through the tortuous accession process successfully. Hungary is far from alone in voicing concerns about Ukraine’s membership, as both Poland and France worry about the impact of Ukrainian agricultural production on their farming sectors, and others fret that Ukraine would be an expensive and corrupt drain on European coffers.
But while Russian skepticism might be justified, it is not the same thing as certainty that EU members will close the door on Kyiv. Putin must have anticipated that the U.S. would almost immediately begin pressing its European partners to hasten the accession process. Feigning acceptance of Ukrainian membership would be a high-stakes risk that could easily backfire on Moscow.
A more likely factor is simple pragmatism. The Russian military has already shown that it cannot conquer all of Ukraine. Its initial bid to seize Kyiv through a quick assault on the Antonov airport fell prey to advance U.S. intelligence warnings and Ukraine’s brave and determined resistance. As a result, Russia’s under-manned and under-supplied invasion force had to retreat, regroup, and refocus its efforts on Ukraine’s east and south. And even if Russia were capable of conquering all of Ukraine — the largest national territory entirely in Europe — it would have little hope of governing it, as it would almost certainly face active Ukrainian guerrilla attacks and require an occupation force several times the size of the current Russian military.
Furthermore, even if Russia could somehow manage to conquer, occupy, and govern Ukraine’s vast expanse, it would still have to contend with a NATO alliance that has doubled in size since the end of the Cold War, and whose European members are revitalizing their withered military industries and pledging to build up their combat capabilities for the first time in decades. For its part, the United States has announced plans to put intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles in Germany for the first time since Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty banning them in 1987 — missiles that could reach strategic targets in minutes with a high probability of overcoming Russian missile defenses.
Conquering Ukrainian territory would not solve these broader security problems for Russia. In fact, it would almost certainly deepen NATO’s hostility and resolve, forcing Russia either to put its economy on an expensive, near-permanent war footing or rely increasingly on more cost-effective (albeit more destabilizing) theater nuclear weapons to counter NATO.
In either case, Russia would find itself even more dependent on China for trade, technology, and diplomatic support — hardly the mark of a great power that Russia’s elites believe it is and must be.
Putin probably recognizes that a willingness to live with Ukraine’s potential membership in the EU is a necessary price for avoiding such a scenario and gaining terms in a Ukrainian peace deal that he regards as essential to Russian security. The first and most important is to get the United States to close the door on Ukraine’s joining NATO or otherwise hosting NATO-member combat forces on its territory — demands that Russian officials have voiced for several decades and were among the key factors motivating the Russian invasion.
The second is to revive negotiations over European security and nuclear arms control that could minimize threats to Russia, but which are either dead or on life-support.
These would be small prices for the United States to pay for anchoring Ukraine in Europe politically and economically. Because every American president since George W. Bush has shown that he will not commit U.S. troops to fight Russia in defense of Ukraine and Georgia, a formal commitment to end NATO’s eastward expansion would be less a concession to Russia than an acknowledgment of an existing reality. Entering arms control talks with Russia, putting Europe on a path toward stability, and reducing Moscow’s dependence on China would enhance, not diminish, America’s own security.
Even if the accession process proves bumpy, it could promote Ukraine’s sovereignty, prosperity, and societal healing, which will be critical to its future self-defense capabilities. Optimism about Ukraine’s future could encourage substantial numbers of the millions of refugees that fled the war to return home and arrest Ukraine’s demographic collapse. The requirements of membership would allow Ukraine to advance reforms protecting Russian-speaking minorities and minimizing political extremism without appearing to capitulate to Moscow’s demands.
Most important, given the near impossibility of NATO membership, the prospect of EU accession — a desire that underpinned Ukraine’s Maidan revolution in 2014 — might be the best hope for persuading Ukraine’s citizens that a compromise peace settlement is worth the blood they have sacrificed over the past three years.
Swapping Ukraine’s military neutrality for the prospect of EU membership would not by itself suffice to end this tragic war. But it is a compromise that Trump, Europe, and Ukraine should embrace.
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