Neocons pushing President Trump to abandon negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and instead prioritize military action apparently have a heavy hitter in their corner: Republican Party king-maker Rupert Murdoch.
The battle between Trump’s MAGA loyalists and the neocons over war with Iran intensified last week when right-wing media star Tucker Carlson railed against conservative talk show host Mark Levin for continuing to push the president to attack Iran instead of making a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program.
Politico reported on Tuesday that Carlson’s attack on Levin came after he was tipped off that during a private lunch with Trump at the White House hours prior, Levin was urging the president “to allow the Israeli government to strike Iranian nuclear sites.”
While the New York Post — one of the crown jewels of Murdoch’s media empire — has been targeting Trump’s top Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff over his talks with Iran, the Politico report adds that the Fox News chairman’s role in the campaign to get Trump to back off seeking a nuclear deal is much more involved.
Murdoch has apparently “privately complained to confidants about Witkoff’s efforts” and one source close to Trump said that “Levin and Murdoch are all over Trump all the time.” But the source said that the lobbying “might actually hurt their case,” adding, “[o]nce he’s kind of made his mind up, you can come at it later from a different angle, but you keep pressing, he digs in.”
Meanwhile, according to Politico, other Trump aides are concerned that those advocating against a deal or pushing for war can have influence on the president:
Still, even among those pressing for diplomacy, there is concern about the president’s penchant for changing his mind depending on who he’s last spoken to. There’s a fear Trump — who has threatened to bomb Iran if they don’t come to heel — could act on rhetoric many largely deem negotiating bravado.
“[Trump is] very solid in what he wants and letting Witkoff do his thing,” said one person close to the talks. “But depending on who he hears from, he may move a little bit.”
Ultimately “a longtime Trump ally” says the president “is not going to support war” with Iran. “But I’m telling you,” the ally said, “these guys won’t take no for an answer.”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top image credit: Business magnate Rupert Murdoch watches as United States President Donald J Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, February 3, 2025. Credit: Chris Kleponis / Pool/Sipa USA VIA REUTERS
Top image credit: 250717-N-CT713-2083 SOUTH CHINA SEA (July 17, 2025) Sailors conduct flight operations on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Vinson, the flagship of Carrier Strike Group ONE, is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Amber Rivette)
The unipolar moment is over, and the U.S. must adapt its foreign policy to an increasingly multipolar world. The old overly ambitious strategy of liberal hegemony is ill-suited to the new realities of the 21st century. Moreover, the U.S. is badly overstretched with too many commitments around the world, and it needs to chart a different course if it is to prosper in the decades to come.
To meet that need, Emma Ashford — a senior fellow at the Stimson Center —lays out the case for a new pragmatic grand strategy of realist internationalism in her valuable new book, “First Among Equals: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World.”
The book is split into two halves. The first reviews the history of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and how the unipolar moment has been gradually giving way to “unbalanced multipolarity.” In unbalanced multipolarity, the U.S. and China are the “predominant powers,” but there are also many “capable second-tier powers” made up of both U.S. allies and other rising powers.
Ashford makes a good case that this multipolarity is real and that the U.S. will have to change how it operates in the world to flourish in these new conditions. Instead of pursuing dominance and global “leadership,” Ashford urges the U.S. to foster multipolarity and to encourage allies to become less dependent on America.
The second half is Ashford’s defense of what she calls realist internationalism. The main outlines of realist internationalism will be familiar to advocates of restraint and they are largely consistent with what most restrainers have proposed in recent years. In broad strokes, the U.S. under realist internationalism would significantly reduce its military presence in both Europe and the Middle East and shift the burden for security to wealthy and capable allies wherever possible, but it would increase the overall resources and attention devoted to Asia and the Pacific.
The U.S. would remain engaged in the first two regions, but this would primarily take the form of diplomacy and commerce. There would also be greater investment in non-military tools of statecraft and a shift away from economic coercion to deeper economic engagement with the world. U.S. foreign policy would be less heavily militarized, but U.S. engagement would continue and, in some ways, intensify. As Ashford puts it, “Engagement — but for far more limited ends — is the watchword of this book.”
The direction of U.S. foreign policy is more up for grabs than it has been in decades, and there are several different paths that the U.S. could take. In one of the early chapters, Ashford discusses these alternatives in an overview of four competing groups vying to shape the future of U.S. foreign policy.
She sees four main contenders in current foreign policy debates: liberal-order primacists, “America first” hawks, progressive worldbuilders, and realist-restrainers. She defines each group by identifying how each one approaches key questions about the U.S. role in the world. These include, among others, how each group understands U.S. national interests, which regions they prioritize, how much of a forward military presence they support, their view of allies, and how willing they are to use force.
“First Among Equals”is a defense of a restrained foreign policy, but Ashford’s analysis of the different groups’ strengths and weaknesses is balanced. She calls attention to the flaws of each approach, and she acknowledges that each strategy has potential pitfalls and risks. Restrainers will appreciate most or all of Ashford’s policy recommendations in the second part of the book, but this isn’t a book only for advocates of realism and restraint.
As Ashford acknowledges, there are some important overlaps between realist-restrainers and progressive worldbuilders that can make them allies in the struggle to make U.S. foreign policy more peaceful and less destructive. Realist-restrainers and progressive worldbuilders may have different ultimate goals for U.S. foreign policy, but they share an opposition to militarism and meddling in the affairs of other countries that puts them on the same side in many current policy debates.
As a practical matter, if realist-restrainers are going to make any progress towards realizing something like realist internationalism, they will need partners on the left to achieve that. “If a realist internationalist strategy is to be implemented, it will likely need to draw support from some subset of both political parties — not merely from one.”
The discussion of proposed U.S. withdrawals from Europe and the Middle East is probably the best part of the book. This is where realist internationalism breaks with the status quo most sharply, and these are changes that have been needed for a very long time. Ashford proposes that the U.S. should have no significant troop presence in Europe within 10 years. If that sounds extreme, consider how bizarre it is that the U.S. still has a substantial military presence in Europe more than three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is a long overdue correction.
In the Middle East, Ashford argues that the U.S. should withdraw its ground forces and close most of its bases in the region in the next five to 10 years, leaving only a small naval force to guard shipping lanes. She is right to reject attaching conditions to these withdrawals. Whenever a withdrawal is “conditions-based,” that becomes an excuse to delay it indefinitely.
Ashford’s realist internationalism would be a huge improvement over the status quo. The U.S. would benefit from defining its interests much more narrowly and reducing its security commitments. The U.S. would be less likely to join and start unnecessary wars, and it wouldn’t have to maintain such a large military presence overseas. If the U.S. were fostering multipolarity, it would not be waging senseless economic wars against Brazil and India, but it would be seeking to strengthen ties with both. If the U.S. moved away from using sanctions it would not be inflicting collective punishment on tens of millions of people around the world.
Realist internationalism would be more pragmatic and restrained strategy for the United States, and it would also be less likely to harm other countries.
“First Among Equals”is an important contribution to the debate about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Ashford has done an excellent job in mapping out what a better, more restrained strategy would look like in practice. U.S. policymakers would do well to read this book and follow her recommendations.
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Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, R-La., right, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, arrive to address the media after a meeting in the U.S. Capitol on Friday, February 7, 2025. (Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Sipa USA)
First order of House business: Protect Israel’s Netanyahu?
In his farewell address to the nation, George Washington included a special pleading:
"Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government."
It is said that Israel’s influence over American military and foreign affairs is unique — that no small state in modern times has exerted such control over the affairs of a great power. This is a troubling claim. But is it true?
For sure, foreign powers historically have attempted to influence American politics, to steer, or even control our actions in the world. But their interventions never came close to matching Israel’s sustained sway over Washington’s power centers. This intricate grip has now lasted generations and has prevented the U.S., time and again, from acting in its own security interests in domestic as well as foreign affairs.
A comparative analysis would be useful in order to fully grasp the gravity of the situation. Let’s look at four instances in which foreign powers tried to intervene in U.S. politics. How aggressive were they? How much did they threaten American security? Was U.S. sovereignty ultimately damaged?
Only then can we fully take the measure of Israeli influence operations today.
France tries to manipulate its weaker client
Bourbon France was a decisive factor in securing American independence in 1783. Ten years later, France was torn by revolution and invaded by European great power monarchies. In desperation, France tried to suborn its former client, the United States. “Citizen” Edmond-Charles Genêt was sent to petition President Washington for help; instead, he lured Americans into a privateer scheme to raid British and Spanish shipping.
Washington had just declared neutrality in France’s European war. This was a naked bid to drag America into war. Washington quickly quashed Genet; yet the new United States continued to benefit from its fraternal relationship with France. There was the Louisiana Purchase, and then, in 1812, Madison took the U.S. to war with Britain in the belief that Napoleon was about to defeat America’s old nemesis. Hence, American strategy remained under the long, yet mutually beneficial, shadow of its old French patron — and then, after just a generation or so, it was gone.
Britain, France use Confederate States for their own ends
In the American Civil War, Britain made war on the U.S. through its proxy Alt-America, the Confederate States of America. The million rifles it delivered to the Confederates kept the Rebel cause going. Plus, Royal Navy ironclads — massed for several years in Bermuda — deeply degraded the Union blockade. Britain’s strategic goal was a bit like U.S. aims against Russia in the Ukrainian war: to cut off at the knees a threatening great power competitor. This was a double manipulation: arming the South, while also forcing the North to accept their proxy subversion — given that armed resistance would push the federal state into a world war with Britain and France. France tagged along only as Britain’s sidekick, taking advantage of the Civil War to invade Mexico. Yet in the event, England’s opportunity evaporated quickly: By 1864, a losing Southern cause forced Britain and France to “cut bait.”
A desperate Britain manipulates the new world power
After the outbreak of world war in 1914, the Allies found themselves totally dependent on U.S. production of war materials. Their war effort depended on the multiple millions of American-made artillery shells, rifles, and explosives that issued forth from the might of U.S. industry.
Britain’s ruling class desperately sought to bring America directly into the war. To that end, they brought to bear every dark art in His Majesty’s Grey Zone arsenal: over-the-top propaganda, sensational intel leaks, and, just possibly, a very grim false flag operation. A triumphant British intel op — the Zimmerman Telegram — helped tip the scales. The U.S. was led by the hand, and not so gently, into World War I.
Britain’s — and Winston Churchill’s — efforts to corral the U.S. into a second world war were even more strenuously devious than those before 1917. Yet, with the full and enthusiastic support of FDR, they can hardly be called manipulation.
A beleaguered USSR manipulates the world power
Stalin’s Soviet Union — industrially backward and internationally isolated — found a sympathetic helpmate in the “progressive” Roosevelt administration after 1933. However, when Soviet archives were briefly cracked open after 1991 we could see how deeply the U.S. government was interpenetrated by hundreds of Red-American agents at that time, many at the highest levels of influence and counsel. Moreover, the U.S. gave away the store: 1) It basically forgave the entire Russian war debt (accrued during WWI), which was 150% of U.S. GDP (subsident as it was in the midst of Depression); 2) it gave the USSR access to U.S. aviation technology, the world’s best; and; 3) it encouraged America’s preeminent corporations to create and run a new world of Soviet manufacturing, making Stalin’s dreams of world-class industrialization come true. Not to mention that the Soviets also managed to steal both the A-Bomb and its delivery system, the B-29. Overall, a masterclass in strategic manipulation!
In sum, these all share broad characteristics:
Earlier campaigns were substantively non-ideological, “realist” and opportunistic in nature. Genet covered his schemes in a sheen of revolutionary fraternité, just as Stalin pushed democratic brotherhood in the fight against fascism. Yet dreams of eventual world revolution still had U.S. aid as their single-minded goal. The French Republic, Soviet Union, and British Empire (after 1914) desperately needed the U.S. on their side for resources and money. In sharp contrast, Britain and France in the Civil War were simply flint-eyed opportunists. To bring America to its knees, in the steely slang of great power politics, was in Britain’s strategic interest.
These earlier influence operations were focused on the immediate situation. Leverage over American politics was not meant to be permanent. Rather, political influence was designed to achieve short-term relief in the midst of crisis: For a beleaguered French republic, and even more so for an isolated, bankrupt, and industrially backward Soviet Union. Getting the U.S. in the war (after 1914) was Britain’s existential requirement.
In these cases, moreover, all influence was temporary. In fact, after 1865, 1918, and 1945, aggressive attempts to leverage America led to political backlash and blowback; i.e., the Alabama Claims, the renunciation of the League of Nations, and both the Red Scare and Cold War.
Were they cunning, manipulative, damaging on a number of levels? Yes. Yet all these cases of aggressive foreign influence pale in comparison to Israel’s strategic control operations over the last 80 years.
The Israeli operation is driven by ideology, and shares nothing with the boilerplate mantras of Genet or Stalin. The Israeli “operation” in Gaza is infused with messianic goals and objectives that span decades. Moreover, its softest targets in American politics (Evangelical conservatives) are themselves defined by messianic goals and an apocalyptic vision. The prize is Greater Israel, and nothing less can be accepted. It is what drives the most zealous among the Israeli right — and the Likud as a whole — and which has come as well to animate its Republican supporters, some of the most powerful people in Washington today, including House Speaker Mike Johnson, Ambassador Mike Huckabee, even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
How did we get to this place?
Three powerful messianic American constituencies have taken the place of the old Washington realpolitik era, which ended in the first Bush administration. First, there was the rise of messianic (secular) neoconservatism, represented by the likes of Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. They saw Israel as a powerful American interest in the larger fulfillment of America’s world mission. Then there was the emergence of a “Christian Zionist” bloc, which occupies a place of central salience in the Trump administration. Finally, the highly organized and well-funded Israel lobby has never had a more dominant hold on the executive and legislative branches of the United States government.
Together, they have become the mighty engine driving support for the “Greater Israel” vision and Israel’s government, which has been dominated by the right-wing Likud Party for nearly 50 years.
Thus, unlike earlier foreign influence operations in the American experience, there is no short-term situation. Israel is committed to its long march, and grimly determined to pull America along with it. Its forever war with Islam and what it calls “terrorism” point to a protracted, neo-Punic struggle. Indeed, Israel is steeled for centuries of war. This contains within itself far-reaching and dangerous implications.
Yet all foreign influence operations — highlighted by historical cases — are ultimately dependent on the submissive good will of those “under the influence.” Americans had real sympathy for revolutionary France. Confederate leaders truly believed that the British ruling class, or at least King Cotton, was their friend. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt were rooting for the Allies, not the Central Powers. FDR’s regime was full of “fellow travellers” eager to make common cause with Reds against Fascists.
Hence, this influence campaign by a foreign power is unprecedented in its scope and success, and threatens the very sovereignty of the nation more than at any time in America’s history.
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Top photo credit: Servicemen of the Azov battalion are attending a ceremony to remember the victims of the Olenivka camp explosion, in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 28, 2024, (Photo by Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto)
Over the last several weeks, Russia’s 51st Combined Arms Army has achieved a penetration of the Ukrainian defenses northeast of Pokrovsk, seeking to isolate the Ukrainian forces defending the city.
To seal off the penetration, Ukrainian forces committed a large number of formations, spearheaded by the 1st “Azov” National Guard Corps.
While the results of fighting are still uncertain at the time of this writing, the presence of an entire “Azov” Corps and its sister Corps in the regular army has come as a surprise to many observers. Most remember it as a single regiment of about 1000 men and are shocked to find it has grown into two multi-brigade structures of over 20,000-40,000 soldiers each. The growth and far-right leaning of this formation could have an impact on the future of any Ukraine peace deal.
The Azov militia battalion was founded by Andriy Biletskyi, whom many have accused of harboring white supremacists views. At one point it was prohibited from receiving U.S. aid by Congress for its extremist views, The unit earned a reputation for battlefield success for its capture of Mariupol (on the Sea of Azov, from which it takes its name) in early 2014 from Donbas separatists.
Ironically, at the time its reputation may have been exaggerated. There are few videos of actual combat and the unit’s first fatality came a month later during battle for Marinka. This may have been the result of an excellent public relations program that Azov established early on.
Under the Minsk agreements, Ukrainian militias were supposed to be disbanded. Instead, in 2015, Ukraine folded them into the National Guard structure. This was intended to professionalize the militias and remove the extremist ideology from the ranks. It's difficult to assess how well the later plan worked since most of the officers together with rank and files were retained. Military professionalism and radical ideologies are not mutually exclusive, as the Waffen SS, from which Azov has drawn its symbology, demonstrated in World War II.
It is also worth noting that Ukraine fields two armies. One under the Ministry of Defense and the second one in the Ministry of Interior, which is closer to the U.S. Department of Justice, aimed at enforcing domestic laws rather than external defense. This second army is called the National Guard. These troops have nothing in common with the U.S. National Guard, run by state governments and federalized as needed, instead these are regular combat units that answer to the Minister of Interior instead of Defense.
Since the Russian invasion in 2022, Azov has fought with professionalism and great courage in multiple theaters. It started out in Mariupol, together with the 35th Marine Brigade defending the city for several months until finally surrendering in ruins of the “Azovstal” factory. In the meantime, the regiment’s original founder created several other formations around Kyiv also naming them Azov and successfully contributed to defending the city. Eventually these units would merge into the 3rd Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Army.
Accomplishing every one of those tasks was impressive PR. Azov did an excellent job advertising its combat performance. By 2023, Azov has morphed into two highly capable brigades, the Army’s 3rd Assault Brigade led by Andriy Biletskyi, the original founder of Azov militia, and the 12th National Guard Brigade commanded by Denys "Redis" Prokopenko, who commanded the Azov regiment in defense of Mariupol before being captured and eventually exchanged in a prisoner swap.
In addition, Kraken Special Forces Regiment within HUR (Holovne Upravlinnia Rozvidky, which translates to Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense) was also formed by Azov veterans. It is key to note that while Azov fighters were excellent, its leadership refused to commit them to battles that would have resulted in heavy casualties, even if it meant disobeying orders.
For example in 2023, when sent to restore the lines of Avdiivka, leadership of Azov’s 3rd assault brigade realized the futility of the operation and pulled out instead of allowing itself to be ground down in an un-winnable defense. This would remain the pattern of Azov combat performance. It would be brought in to stabilize the situation, counterattack to eject the Russians from advanced positions, but never remain on the defensive to face Russian firepower.
The result is that Azov acquired a legendary reputation for its offensive operations, while preserving its core of combat veterans. When in February 2025, Ukraine began to form corps from the most successful brigades, Azov was at the forefront. Both Army’s 3rd Corps and the National Guards’ 1st Corps were formed around Azov units, with former brigade commanders now elevated to corps command.
As of today, Azov leadership is in charge of nine brigades, the Kraken SOF Regiment, and numerous other support units, for a total of about 40,000-80,000 men or 10% of Ukrainian armed forces.
Azov is now positioned as one of the very last combat capable formations in Ukraine. Its soldiers are still motivated and trained to conduct organized offensive operations. Other formations still exist but the soldiers manning them are unwilling recruits increasingly pulled off the streets by press gangs. For example the Ukrainian Marine Corps was destroyed in the battle of Krinki, while the Air Assault Troops together with many elite mechanized formations like 47th Brigade were badly mauled in Kursk operation.
Apart from a couple of Shturmovie (Storm) Regiments currently fighting alongside Azov around Pakrovsk and the Presidential Brigade in Kyiv, there are few units left in the Ukrainian Army still fully capable of offensive operations. Former Chief of Staff of the 12th Azov Brigade Bohdan Krotevych, claimed that most brigades were at 30% and by doctrine are considered non-mission capable, unable to defend much less attack.
Azov’s leadership isn’t likely to be democratically elected to political office. In a survey of 13 possible candidates, Azov leaders have a combined 4.1% of population behind them, trailing Gen.Valerii Fedorovych Zaluzhnyi by almost 20% — but the combat power at their disposal makes it impossible to ignore. In essence Azov stands to become a modern day equivalent of the Ottoman Janissary Corps, enjoying veto power over the government’s decisions and ability to make and unmake presidents.
They have exercised this power before. In 2019 when Zelensky attempted to implement the Minsk Agreements, he personally ordered Azov fighters to pull back from the line of contact and they refused. Back then Azov was just a regiment of about 1000 men, today has much greater numbers and strength to resist if it chooses.
This is where the peace deal may run into an ideological wall. The Russian war goal of denazification is aimed at groups like Azov. Yet the Ukrainian state would be both unwilling and unable to disarm 10% of its armed forces and most effective ones at that. Furthermore, any other Russian demand related to education, linguistics and religious rights could be blocked by Azov-linked politicians no matter what Ukrainian government signs.
Additional risk is that after the peace deal, Azov would remain along the line of contact continuing low intensity fighting as they did prior to 2022, and supporting resistance on territories de facto ceded to Russia. This will undermine any long-term peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, regardless of Kiev’s intent. It would also place any possible peacekeeping force in a major dilemma. Fight Azov, nominally Ukrainian troops, or turn a blind eye and risk conflict with the Russian army when it retaliates.
The evolution of Azov from a single militia battalion to two combat corps of the Ukrainian Security Forces poses a significant challenge to post war Ukraine. A far right organization with the only real combat-capable formations and demonstrated willingness to ignore orders, risks unhinging any peace deal made with Russia, even if none of the governments involved are interested in fighting.
Western powers need to address the Azov issue as part of any peace negotiations or risk renewal of hostilities with potential for major war across Europe.
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