Former Israeli official Merav Ceren, who caused a stir when she was appointed in April to head of the Israel and Iran desk at Trump's National Security Council has lost her position in a agency-wide purge that left "scores" political appointees and career officials cleaning out their desks on Friday.
A former "national security fellow" at the pro-Israel Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Ceren had said on her resume that said she had previously served in a negotiating role for Israel’s Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories and Palestinian Authority officials. President Trump had called her a "patriotic American" when her posting was announced.
The rest of those relieved from duty are a mix of political appointees which will be left with no jobs, and career civil servants who had been attached to other agencies (typically, State Department and Pentagon) and will go back to posts at those departments. This all comes at the direction of Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State who has been assigned acting National Security Advisor (and head of NSC) in the wake of Mike Waltz's reassignment to the UN earlier this month.
Rubio has appointed Andy Baker (who works for Vice President JD Vance) and Robert Gabriel (who advises Trump) as his NSC deputies.
The Friday firings should come as no surprise as the administration has been signaling its desire to scale down the White House national security agency which critics say has become too bloated and unwieldy over recent years. The agency inherited from Biden stood at about 215 plus about 180 support staff. That is actually smaller than the Bush II/Obama years, which is when the protraction reportedly began — they had 204 and 222 respectively, according to the Washington Post. In his first term Trump had scaled down to 110 from the previous Obama term.
According to the Post, Trump is aiming to get back down to the Brent Scowcroft years (he served as National Security Advisor to Presidents Reagan and Bush I) and earlier, when NSC's were tight. The NSC is supposed to be "coordinating and implementing work originating in the departments and then ensuring the president’s decisions are implemented,” according to Alexander Gray, who worked in Trump's first NSC.
Instead the NSC has become its own policymaking power center in the Executive Branch and can been affected by career officials (and support staff) who have burrowed in from earlier administrations. Critics say the career officials can serve as very effective bureaucratic obstacles, especially when they carry conflicting political and foreign policy agendas into the new administration.
Trump's former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien (Trump had four NSAs in his first term) published an op-ed with Gray last month, which he told NPR was a catalyst for the purge. “We believe the NSC policy staff could be streamlined to 60 people, the same number of NSC staffers that President Dwight D. Eisenhower employed," they wrote. It would seem they are well on their way, and with one less former Israeli government official.
Top photo credit: Handout - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, left, speaks with U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine, Ret. General Keith Kellogg prior to their meeting, August 18, 2025 in Washington, D.C. Zelenskyy met with Kellogg before the planned meeting with President Donald Trump later in the day. Photo by Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via ABACAPRESS.COM
If Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky cannot agree in principle with the contours of a peace deal mapped out by President Trump, then the war will continue into 2026. I’d encourage him to take the deal, even if it may cause him to lose power.
The stakes couldn’t be higher ahead of the showdown in the Oval Office today between President Donald Trump and President Zelensky, supported by EU leaders and the Secretary General of NATO.
Following the Alaska Summit, President Trump has articulated the contours of a peace plan that he discussed with President Vladimir Putin. At stake, a long-overdue and much needed end to the blood-letting that has killed or injured one and a half million people so far across both sides.
Can the president get it over the line?
A reported key U.S. concession, hinted at by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, involves “game-changing” security guarantees for Ukraine that would have the effect of Article 5 coverage without membership of NATO. Zelensky has welcomed this concession and the European “coalition of the willing” issued a statement which “commended” President Trump’s concession on U.S. support.
But other aspects of the U.S. position will cause concern among the coalition and their transatlantic partners. Ahead of today’s meeting, President Trump has indicated that Ukraine won’t get back Crimea and won’t go into NATO. While the president’s pronouncements on the war have ebbed and flowed, on these two points he has remained consistent. He argued earlier this year that Ukraine should be prepared to recognize Russian occupation of Crimea. Right from the get go, the Trump administration has suggested that Ukraine’s NATO path is unrealistic.
What is different today is that the president has drawn this red line having eyeballed President Putin in Alaska and judged that the Russian position is not going to change. While those European leaders supporting President Zelensky at today’s meeting might press for a softening of this line, it seems, at this late stage, that Trump’s mind is made up.
In some ways the Crimea issue is the least problematic, as the draft Istanbul agreement of spring 2022 allowed for a dialogue about the future status of the peninsula. It also, of course, provided for Ukrainian neutrality and non-membership of NATO. However, after Boris Johnson and others encouraged Zelensky to keep fighting rather than accept the deal, Western leaders have dug in fixed positions on Ukraine’s supposed right to join the military alliance.
When it comes down to it, this war has always been a battle of wills between Russia on one side and the West about the continued eastern expansion of NATO.
If President Trump persuades Zelensky and European leaders into a deal that takes NATO off the table, even if security guarantees are included, it will represent a crushing embarrassment for the Western military alliance that accounts for 55% of global military spending. This will have long term political consequences for mainstream political parties in Europe who have pushed the NATO line to the hilt, and signed up to vast increases in military spending, at the expense of domestic spending priorities.
But I judge, in any case, that NATO is not the most contentious issue to be discussed today.
The biggest sticking point will undoubtedly be the suggestion that Ukraine give up its remaining foothold in Donetsk oblast in return for Russia vacating its much smaller footholds in Kharkiv and Sumy. On the surface, that does not appear a fair trade. Zelensky has flatly refused to concede territory. Ceding unconquered lands in the Donbas that the Ukrainian Army has defended valiantly and at great cost would represent an act of political suicide on his part.
At the start of this year, Zelensky’s election prospects hung in the balance, a commentator at the Kyiv School of Economics remarking that success was contingent upon “the exact terms of the ceasefire, namely, the public perception of them as a ‘victory,’ ‘honorable draw' or 'defeat.'"
Since then, more Ukrainian towns have been swallowed up by Russia’s advance. Few people would be able to see the loss of what is left as anything other than dishonorable defeat. Facing an already slim prospect of re-election as and when a post-war presidential plebiscite is held in Ukraine, this would almost certainly doom Zelensky to lose power.
The flip side, of course, is that one more year of war would take Russia much closer to the complete occupation of Donetsk oblast anyway. The only difference being that possibly hundreds of thousands of additional Ukrainian and Russian troops would die in the intervening period of bloody, attritional warfare.
The only scenarios in which that didn’t happen would be the involvement of European troops on the battlefield, the sudden implosion of Russia’s economy or a change of power in Moscow. While much discussed, none of these have ever looked remotely likely. So, the statesmanlike thing for Zelensky to do would be to look into the future, decide that the best interests in Ukraine lay in cutting his losses, and settle with peace based on concessions that may come at a heavy personal cost.
Having invested so much in supporting Zelensky, European leaders won’t want to see him fail. And yet there are costs to them too, in supporting him holding out for another year of war the outcome of which is increasingly predictable. As I have pointed out several times before, Europe cannot afford to keep funding the Ukrainian war effort.
If President Trump can align Europe around the need to bring this dreadful war to a close it will represent a monumental achievement on his part. The cold truth is that no one is winning here, not Russia, NATO and most definitely, not Ukraine.
Securing the peace is often tougher than prosecuting a war. In the best interests of his magnificent country, I would encourage Zelensky to take the deal.
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Top image credit: FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with Democratic Republic of the Congo's Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwanda's Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington D.C., June 27, 2025. REUTERS/Ken Cedeno/File Photo
On June 27, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, brokered by the United States. About a month later, on August 1, they agreed to a Regional Economic Integration Framework — another U.S.-brokered initiative linking the peace process to cross-border economic cooperation.
All of this has been heralded as a “historic turning point” that could end years of conflict in eastern Congo between the M23 rebel movement, backed by Rwanda, and the Congolese state.
But anyone who has followed the conflict in recent years knows this promise should be approached with great caution. Since the outbreak of the latest round in this decades-old conflict in November 2021, several peace initiatives have already been launched — all of which failed. They were accompanied by ambitious declarations, but also by structural mistrust, poor implementation, and military developments that outpaced diplomacy. The current peace agreement repeats a formula used in previous peace agreements: Rwanda is asked to withdraw its troops, while the DRC must take action against the FDLR rebels (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, heirs of the genocide perpetrators in Rwanda), a group Kigali sees as an existential threat.
A built-in stalemate?
A core flaw in the Washington deal is that many FDLR forces are located in M23-controlled territory. Neutralizing them would require — at least substantial — withdrawal from that territory by the M23, an act that would be political suicide for a Rwanda-backed group. Without credible incentives to give up hard-won ground, the M23 will not budge. For its part, Rwanda can refuse to withdraw its forces until the FDLR are eliminated, locking the process into a stalemate: Kinshasa cannot reach the FDLR without first dislodging M23, which refuses to move.
That leaves two politically impossible scenarios: M23 dismantles itself, or Kinshasa accepts permanent M23 control over part of its territory — an outcome equally unacceptable to the Congolese government.
Follow the money
If the political framework is shaky, the economic underpinnings are equally fraught. For Washington, the peace deal offers a gateway to Congo’s vast reserves of “critical minerals” essential for the global energy transition and high-tech industries — coltan, cobalt, copper, and lithium. It also offers a way to counter China’s dominance in the DRC’s mining sector.
For Kinshasa, the hope is that U.S. backing will bring investment and political support. Projects in the economic package include the Ruzizi III hydroelectric dam, shared with Rwanda and Burundi, and a $700 million investment to build a methane gas-to-electricity plant on Lake Kivu — led by U.S. firm Symbion Power. But the conflict has stalled the latter, and no construction has begun.
U.S. companies have already moved to secure stakes. Soon after the Washington deal was sealed, KoBold Metals — backed by Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates — signed an exploration pact with the Congolese government, allowing the company to apply for exploration permits in Congo covering more than 1,600 square kilometers, and to develop (part) of a lithium mine in Manono. But KoBold has been tied up in international arbitration with an Australian company, AVZ, since 2023, with AVZ arguing that the U.S. deal violates an international arbitration order.
These moves reveal the deeper reality: Congolese minerals are more than ever a geopolitical battleground, and the U.S. is leveraging the peace process to advance its strategic interests.
Will investment bring peace?
The theory underlying the Washington deal is that big-ticket investments will drive local development and, in turn, promote peace. In practice, the risks are high in the DRC: weak governance, poor infrastructure, insecurity in mining zones, and the long timelines from contract to production. U.S. firms also face costly environmental and governance requirements. Even in the best-case scenario, major projects are unlikely to deliver tangible benefits before 2028 — the presumed expiration of the current terms held by President Donald Trump’s and his Congolese counterpart, Felix Tshisekedi.
In the meantime, the June 27 deal looks less like a genuine peace accord and more like a stability pact — a diplomatic cooling mechanism to secure access to resources. It risks leaving the structural drivers of conflict untouched while legitimizing a status quo of fragmented control.
M23 and its incentives
A critical flaw of the Washington deal is that it sidelines M23 — the rebel group that has gained control of much of eastern Congo and that is central to any durable peace. While Rwanda denies supporting the group, U.N. reports repeatedly document that M23’s military gains have relied on Rwandan Defense Forces. Yet the June 27 agreement focuses almost exclusively on Rwanda withdrawing troops and Kinshasa neutralizing the FDLR, leaving M23’s cooperation largely unaddressed.
Separately, negotiations have been ongoing between the Kinshasa government and M23 — which was not involved in the U.S. peace deal. On July 19, Kinshasa and the M23/AFC signed a declaration of principles that began with a ceasefire pledge. Direct talks were expected to begin no later than August 8, accompanied by a number of confidence-building measures, including the release of prisoners.
Neither the Washington deal nor the Qatari agreement between the M23 and Kinshasa have had much effect on the ground. Directly after the signing of the U.S. peace deal, the M23 spokesperson clearly said it wasn’t going anywhere. The group since has repeatedly asserted that it wants to transform the Congolese state into a federal system, in which it would govern its territories autonomously. Moreover, M23 forces have continued killing civilians: the U.N. human rights office has documented how the rebel group, aided by members of the Rwandan army, killed at least 319 civilians between July 9 and 21 in the North Kivu region — most of these local farmers camping in their fields during the planting season. In the last week, fighting between government-affiliated militias — the “Wazalendo” — and M23 intensified.
Political breathing room for Tshisekedi
For now, the deal has already eased political pressure on Congolese President Tshisekedi. A new government has been formed, but, despite promises of inclusivity, no major opposition figures have joined. Many demanded a national dialogue mediated by Congo’s Catholic and Protestant churches — a demand that has been ignored.
Kinshasa has yet to approve the peace deal in parliament. Civil society has been shut out entirely, reinforcing the perception that the process is an elite bargain between political and military actors from which the Congolese public has been excluded. This lack of inclusivity raises a more fundamental concern: even if the ink on the agreement is fresh, the underlying drivers of the conflict remain largely untouched.
The regional wild card
The deal also skirts the interests of other regional players that profit from Congo’s instability. Uganda, for example, was not part of the negotiations but controls territory in eastern DRC. In 2024, estimates from Uganda’s central bank show how the country exported nearly $3.5 billion worth of gold, much of it believed to have been illicitly sourced from Congo. Rwanda’s own gold exports, estimated at $1.5 billion in 2024, are similarly linked to smuggling from the DRC. For both countries, the spoils of war may outweigh the uncertain benefits of U.S.-brokered economic projects.
A fragile deal in service of bigger agendas
The Congo-Rwanda agreement has been packaged as a breakthrough, but its design raises a number of questions. It hinges on conditions that are hard to reach for both sides, and it leans on economic incentives that may take years to materialize.
Still, it is the most substantive initiative currently on the table — and in a conflict as entrenched as this one, even a flawed process is better than none. It deserves support, if only because it keeps channels open and tempers the risk of wider escalation.
That support must go beyond resource-driven projects. The U.S. administration should be willing to invest not only in economic incentives but also in sustained political engagement — putting its weight behind the Doha process with M23 and committing diplomatic bandwidth to ensure the June 27 agreement is implemented and monitored. Without that, the deal risks drifting into irrelevance, leaving the people of eastern Congo once again waiting for a peace that never arrives.
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Top photo credit: Secretary Marco Rubio is interviewed by Lara Trump at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., July 21, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)
These congressionally mandated reports are usually published in early spring about the events of the previous year. In addition to the significant lag in their release, the 2024 reports are drastically shorter and cover a much narrower range of human rights abuses than in previous years. They no longer include prison conditions and detention centers, civil liberties violations, or rampant corruption.
Moreover the State Department has dropped sections on abuses of women and no longer documents crimes such as rape, female genital mutilation, sexual exploitation of children, and infanticide, nor abuses against vulnerable populations like LGBTQ individuals and the disabled.
In particular, the administration has intentionally obscured horrific human rights abuses by countries like Israel and El Salvador — the 2023 report on Israel-Palestine was 103 pages, the 2024 report is a mere nine pages, and stresses crimes committed by Hamas while largely ignoring those committed by Israel.
For example, the 2023 report on El Salvador described the country’s “harsh and life-threatening prison conditions,” while no such section exists in the 2024 reports. Not surprisingly, that is where the Trump Administrationhas been deporting migrants for incarceration. Meanwhile, countries that previously had minor human rights infractions, such as the UK and Germany, came in for particular criticism under the current administration’s emphasis on alleged violations of freedom of expression, in particular restrictions placed on far-right groups.
By slashing the reports themselves, as well as eliminating the bureau responsible for producing them, the Trump administration has signaled to the world that it does not care about human rights. This is likely to be interpreted by countries around the world, whether U.S. partners like Israel and Egypt, or adversaries like China and Russia, as signaling that they can abuse their populations with impunity.
Members of the Democratic establishment have criticized Trump’s disregard for human rights, as embodied by these reports. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, told the Washington Post, “These reports are required by law to ensure American taxpayer dollars do not support autocrats who violate the rights of their citizens.” This conveniently ignores the fact that under Biden and all previous U.S. presidents, the U.S. has sent tax dollars to support countless autocrats who violate their people’s human rights.
The original purpose of the reports was to determine a country’s eligibility for receiving U.S. security assistance , although this original intent has never been fulfilled. Although Trump blatantly disregards human rights, I fear that, in contrast, a narrative is already taking shape that the Biden administration put human rights at the center of its foreign policy, as Biden pledged to do upon taking office. It very clearly did not.
I worked on the Human Rights Reports under Biden, specifically in the office focused on human rights in the Middle East, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, that Trump subsequently dismantled. I have written previously about the frustration of trying to advocate for human rights within the U.S. government, where such considerations have rarely driven policy outcomes and instead were primarily used as a cudgel to punish countries the U.S. already considered adversaries, from Russia and China to Iran and Cuba.
While these governments certainly engage in gross violations of their citizens’ human rights, the U.S. uses these crimes to justify sanctions and a range of other punishments, while similar abuses committed by U.S. partners do not motivate similar punitive measures.
My office’s already challenging mission to promote human rights became essentially impossible after October 7, 2023, as the U.S. aided and abetted Israel’s collective punishment against the Palestinian people, including blockading aid, bombing of hospitals and shelters, and killing of tens of thousands of civilians. Any time that our office tried to scold Arab governments for imprisoning dissidents or intimidating journalists, they asked how we could criticize them, given what we were enabling Israel to do in Gaza. The Biden administration’s hypocrisy on human rights was rank — in particular, its strenuous emphasis on the human rights of Ukrainians but complete disregard for those of Palestinians.
In the end, I do not know which approach is more destructive to the cause of protecting human rights: the Biden administration’s selective and therefore hypocritical prioritization of some people’s rights and not others, or the Trump administration’s near total disregard for human rights.
For many people around the world who have long chafed at America’s self- righteousness in the human rights sphere, Trump’s bald indifference will feel, at the very least, more honestly reflective of America’s real policies.
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