Neocons pushing President Trump to abandon negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and instead prioritize military action apparently have a heavy hitter in their corner: Republican Party king-maker Rupert Murdoch.
The battle between Trump’s MAGA loyalists and the neocons over war with Iran intensified last week when right-wing media star Tucker Carlson railed against conservative talk show host Mark Levin for continuing to push the president to attack Iran instead of making a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program.
Politico reported on Tuesday that Carlson’s attack on Levin came after he was tipped off that during a private lunch with Trump at the White House hours prior, Levin was urging the president “to allow the Israeli government to strike Iranian nuclear sites.”
While the New York Post — one of the crown jewels of Murdoch’s media empire — has been targeting Trump’s top Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff over his talks with Iran, the Politico report adds that the Fox News chairman’s role in the campaign to get Trump to back off seeking a nuclear deal is much more involved.
Murdoch has apparently “privately complained to confidants about Witkoff’s efforts” and one source close to Trump said that “Levin and Murdoch are all over Trump all the time.” But the source said that the lobbying “might actually hurt their case,” adding, “[o]nce he’s kind of made his mind up, you can come at it later from a different angle, but you keep pressing, he digs in.”
Meanwhile, according to Politico, other Trump aides are concerned that those advocating against a deal or pushing for war can have influence on the president:
Still, even among those pressing for diplomacy, there is concern about the president’s penchant for changing his mind depending on who he’s last spoken to. There’s a fear Trump — who has threatened to bomb Iran if they don’t come to heel — could act on rhetoric many largely deem negotiating bravado.
“[Trump is] very solid in what he wants and letting Witkoff do his thing,” said one person close to the talks. “But depending on who he hears from, he may move a little bit.”
Ultimately “a longtime Trump ally” says the president “is not going to support war” with Iran. “But I’m telling you,” the ally said, “these guys won’t take no for an answer.”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top image credit: Business magnate Rupert Murdoch watches as United States President Donald J Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, February 3, 2025. Credit: Chris Kleponis / Pool/Sipa USA VIA REUTERS
Top photo credit: U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee visits the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest prayer site, in Jerusalem's Old City, April 18, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun
As the Trump administration continues to try to broker a nuclear deal with Iran, Israel’s president Benjamin Netanyahu has not been a willing partner in those efforts.
The two spoke Monday evening, but Israel’s government has threatened strikes on Iran that could upend a deal. When Trump bypassedIsrael on his Middle East trip last month, many saw it as a snub to Netanyahu.
Trump appears eager for some sort of deal, whether Israel’s current government likes it or not.
So why would the U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee expend energy (and taxpayer resources) talking to Netanyahu’s anti-Iran, hardline coalition members to ensure they keep don’t jump ship, threatening his government and power?
According to The Times of Israel on Tuesday, Huckabee met with ultra-Orthodox Haredi members of the coalition in the Knesset who have threatened to dissolve the government. These members have said they might leave Netnayahu’s coalition over the lack of an exemption to the draft for members of its community.
Huckabee reportedly told the group, "Government stability is important for addressing the Iranian issue.” It was not clear why Netanyahu's political survival would be important when it came to Iran.
Huckabee also reportedly told the Knesset group, "it would be difficult for the U.S. to back Israel if elections are held now.”
It is not exactly clear what Huckabee meant in saying this, as if U.S. support for the country was contingent upon who wins its elections.
Huckabee also said Tuesday that the U.S. no longer supports establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank, saying there’s “no room for it” and that it will likely not occur “in our lifetime.” This is also the long held position of Israel’s president, but not an official U.S. one.
Moreover, President Trump, Huckabee’s boss, has not been as clear as his ambassador appeared to be Tuesday on the issue of a Palestinian state.
Huckabee denies injecting himself into Israel’s internal politics, which would be a peculiar move for a U.S. official in the midst of his own country’s delicate diplomacy with an Israeli adversary.
“The report also said it was not clear if Huckabee was acting under U.S. President Donald Trump’s instructions or on his own initiative," the Israel Times report said, referring to Channel 13 in Israel, which broke the initial story on Huckabee's talk with the Haredi, "adding that Netanyahu was aware of the U.S. envoy’s outreach and pleased by it.”
Huckabee is an avowed Christian Zionist who has said in the past that there is no such thing is a Palestinian. But he now represents the policies of the president and the United States, not any other state or its government.
Opposition Leader Yair Lapid pondered the same observation, saying he hoped the report was not correct.
“Since I have no doubt that Ambassador Huckabee respects Israel’s independence and its democracy, I hope and believe that the report that he is interfering in Israel’s internal politics and trying to help Netanyahu [deal with] the ultra-Orthodox in the military draft law crisis are not true," Lapid shared on X. "Israel is not a protectorate.”
Huckabee attempted to clarify later Tuesday that he was not interfering. “There has been no attempt to influence Haredi Knesset members regarding a decision to dissolve the government,” Huckabee wrote on X. “I have repeatedly said in private conversations that it is not the role of the United States, nor of its Ambassador, to try and choose the government of Israel.”
Lapid shared the ambassador’s post, adding, “We are grateful to Ambassador Huckabee for this important statement that he has not, and will not, get involved in the coalition crisis here in Israel.”
But if the report is credible, Lapid had good reason to be skeptical of Huckabee’s non-intervention and impartiality claims.
So might President Trump.
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Top image credit: EVERETT (WA), USA – JANUARY 30 2015: Unidentified Boeing employees continue work building its latest Boeing 777 jets at its Everett factory (First Class Photography / Shutterstock.com)
As the U.S. and Iran engage in fraught rounds of nuclear talks, deep distrust, past failures, and mounting pressure from opponents continue to hinder progress. Washington has reverted to its old zero-enrichment stance, a policy that, in 2010, led Iran to increase uranium enrichment from under 5% to 20%. Tehran remains equally entrenched, insisting, “No enrichment, no deal, No nuclear weapons, we have a deal.”
In Washington, the instinct is to tighten the screws on Tehran, make military threats credible, and explore strike options to force capitulation. Yet history shows that these coercive tactics often fail. Sanctions have not secured compliance and have proven costly to U.S. interests. Military strikes are unlikely to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities; instead, they risk convincing Tehran to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.
Breaking this impasse requires a strategic pivot from punishment to pragmatic economic engagement. Economic incentives are not rewards; they are essential diplomatic tools. By directly linking benefits to verified nuclear compliance, Washington can foster real cooperation and strengthen U.S. security. And it would be a real boon for both U.S. and Iran markets, which have been closed off from each other for decades.
The limits of sanctions-only diplomacy
The sanctions-first strategy sought to convert foreign economic pressure into domestic political upheaval, forcing political capitulation. In reality, sanctions have impoverished ordinary Iranians without significantly altering the regime’s calculus. Rather than capitulation, Iran has advanced its nuclear capabilities and developed a sophisticated sanctions-evasion network.
Despite significant economic hardship, Iran has maintained a modest annual economic growth rate of 4% since 2020. However, this growth conceals more profound economic challenges. Persistent inflation ranging from 30% to 40% and budget deficits between 20% and 25% have forced the government into unsustainable financial practices, such as printing money and imposing heavy taxes on the private sector, which worsen the country’s ongoing stagflation. Although sitting on some of the world’s largest energy reserves, Iran struggles with significant energy inefficiencies and shortages due to a lack of investment.
With no viable domestic political backlash, Iran’s leadership prefers “resistance” to capitulation with no payoff, calculating it can outlast sanctions as long as no real benefits are on offer. To change this calculation, the U.S. must offer targeted economic advantages to Iranian elites and citizens, creating domestic pressure for compliance and coexistence. This does not mean abandoning sanctions or rewarding adversarial behavior; rather, it involves strategically linking economic gains to verified nuclear restrictions.
By clearly tying diplomatic compliance to tangible economic improvements, Washington can build powerful constituencies in both countries committed to preserving the deal. I explain this in a new brief for the Quincy Institute entitled, "The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal."
Economic engagement as a catalyst for change
A growing number of Iranian elites now believe that unlocking Iran’s geo-economic potential and addressing escalating economic challenges hinges on the U.S. economic engagement. While military-linked hardliners resist any economic ties with America, most elites have reluctantly recognized that even under a JCPOA-like deal, partnerships with non-U.S. economies remain fragile without U.S. involvement.
Hardliners understand that greater openness would erode the power of military-linked conglomerates and undermine the rationale of economic militarization. Meanwhile, moderates acknowledge that Iran’s economy requires a durable deal that includes strong American constituencies with vested interests in maintaining sanctions relief.
Targeted economic incentives could deepen these elite divisions and pressure Tehran toward compliance.
A flexible, incentive-driven framework
A practical step includes launching an economic dialogue parallel to the technical nuclear discussions to explore options for selectively opening Iran’s substantial consumer market to American businesses. Even without fully repealing primary sanctions laws, President Trump can selectively license up to $25 billion in annual U.S. exports and enable U.S.-owned subsidiaries to engage with up to $4 trillion in untapped Iranian investment opportunities by 2040.
Licensing up to $25 billion annually in U.S. exports, particularly in aviation, agriculture, and automobiles, could create and sustain over 200,000 American jobs each year. Beyond this $25 billion export figure, Iran needs to immediately import approximately $180 billion worth of equipment and machinery to renovate just 30 percent of its outdated industrial base, $50 to $60 billion to expand and upgrade its electric transmission and distribution systems, and another $60 billion to modernize and expand its rail network. If permitted, these imports could be sourced primarily from the U.S. market.
Facilitating these exchanges provides durable incentives for both sides. Reinstating Boeing deals could revitalize manufacturing hubs in Washington and South Carolina. Similarly, American farmers, especially in the Midwest, would directly benefit from increased agricultural exports to Iran, where billions of dollars’ worth of staple commodities such as soybeans and corn are consistently imported.
Beyond immediate trade benefits, Washington can authorize a new General License H, providing a five-year window for U.S.-owned subsidiaries to operate in Iran’s designated sectors. With the largest untapped market in the Middle East, without sanctions, Iran could add $600 billion to $1 trillion in GDP by 2040. Meeting these goals requires $2.3 to $4 trillion in capital by 2040. Allowing indirect American investments, without repealing primary sanctions laws, provides a pragmatic, politically feasible pathway to integrate Iran’s economy into a broader regional economic network. As the payback period for most Iranian projects with a high return rate is less than five years, if compliance endures, it can be extended or evolve into permanent relief. It gives U.S. businesses a foothold while preserving leverage.
Engaging regional partners such as Saudi, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE to participate in joint ventures with American subsidiaries could further amplify the deal’s economic and geopolitical benefits. This regional economic cooperation would bolster stability across the Persian Gulf and raise Iran's costs if it breaches compliance terms, significantly strengthening diplomatic leverage.
A dynamic “snap-forward” mechanism could also be introduced, allowing Iran’s economic openings to accelerate as Tehran demonstrates sustained compliance and cooperation. This incentive-driven approach contrasts sharply with the reactive, punitive “snap-back” sanctions of previous agreements, creating a positive, mutually reinforcing cycle of compliance and reward.
Anchoring nuclear diplomacy in economic incentives offers U.S. policymakers a chance to achieve security goals that decades of coercion alone have failed to deliver. When tied to verifiable compliance, economic benefits become powerful leverage to force sustained Iranian compliance. Now, Washington faces a choice: double down on a sanctions-driven strategy with a track record of failure, or embrace a smarter, incentive-based policy that brings nuclear security, regional stability, and economic gains for American workers.
It’s time to recognize the limits of sanctions-only diplomacy and prioritize economic engagement as the foundation of a more effective Iran strategy for lasting security and diplomatic stability.
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Top photo credit: A cover dance band performs during an event devoted to the Spring Festival, at a shopping mall in Khimki, on the outskirts of Moscow, Russia, February 10, 2024. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov
Russia is no stranger to costly, grinding wars. Soviet authorities made a point of allowing the performing arts to continue during the 872-day battle for Leningrad during World War II, widely considered the bloodiest siege in history.
Thousands of displaced and starving locals flocked to the Mariinsky, Komissarzhevskaya, and other theaters to the unrelenting hum of shelling and air raid sirens. The 1942 Leningrad premiere of Shostakovich's Seventh Symphony stands as both a singular cultural achievement and a grim reminder of Russian tenacity in the face of unspeakable hardship.
The situation today is very far removed from the horrors of the Eastern Front. I found nary a hint after spending over a week in Moscow that I am in a country prosecuting the largest and most destructive war in Europe since 1945. Business is booming. Previously vacant storefronts in Moscow’s luxury GUM department store and the city’s many other shopping malls are, for the most part, reoccupied by Chinese companies and multibrand stores selling the same Western high-end products that continue to flood into Moscow through countless parallel import schemes that have proven highly lucrative for Russia’s neighbors.
It was striking how convincingly Chinese car manufacturers have tightened their grip over the Russian market. “What, did you expect us to walk?” one of my interlocutors said, perhaps sensing my incredulity. “We have to drive something.” Yet German cars remain a clear status symbol for well-off Russians — one can find far more Mercedes and Maybach makes on the streets of Moscow than in Washington, D.C.
It is true the city is peppered with military recruitment posters, but this, too, is a remarkable testament to the normalcy the Kremlin has been able to maintain over three years into this war. Russian President Vladimir Putin resisted calls from Moscow’s hardliners — more on them shortly — to pursue full-scale wartime mobilization, instead creating a soft semi-mobilization model that draws large numbers of contract soldiers with generous compensation and benefits packages.
The government enjoys popular confidence, stemming in no small part from its effective handling of the economy. It is shocking to the Western imagination that, even amidst this war and the many personal tragedies that come with it, there is a sense among the people I spoke to that the post-1999 Russian Federation is the most stable, comfortable iteration of Russia in recent and even distant memory.
The rhythm of Moscow life is dictated by an insatiable hunger for upward mobility and ever-greater consumption — there is a brazenly capitalistic quality to it all that would take many Americans, let alone our more staid Western European friends, by surprise. Russians generally still do see themselves as Europeans and as part of a broader Western civilizational inheritance, but there is a realization that must have crept in somewhere between 20,000 sanctions imposed since 2014 that life will go on with this conflict in the background and without the West, even if the vast majority of Russians strongly prefer to be part of a common Western commercial and cultural space.
I came away from my contacts with the Moscow elite, including officials, with the conclusion that there are two broad camps in Russia. Most elites are what I would describe as situational pragmatists. These aren’t people who would give away the farm for a peace deal, but they are well aware of the long-term costs of prosecuting this war — including a deepening dependence on China that far from everyone in Moscow is comfortable with.
They are also cautiously interested in working with the Trump administration on a settlement that doesn’t just end the war but potentially addresses a broader constellation of issues in the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West.
Then there is a smaller faction of hardliners who treat this war not as an arena for resolving larger strategic issues between Russia and the West but as a bilateral conflict wherein Moscow’s goal is simply to crush Ukraine and secure its unconditional capitulation. Though the political balance of power decidedly tilts toward the moderates, especially with the advent earlier this year of a U.S. administration that supports a negotiated settlement, the hardliners’ influence wanes and waxes proportionally with the belief that the U.S. is unable or unwilling to facilitate a settlement that satisfies Russia’s core demands.
What exactly these demands are, and whether Russia is willing to compromise on them, is a complex issue that hinges on all the potential linkages involved. To what extent would Russia, for example, be willing to scale back its territorial claims in exchange for a reopening of Nord Stream 2, reintegration into the SWIFT financial messaging system and other financial institutions, or an agreement foreclosing NATO’s eastward enlargement?
Still, nearly everyone I spoke to identified a baseline set of conditions for any peace deal. These include Ukrainian neutrality and non-bloc status, limits on Ukraine’s postwar military, guarantees against the deployment of any Western troops on Ukrainian territory, and at least de facto international recognition of territories controlled by Russia. My interlocutors argued that an unconditional ceasefire without a roadmap for addressing these issues is a recipe for freezing the conflict in Ukraine’s favor, something they say the Kremlin will never agree to.
These points are of course subject to numerous caveats and provisos. For one, Russia’s insistence on non-bloc status never extended to Ukraine’s ability to seek EU membership, something Kyiv can hold up as a victory in a settlement. There is also an implicit recognition that Moscow can’t prevent Ukraine from maintaining a domestic deterrent, even if subject to certain restrictions along the lines discussed during the 2022 Istanbul negotiations, against a Russian reinvasion.
I developed the impression from my meetings that Russia would demonstrate a great degree of flexibility in other areas, including rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine and the status of around $300 billion in Russian assets frozen in the West, if the strategic issues rehearsed above are resolved to Moscow’s satisfaction.
No one in Moscow who favors a settlement, which is almost everyone I spoke to, wants America to “walk away” from this war in the way that U.S. officials have previously suggested.
There is a widespread recognition that, if the White House permanently extricates itself from the conflict, Moscow would be left with European and Ukrainian leaders who will reject anything that can be remotely perceived as a concession. In that case, the Kremlin will undoubtedly decide that it has little choice but to take this war to its ugly conclusion.
I return from Russia with the conviction that such an outcome is neither inevitable nor desirable from Moscow’s perspective. A deal is possible, which is not to say that it can be achieved in short order or that Russia won’t drive a hard bargain. But for all of the destruction and tragedy visited by this war, it is not, mercifully for all involved, Leningrad in 1942.
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