Neocons pushing President Trump to abandon negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and instead prioritize military action apparently have a heavy hitter in their corner: Republican Party king-maker Rupert Murdoch.
The battle between Trump’s MAGA loyalists and the neocons over war with Iran intensified last week when right-wing media star Tucker Carlson railed against conservative talk show host Mark Levin for continuing to push the president to attack Iran instead of making a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program.
Politico reported on Tuesday that Carlson’s attack on Levin came after he was tipped off that during a private lunch with Trump at the White House hours prior, Levin was urging the president “to allow the Israeli government to strike Iranian nuclear sites.”
While the New York Post — one of the crown jewels of Murdoch’s media empire — has been targeting Trump’s top Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff over his talks with Iran, the Politico report adds that the Fox News chairman’s role in the campaign to get Trump to back off seeking a nuclear deal is much more involved.
Murdoch has apparently “privately complained to confidants about Witkoff’s efforts” and one source close to Trump said that “Levin and Murdoch are all over Trump all the time.” But the source said that the lobbying “might actually hurt their case,” adding, “[o]nce he’s kind of made his mind up, you can come at it later from a different angle, but you keep pressing, he digs in.”
Meanwhile, according to Politico, other Trump aides are concerned that those advocating against a deal or pushing for war can have influence on the president:
Still, even among those pressing for diplomacy, there is concern about the president’s penchant for changing his mind depending on who he’s last spoken to. There’s a fear Trump — who has threatened to bomb Iran if they don’t come to heel — could act on rhetoric many largely deem negotiating bravado.
“[Trump is] very solid in what he wants and letting Witkoff do his thing,” said one person close to the talks. “But depending on who he hears from, he may move a little bit.”
Ultimately “a longtime Trump ally” says the president “is not going to support war” with Iran. “But I’m telling you,” the ally said, “these guys won’t take no for an answer.”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top image credit: Business magnate Rupert Murdoch watches as United States President Donald J Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, February 3, 2025. Credit: Chris Kleponis / Pool/Sipa USA VIA REUTERS
House Speaker Mike Johnson took part in a private meeting with pro-Israel leaders from a variety of organizations on Capitol Hill last Wednesday during which he reportedly expressed concern about growing “isolationism” in the GOP.
Speaking to several individuals who attended the meeting, Jewish Insider reported, “Johnson, who described himself to the group as a ‘Reagan Republican’ focused on ‘peace through strength,’ acknowledged that isolationism is rising in the Republican Party, and that the party is likely bound for a major debate on the issue after President Donald Trump leaves office.”
The report added, “And Johnson told the group that, in his candidate recruiting efforts, he’s working to filter out isolationists to prevent that wing of the party from growing larger in the House, four people who attended the meeting said.”
While it’s unclear what Johnson meant by “isolationists,” it’s likely, given his audience, that he’s referring to those who don’t support the far-right pro-Israel view, oppose Israel’s war in Gaza and/or advocate for Palestinian rights. The term is also often used by neoconservatives and other proponents of American militarism more generally to smear advocates of restraint.
In any case, the “major debate” on GOP foreign policy — particularly about Israel — that is supposed to take place after Trump leaves office has been wellunderway for some time. And Johnson’s crusade to root out the so-called “isolationists” — meaning those anti-war Republicans who are increasingly critical of Israel — is not new.
Almost three decades ago, when Pat Buchanan defeated the GOP establishment candidate, Sen. Robert Dole, in the 1996 Republican New Hampshire presidential primary, party heads worked feverishly to make sure that’s as far as he got.
When my former boss, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), ran for the U.S. Senate in 2010, the GOP brass didn’t want the son of Ron Paul anywhere near Capitol Hill. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) handpicked his own primary candidate who received the endorsements of American war machine boosters like former Vice President Dick Cheney and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani.
Cheney didn’t endorse in any other GOP primary that year but insisted that Paul’s more hawkish opponent was the “real conservative” in that race.
After Paul won the general election in a landslide, former George W. Bush speechwriter and prominent neoconservative David Frum lamented, "How is it that the GOP has lost its antibodies against a candidate like Rand Paul?"
The senator’s father — himself a former member of Congress — never got anywhere near the White House in his two Republican presidential runs in 2008 and 2012, but he did help inspire a sizable anti-war populist movement, the popularity of which has worried the old guard for decades.
Ever since Donald Trump declared that the George W. Bush administration lied about the Iraq war on a Republican presidential debate stage in 2016, and went on to win the election, GOP foreign policy debates almost immediately expanded beyond the parameters of a military first approach.
It became okay to be “America First,” meaning prioritizing the interests of one’s own nation above those of others, whether it be foreign funding or foreign wars, which was kryptonite to those intent on making the world safe for democracy, as neocons often claimed they were doing.
So if Speaker Johnson is worried about internal debates on the direction the GOP is going on Israel and wants to nip that in the bud, he’s too late.
Indeed, polling has shown that Republicans are increasingly moving away from their traditional reflexive support for Israel. On the Gaza war, a new Associated Press-NORC poll revealed “a bipartisan uptick in Americans finding Israel’s military response has ‘gone too far.’”
“About 7 in 10 Democrats say this now, up from 58% in November 2023,” the report noted. “And roughly half of independents say the same, compared with about 4 in 10 in the earlier measure.”
“Republicans have also moved slightly, from 18% to 24%,” the AP noted.
A late August poll showed that 14% of Republicans had become comfortable calling Israel’s actions in Gaza a “genocide.” As RS observed three weeks ago, “The view that Washington’s support has enabled Israeli actions in Gaza was transpartisan. Nearly three out of four Democrats (72%) agreed with that proposition, as did 57% of Republicans, and 63% of self-identified independents.”
Another poll in June found that 53% of Trump voters didn’t think at the time that the U.S. military should get involved in the conflict between Iran and Israel. The poll also found that 63 percent of Trump voters said the U.S. should “engage in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program” while just 18% said the U.S. should not.
And before Israel launched its 12-day war on Iran this summer — that Trump later joined — a whopping 64% of Republicans said in another poll that they supported negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
This is why AIPAC — the powerful pro-Israel lobby group that works to keep Washington in line — is ponying up hundreds of thousands of dollars to oppose restrainers like Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.). Johnson appears worried that they and a handful of other GOP restrainers might grow in number in the mid-terms, and pro-Israel leaders are being promised that this increasing “isolationism” will be stopped. Massie and others have acknowledged exactly what is happening to them.
All this is making Mike Johnson simply the latest establishment champion for war in his party’s never ending battle against any Republican who might prevent it.
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Top image credit: Brian Jason and Alessia Pierdomenico via shutterstock.com
On Monday, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a framework agreement with He Lifeng, China’s top economic official, to save TikTok despite a 2024 law aimed at banning it from Americans’ phones. Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are scheduled to speak on Friday to finalize the deal.
The announcement raised hopes not just for preserving Americans’ access to one of the most popular apps in the world, but also for real progress in the fraught relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries — a relationship that seemed headed toward serious conflict just five months ago.
Then, on Wednesday, reports emerged that Chinese regulators had directed China’s major tech companies to stop purchasing Nvidia-made AI chips. Suddenly the possibility of productive relations was again thrown into doubt.
It’s certainly too soon to proclaim a new start to the relationship. But it’s also premature to accept the self-serving contention of those pushing conflict that China holds only ill intent. Trump could all too easily return to the Biden administration’s strategy — the same one that most of his advisers support — which would lead to a permanent rupture and a new era of great power conflict. But Trump could still choose a modus vivendi with China, if he is willing to focus his diplomats on a new framework for trade and investment on both sides.
The origins of the TikTok expropriation bill lie in the hothouse atmosphere of bipartisan China animosity that dominated thinking in the prior two U.S. administrations. Officials in the first Trump term, taking advantage of their boss’s trade grievances, seized their opening to press a very different agenda of systematic geopolitical confrontation. Where Trump merely wanted to shift the terms of trade toward the United States and display his own power, his neoconservative and militarist advisers believed that the U.S. and China are locked in an existential struggle for control over the global system.
The Biden administration assumed that same framework — institutionalizing it, extending it, and pressuring U.S. allies to join it. To Biden officials, restricting and excluding China was not only essential to maintaining American primacy but also the key to renewing American economic dynamism and marginalizing populist challengers of the right and left.
Once thinking in both parties defined China as an irredeemable adversary, politicians started competing to advance the most antagonistic measures. In 2023, members of Congress introduced an average of 3.5 bills each day aimed at restricting, discrediting, or undermining China, over 600 in all. This was against a single piece of legislation encouraging a constructive relationship — a bill that would have restored the Fulbright educational exchange program.
One of those 600 hostile bills established the House’s China Select Committee. Chaired by the energetic Republican Mike Gallagher from Wisconsin, who coordinated closely with Democratic ranking member Raja Krishnamoorthi, the Select Committee became a fount of belligerent hearings meant to impress upon the American people the need for conflict with China. It also acted as an assembly line formulating anti-China legislation. (Gallagher subsequently quit Congress for a more lucrative job at Palantir, though he continues to argue alongside Trump 1 China chief Matt Pottinger that the U.S. goal should be “winning the cold war with China” by destabilizing the Chinese government.)
The Gallagher–Krishnamoorthi committee wrote the TikTok expropriation bill, introduced it in March last year, and eight days later carried it to a crushing victory in the House on a vote of 197–15 among Republicans and 155–50 among Democrats. Gallagher branded TikTok “digital fentanyl” in reference to another conspiracy theory, that the Chinese government is sending fentanyl to the U.S. to kill Americans.
Biden signed a slightly modified version of the bill into law just over a month later. The Biden administration had never prioritized the issue, but since its domestic and foreign policies revolved around amplifying the China threat, it made no effort to stop the rush to suppress TikTok.
This outcome illustrates larger patterns in China policy under Biden. First, attacking China was regularly a substitute for broader policies — in this case, regulating all social media companies regardless of the nationality of their owners — that alone would have addressed the problems blamed on China. With political leaders unwilling to confront entrenched corporate power and dysfunctional political institutions, ineffectual and counterproductive policy was the only “realistic” option.
Second, the frantic anti-China environment in Washington made U.S. leaders assume that anything Beijing opposes must be good for the United States. But U.S. public opinion, insulated from the mania in Washington, rarely shared that unanimity. In the case of TikTok, only a third of the population supports the ban, another third is unsure, and one-third opposes it. The longer the issue is under discussion, the higher opposition has risen.
It turns out that Americans are right to be skeptical. Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.), after hearing the Biden administration’s case, said: “Not a single thing that we heard in today’s classified briefing was unique to TikTok. It was things that happen on every single social media platform.”
When asked if China is currently using the app in “untoward ways,” Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.) referenced his classified access as ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee and replied: “It’s not. Full stop. It’s not.”
Indeed, when the Biden administration presented its argument to the Supreme Court, it only pointed to threatening measures that China could take, nothing it was actually doing.
Trump was more sensitive to the politics of the issue, as well as to the contributions of billionaire TikTok investor Jeff Yass. He has also stubbornly refused to sign on to the DC consensus on China conflict. After his initial efforts to force China into submission spectacularly backfired, leading China to prove its own leverage over the American economy, Trump recognized Xi Jinping as a peer and accepted Xi’s demand for a negotiating framework. The TikTok agreement seems to be the first positive outcome of this newly civil atmosphere.
China’s Nvidia ban shows how fragile relations remain. It would be a mistake, however, to read China’s actions as revealing the impossibility of great power coexistence. Once the conditions in Washington described above are taken into consideration, Beijing’s aim of weaning Chinese companies off U.S. technology seems little more than a prudent measure to guard against an unremittingly hostile power.
Although Trump is serious about forging a deal with China, it can be quite difficult in Beijing to take him seriously. Trump refuses to subordinate U.S. business interests to national security absolutism, but at the same time he is negotiating with other countries to exclude China from global economic networks. He defers to Chinese sensitivities on Taiwan but his Pentagon is pushing Biden-era containment measures in an even moreaggressivedirection. Just this week, Trump offhandedly claimed he is negotiating with the Taliban to restore U.S. control over Bagram Air Base because “it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.” Such inconstancy might flummox U.S. allies into significant concessions, but it’s ruinous in the China relationship.
If Trump were serious about a deal, he could start by focusing his administration on a breakthrough agreement to bring large-scale Chinese investment into crucial industries like battery manufacturing through joint ventures with U.S. companies. With proper national security safeguards and binding conditions to guarantee the hiring of local workers, a union neutrality agreement, and technology transfer, Chinese companies would regain access to the world’s largest market and the American economy would regenerate vital industrial capacities.
But “focus” is the key word here. China will accept the loss of the U.S. market and continue preparing for open conflict if Trump cannot clearly reorient the United States. And given the continuing commitment to conflict in both parties, the DC establishment would happily carry us into such a disastrous conflict.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
Drones vs. dogma
You could deduce a war going on high overhead last week as the Pentagon hemmed and hawed over how to keep the aerospace edge that it has viewed as its property since World War II. As outside experts warned of the U.S. losing its grip on the sky because it isn’t keeping pace with the drone revolution, Russia was probing NATO’s eastern flank. The alliance bolstered security following at least 19 drone incursions over Poland September 10. “Russia is likely attempting to gauge both Poland’s and NATO’s capabilities and reactions in the hopes of applying lessons learned to future conflict scenarios with the NATO alliance,” the independent Institute for the Study of War said. Gulp.
Despite spending billions on its own drones, the Pentagon is ill-prepared to defend its forces against such enemy aircraft, a report(PDF) from the Center for a New American Security concludes. “After decades of air dominance and a near-monopoly on precision strike, the United States now faces a dramatically different, more hostile world as the proliferation of cheap drones has democratized mass precision fires,” says the report, released the same day Russia poked Poland. “It is likely that in any future conflict, drones will pose an unavoidable threat to American forces,” authors Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell add.
“All too often,” the report says(PDF), “U.S. forces use exquisite precision-guided missiles worth hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars apiece to destroy cheap drones.” Not gonna work.
Unfortunately, the Defense Department is following its usual path to deal with this latest threat: spending like there’s no tomorrow. Or rather, like it’s still yesterday.
It remains business as usual for the U.S. military: Lockheed, the Department of Defense’s biggest contractor, was publicly salivating over its push to turn its troubled F-35 into a Ferrari. Boeing has been boasting that its yet-to-fly F-47 fighter is likely to fly sooner than anticipated. The Air Force hailed the first flight of Northrop’s second B-21 bomber from its California plant on September 11. And the service is spending $8 billion beefing up Lockheed’s F-22 fighter fleet.
Yet all of these aircraft require humans in the cockpits, with all the range, cost, and safety complications such carbon-based cargo carries. The swarming warnings on what future wars will look like are increasingly drone-centric. A wide-awake Pentagon, not welded to the past, needs to divert more of its spending on yesterday’s weapons to come to grips with tomorrow’s threats.
Throw-weighting good money after bad…
Speaking of spending money on yesterday’s weapons, the Air Force has acknowledged it can keep its fleet of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in service until 2050. That may be necessary, because the service has run into problems developing the replacement it says it needs.
“The Air Force reported to Congress in 2021 that Minuteman III would reach the end of its service life in 2036,” the Government Accountability Office said in a September 10 report on the ICBM fleet. “Now, facing delays to Sentinel, the Air Force is evaluating options to continue operating Minuteman III through 2050.”
Yikes! The Minuteman III was first deployed in 1970, when the U.S. military was waist deep in the big muddy of Vietnam. If deployed until 2050, they will have been standing guard for 80 years — four times longer than the war in Afghanistan.
The Pentagon largely blames the delays — and an eyewatering 81% hike in the missile fleet’s price tag, to $140.9 billion — on the service’s pie-in-the-dirt scheme to reuse much of the current ICBMs’ ground-based infrastructure for the new missiles.
But as the current ICBM fleet ages, and its replacement grows ever more costly, there is another option. The land-based ICBM force is the least-valuable leg of the nation’s nuclear triad, which also includes submarine-launched missiles and bombers. It is beyond ripe for amputation.
But old habits die hard. The Pentagon is addicted to the Sentinel, bolstered by lawmakers whose states are home to the ICBM fields and the missile makers. So, count on this nuclear madness continuing until we’re broke, reduced to ashes, or both.
Another flubbed Air Force procurement
The Air Force Academy’s strikingly modern Cadet Chapel in Colorado Springs, Colorado, doesn’t have much in common with the service’s drones and missiles. Except that its cost, like theirs, is rising faster than a 4th of July firework.
The Air Force shut down the 1962 chapel, largely to fix its leaky aluminum roof and the resulting water damage, in 2019. It planned on spending $158 million and wrapping up the job in 2022. It built a “cocoon” around the 14-story structure so weather wouldn’t slow down the effort. But there were supposedly unanticipated problems — like asbestos — that recently have driven its cost to $335 million and its completion to 2028. That’s a 112% cost increase and a six-year delay.
It’s a too-typical S.N.A.F.U. — Situation Normal: Air Force Unknowns — that’s encoded in the service’s DNA. It mirrors the kind of wishful-thinking woes the Air Force is having with its Sentinel ICBM program cited above. (“Let’s reuse the missile silos!” “What asbestos?”). These are basic building-block oversights that wouldn’t be tolerated in the real, non-military world. That’s why it’s taking twice as long to plug the leaks in the chapel’s roof as it did to rebuild the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris following its devastating 2019 fire. And why has the cost of the chapel’s repairs doubled? “The high costs have been driven by the complex design of the building,” Mary Shinn of the Colorado Springs Gazette reported last year.
Bingo! Pretty much like everything else the Air Force designs and builds.
President Donald Trump’s advertised $175 billion “Golden Dome” missile shield will likely cost about $3.6 trillion if it is going to be as robust as Trump promises, defense-budget guru Todd Harrison of the conservative American Enterprise Institute wrote in a September 12 analysis.
The Pentagon has hired a contractor to begin work on bettering its biggest bunker buster following their use against buried Iranian nuclear sites in June, Greg Hadley reported September 8 at Air & Space Forces Magazine.
Following Trump’s deployment of troops to U.S. cities, the number of Americans missing work for National Guard duty has reached a 19-year high, the Washington Post’s Abha Bhattarai reported September 7.
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