Follow us on social

MEK’s shadow in European Parliament

MEK’s shadow in European Parliament

The controversial and aging exiled Iranian opposition is working to gain influence in Brussels

Analysis | Europe

While former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo were heaping praise on the Mojahedin-e Khalq (the People’s Mojahedin) at the group’s annual gathering in Paris in early July, the controversial and aging exiled Iranian opposition group was making similar advances in nearby Brussels.

The conservative Spanish politician Javier Zarzalejos, a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), the main center-right group in the European Parliament, was elected chair of the EP’s powerful Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). LIBE is one of the most influential bodies in the assembly as it shapes the EU’s legislation in such sensitive areas as migration, counterterrorism, and foreign interference, among others.

What is less well known is that in the outgoing legislature (2019-2024), Zarzalejos served as the chair of the Friends of Free Iran (FoFI), a cross-party grouping of parliamentarians who support the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the MEK’s umbrella organization. Zarzalejos is also the director of the neoconservative Madrid-based Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies (FAES), a think tank closely linked to former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar.

FoFI does not appear to have a website. On its X profile, it claims to enjoy “an active support of many MEPs from all political groups,” yet it wouldn’t disclose the list of its members. In fact, the group’s activities suggest that platforming NCRI leader Maryam Rajavi in Brussels and Strasbourg may be the only reason for its existence.

These pro-MEK activities, consisting of calls for regime change in Iran and promotion of NCRI/MEK as the legitimate alternative to the current government led Tehran to place FoFi, Zarzalejos, and a few other associated parliamentarians on its sanctions list in October 2022. In retaliation, the European Parliament declared that it won’t engage any longer with the “Iranian authorities.”

The MEK, described by a range of expert observers from the State Department to the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute as “cult-like” or a “cult” centered around Rajavi and her late husband, has a long history of terrorist activity directed at westerners in Iran such that it earned a place on the U.S. and EU lists of terrorist organizations.

That the MEK was removed from those lists (in 2012 and in 2009 respectively) after a well-funded lobbying effort on its behalf, does not exonerate the group’s terrorist past, its bizarre internal practices, and human rights abuses that have been well-documented by institutions, including Human Rights Watch and the RAND Corporation, among others.

For someone like Zarzalejos to promote the MEK is even more peculiar given his close relationship to Aznar, one of the key promoters of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq where the group was known for its service to Saddam Hussein.

But the drive for regime change in Iran apparently trumps consistency: Aznar himself addressed the MEK convention in 2010, as did scores of other cheerleaders for the Iraq war, starting with former U.S. national security adviser John Bolton, who was fired by ex-president Donald Trump for excessive hawkishness.

Not only should the MEK’s past record be a red flag for any politician claiming to uphold civil liberties, but its present activities have invited increased scrutiny, particularly in the context of heightened concerns over illicit attempts at interference in democratic processes in the U.S. and EU.

Last year, the European Parliament adopted a report on foreign interference in which it noted that the “extra-EU funding of political activities and politicians in the EU puts at risk the integrity of the democratic functioning of the EU Member States and requires thorough investigations to hold those complicit accountable.”

In that context, the role of the NCRI/MEK was highlighted, in particular its funding of the far-right Spanish party Vox as revealed by the Spanish newspaper El Pais. That may well be only the tip of the iceberg, as the MEK is known to pay lavish sums without disclosing the sources of its funding to former and present Western politicians to burnish its credentials.

Interestingly, the report was authored by Sandra Kalniete from Latvia, a fellow conservative from Zarzalejos’ EPP. But that report apparently didn’t persuade him to cut his ties to the MEK. In January 2024, he chaired a meeting in the European Parliament with an ex-parliamentarian, Struan Stevenson, known for his staunch support of the NCRI, and a member of the NCRI’s so-called foreign affairs committee, Farzin Hashemi. That meeting featured the presentation of a “report” on Iran’s nefarious influence networks in Europe, which consisted of thoroughly debunked smears against a group of Western academics with Iranian backgrounds targeted for their work by Iran International and Semafor.

Three months later, Zarzalejos, without mentioning the NCRI/MEK explicitly, repeated the group’s talking points by characterizing Iran as an “apocalyptic theocracy” and urging the EU to support the opposition “instead of echoing the defamation campaigns originating in the Iranian theocracy.”

Given the opacity surrounding FoFI’s membership, it is not clear whether Zarzalejos remains its chair in the new legislature. There can be no reasonable doubt, however, that, as the examples above show, his links to the organization are recent enough to suggest a potential conflict of interest. On the one hand, Zarzalejos’ new position requires him to fight against malign foreign interference in the European Parliament. On the other hand, he has long been a champion of the NCRI/MEK which the EP itself has explicitly identified as an example of malign foreign interference.

That Zarzalejos’ election didn’t attract much attention may be explained by the fact that the media spotlight was focused on a far bigger scandal: the election of Charlie Weimers of the far-right Sweden Democrats — a party founded with neo-Nazi roots — as a vice-chair of the LIBE committee. Weimers happens to be another staunch foe of the Iranian government, and, like Zarzalejos, is on Tehran’s sanctions list, although he is known to support the son of the deposed shah, Reza Pahlavi, rather than Rajavi and the MEK.

That, however, may be a distinction without a difference: Pahlavi made clear his disdain for democracy by referring to it as an “inauthentic Western construct” at a recent national conservatism conference in Washington. What really matters is how European politicians endorsing undemocratic foreign figures like Rajavi and Pahlavi end up being in positions tasked with safeguarding civil liberties and democratic integrity in the EU.

Ultimately, such personalities are only likely to further highlight the irrelevance of the European Parliament in EU foreign policymaking. The EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, is sending the European External Action Service political director and the EU’s chief nuclear negotiator Enrique Mora to the inauguration of newly-elected Iranian president Massoud Pezeshkian in Tehran early next month.

FoFI has predictably slammed the move but can’t stop it. There is an appetite in European capitals to at least test diplomacy with the new reformist administration in Tehran. That is not to say, however, that the activities of the MEK and its supporters in Western legislatures are completely harmless. To the contrary, they not only create a negative climate for diplomacy with Iran, but by embracing and normalizing non-transparent actors with destructive agendas, they also contribute to eroding the integrity of democratic systems.


London, UK – October 20 2018: Protestors linked to the Iranian group Mojahedin-e Khalq demonstrate in Whitehall, near the entrance to Downing Street (Photo: Dominic Dudley/shutterstock)

Analysis | Europe
Trump and Keith Kellogg
Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump and Keith Kellogg (now Trump's Ukraine envoy) in 2017. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Trump's silence on loss of Ukraine lithium territory speaks volumes

Europe

Last week, Russian military forces seized a valuable lithium field in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, the latest success of Moscow’s grinding summer offensive.

The lithium deposit in question is considered rather small by industry analysts, but is said to be a desirable prize nonetheless due to the concentration and high-quality of its ore. In other words, it is just the kind of asset that the Trump administration seemed eager to exploit when it signed its much heralded minerals agreement with Ukraine earlier this year.

keep readingShow less
Is the US now funding the bloodbath at Gaza aid centers?
Top photo credit: Palestinians walk to collect aid supplies from the U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 29, 2025. REUTERS/Hatem Khaled/File Photo

Is the US now funding the bloodbath at Gaza aid centers?

Middle East

Many human rights organizations say it should shut down. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have killed hundreds of Palestinians at or around its aid centers. And yet, the U.S. has committed no less than $30 million toward the controversial, Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF).

As famine-like conditions grip Gaza, the GHF says it has given over 50 million meals to Palestinians at its four aid centers in central and southern Gaza Strip since late May. These centers are operated by armed U.S. private contractors, and secured by IDF forces present at or near them.

keep readingShow less
mali
Heads of state of Mali, Assimi Goita, Niger, General Abdourahamane Tiani and Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, pose for photographs during the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger July 6, 2024. REUTERS/Mahamadou Hamidou//File Photo

Post-coup juntas across the Sahel face serious crises

Africa

In Mali, General Assimi Goïta, who took power in a 2020 coup, now plans to remain in power through at least the end of this decade, as do his counterparts in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. As long-ruling juntas consolidate power in national capitals, much of the Sahelian terrain remains out of government control.

Recent attacks on government security forces in Djibo (Burkina Faso), Timbuktu (Mali), and Eknewane (Niger) have all underscored the depth of the insecurity. The Sahelian governments face a powerful threat from jihadist forces in two organizations, Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims, JNIM, which is part of al-Qaida) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). The Sahelian governments also face conventional rebel challengers and interact, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in tension, with various vigilantes and community-based armed groups.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.