The Pentagon has announced that it has again undervalued ammunition, missiles and other military equipment provided to Ukraine, opening the door to supplying $2 billion in new military support for Kyiv.
This brings total aid tied to such re-valuations of systems provided from U.S. stocks to $8.2 billion, a considerable sum in light of the current political bottleneck in Congress over providing new assistance to Ukraine.
The latest revision in the estimated value of U.S. equipment comes at a critical time for the Ukrainian government, as the continuation of large-scale deliveries of U.S. weaponry is in doubt not only due to divisions in Congress but due to the possibility of an aid cutoff should Donald Trump win this fall’s presidential election.
In the meantime, the Government Accountability Office has argued that there needs to be a clarification of how weapons provided from U.S. stocks should be valued, a move that would preclude the kind of accounting shuffle that has once again opened the way to additional billions in aid to Ukraine.
It’s hard to begrudge Ukraine additional assistance in its effort to defend against further Russian territorial gains, but arms alone, on whatever scale, will not be enough to resolve the conflict in a way that allows that nation to rebuild itself from the devastation caused by the Russian invasion. Nor will it enable Ukraine to construct an economically viable democracy. The best hope for salvaging such an outcome is a diplomatic initiative, as challenging as that may be.
Ultimately, the Pentagon’s statistical maneuvering to free up funding for Ukraine is likely to have a limited impact on the outcome of the war. It is important that Kyiv get the support it needs to defend itself. But the notion that Ukraine can win a decisive military victory, if only there were a steadier flow of weapons aid, is dangerously misguided.
It will take more than a little budgetary sleight-of-hand to set the stage for a settlement of the conflict on terms acceptable to Ukraine. It’s long past time to abandon the approach of providing weapons to Ukraine and hoping for the best, as a number of key U.S. officials are coming to recognize.
They now believe that the purpose of military aid should be to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in negotiations to end the war, not to subsidize “total victory” on the battlefield. In this context, a one-time tranche of $2 billion in military aid, while useful in the short-term, will ultimately have a modest impact on the outcome of the conflict. The Pentagon and the administration need to focus on the big picture — how to end the conflict in Ukraine — rather than cooking the books to provide a one-time infusion of military support.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
Following a reported push from the Biden administration in late 2024, Mike Waltz - President-elect Donald Trump’s NSA pick - is now advocating publicly that Ukraine lower its draft age to 18, “Their draft age right now is 26 years old, not 18 ... They could generate hundreds of thousands of new soldiers," he told ABC This Week on Sunday.
Ukraine needs to "be all in for democracy," said Waltz. However, any push to lower the draft age is unpopular in Ukraine. Al Jazeera interviewed Ukrainians to gauge the popularity of the war, and raised the question of lowering the draft age, which had been suggested by Biden officials in December. A 20-year-old service member named Vladislav said in an interview that lowering the draft age would be a “bad idea.”
“I would choose to be shot to death right here, in Kyiv instead of going to the frontline,” said a 17-year-old Ukrainian named Serhiy in these interviews. Serhiy’s mother shared her son’s opinion, as young people “aren’t developed mentally, they will jump on (enemy) weapons without thinking, without understanding.” Continuing with, “they don’t yet have a feeling of self-preservation, they are just flying into battle. This will be (the) destruction of the Ukrainian people.”
This idea that more young Ukrainians should be fighting may conflict with Trump’s stated goals of ending the war immediately and through negotiations. Or it might be a way to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into talks, knowing that he does not have much manpower left to give, even with the lowered draft age.
Despite lowering the draft age from 27 to 25 in 2024, Kyiv had to resort to using patrols to enforce the unpopular measure. Desertion has been a consistent issue in the Ukrainian military, with Kyiv charging at least 100,000 under desertion laws since 2022. Desertions have continued as recently as last week, with dozens of Ukrainian soldiers under training in France being accused of abandoning their posts.
Studies show that Ukraine is facing a severe population crisis if changes aren’t made. The U.N. Population Fund estimated that 10 million, or a quarter of the Ukrainian population, have been lost to death or displacement since 2014, and a separate study claimed that a third of Ukraine’s working population would be lost by 2040. Lowering the compulsive service age to 18 would certainly exacerbate demographic and population crises, especially as Russia seemingly has seen regular successes on the battlefield.
The war in general, is no longer popular with the Ukrainian people either. A recent Gallup Poll found that, for the first time, a majority of Ukrainians preferred a negotiated settlement to continued fighting. Since over 50% of Ukrainians are opposed to this war, it would seem that the “democratic” option would include peace talks as opposed to lowering the draft age, as supported by Waltz.
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Top photo credit: Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky (Office of Ukraine President/Creative Commons); US President Donald Trump (Gabe Skidmore/Creative Commons) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (World Economic Forum/Creative Commons)
Russia’s dismissive response to possible provisions of a Trump settlement plan floated in Western media underscores how difficult the path to peace in Ukraine will be. It also highlights one of the perils of an approach to diplomacy that has become all too common in Washington: proposing settlement terms in advance of negotiations rather than first using discreet discussions with adversaries and allies to gauge what might be possible.
To achieve an accord that Ukraine will embrace, Russia will respect, and Europe will support, Trump will have to revive a tradition of American statesmanship — balancing power and interests among capable rivals — that has been largely dormant since the Cold War ended, and U.S. foreign policy shifted its focus toward democratizing other nations and countering terrorism.
A wide range of issues will require detailed negotiation, but three principles will be key to his success:
Put American Interests First. The Biden administration has, from the invasion’s start, insisted that it is up to Ukraine to decide if and when to seek an end to the war. It has offered tactical advice but deferred to Kyiv on setting strategy. This has proved to be a recipe for unending conflict that is devastating Ukraine and perversely incentivizing Kyiv to draw the United States more directly into the war.
Trump must put America back in the driver’s seat, focusing on core U.S. national interests in negotiating a settlement. Foremost among these is the establishment of a stable balance of power in Europe that deters rather than provokes Russian aggression, while enabling the United States to focus attention and resources on renewal at home and on a more formidable challenge, China, abroad. Ukraine cannot negotiate that regional balance; only the United States has the power to orchestrate the continent-wide mix of military measures and diplomatic safeguards that will be required.
Insisting that American interests serve as our North Star in negotiations does not mean that Trump should ignore Ukrainian interests in cutting a deal with Moscow. Without Ukraine’s buy-in, no settlement will prove lasting or effective, and ensuring that Ukraine can prosper as a secure, independent state is an important American goal. But some public pressure on Zelensky could help him deal with domestic opposition by blaming Trump for some painful but necessary compromises. Although opinion polls indicate that a majority of Ukrainians favors a quick settlement, there remains a group of hardcore nationalists that strongly oppose any negotiations.
Broaden the Problem. Part of the reason that Biden has deferred to Kyiv was a widely shared belief in Washington that the war is a bilateral matter between Russia and Ukraine, and that the key to any peace settlement was to maximize Ukraine’s leverage on the battlefield. That assumption was fundamentally flawed. It failed to understand that Russia’s enormous numerical advantages in population and military production meant Ukraine’s military was bound to weaken over time in a war of attrition, even with robust Western support. And it failed to recognize that the United States has long been able to negotiate from a position of strength if it viewed the war through a wider lens.
For Russia, the war is a key theater in a larger geopolitical conflict with the United States. Its primary goal has been to block Ukraine’s membership in NATO, as well as to prevent a U.S. presence in Ukraine that would threaten Russian security. But even capturing all of Ukraine would not resolve Russia’s larger security problems with NATO. The Kremlin would still have to contend with a 32-member NATO alliance whose military and economic might far exceeds that of Russia. In particular, Russia will soon face U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Germany for the first time since the 1980s, for which it has no effective countermeasures. These larger security issues provide the United States with leverage to end the war while protecting core Western and Ukrainian interests — including a secure path toward Ukrainian membership in the EU.
Play the China Card. Recognizing that the war has deepened Russia’s dependence on China, the Biden administration pressed the Chinese to arm-twist Putin into ending the invasion, dangling the prospect of new sanctions if Beijing refused. But Beijing’s ambivalence toward the war was never going to translate into picking sides, and Biden’s with-us-or-against-us approach missed an opportunity to explore the subtleties in China’s calls for settling the war.
China certainly sympathizes with Putin’s concerns about NATO, and it does not want Russia to lose, which would leave China alone facing an invigorated U.S. bloc. But neither is it happy about Russia’s territorial conquest, which evokes painful chapters in China’s own history and increases the chances of a nuclear conflict that would have numerous negative consequences for Beijing. Moreover, facilitating a compromise settlement could pay dividends for China’s image in Europe, a market that is growing in importance to Beijing as trade with the United States comes increasingly under threat.
Trump can channel this ambivalence into a helpful Chinese role. The United States does not need and should not seek Chinese help in mediation. But inviting China’s special envoy on Ukraine to visit the United States and discuss a settlement — something Beijing sought but Biden refused to offer — would put pressure on Putin to join peace talks. And China could play an invaluable role in post-accord reconstruction of Ukraine, which would serve as a powerful disincentive for Putin to violate the terms of a settlement or reinvade.
The path toward peace in Ukraine will be arduous. Russia is deeply distrustful of American intentions and has profound doubts that Trump can wrangle the Washington establishment into support for any settlement. But with diplomatic skill and a dollop of luck, Trump could achieve what until recently seemed all but impossible: an independent Ukraine securely embedded in the EU; a Europe better able to deter and counterbalance Russia with its own resources; and a Russia and China that are less united in their hostility toward Washington. That vision is well worth pursuing, even if the odds of failure are significant.
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Top photo credit: Former Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, President-elect Trump’s nominee to be Director of National Intelligence, is seen in Russell building on Thursday, December 12, 2024. (Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Sipa USA)
Not long after Donald Trump nominated Tulsi Gabbard to serve as his director of national intelligence (DNI), close to 100 former national security officials signed a letter objecting to her appointment, accusing her of lacking experience and having “sympathy for dictators like Vladimir Putin and [Bashar al-]Assad.”
Trump has now made many controversialforeign policynominations that stand at odds with his vows to end foreign wars and prioritize peace and domestic problems — including some who are significantly less experienced than Gabbard — yet only the former Hawaiian Congresswoman has received this level of pushback from the national security establishment so far.
There are legitimate criticisms of Gabbard’s record. But this effort is not motivated by any of them. Instead, it’s an attempt to torpedo her appointment because of her more restrained posture toward America's foreign conflicts.
Gabbard is by no means the anti-war advocate’s ideal appointee. Rather than large-scale interventions she has said that she supports killer drones and special forces to hunt terrorists in other countries, pushing the self-defeating idea — advanced by the Bush II and Barack Obama administrations, and more recently, by Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel — that terrorism can be defeated through bombs and assassinations, and it does not seem those views have changed.
She was hostile to diplomacy with Iran under Obama. She voted for the nuclear deal, but only after repeatedly criticizing his attempts to forge it, and even backing legislation to undermine the agreement. She has been a staunch supporter of Israel and its war in Gaza, calling American college protesters “puppets of these radical Islamist organizations…that stand opposed to our ideology of freedom.”
But the Washington foreign policy establishment has lurched to such extremes over the past decade, that the once fairly banal positions held by former President Barack Obama — who did not view Ukraine as a core U.S. interest worth going to war over, and was wary of growing American military involvement that could provoke a proxy war with Russia — have now become cast as radical, even treasonous. In this context, Gabbard looks like a moderate.
Gabbard — a U.S.veteran who served in the Iraq War and is currently a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army reserves — remains one of the shockingly few voices to foreground the threat of nuclear war as a priority for U.S. policy toward the Ukraine war, as well as to advocate for a negotiated solution to the conflict.
She is likewise one of the depressingly few voices to ever warn about the very real nuclear risk of ratcheting tensions with China, has criticized Trump’s trade war with the country, and has urged a peaceful, cooperative U.S. relationship with Beijing — and at a time when virtually the entire Washington establishment is dead set on a policy of confrontation.
And despite her hostility at the time to the Iran deal, she has repeatedlywarnedthat war with Iran would be a disaster, and bitterlycriticized Trump’s 2020 assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani as unconstitutional and “an act of war.”
These views don’t just make Gabbard an outlier in establishment circles; more pertinently, they would make her an outlier in the incoming Trump cabinet, the key foreign policy posts of which have been almost entirely filled with ultra-hawks on either Russia, China, Iran, or all three.
In other words, whatever one thinks of Gabbard, she would functionally be one of the few voices speaking in Trump’s ear urging that he act with restraint towards two nuclear superpowers, as almost everyone in media, Washington, and his own administration pushes him to escalate against both.
That much of the foreign policy establishment is bent on this same disastrous path explains the vociferous objections to Gabbard’s nomination in the December letter. In it they point to her visit to Syria in 2017 to meet with Bashar al-Assad (something then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi did in 2007) as an example of aligning “herself with Russian and Syrian officials.” Gabbard has repeatedly called Assad a “brutal dictator” but also insisted that “if we profess to truly care about the Syrian people, about their suffering, then we’ve got to be able to meet with anyone that we need to if there is a possibility that we can achieve peace.”
In reality, if “chumminess” with dictators was actually disqualifying for a government position, virtually all of Washington would be out of a job.
Hillary Clinton famously boasted about former Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak and his wife being “friends of my family.” The Bush family, among others, were famously close with a prominent member of the despotic Saudi royal family, who, unlike anyone in Syria, was actually complicit in carrying out an attack on the United States. Congressional and executive staffers, and even former members of Congress regularly leave government to lobby for these and other dictatorships. The Biden team has personally offered the House of Saud all manner of enticements over the last four years to play nice with Israel and to help control oil prices.
Some of the signatories themselves are less-than-hostile to foreign autocracies. Take Former Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the very first listed signatory: she was for years on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, one of whose top funders is the despotic and warmongering government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and spent years at Albright Stonebridge Group, which works to leverage former government connections to open doors for corporations in sometimes brutal autocracies like both the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Last year, another signatory, Caspian Policy Center Senior Fellow Eric Rudenshiold, was part of a delegation meeting with Azerbaijan’s government-owned Port of Baku to explore future business opportunities with the West, only a year after its authoritarian, election-rigging leader had ethnically cleansed and military retaken a contested territory from its neighbor, Armenia.
The Caspian Policy Center in general regularly meetswithAzerbaijani officials and facilitates their meetings with U.S counterparts to encourage deepening ties between the two governments, something it’s hard to believe would go by without an eyebrow being raised if they did the same with Syria or Russia.
You could go down the list and find other names with similar backgrounds.
Ironically, the one foreign authoritarian leader that Gabbard does have concretelinks to, and has been inarguably friendly with, is the one that goes unmentioned in both the letter and in most establishment criticism of Gabbard. That would be Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has been accused of inciting a deadly anti-Muslim pogrom and, as prime minister, has cracked down on press freedoms, civil liberties, and political opponents.
It’s all a reminder that the signatories don’t really oppose talking to “bad guys.” They are cynically using such rhetoric as cover for much narrower objections that include Gabbard’s past sins against the Democrats (endorsing Bernie Sanders in 2016 over Hillary Clinton, and leaving the party, calling it “an elitist cabal of warmongers,” in 2022), and her serving as a potential obstacle to maintaining a militarized posture against Russia and China and to the War Party itself in Washington, which has long enjoyed buy-in from both party elites.
Sadly, if Gabbard is voted down, her most likely replacement would not be someone with more consistent anti-war views than her — it would be someone with much more hawkish bonefides and much less likely to buck the system.
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