Iran's political factions divided over future of nuclear  program

On August 28, the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) set the clock ticking, triggering the snapback mechanism and warning Iran that it must show meaningful progress on nuclear diplomacy within 30 days or face the return of pre-2015 U.N. sanctions.

Coming after Israel and the United States attacked Iran, hitting nuclear facilities and infrastructure and assassinating senior Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) officers and nuclear scientists, the EU’s decision has raised the stakes immeasurably.

It also comes as President Trump declared Iran should not engage in uranium enrichment. But the issue is not simply one of centrifuges and international inspection protocols to monitor Iran’s compliance. It is whether the Islamic Republic can reconcile its ideological posture with the need to survive.

The debate inside Tehran is now sharper than at any point since the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 when U.S. President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions. At one end stands President Masoud Pezeshkian urging pragmatic engagement. At the other, the hardline bloc associated with Keyhan newspaper in demanding escalation. Above them, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sets the limits, allowing neither surrender nor uncontrolled confrontation.

Pezeshkian is keenly aware that confrontation with the United States will not serve Iran. He is also aware that he would be signing the end of his political career if he capitulated to U.S. pressure to abandon Tehran’s nuclear program. This is a tough balancing act. After U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in June, Pezeshkian’s government suspended cooperation with the IAEA by banning international inspections at nuclear facilities. This was a defiant act, meant to show Iran would not be bullied. Yet Pezeshkian’s tone in other moments has been pointedly different, revealing a realistic assessment of his options. “If we rebuild the nuclear facilities, they are going to attack them again,” he said last month before asking the obvious question directed at hardliners who reject diplomacy: “What can we do if we do not enter negotiations?”

Pezeshkian’s reformist base has gone even further. In a controversial statement, the Reform Front urged Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment voluntarily to prevent snapback and the economic collapse that would likely follow. Iranian outlets carried the call, which was immediately condemned as treachery by hardliners

In a rare public statement, former President Hasan Rouhani, expressed hope that Iran could still convince European signatories to JCPOA to remove snapback from the U.N. Security Council agenda, although he did not say how. Rouhani made it clear that snapback will be very costly for Iran, and pleaded with JCPOA critics to stop censoring the deal.

Keyhan, the hardliners’ mouthpiece, has been adamant that Iran must not retreat, but instead rely on threats that force others to step back. They have called for Iran’s exit from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Such moves, of course, would escalate the crisis deliberately and increase incentives for building a nuclear bomb. For this faction, which includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, compromise is a slippery slope. Better to endure sanctions, and possibly another round of confrontation with Israel and the United States, than surrender sovereignty.

Khamenei hovers uneasily over the two camps, which might explain his often contradictory statements. He has described the nuclear issue with the U.S. as “unsolvable” and dismissed direct dialogue as superficial. Yet, in the same week he defended Pezeshkian from criticism, urging Iranians to support “those who serve the nation, especially the president, who is hardworking and persistent.” The balance is revealing, he will not permit surrender and sees the pragmatists as useful in breaking out of this quandary.

Outside powers complicate the equation. Russia and China opposed the E3 decision but they cannot block snapback; instead, they may simply refuse to enforce sanctions, dulling the economic impact on Iran. Tehran may be encouraged by that. But this would offer only partial relief; while significant, they can’t substitute for access to global markets.

Russian officials have openly called the E3 move “illegitimate,” with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warning it will inflict additional damage to confidence in international mechanisms. For its part, China’s foreign ministry described the decision as “irresponsible” and signaled that Beijing would not cooperate with enforcement. Official Iranian outlets, such as Tasnim and Fars, have amplified these statements, presenting Moscow and Beijing as bulwarks against Western pressure. Yet Iranian economists caution that Russian and Chinese non-compliance cannot compensate for the loss of European markets or access to global banking. The IMF projects Iran’s economy to grow only 0.6% in 2025, the lowest in the Middle East except for war-ravaged Syria and Lebanon.

Israel, meanwhile, has wasted no time. It is lobbying Washington to act again, urging the U.S. not to relent on its “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Defense Minister Israel Katz warned bluntly that Israel would strike if threatened. With the 30-day deadline looming, delay in Tehran’s response to the E3 to restore trust will be read in Tel Aviv as a green light for renewed bombing. The lesson of June, that Iran’s nuclear program can be struck and set back overnight, likely informs Israeli calculations.

All hope seems to rest on Pezeshkian’s ability to navigate this maze and somehow secure the approval of the Supreme Leader to find a compromise. His mission would be to match national pride with pragmatism: preserve the right to enrich, but cap levels and accept inspections that reassure Europe and lower the risk of further strikes. Khamenei has done this before, dressing compromise in revolutionary terms as “heroic flexibility.” He may do so again to prevent the greater danger of collapse. It may be that Rouhani’s comments were aimed for the ear of the Supreme Leader so that he reins in the hardliners.

Ordinary Iranians, meanwhile, are showing signs of war weariness. Sporadic local protests over basic needs have become commonplace. Surveys published last month by the Iranian Students Polling Agency suggest that over 70 percent of Iranians prioritize economic stability over nuclear advancement, further evidence that the public mood is shifting. This underlines Pezeshkian’s dilemma: his push for negotiations is not only a diplomatic calculation, but also a response to the mounting fatigue of a society unwilling to carry the costs of perpetual confrontation.

Without a compromise within the coming weeks, the consequences could be devastating. The return of sanctions will likely crush what remains of Iran’s economic resilience. The IRGC may be willing to fight on, but ordinary Iranians have demonstrated they do not wish to be sacrificed at the altar of ideology. Without a quick response to stop the clock, Israel will view Tehran’s inaction as a license to strike again. The regime will face what it has feared most: a challenge not to its centrifuges, but to its very survival.